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As I have already suggested, everything we say in these subjects is challengeable, not just in the sense 
in which knowledge in the sciences is challengeable by bringing in new information or revealing flaws 
in the logic of the original reasoning, but challengeable by bringing to bear another idiom, another 
context, another emphasis, another perspective, another sensibility. And these are always matters of 
judgement, albeit of disciplined and experienced judgement rather than merely subjective or arbitrary 
judgement. The greater persuasiveness of the new account cannot be demonstrated conclusively: it can 
only attempt to plug itself into our understanding at a greater number of points, to build more 
plausibility and more illumination into a rearrangement of what is already in some sense partly 
known. 
Stefan Collini (2012)* 
 
 
 
 
 
And some people, passing among the scattered pieces of that great overturned jigsaw puzzle, start to 
pick up a piece here, a piece there, with a vague yet irresistible notion that perhaps something might 
be done about putting the thing back together again. … Two difficulties with this latter scheme at 
once present themselves. First of all, we have only ever glimpsed, as if through half-closed lids, the 
picture on the lid of the jigsaw puzzle box. Second, no matter how diligent we have been about 
picking up pieces along the way, we will never have anywhere near enough of them to finish the job. 
The most we can hope to accomplish with our handful of salvaged bits—the bittersweet harvest of 
observation and experience—is to build a little world of our own. A scale model of that mysterious 
original, unbroken, half—remembered. Of course the worlds we build out of our store of fragments 
can be only approximations, partial and inaccurate. As representations of the vanished whole that 
haunts us, they must be accounted failures. And yet in that very failure, in their gaps and inaccura-
cies, they may yet be faithful maps, accurate scale models, of this beautiful and broken world. … 
That is the paradoxical power of the scale model; a child holding a globe has a more direct, more 
intuitive grasp of the earth’s scope and variety, of its local vastness and its cosmic tininess, than a 
man who spends a year in circumnavigation. 
Michael Chabon (2013)†
                                                     
 
* “The Character of the Humanities”, What are Universities for? (London & New York: Pen-
guin, 2012), 79. 
† “The Film Worlds of Wes Anderson”, The New York Review of Books 60/4 (2013): 23. 
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To constitute a full urban community a settlement must display a relative predominance of trade-
commercial relations with the settlement as a whole displaying the following features: 1. a fortifica-
tion; 2. a market; 3. a court of its own and at least partially autonomous law; 4. a related form of 
association; and 5. at least partial autonomy and autocephaly, thus also an administration by 
authorities in the election of whom the burghers participated. 
Max Weber (1921)1 
 
The absence of the government house from the list of the indispensable characteristics of a town would 
suggest at first blush that the Muslim town is perhaps not to be understood as a body politic at all. 
In any event, it is not (what the polis was) an autonomous association of citizens. A given town may 
at a given moment enjoy independence or self-government, in the sense that it is not subjected to an 
outside power of whose territory it forms but one part. Sovereignty and freedom may fall to it acci-
dentally, as it were; self-government with executive officials designated by the full citizens there never 
could be, for the city constituted not a closed corporation, a share in which defines the citizen, but 
merely a functionally unified, administrative entity with a more or less stable complement of settlers 
or inhabitants. To such cities Plato’s characterization of certain states as ‘merely aggregations of men 
dwelling in cities who are the subjects and servants of a part of their own state’ could fittingly be 
applied. There were no qualifications to be met to obtain admission to citizenship in the Muslim 
town for the simple reason that there was no body of town dwellers in whom political or civic author-
ity was seen to reside. 
Gustave Edmund von Grunebaum (1955)2 
 
As to [the pre-eminence of the ‘central’ area over the periphery], concentrated in the city’s 
‘central’ area (often coterminous with the physical center, but not necessarily so) are the most promi-
nent governmental and religious edifices and usually the main market. The chief public buildings 
either crowd around an open square, or plaza, onto which converge a number of streets … or stand 
along, or at the end of, a broad, straight thoroughfare … The plazas or main streets serve as meet-
ing places and ceremonial sites for the populace … Subdivisions along ethnic and/or occupational 
lines are manifested in the preindustrial city in the numerous wards or quarters, well-defined neigh-
borhoods with relatively homogeneous populations that develop special forms of social organization. 
Gideon Sjoberg (1960)3 
 
Seventeenth-century Izmir strikingly resembles Braudel’s vision of the early-modern European city. 
He writes of “autonomous worlds” of “unparalleled freedom” that had “outwitted the territorial 
state” and pursued “an economic policy of their own.” He proclaims that they ruled “their fields 
autocratically, regarding them as positive colonial worlds before there were such things,” and asserts 
that they were “capable of breaking down obstacles and creating or recreating protective privileges.” 
The new city of Izmir conformed to this path first trodden by the European city; other nonwestern 
ports were to follow. 
Daniel Goffman (1990)4 
                                                     
 
1 Max Weber, The City (New York: Free Press, 1966), 80-81. 
2 G. E. von Grunebaum, “The Structure of the Muslim Town”, in id., Islam: Essays in the 
Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition (London: Routledge, 1961), 141-42. 
3 Gideon Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City: Past and Present (New York: Free Press, 1960), 96, 
100. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Between them, the four quotations above roughly indicate how Ottoman 
Izmir has been approached by modern historians. They have not been re-
produced here because they capture current debates on historical urbanism 
in the Islamic world, but because they reflect the attitudes prevalent in most 
European travelers’ accounts and diplomatic and mercantile correspondence 
from the city, as well as informing the analytical frameworks of modern his-
toriography on it. The city’s Ottoman past and its meanings have always 
been, and are still, reconstructed and reinterpreted overwhelmingly from 
precisely these two categories of sources. The problem is not that historians 
of Izmir wish to neglect local Ottoman sources, but that they are hard-
pressed to find ones suited for the task. This has two causes, the first being 
the repeated loss to earthquakes and fires (in 1688, 1743 and 1922) of most 
quantitative (or readily quantifiable) Ottoman local records, and the second 
being the experimental quality of the city’s fiscal and administrative role 
within wider Ottoman administration – which meant that significant reforms 
in the administration of the Ottoman realm, as prompted by regional and 
world historical developments, were invariably tested and then quickly intro-
duced in Izmir – the most valuable Ottoman nexus where these develop-
ments interacted. This has significant consequences for the consistency of 
Ottoman records from and on the city. Therefore, although a sprinkling of 
Ottoman records (always the same few) is often applied, it invariably fails to 
shake the city’s historiography from its European foundations and frame-
work and to reconstruct it as the Ottoman city that it was, with a history that 
is at once Ottoman and European. 
The history with which we are left is in essence external: with one or two 
notable exceptions (though not for the 17th century), it speaks of Europe in 
Izmir and the world, not of Ottomans in Izmir and the world, nor even of 
Izmir in the Ottoman Empire. But most surprisingly, it does not really speak 
of Izmir as a city with its own history and culture, demography and geogra-
phy. Forced to take most of its cue from contemporary European sources 
that display a – perhaps dissembled, but all the same – marked disinterest in 
the workings of their Ottoman surroundings, it reduces Ottoman Izmir to 
life and trade along the European thoroughfare Frank Street. And assisted by 
the problematic and increasingly abandoned paradigm of the Islamic city, it 
treats the rest of the city as an uncivic and loose collective ruled haphazardly 
                                                                                                                        
 
4 Daniel Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550-1650 (Seattle: University of Wash-
ington Press, 1990), 145-46, citing Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), 396. 
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and arbitrarily by a representative from the imperial center. The levers and 
buttons of this dark and somewhat cumbersome urban machine (often along 
with the region and the empire of which it was part), then, are operated at 
will by the Europeans to dispense and absorb goods as they required. Their 
capability to do so is supposed to have started from the second half of the 
16th century and to have subsequently drawn in so much of the wider Otto-
man economy that it became irreversible, i.e. the West all-powerful, by the 
1670s, after which followed a golden age for cosmopolitan Izmir, but a long 
and dark one indeed for the Ottoman Empire. Even the occasional historian 
who does attempt to treat Izmir as a city in its own right and restore some 
agency to it, is in the end forced by the sources and a succession of para-
digms at least partly predicated on them, to regard the urbanization of Izmir 
as a European phenomenon. 
 
Given the fact that the European quarter of 17th-century Izmir took up a tiny 
fraction of the urban area, that a more balanced and skeptic reading of dip-
lomatic and mercantile correspondence reveals their narrativity and suggests 
a far less uneven distribution of power in mercantile relations, and that it 
seems unlikely that crosscultural trade would have thrived in a context so 
thoroughly segregated and skewed, we are left to ask what can be done about 
this predicament. Given the available sources and scholarship, is it possible 
to attain a more realistic representation and understanding of how 17th-
century Izmir’s Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Jewish and European communi-
ties, inhabitants and visitors related to each other; of the degree to which 
they were and were not interdependent; of the role played in this by an urban 
history and culture particular to Izmir; of how this history and culture was 
reproduced because and despite of that intercultural dynamic; of how Otto-
man administration regarded it; and of the consequences of this? 
An answer to these questions clearly has relevance beyond Izmir’s histo-
ry. An overdue analytical shift away from national-communal historiography 
and the interaction of economic systems, to crosscultural contact and such 
relations of power as we can manage to identify within them, will enable us 
to question the near-absence of everyday crosscultural relations in European 
sources and the historiography which has sprung from this absence. What’s 
more, since the problematic nature of the pertinent primary sources has all 
too often left outdated historiography and paradigms to stand in for new 
research in approaching early modern Izmir (and through it western Anatolia 
and the Ottoman Empire), a reconstruction of this history from the ground 
up might in itself pose a wider challenge to the large body of scholarship in 
which our one-sided understanding of the transformation of Izmir plays a 
significant part. 
 
What is needed to achieve such a shift is a comparative analysis of cultural, 
social and political-administrative relations as presented in the ubiquitous 
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diplomatic correspondence on the one hand; and the cultural, social and 
political-administrative realities buried beneath these same narratives – but 
shining through in times of crisis – on the other. The strategy through which 
this comparison might be achieved, and its wider meaning interpreted, is one 
that brings together the hidden references to European crosscultural contact 
in that correspondence with a broad reconstruction of early modern (specifi-
cally, late-17th-century) developments in European and Ottoman history to 
show how their interaction played out in Izmir. With any luck, the resulting 
image will differ sufficiently from previous presentations to cast doubt on 
the appropriateness of the cultural and economic paradigms that have so 
dominated the historiography of Izmir and its uses. 
Therefore, we will attempt to formulate our answer to the question of 
power in these crosscultural relations by relegating economic power and its 
deficient indicators to the background and focusing our attention on such 
other indicators of that power as we might be able to identify – i.e. legal, 
fiscal and administrative developments, and the history of urban demogra-
phy and geography. 
To this end, a number of previously unused and new sources will be 
tapped in addition to the archival series (European diplomatic archives and 
the Ottoman registers for land-lease, foreign affairs, and imperial orders), 
historical travel accounts (Tavernier, Spon, Tournefort, e.a.) and learned 
works (Ottoman, European and world histories, economic or otherwise) that 
are commonly used for studying historical Izmir and its place in the world. 
Most notable among these are scores of Ottoman fiscal miscellanea (Mali-
ye’den müdevver defterler) and a crucial Ottoman endowment deed (vakfiye) from 
the Köprülü and Süleymaniye libraries detailing a major overhaul of Izmir’s 
infrastructure, as well as many recent historical, legal, anthropological, socio-
logical and demographical studies. 
 
Our primary hypothesis will be that Izmir’s culture and political economy 
were purposefully manipulated by the Ottoman and European centers and 
their various representatives in their quest for dominance, but that these 
found themselves consistently resisted and thwarted by Izmir’s cultural and 
institutional dynamic. We will posit that this distinctly crosscultural urban 
culture had its own political economy, with its own logic and trajectory. 
From this primary hypothesis immediately follows another – which holds 
that the image of Izmir as a segregated and administratively neglected ‘city’ 
was a façade. Willfully constructed by the Ottoman and European centers 
and their local representatives, it was maintained to hide from view a world 
of crosscultural compromise and mutual dependencies. This hidden ‘middle 
ground’ and the urban culture it fostered, differed significantly enough from 
that in other Ottoman places of crosscultural trade to effectively constitute a 
distinct urban culture. 
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We will have succeeded if, by the end of this text, the existence of such a 
specific urban  culture and politics – not always understood in Istanbul and 
the European capitals but prevalent within Izmir’s society and institutions – 
can carry your conviction. And if it does not seem at all farfetched to claim 
that this specific society and its institutions absorbed, internalized and trans-
formed the systemic shocks delivered to it instead of simply giving way to 
them. 
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The Ottoman City 
 
 
 
In the half century before Timur despoiled the town in 1402, Izmir’s Turkish population 
had confined itself to Kadifekale, the castle on the hill, and its immediate surroundings be-
cause of the Christian menace ensconced in Aşağıkale, the castle guarding the divided set-
tlement’s inner harbor. As the site became repopulated during the pax ottomanica following 
Timur’s decisive victory, the Turks gradually drifted down the hill from the quarter (ma-
halle) of Faikpaşa, to Mescid-i Selâtinzade, Han Bey (Pazar), and Liman-i Izmir until 
by 1528-29 a solid band of Muslim settlement extended from castle to castle and obliterat-
ed the ancient partition between Crusader and Turk … While these four quarters formed 
the heart of the renascent town, this downward movement did not develop its other two 
quarters, Boynuzseküsü and Cemaat-i Gebran. The first was a largely autonomous village 
near Izmir and linked only administratively to it. The second, a ‘community of Christians’ 
(cemaat-i gebran), constituted a Greek Orthodox enclave adjoining the harbor. Its twenty-
nine households, whose members rebuilt their quarter in the decade after Timur’s onslaught, 
comprised approximately 14 percent of the town’s inhabitants. 
Daniel Goffman (1990)5 
 
History 
At first glance, the paradigm of the Islamic city seems particularly well suited 
to Izmir. Although its formation and development was by no means typical 
for the Islamic or the Ottoman world; it would be difficult to find a city with 
a history better suited to the typification of Islamic cities as “agglomerates of 
densely inhabited components”.6 In fact, the Izmir of 1678 was the result of 
the gradual fusion of what originally had been two opposing frontier towns, 
one Muslim and one Christian. Nevertheless, the city’s history had already 
commenced millennia before the advent of Islam.7 
                                                     
 
5 Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 11-12. 
6 Richard van Leeuwen, Waqfs and Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman Damascus (Leiden: 
Brill, 1999), 15. 
7 See generally Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir kazasının sosyal ve iktisâdî 
yapısı (Izmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayını, 2000); Necmi Ülker, The Rise of Izmir, 
1688-1740 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1975); Besim Darkot, “İzmir”, İslam Ansi-
klopedisi (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988-…), 1239-51; Constantin Iconomos, Étude sur 
Smyrne (Izmir: Tatikian, 1868); Kate Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: 
The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Kenneth M. 
Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571, vol. 1: The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (Phila-
delphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1976); Cl. Cahen, “Alp Arslan”, EI2 (Leiden: 
Brill, 2003), i: 420a-21b; C. E. Bosworth, “Saldjūkids, III.5: The Saldjūks of Rūm”, EI2, iix: 
948a-50a; G. Leiser, “Sulaymān b. Kutulmısh”, EI2, ix: 825b-26a; S. Soucek, “Milāha, 2: In the 
Later Mediaeval and Early Modern Periods”, EI2, vii: 46a-50b; I. Mélikoff, “Aydın-oghlu”, 
EI2, i: 783a-b; Beatrice F. Manz, “Tīmūr Lang”, EI2, x: 510b-12b; Halil İnalcik, “Bāyezīd I”, 
EI2, i: 1117b-19a; I. Mélikoff, “Djunayd”, EI2, ii: 598b-600a; Halil İnalcik, “Mehemmed I”, 
EI2, vi: 973b-8a; J. H. Kramers, “Murād II”, EI2, vii: 594a-5b; L. de Blois, and R. J. van der 
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Greek and Roman Izmir 
The part of the city which will be considered Ottoman was largely construct-
ed on top of – and with materials from – Ancient Izmir, or, as it was origi-
nally called, Smyrna. Archaeological evidence indicates settlement dating 
back to the third millennium BC, with signs of Greek habitation from about 
1000 BC. According to Herodotus, the city was originally founded by the 
Aeolians, but later conquered by the Ionians. The, by that time, stately city 
on the site of what is now Bayraklı, boasting extensive fortifications and 
blocks of two-storied houses, was captured and demolished by the Lydian 
king Alyattes in 575 BC, its surviving inhabitants fleeing the site for the area 
between modern Naldöken and Buca. In 541 BC, what remained of Smyrna 
went over into Persian hands and remained there until Alexander the Great 
extended the theatre of his war against the Persians to Ephesus in 344 BC. In 
the course of the war, Alexander is reported to have entrenched himself on 
Mount Pagus and, realizing the suitability of the location, to have designated 
it as a site for future habitation. The project of refounding Smyrna on this 
new site was subsequently taken on by Alexander’s successors Antigonus I 
Monophthalmus (d. 301 BC) and his enemy and successor Lysimachus (d. 
281 BC), when it re-emerged as one of the chief cities of Asia Minor. By 
now, the acropolis on Mount Pagus was proving too small to accommodate 
the urban sprawl, and the city started descending the hillside to the coast. 
In the first quarter of the third century BC, Seleucus I Nicator (d. 281 
BC) took Smyrna from Lysimachus and added it to the dominions of the 
Seleucid kingdom. Practically until the city’s addition to the Roman Middle 
Republic (from 264 to 133 BC), it remained in possession of the Seleucids. 
During this period, it was respectively governed by Seleucus I’s son Antio-
chus I Soter (d. 262/261 BC), his son Antiochus II Theos (d. 246 BC) – 
when it was used as a base in the war with Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt 
(d. 246 BC) – and his son Seleucus II Callinicus (d. 225 BC), who lost it to 
Attalus II Philadelphus of Pergamum (d. 138 BC). Antiochus III (d. 187 BC) 
afterwards attempted to regain Smyrna through diplomacy, but failed when 
the Smyrniotes called Rome to its defense. In 190 BC, a Roman fleet under 
admiral Gaius Livius ushered in Smyrna’s Roman age. 
                                                                                                                        
 
Spek, Een kennismaking met de oude wereld (Bussum: Coutinho, 2001); 95-142; and Ency-
clopaedia Brittanica, deluxe CD edition (Chicago: 2003; 2004), s.v. “Izmir”, “Ionia”, “Ionian”, 
“Aeolis”, “Antigonus I Monophthalmus”, “Lysimachus”, “Alyattes”, “Seleucid kingdom”, 
“Seleucus I Nicator”, “Antiochus I Soter”, “Antiochus II Theos”, “Seleucus II Callinicus”, 
“Pergamum”, “Attalus II Philadelphus”, “Antiochus III”, “Hadrian”, “Marcus Aurelius”, 
“Theme”, “Nicephorus II Phocas”, “Byzantine Empire”, “Manzikert, Battle of”, “Alp-
Arslan”, “Anatolia”, “Alexius I Comnenus”, “Crusade”, “Baldwin I”, “John III Ducas 
Vatatzes”, “Michael VIII Palaeologus”, “Andronicus II Palaeologus”, “Zaccaria, Benedetto”, 
“Aydin Dynasty”, “Clement VI”, “Knights of Malta”, “Timur”, “Bayezid I” and “Mehmed 
II”. 
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As a Roman city, Smyrna, by now extending from the fortified district on 
Mount Pagus (see Map 1) down to the seashore, gained prominence as the 
center of a civil diocese in the province of Asia. It was on equal footing with 
Ephesus and Pergamum and became celebrated for its riches, beauty and 
learning. However, Caesar’s death (44 BC) and the succeeding struggle for 
power spelled ruin for the city. It languished away in war and commercial 
decline until Hadrian (r. 117-138) actively sought to restore it to its former 
power. He constructed a temple, a gymnasium and a market in the area be-
tween Mount Pagus and the seashore, and exempted the city from imperial 
taxation. Shortly after its restoration, in the year 178, a severe earthquake hit 
the city, killing many inhabitants, destroying its temple and filling its inner 
harbor with debris. It was quickly rebuilt under Marcus Aurelius (r. 161-180). 
 
Byzantine and Seljukid Izmir 
As part of the Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, empire, Smyrna’s fortune again 
proved fickle. Although it withstood an Arab siege in 627, the city went into 
decline under Nicephorus II Phocas (r. 963-969); perhaps its commerce 
suffered from that emperor’s relentless campaigns against the Arabs. If so, 
its becoming capital of the maritime province (theme) of Samos was a bad 
omen indeed. The theme-system was not designed to promote commerce but 
to help marshal Byzantine resources to withstand the mounting threat of 
Turkish invasions and this no doubt forced the city to turn its back on the 
profitable sea and brace itself for the onslaught from the Anatolian interior. 
Turkish settlers had already been trickling in before that time, prompting 
many Greeks to leave for the islands or the still securely Byzantine Balkans. 
Following the Byzantine defeat at the hand of the Muslim Seljuks under Alp 
Arslan (d. 1073) at the Battle of Manzikert (modern Malazgirt, 1071), their 
numbers increased dramatically. 
In 1081, lower Smyrna was seized by Süleyman bin Kutulmış (d. 1086), 
founder of the Anatolian branch of the Seljuks (the Seljuk sultanate of Rum). 
After his death, the lower city (by now also known by its Turkish name; Iz-
mir) was governed by Seljuk prince Çaka Bey, who used its inner harbor as a 
base for the naval expeditions that added Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Rhodes 
to his territories along the coast from Çanakkale (on the Asian side of the 
Dardanelles) to Kuşadası (Levantine: Scalanuova). After Çaka’s death as a 
result of the pact concluded against this increasingly powerful rival by Seljuk 
sultan Kılıç Arslan (d. 1107) and Byzantine emperor Alexius I Comnenus (r. 
1081-1118), Yalvaç Bey ruled there until 1096. The first Crusade (1096-1099) 
and the consequent Seljuk retreat from Iznik (Byzantine Nicaea) to Konya 
(Iconium) in 1097 resulted in the city being re-conquered by the Byzantines. 
What happened to the city until 1261 is not entirely clear, but it appears 
to have largely remained under Byzantine suzerainty, notwithstanding con-
tinuing Muslim habitation. Constantinople’s falling to the Venetian-
dominated Fourth Crusade in 1203 brought about a period of prolonged 
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chaos. On 16 May 1204, the crusaders proclaimed the Latin empire of Con-
stantinople. They were to be challenged by three Byzantine provincial cen-
ters, Trebizond (Trabzon), Árta and Nicaea (Iznik) – all aspiring to the Byz-
antine crown. Eventually, the latter was to gain the advantage and its ruler 
Theodore I Lascaris (d. 1222) was crowned the new (Nicaean) Byzantine 
emperor in 1208. The turmoil of the Nicaean period blurred the boundaries 
of authority in the Aegean and along its coast considerably. The vacuum left 
by the Byzantine retreat was mainly filled by the Genoese. As Venice’s great-
est rival to commercial empire, Genoa proved an invaluable ally to the Ni-
caean emperors and became a crucial factor in the resurgence of Byzantine 
power. 
 
Latin and Aydınoğlu Izmir 
When Constantinople was restored to the Byzantine empire in 1261, Michael 
VIII Palaeologus (r. 1259-1282) was faced with a continuing Venetian and 
Genoese presence in the Aegean. Lacking the power to oust them, he award-
ed the battling Venetians and Genoese extensive commercial privileges (ca-
pitulations), which at least maintained his nominal suzerainty. Thus, it hap-
pened that a number of Venetian and Genoese families seized the commer-
cial and military initiative in the region. In the opening years of the 14th cen-
tury, the Genoese Zaccaria-family, operating from its alum-rich fief at Pho-
caea (Foça, just north of Izmir), expanded its control to Chios. In 1304, An-
dronicus II Palaeologus (r. 1282-1328) extended the Genoese privilege to 
trade through Izmir and expressly permitted them to settle there as well.8 
Shortly after, the Zaccarias, who were already in command of the harbor 
castle built by John III Ducas Vatatzes (r. 1222-1254) and, through it, of the 
lower city, also managed to gain control of the castle that same emperor had 
constructed on Mount Pagus. 
                                                     
 
8 “1304 März – Privilegium aurea bulla munitum (text): nach verhandlungen mit dem 
genuesischen gesandten Guido Embriaco und Acursio Ferrari erhalten die Genuesen folgende 
privilegien: 1. ein quartier in Galata, von einem graben und einer gebäudefreien zone von 60 
ellen breite umgeben und von der mauer der befestigung von Galata längs deren mauer durch 
eine gebäudefreie zone getrennt; eine befestigungsmauer für ihre quartier sollen sie indessen 
nicht aufführen dürfen, dagegen wohnungen und alle beliebigen befestigungsbauten innerhalb 
ihres gebietes; 2. dort erhalten sie einen fleischmarkt, einen getreidemarkt, eine loggia, ein bad, 
kirchen, lateinische priester, waage und genuesische wägebeamte (doch muß bei den wägung-
en ein schreiber und ein anderer abgesandter des kaiserlichen zollamtes anwesend sein); für 
die wägung ihrer eigenen waren haben sie nichts zu entrichten, aber für die übrigen waren ist 
das vorgeschriebene wäregeld an das kaiserliche zollamt zu bezahlen; 3. die drei griechischen 
kirchen des gebietes bleiben dem ptr. von Kpl. Unterstellt; 4. jeder Genuese, oder wer rech-
tens dafür gilt, verbleibt unter der kontrolle der genuesischer verwaltung, auch wenn er sich zu 
einer andere nation überführen läßt, und nimmt nicht an den privilegien der Genuesen teil; 5. 
die Genuesen erhalten ein quartier in Smyrna mit loggia, bad, bäckerei, kirche und anderem 
wie in Galata”, Franz Dölger, Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches von 565-1453, 
vol. 4: Regesten von 1282-1341 (München: Oldenbourg, 1960), 41-42. 
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However, the Venetians and the Genoese were not the only ones taking 
an interest in the Byzantine possessions; in the wake of their struggle, several 
Turkish emirates – among them the Ottomans – also started extending their 
influence at the emperors’ cost. In 1317, Aydınoğlu Mehmed Bey, founder of 
the emirate of Aydın (in existence from 1308 to 1425), pried the upper castle, 
now called Kadifekale, from the Zaccarias’ control. Upon Mehmed Bey’s 
death in 1334, his son and successor Umur Bey (r. 1334-1348) immediately 
started a campaign to oust the Genoese from the castle protecting Izmir’s 
harbor. After a siege of two-and-a-half years the defenders fell back on Chios 
and the Aydınoğlus became the sole masters of the city. Again, Izmir’s har-
bor was used as a launching pad for Muslim expeditions to the Archipelago 
and this time – unlike under Çaka Bey – also to the Greek mainland and the 
Black Sea coast. In time, the depredations of the Turkish emirates, and par-
ticularly those of the Ottomans and the Aydınoğlus, became such a threat to 
Byzantines, Venetians, Genoese and crusader kingdoms alike, that Pope 
Clement VI successfully preached a crusade to halt their advance. 
And so it happened, that a combined fleet of the Republics of Venice and 
Genoa, the Kingdom of Cyprus, the Knights Hospitallers (based on Rhodes 
since 1308) and the Duchy of Naxos destroyed Umur Bey’s fleet and took 
the lower castle in October 1344. It was subsequently handed over to the 
care of the Knights Hospitallers, who added fortifications and renamed it the 
castle of Saint Peter. Through this advance position the knights were able to 
dominate the lower city while the emirate clung on to Kadifekale. Despite 
several attempts by both sides to gain complete control of the city, it was to 
host a very active frontier between Crusader and Turk, Christianity and Is-
lam, for a good half century. 
 
Aydınoğlu and Early Ottoman Izmir 
By the end of the 14th century, the Ottomans had supplanted most of the 
Western Anatolian emirates. Under Bayezid I Yıldırım (r. 1389-1403) they 
wrested Kadifekale from the Aydınoğlus, but failed to oust the knights from 
the castle of Saint Peter; that task was left to Mongol conqueror Tamerlane 
(Timur Lenk, r. 1370-1405). After defeating and capturing Bayezid in the 
Battle of Ankara on 20 July 1402, he marched on to the Aegean and in De-
cember captured Izmir in its entirety after a siege of less than two weeks. 
Apparently having sufficiently punished the Ottomans for encroaching upon 
Anatolian territories that were still nominally his, Timur restored the remains 
of the emirates and returned to Samarkand in 1403. Izmir became the terri-
tory of Cüneyd Bey (r. 1405-1425), grandson of Mehmed Bey and nephew of 
Umur Bey, and the center of a vigorously renascent emirate of Aydın. 
Meanwhile, the reshuffling of power that had been the result of Timur’s 
campaign had far from ended the rivalry between the emirates. After a long 
series of intrigues, implicating Cüneyd on various sides in the desperate 
struggle for the Ottoman succession raging between Bayezid’s three sons, 
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the victorious new Ottoman sultan Mehmed I (b. 1386/87, r. 1413-1421) laid 
siege to Cüneyd’s Izmir in 1415. He captured it after ten days and left his 
former adversary in control of the region on the condition that he would 
recognize Ottoman suzerainty. Within a year, however, Mehmed had ap-
pointed Cüneyd governor of Nicopolis (Nikópolis) and entrusted the prov-
ince of Aydın to his Bulgarian vassals. After yet another adventure against 
Mehmed and several years in Byzantine captivity, Cüneyd managed to return 
to Izmir in 1422 and started to reconquer his former territories from there. 
Mehmed I’s successor Murad II (r. 1421-1444, 1446-1451) initially merely 
attempted to contain Cüneyd. He appointed a new governor of Aydın, one 
Halil Yakışı, to keep him in check. In the end, the Aydınoğlu prince proved 
so intransigent, even kidnapping and killing Yakışı’s sister, that the sultan was 
left with no other option than to try and dispel him from Izmir completely. 
In 1424, the Ottoman governor-general of Anatolia, Oruç, definitively added 
the city to the Ottoman lands. From his refuge in the fortress of Ipsili (on 
the coast opposite Samos), Cüneyd desperately and repeatedly tried to obtain 
assistance from Venice and the emir of Karaman, but to no avail. In 1425, 
Oruç’s successor Hamza defeated an army commanded by Cüneyd’s son in 
the plain of Akhisar, while Ipsili was attacked from the sea with Genoese 
assistance. Cüneyd surrendered on the promise that his and his relatives’ 
lives would be spared, but could not escape Yakışı’s revenge; the victor had 
all that was left of the Aydınoğlu line put to death. 
 
The City as a Frontier 
The most striking feature of Izmir’s history up to this point is the city’s 
seemingly perpetual oscillation between East and West, between Asia Minor 
and the Aegean, even to the point of literally being torn apart. It would be an 
exaggeration to claim that the Aeolian, Macedonian, middle Roman, middle 
and late Byzantine, Latin and late Aydınoğlu polities represented “the West” 
or the Aegean; and that the Ionian, Lydian, Persian, Seleucid, Attalid, early 
Byzantine, Seljukid, early Aydınoğlu, Timurid and Ottoman polities repre-
sented “the East” or Asia Minor. If such a polarity existed it was never that 
absolute. Nevertheless, if the geography and orientations of these polities are 
considered, a pattern can certainly be discerned. 
Izmir’s repeated switching of overlords not only changed its political con-
figuration time and again, it also altered the composition and distribution of 
its population. As new rulers imposed themselves on the city, they brought 
in kinsmen and loyal followers to help administer their new territory. These 
would in turn depend on ethnically or culturally related sections of the popu-
lation, bringing certain sections of it to prominence at the cost of others. 
They did so not just politically, but also in terms of geographical location and 
social status as they moved into the city’s central areas and appropriated its 
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military, commercial, legal, religious, administrative and political infrastruc-
tures, reconfiguring them in the process.9 
It would be a mistake, however, to think of these processes of appropria-
tion and reconfiguration as tidal waves washing over the entire city. In the 
course of Izmir’s history, the frontier was not only repeatedly carried over 
the city and back again by the ebb and flow of the city’s consecutive masters; 
it repeatedly ran aground halfway. At several moments in the city’s history it 
ran East of Kadifekale, directly beneath its western walls, along the foot of 
the western slope of Mount Pagus, straight through the middle of the city 
from southwest to northeast, along the landward side of the ramparts of the 
castle of St. Peter, along its seaward side and the city’s beach, through the 
Gulf of Izmir and beyond it. What’s more, it did not just move back and 
forth between East and West, it also rotated. For instance, the 11th century 
                                                     
 
9 See Sjoberg, Preindustrial City. Sjoberg formulated his theory of the pre-industrial city as a 
critique of the then-dominant concentric zonal, or Chicago School of urban sociology, model 
of Ernest W. Burgess (which describes a “positive correlation between the socioeconomic 
status of residential areas and their distance from the central business district: the most afflu-
ent urban residents live in the outer suburbs, a finding which Burgess's followers generalized 
from Chicago to all American cities (see Schnore, 1965). Growth within the city was propelled 
from the centre through the process of invasion and succession whereby new immigrants 
occupied the lowest quality homes in the zone in transition and pressed longer-established 
groups to migrate outwards towards the suburbs”, “Zonal Model” (2009), Geodz: The Earth 
Encyclopedia, http://www.geodz.com/eng/d/zonal-model/zonal-model.htm (accessed 4 July 
2011). Sjoberg’s model, which still goes largely unchallenged and serves as a widely used 
alternative to Chicago School-variations indeed seems more pertinent to pre-industrial Izmir. 
There (as will become apparent throughout the remainder of this text), economic and ethnic 
zones were seemingly randomly clustered around a center occupied by a non-commercial 
ruling class, with commercial zones located near the centre (but not in it) and non-Muslim 
populations (especially Greeks and Europeans, but also to a lesser degree Jews and Armeni-
ans) around it. Sjoberg asserts that “power is consolidated by the ruling class through its 
residential location in the city centre, the most protected and most accessible district. Here, 
residents forge a social solidarity based on their literacy, access to the surplus (which is stored 
in the central area of the city), and shared upper-class culture that includes distinctive manners 
and patterns of speech. Elite clustering in the city centre is reinforced by the lack of rapid 
transportation. The privileged central district is surrounded by haphazardly arranged neigh-
borhoods housing the lower class. Households in these areas are sorted by occupa-
tion/income (merchants near the centre, followed by minor bureaucrats, artisans and, finally, 
the unskilled), ethnic origin and extended family networks. Merchants are generally not ac-
corded elite status, since power is achieved through religious and military control while trade 
is viewed with suspicion. The model is less clear on the residential placement of outcaste 
groups (typically slaves and other conquered peoples): some of these perform service roles 
and are intermingled with the rest of the urban population, while others live at the extreme 
periphery of the city and frequently beyond its walls”, “Sjoberg Model” (2009), Geodz: The 
Earth Encyclopedia, http://www.geodz.com/eng/d/sjoberg-model/sjoberg-model.htm 
(accessed 4 July 2011); and Ernest W. Burgess, “The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a 
Research Project”, in The City Reader, eds. Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 150-57. See also Mike Savage, Alan Warde and Kevin Warde, Urban Sociolo-
gy, Capitalism and Modernity (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 70-74. 
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saw a Turkified lower Izmir and a Byzantine upper city, while the 14th wit-
nessed a fully reversed situation. 
Such a volatile frontier must have had a profound impact on both the 
physical city and on the interaction between its inhabitants on either side – 
with, one suspects, consequences for the physical and social heritage the 
Ottomans would work to incorporate later on. What should interest us par-
ticularly in investigating the degree of autonomy and incorporation of Izmir 
and its several communities is the question how deep and hard the division 
between Izmir’s parts actually was during the pre-Ottoman period: were they 
constantly at odds or only incidentally, were they so across all social strata or 
only among particular ones, and did this (temporality and modality) change 
over time? 
 
A dearth of sources shedding light on the demography and topography of 
pre-Ottoman Izmir precludes firm answers to these questions. But a number 
of contemporary narratives as well as modern studies do shed light on the 
strategic situation of Izmir and on the general attitudes and objectives of the 
parties involved in the struggle for the town and the region. These can yield 
some tentative answers. 
The most obvious source to study for added context on pre-Ottoman 
Izmir as a frontier is without a doubt The Alexiad.10 Written around the year 
1148, Anna Komnene’s chronicle of the reign of her father, emperor Alexius 
I, details the vicissitudes of their Komnenian dynasty and the struggling em-
pire it headed as, between the years 1081 and 1118, it attempted to remain 
afloat amidst a veritable deluge of imperial contenders, Normans, Scythians, 
Manicheans, crusaders, and Cumanid and Seljukid Turks. Izmir, by then at 
the southeastern edge of what remained of the unbroken Byzantine posses-
sions in Anatolia, figures prominently in The Alexiad as the last Byzantine 
bulwark stopping Seljuk emir Çaka Bey and his newly constructed fleet from 
strangling what remained of Byzantine Anatolia from the sea. 
If Anna Komnene’s description of the several campaigns, truces, negotia-
tions, alliances and concessions over Izmir make one thing abundantly clear, 
it is that when faced with such protracted periods of military-strategic unrest 
and repeated reversals as befell all parties engaged in Izmir, none of them (be 
they Byzantines, Turks, or Latins) stood to gain much from a rapid and 
forced full incorporation of the town’s estates and population. The degree of 
violence and disruption such repeated appropriation under truce or peace 
would add to the damages already inflicted by armed conflict must have been 
generally understood to be detrimental to all parties’ future interests in the 
town and the region – notwithstanding the complaint in The Alexiad that 
                                                     
 
10 Anna Komnene, The Alexiad (London: Penguin, 2009). 
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petty Muslim rulers who had installed themselves on the Aegean coast and 
islands treated the Christian inhabitants like slaves and ravaged the region.11 
Although western Anatolia was surely no exception to the general rule 
that war enslaves and ravages, we should bear in mind that in our context 
such statements tend to reflect fiscal and territorial concerns more than pure-
ly ethical or moral ones (if the distinction will have made much sense to 
contemporaries to begin with). In fact, even the evolution of both the actual 
Byzantine and Islamic institutions of slavery (significantly different from 
ancient and modern variants) shows that they developed and adjusted in 
response to fiscal problems primarily, with moral considerations figuring as 
but one dimension of divinely sanctioned fiscal rule.12 
Similarly, we should consider that indignant Byzantine references to the 
virtual enslavement and overall devastation wreaked by Turkish competitors 
could in reality very well be little more than morally dressed allusions to the 
not quite so bloody Islamic fiscal practice of levying a poll-tax from non-
Muslim subjects (as a mark of subordination) and of permanently lowering 
the overall tax burden immediately after a takeover. If there was much devas-
tation to the region it will have been in the fiscal sense first and foremost; 
through a lax regime that preemptively undermined any future Byzantine 
attempts at regaining its lost territories since no amount of tried and tested 
Byzantine propaganda would suffice to regain the sympathy and support of 
populations now used to the much lighter hand of Islamic governance.13 
Nevertheless, both The Alexiad and many other chronicles and letters do 
testify to occasional heavy disruptions of life and trade. Anna Komnene 
repeatedly refers to the ravaging of Western Anatolia’s rural districts in the 
seemingly perpetual to and fro between Byzantines and Turks, to the razing 
of one city (Adramyttium, modern Edremit, opposite the island of Lesbos) 
by Çaka’s first Turkish navy, as well as to the gruesome treatment twice met-
ed out to defeated Turkish troops in Phrygia and Philadelphia (modern 
Alaşehir).14 
Still, if the destruction of Adramyttium and the brutal elimination of 
Turkish units in Izmir’s deeper hinterlands merit such specific mention while 
the city itself (a hundred miles and more to the south, west and southwest of 
those battle sites) lies at the heart of so much of The Alexiad’s action, we may 
safely assume that that city and its general population were spared such grue-
some fates – a noteworthy conclusion considering that the unceasing strife 
                                                     
 
11 Ibid., 309 (emphasis added). 
12 See generally Youval Rotman, Byzantine Slavery and the Mediterranean World (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009). 
13 Cf. Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 201-5 (“The Muslim Conquest and Tax 
Reduction”). 
14 See Komnene, Alexiad, 397-400 and throughout. 
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between Alexios’ and Çaka (and his successor Yalvaç) centered on Izmir and 
was in fact the first acute manifestation of a long-lasting Greco-Turkish de-
mographical competition in the Byzantine core territories. Apparently, that 
competition and the military confrontations that arose from it, did not affect 
the town’s general population to the degree of destroying or dispersing it. In 
any case, not in the one-and-a-quarter century leading up to the Byzantines’ 
regaining full control of Izmir after the Seljuks had been beaten back to 
Konya by the First Crusade, nor in the remaining years leading up to the 
Venetian proclamation of the Latin empire of Constantinople. 
Surprisingly perhaps, even the years of Byzantine breakdown, reconstruc-
tion and rehabilitation (from 1204 to 1222 to 1261) were not all that trouble-
some for Izmir. Lightly governed by the struggling (Nicaean) Byzantine em-
pire with Genoese backing, its ethnically diverse Greek, Latin and Turkish 
population appears to have survived without much disruption.15 The recap-
ture of the upper castle by the Turks in 1317, this time under the banner of 
Aydınoğlu Umur Bey, will have heightened tensions between upper and 
lower Izmir. Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that depopulation and de-
struction was the result. 
 
The first major disruption of crosscultural contact that did occur in Izmir 
was not of Levantine making. Whereas Byzantines and Turks had stood with 
and against each other in a strength-sapping yet strangely sustaining embrace, 
either unwilling or incapable to force a victory that sacrificed the main prize 
to matters of principle, it was the “Smyrniote crusade” (1344-1346) that 
chose a fight to the death over a draw. The alliance of Venice, Cyprus and 
Knights Hospitallers that descended on Izmir in 1344 under the papal ban-
ner to salvage Venetian interests in the name of Christianity managed to take 
the lower city, but never dislodged the Turks from the upper city. 
Whatever communication and cohabitation had existed between the city’s 
parts under Byzantine rule was apparently ruined by the crusaders’ winner-
takes-all attitude. What remained was a “labyrinth of deserted houses … 
between the Turks on the height and the Christians below”, a veritable “no-
man’s-land between the harbor fortress and the Turkish-held acropolis”, 
with a fledgling “Venetian suburb” below hugging the walls of the harbor 
castle in which “the crusaders lived in an atmosphere of almost daily crises” 
because of continuous mangonel bombardments by the Turks.16 After some 
years of failures and successes (resulting in the deaths of both sides’ com-
manders) the unsustainable policy of radical animosity was abandoned, giv-
                                                     
 
15 See the privilege reproduced by Dölger, Regesten 4, 41-42. 
16 See Setton, Papacy and the Levant 1, 192. 
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ing way to negotiations for a sustainable cohabitation between the papacy 
and the Aydınoğlus in 1348.17 
In the course of the following three quarters of a century that would pass 
until Izmir was brought securely under Ottoman rule in 1424, the more or 
less peaceful cohabitation between the city’s populations that had endured 
for much of the preceding centuries would be tested once more, this time by 
Timur’s indiscriminatingly devastating invasion of 1402. The ensuing pax 
Ottomanica (which ended with the Allied Greek occupation of 1919 and the 
destruction of the city in 1922) was heavily disrupted on only one occasion, 
in 1472, when much of the town was purposefully burnt by a withdrawing 
Venetian naval raiding party.18 
 
The admittedly somewhat indirect evidence for relatively peaceful coexist-
ence between general populations of different ethnic backgrounds and reli-
gious persuasions across most of Izmir’s history seems to be confirmed by a 
number of excellent recent studies on the Byzantine empire. Youval Rot-
man’s Byzantine Slavery and the Mediterranean World, John F. Haldon in Ian 
Moriss and Walter Scheidel’s The Dynamics of Ancient Empires: State Power from 
Assyria to Byzantium, and Edward N. Luttwak’s The Grand Strategy of the Byzan-
tine Empire, while not specifically concerned with Izmir and while studying 
Byzantine polity and society from widely diverging angles (resp. social-
fiscally, structural-politically, military-strategically), all track the evolution of a 
Byzantine system that became optimally geared to maintaining a guarded 
Christian-Muslim coexistence, preferably within the confines of the Byzan-
tine state, but also between it and the outside world.19 That image corre-
sponds with that from our evidence on Izmir. 
These studies also testify to the incomprehension and disgust Byzantine 
policies of flexibility and peripheral softness elicited from Western contem-
poraries and moderns alike. In Haldon’s words: 
 
In 1869, the historian William Lecky wrote: «Of that Byzantine empire, the universal 
verdict of history is that it constitutes, without a single exception, the most thoroughly base 
and despicable form that civilisation has yet assumed. There has been no other enduring civ-
ilisation so absolutely destitute of all forms and elements of greatness, and none to which the 
epithet mean may be so emphatically applied … The history of the empire is a monotonous 
story of the intrigues of priests, eunuchs, and women, of poisonings, of conspiracies, of uni-
form ingratitude.» This image, which nicely reflects the morality and prejudices of the mid-
                                                     
 
17 See ibid., 195-223. 
18 See Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571, vol. 2: The Fifteenth Century 
(Philadelphia: Independence Square, 1978), 317. 
19 Rotman, Byzantine Slavery; Luttwak, Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire; and John F. 
Haldon, “The Byzantine Empire”, in The Dynamics of Ancient Empires: State Power from Assyria to 
Byzantium, eds. Ian Moriss and Walter Scheidel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
205-54. 
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Victorian world, has been remarkably resilient. Indeed, it lives on in some popular ideas 
about the Byzantine world, a combination of Victorian moralizing and Crusaders’ preju-
dices, and in the use of the adjective “Byzantine” in a pejorative sense. And there are some 
modern writers – for the most part, not professional historians – who have, consciously or 
not, transferred these prejudices to the world of contemporary scholarship, if not with respect 
to the “corrupt” Byzantine court, then in terms of a romantic, “Orientalist” image of By-
zantium that merely contributes to the continued obfuscation of the nature of Byzantine so-
ciety and civilization. In the light of the evidence in the written sources, the Byzantine court 
was certainly no more venal, corrupt, or conspiracy ridden than any other medieval court in 
West or East. But it has taken a long time to deconstruct these attitudes. Historians 
working within the western European tradition in particular have been victims, in this re-
spect, of the nationalist and Eurocentric propaganda that arose in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and afterward and in the context of the evolving nationalist and ration-
alist attitudes of the age, by which northern and western European culture was credited 
with an integrity, sense of honor, and straightforwardness that the corrupt “orientalized” 
medieval Byzantine world (and also the Islamic world, consigned to the same fate) had 
lost.20 
 
In view of that analysis it is hardly surprising that all major disruptions of 
Izmir’s delicate equilibrium of guarded cohabitation had one thing in com-
mon; they invariably came from beyond the Levant, from the Franks to the 
West and the Mongols to the East. 
So, although Byzantine-Turkish antagonism was certainly no fiction in 
the military and political arenas, it was certainly never continuous and radical 
in the social and economic spheres.21 To understand why this was so, it 
might think help to think of the city as a complex organism, recognized as 
such by its major beneficiaries: if it is to continue to fulfill its internal and 
external functions, a rigid fission is simply out of the question. For Izmir to 
continue to function in any socially, economically and strategically viable way 
for its inhabitants, its region, and its imperial stakeholders, it was crucial that 
the arterial roads between the seaport at its heart, the wider body of the city 
itself and the milieu of its hinterland remained intact (see Map 1).22 
                                                     
 
20 Ibid., 210-11. 
21 See generally Molly Greene, A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern 
Mediterranean (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Fleet, European and Islamic 
Trade. 
22 Organic metaphors are now regarded as suspect because of the risks involved in using 
them as analytical tools (they invite naturalistic interpretations and over-functionalism, and 
have a history of being abused for nefarious purposes). Nevertheless, there is no denying they 
are useful in stimulating one to imagine how geography and commercial and social processes 
meet and interact within a defined and specialized area such as a city (if only one remembers 
that a metaphor in itself holds no causal value). It is no coincidence that the authors of an 
excellent and recent work on Divided Cities, in trying to distil a generic “divided city” from 
their five cases (Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia), use an inverted variant of our 
organic metaphor: “Rarely a senseless and spontaneous convulsion, urban partitioning may be 
like a fever: the unhappy but strategic response of an organism to a threat encountered within 
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MAP 1: GENERAL TOPOGRAPHY OF IZMIR AND ENVIRONS, PRE-16TH CENTURY 
 
Based on Thomas Graves, “The City of Ismir or Smyrna” [map] (London: Hydro-
graphic Office, 1844); with additional detail taken from Richard Copeland, “Smyrna 
Harbour” [map] (London: Hydrographic Office, 1844). 
 
Logically, the prerequisite of a smooth flow of commerce across military or 
cultural barriers became more imperative as the city grew and the volume of 
trade going through it increased. The general scarcity and shortness of abso-
lute antagonism, and the importance attached to the flow of commerce in 
countless ceasefire agreements and peace treaties, establish beyond a doubt 
that from at least the eleventh century onwards Izmir’s inhabitants and over-
lords were very attentive to this imperative and the advantage they would 
                                                                                                                        
 
its own body. Still, a fever is not productively sustained for long; our systematic exploration of 
five divided cities suggests that partition is not an effective long-term reply to discrimination 
and violence”, Jon Calame and Esther Charlesworth, Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, 
Mostar, and Nicosia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), xi. 
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stand to gain by continuing to heed it. Dealings between Izmir’s rival powers 
and populations were above all pragmatic.23 
 
A diverse urban population that managed to live and work together under 
such conditions without too much upheaval must have reached a quite so-
phisticated and stable modus vivendi. The question, then, is how this modus 
vivendi was organized socially and spatially: did this particular urban society 
resemble the compartmentalized, dissociated and uncivic type described by 
Von Grunebaum, or could it have been more akin to Frederick Jackson 
Turner’s nuclearized, self-sufficient and freedom-loving frontier society, later 
transposed to the Ottoman case by McNeill, and afterwards applied most 
effectively to the early Ottoman state by Cemal Kafadar: 
 
Indeed, if anything characterized medieval Anatolian frontiers, and possibly all frontiers, it 
was mobility and fluidity. The Ottoman success was due to the fact that they harnessed that 
mobility to their own ends while shaping and taming it to conform to their stability-seeking, 
centralizing vision. Of course there were limits on both set by natural and social parame-
ters, but still one could move from place to place, allegiance to allegiance, and identity with 
an ease and acceptability hard to even imagine in more-settled societies. People not only 
crossed from one side of the frontier to the other but also moved from one faith to another 
and from one ethnic identity (which usually also meant from one name) to another with fre-
quency. … The sociopolitical order created by these frontier conditions developed a general 
reluctance to recognize an aristocracy, a freezing of inheritable distinction in specific lineages, 
even after settling down.24 
 
In the first case, the response to the circumstances described above would 
have been increasing segregation as different segments of the population 
tried to keep their belligerents at bay by walling themselves in even further in 
                                                     
 
23 Cf. Halil İnalcik, “Imtiyāzāt, ii: The Ottoman Empire”, EI2, iii: 1179a-89b. E.g., Dölger, 
Regesten 4; Hans Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The ‘Ahd-names: The Historical Back-
ground and the Development of a Category of Political-Commercial Instruments Together with an Annotated 
Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents (Utrecht: Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, 1991); and various 
other collections of treaties. For the Ottoman-Genoese case specifically, see Fleet, European 
and Islamic Trade, 4-12 and 156-74. 
24 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1995), 140-41. See Von Grunebaum, “Structure of the Muslim 
Town”, 141-42; and Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 1996), throughout, and esp. 30: “But the most important effect of the frontier 
has been in the promotion of democracy here and in Europe. As has been indicated, the 
frontier is productive of idealism. Complex society is precipitated by the wilderness into a 
kind of primitive organization based on the family. The tendency is anti-social. It produces 
antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct control. The tax-gatherer is viewed as a 
representative of oppression”. See generally William Hardy McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier, 
1500-1800 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). 
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their ethno-religiously homogenous quarters.25 In the second, the frontier 
would have evolved into a society of its own – a precarious balancing act 
that must eventually end with the forces of state centralization and incorpo-
ration pressing heavier than any local dynamic towards crosscultural ex-
change and cohabitation.26 Ideally, the distinguishing trait of such a frontier 
society would – in the words of Cemal Kafadar – be that “the two sides of the 
frontier … over the centuries molded overlapping planes of social and cul-
tural interaction and lived, in certain respects, in more proximity to one an-
other than to certain elements within their ‘own’ societies.”27 Less ideally, 
and at the very least, it would mean that antagonisms between political cen-
ters were not automatically replicated in all spheres of contact on the local 
level, i.e. in daily life. 
That Izmir’s overall growth continued irrespective of formal divisions, 
and that this growth was at least partly facilitated by rulers who were at the 
same time competing for total control of the city, certainly seems to point 
towards a society of the frontier type. If the following chapters indeed con-
firm it to have been such, it would suggest that the city and its society devel-
oped in response to their own historical experience, geographical position 
and social, economic and political needs – instead of according to some pre-
ordained and typical civilizational scheme (as in the paradigm of the Islamic 
city/society). This would in turn make it very difficult to deny Izmir any and 
all autonomously developed overarching civic spirit, even if it existed in a 
guise barely recognizable to western commentators. It would also mean that 
the mode and pace in which that city was incorporated into the Ottoman 
Empire was determined not only by persons and policies in the Ottoman 
capital, but just as much by local power-brokers and institutions that worked 
together to protect local interests against those of the center. 
                                                     
 
25 The circumstances and process through which this might happen are meticulously doc-
umented in Calame and Charlesworth, Divided Cities. The authors emphatically (and, to my 
mind, rightly) argue that these processes and their outcome of division are historically and 
geographically universal. 
26 As in the case of Almohad, Nasrid and Castilian Granada in its frontier phase, before 
the closing of the Granada frontier and the city’s full incorporation into the new Castilian 
order towards 1600, see generally David Coleman, Creating Christian Granada: Society and Reli-
gious Culture in an Old-World Frontier City, 1492-1600 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
Coleman makes it very clear that Granada’s history of cohabitation was a rather rough ride, 
yet, if anything, this demonstrates perfectly the enduring social, economic and spatial instinct 
towards urban integration can be. 
27 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 84. Here, Kafadar also warns us that “Accommodation and 
symbiosis were possible and occurred much more often than historians have so far recog-
nized; identities changed, inclusivism was common, and heterogeneity was not frowned upon. 
Still, hostilities and exclusions were, or could be, part of the same environment, and one 
should be careful not to romanticize, whatever the weight of inclusivism in frontier realities or 
narratives.” The societal impact of fluid frontiers and intensive mobility across them is dis-
cussed throughout the work, but particularly on pages 140-41. 
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Explicitly considering Izmir’s incorporation into the pax Ottomanica a two-
way street forces the realization that there was an interplay at work there in 
which the interests of central and local factions sometimes overlapped to the 
detriment of other central and local factions, but in which there was much 
more occasion for central interests to be diametrically opposed to local ones. 
The question then becomes what kind of marks this multifaceted tug be-
tween autonomy and conformity, relative independence and full incorpora-
tion, left on 17th-century Ottoman Izmir. Or, for that matter, on the Otto-
man policies of that age. 
With these considerations on Izmir’s social configuration in mind, let us 
now turn to the practicalities of that city’s integration into the pax ottomanica. 
 
Izmir as an Ottoman Port 
After the Ottomans had definitively brought the town under their rule in 
1424, upper and lower Izmir were literally and figuratively glued together by 
continuous growth, and specifically, throughout the 17th century, by a series 
of influxes of Armenian28 and Jewish29 migrants (also see Map 10). In the 
                                                     
 
28 “In the early seventeenth century, when Shah ‘Abbas succeeded in regaining the town 
of Nakhčhewan from the Ottomans, he had it destroyed because in his perspective, the resi-
dent elite had traitorously supported his major enemy. Furthermore, in order to prevent the 
rapid reconstruction of Nakhčhewan, he also deported the local traders’ commercial partners, 
namely the Armenians of Djulfa, to a far-away site in the vicinity of Isfahan. There the latter 
constructed the famous merchant diaspora which handled Iranian silk exports throughout the 
seventeenth century, as well as English and Indian goods. Armenian merchants formed part 
of a major commercial diaspora, which on the one hand linked the residents of New Djulfa 
near Isfahan to India and even Tibet, and on the other hand, to Izmir, Aleppo, Amsterdam 
and, at least temporarily, Marseilles. … All this activity must have resulted in more or less 
extended residences of Armenians based in New Djulfa in the major Ottoman centres of 
commerce. Moreover, some of their counterparts domiciled in Amsterdam also traded with 
the Empire and thus visited Ottoman ports, especially Izmir. Most of the principal merchants 
of the Armenian diaspora lived permanently in Iran and merely sent their junior partners, 
often younger relatives, on commercial trips. But there existed colonies of resident Armenian 
merchants in Ottoman cities as well. Thus from the eighteenth century onwards Roman 
Catholic Armenian immigrants from Iran were established in Izmir where some of the wealth-
ier members of the group soon came to intermarry with French merchants”, Suraiya Faroqhi, 
The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (Tauris: London, 2006), 139. 
29 Very recently, David B. Ruderman patterned “Jewish migration to Italy and the Otto-
man Empire” as follows: “Jewish migrations long preceded the end of the fifteenth century in 
both western and eastern Europe. From as early as 1348, large numbers of Jews moved east-
ward to Poland and Lithuania and southward to Italy. They arrived in Italy and primarily 
settled in the regions of Piedmont and the Veneto. They were followed by Jewish immigrants 
from Southern France at the end of the fourteenth century, by Italian Jews moving into cen-
tral and northern Italian cities from the South, and eventually by the exiles from Spain and 
Portugal, from the papal territories in 1569 and from the duchy of Milan in 1597. … Jewish 
settlement in the Ottoman Empire came in surges. The first Jewish immigrants came from 
Romaniot and Karaite communities who settled in pre-Ottoman communities in Anatolia and 
the Balkans. They were followed by Ashkenazic Jews travelling from central Europe. With the 
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course of that same century, the distinctly Ottoman cocktail of Greeks, 
Turks, Latins, Armenians and Jews was topped off with a sizeable Western 
European component as French, English and Dutch merchants flocked to 
the city in search of trade. So, instead of becoming more ethnically uniform 
under continued Ottoman suzerainty, the city’s diversity increased even fur-
ther. This was not the only continuity between the pre-Ottoman and Otto-
man periods; although the city would remain Ottoman until 1923, the oscil-
lating movement continued even in the interim, albeit in different guises. 
In correlation with these migratory patterns, changes occurred in Izmir’s 
economy. When the Ottomans took the city, it had been a Genoese com-
mercial center for more than a century. Its institutions and economy had 
been geared to generate profit from the supply and demand of the horizontal 
axis of Mediterranean trade (which carried luxury goods from the East to the 
West). Its orientation, therefore, was westward. Afterwards, as the city’s 
economy was increasingly integrated into the economy of the expanding 
Ottoman state, this orientation changed. In 1453 Mehmed II the Conqueror 
(r. 1444-1446, 1451-1481) annihilated the Byzantine empire by seizing the 
dwindling city of Constantinople and establishing it as the new Ottoman 
capital, Istanbul. To support the ensuing policy of repopulation of the new 
political center – which within a mere fifty years would develop into the 
largest city in Europe – and the imperial ambitions directed from it, the Ot-
toman economic system had to undergo fundamental restructuring. From 
that moment onwards, the prime objective of the Ottoman economic enter-
prise would be to guarantee the feeding of the capital. In the provisioning econ-
omy that was the result, Izmir’s function was – like that of Ottoman Alexan-
dria – that of a staging point for the collection of surplus regional produce 
and its redirection to the imperial center (along the vertical axis of Mediter-
ranean trade).30 Competing for the acquisition and marketing of that surplus, 
                                                                                                                        
 
conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Sultan Mehmet II turned his new capital Istanbul into a 
newly rebuilt and repopulated city, among them Jews from Greece, Macedonia, Albania and 
Bulgaria, as well as other regions in Turkey. Sephardic Jews and later conversos came to Is-
tanbul, Salonika, Aleppo, Safed, and Jerusalem beginning in the mid-fifteenth century, but 
larger waves of immigrants followed after the expulsions of 1492 and 1497. Some came 
through North Africa, others through Italy and Sicily. Later flows arrived from Portugal after 
1506 and again after 1536. … The one Ottoman Jewish community whose trajectory of de-
velopment was different from the rest was Izmir. Jews migrated to the city in the early seven-
teenth century not as a refuge from persecution and expulsion but because of its economic 
vitality”, David B. Ruderman, Early Modern Jewry: A New Cultural History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 26-27 and 29. 
30 In his 2008 doctorate thesis İsmail Hakki Kadı provides an excellent summary of the 
Ottoman economic mindset (which comprised three leading principles: provisionism, tradi-
tionalism and fiscalism). Kadı also offers a welcome reinterpretation of that mindset in light of 
Ottoman-Dutch commercial relations as they played out in Izmir, Ankara and Amsterdam in 
the 17th and 18th century: İsmail Hakkı Kadı, “Natives and Interlopers: Competition Between 
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however, were a number of increasingly powerful Ottoman and European 
merchant communities that in the course of centuries managed to reorient 
the region’s economy to the west, in the end solidly integrating it into the 
western world economy. 
 
Except for in economic orientation, the oscillating movement between Asia 
Minor and the Aegean also continued in another area: that of administration. 
Following its annexation by the Ottomans, Izmir was attached to the prov-
ince (eyalet) of Anatolia as a kaza (the jurisdiction of a kadı, or judge) in the 
provincial district (sancak) of Aydın-Saruhan.31 However, during a tax survey 
(tahrir) of the district in the year 1573, Izmir and three other jurisdictions 
were reassigned to the neighboring province Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid (the Is-
lands of the White Sea; the “white sea” meaning the Mediterranean and “the 
islands” those of the Aegean Sea).32 Like in Byzantine times, when it had 
been capital of the theme of Samos, Izmir again became part of a maritime 
province. In this new division the kaza came under the sancak of Sığla, which 
had its capital in Urla. Sığla was governed by a derya beyi (a governor of a 
maritime sancak), who was required to contribute two fully outfitted galleys a 
year to the fleet of his governor-general (beylerbeyi) the Lord high admiral 
(kapudan paşa), instead of the previous sancak beyi’s requirement to contribute 
a certain number of cavalry (sipahi) to the Ottoman army.33 Around 1678, the 
pendulum swung back once more as the kaza was reattached to the district 
of Aydın and thereby to the great province of Anatolia.34 
                                                                                                                        
 
Ottoman and Dutch Merchants in the 18th Century” (PhD diss., Universiteit Leiden, 2008), 
12-14 and throughout. 
31 See Katib Çelebi, Kitab-ı Cihannüma (Kostantıniye [Istanbul]: Darultibaat-ul Amire, 1065; 
1145 [1654; 1732]), 669-70. 
32 See Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, XV. ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir kazasının sosyal ve iktisâdî yapısı 
(Izmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayını, 2000), 57. 
33 See Evliya Çelebi, Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi, vol. 9: Anadolu, Suriye, Hicaz (1671-1672), 
ed. Ahmet Cevdet (Istanbul: İkdam Matbaası, 1935), 88-100; and İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, 
Osmanlı devletinin merkez ve bahriye teşkilātı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınevi, 1948), 427-
28. 
34 When Evliya visited Izmir in 1671, Izmir still resorted under the kapudan’s eyalet (Evliya, 
Seyahatname 9, 89). In the absence of definitive documentary proof, scholarship has agreed that 
the transfer to Anatolia took place somewhere in the closing decades of the 17th or the open-
ing decades of the 18th century. Although I have also not been able to locate any Ottoman 
archival evidence roundly declaring the transfer of Izmir and/or environs to the province of 
Anatolia, it in fact must have coincided with (or directly followed) the comprehensive census-
es (tahrirs) of Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid of AH 1087 (AD 1676/77) and Anatolia of AH 1099 (AD 
1678/78); see infra, also for more context on the following. This estimation is based on the 
following facts and circumstances: (1) the administrative reassignment of districts of Izmir’s 
importance in the 17th century (especially with the timar system still in use and not yet fully 
succeeded by an alternative fiscal structure) still required an amount of fiscal/administrative 
planning that required some sort of complete central administrative accounting of its fiscal 
and military assets; (2) from the mid-16th century onwards – when tahrirs were no longer 
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In conjunction with military-administrative responsibility for the kaza of 
Izmir moving back and forth between Anatolia and the Aegean, a similar 
movement can be discerned with regard to the allocation of its tax revenues. 
Almost as soon as the Ottomans were in full control of the city and its coun-
tryside, these were excluded from the feudal tax base of the military (the 
sipahis, sancak beyis and beylerbeyis). In recognition of the region’s high agricul-
tural and commercial yield and of its importance to Istanbul’s food supply, it 
was converted to crown land (hass-ı hümayun); a status reserved for the most 
productive and profitable Ottoman lands.35 When Izmir was appended to 
Sığla, its income was also reappointed. It remained crown land, but the reve-
nue it generated now accrued to the second Lord of the Admiralty (tersane-i 
amire kethüdası), the grand admiral’s second-in-command.36 A good century 
later, when Izmir was reattached to Aydın, its revenue reverted to the sultan, 
who subsequently awarded it to the sultan-mother (valide sultan) as an apa-
nage (arpalık). She governed it through a substitute governor (mütesellim) 
based in the provincial capital of Manissa, leaving the local kadi in charge of 
local administration.37 
In the three-tiered Annales-approach to historical change that distin-
guishes between histoire structurelle (or, the longue durée), histoire conjoncturelle and 
histoire événementielle, the cyclical trend described above would be registered on 
the clock of medium, “conjunctural”, time; that of the “slow but perceptible 
                                                                                                                        
 
conducted after fixed intervals – they were organized in response to specific administra-
tive/political problems and needs of major importance; it is surely no coincidence that the 
two major tahrirs carried out in the second half of the 17th century pertained to the two prov-
inces involved in the transfer; (3) the tahrirs (and the relating transfer of Izmir from Cezayir to 
Anatolia) followed the Ottoman victory in the maritime Cretan War (1669) and Merzifonlu 
Kara Mustafa Paşa’s taking over the reins of executive power from his brother (1676), and 
coincided with the new grand vizier’s redirection of all available Ottoman forces towards the 
land wars on the empire’s northern fronts (against Russia, 1676-1681, and against the Habs-
burgs, 1683-1698); that the reassignment of Izmir’s capital, manpower and military resources 
from maritime towards land-based warfare in fact took place just before or in the course of 
1678 (when the new grand vizier, coincidentally, was also heavily invested in the city’s com-
mercial infrastructure and operations) appears to be confirmed by orders going out to the 
kadis of the (Anatolian) districts of Manisa, Izmir, Tire, Kuşadası, Sakız (Chios), Rodoscuk 
(Tekridağ), Kilitbahir, Çortak, Sultaniye and Kocaeli to have prayers recited for the outgoing 
troops. Istanbul, BBA A.DVN.MHM 96 (AH 1089-90 / AD 1678-79), command 292. 
35 See Cengiz Orhonlu, “Khāss”, EI2, iv: 1094b. 
36 See Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devletinin … teşkilātı, 420-21 and 427-28. 
37 See my “Towards Classifying Avanias: A Study of Two Cases Involving the English and 
Dutch Nations in Seventeenth-Century Izmir”, in: Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-
Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seventeenth to the Early Nineteenth Century, eds. Alastair Hamil-
ton, Alexander Hendrik de Groot, Maurits H. van den Boogert (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 166. Cf. 
Elena Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820) (Athens: 
Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), 37; and Yuzo Nagata, Tarihte âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları 
üzerinde bir inceleme (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997), 23. 
 
 
38 
 
rhythms” of “economic systems, states, societies and civilizations”.38 On this 
clock, and relatively close to “structural” time, Izmir’s history was above all 
else that of a frontier between two regions that more often than not repre-
sented two worlds. Its challenge; to continue to successfully bridge the 
chasm between them. 
 
Demography 
Most observations on Ottoman cities – from contemporary travelers’ ac-
counts and histories to more recent attempts to apply the paradigm of the 
Islamic city to the Ottoman case – have their origin in a number of strong 
assumptions about the status of non-Muslims in Islamic societies. Since the 
history and historiography of that status derived from a specific set of Islam-
ic legal rules and principles to which we will regularly refer throughout the 
remainder of the text, it is important that we are first clear on what these 
entailed exactly. 
 
The Status of the Non-Muslim Communities 
Central to Islam’s relations with non-Muslim peoples and states was the legal 
distinction between dar ül-Islam and dar ül-harb, “the land of Islam” and “the 
land of war” respectively. The former may be defined as “the whole territory 
in which the law of Islam prevails”, the latter as that territory where it does 
not. Non-Muslim inhabitants of the land of war, and the states to which they 
belonged, were in principle branded as harbis, enemies. That is, unless they 
had become tributaries to the land of Islam and qualified as subjects of dar 
ül-ahd, “the land of the covenant” (essentially an extension of dar ül-Islam).39 
Of course, no community or state can function normally if it considers 
every outsider not just a potential enemy, but also a real one. For one, there 
was always the necessity of diplomatic and commercial contact with the out-
side world, which called for an alternative to harbi-status, or at least for the 
possibility of suspending it temporarily (we will return to this müstemin-status 
later on). More importantly, however, allowance had to be made for the non-
Muslim inhabitants of territories that came under Islam, particularly because 
the rapid expansion of Islamic lands meant that Muslims were almost with-
out exception numerically inferior to the Jews, Christians and Persians whose 
lands they had conquered. The Islamic legal institution through which the 
                                                     
 
38 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II 
(London: Collins, 1972), 20-21. Histoire structurelle encompasses “the time of ‘geohistory’ the 
relation between humans and their environment, ‘a history whose passage is almost impercep-
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members of the other revealed, or monotheistic, religions were accorded 
hospitality and protection in the lands of Islam on condition of their submis-
sion, was called dhimma, or – in Turkish – zimmet.40 Persons to whom zimmet 
applied, were zimmis. 
 
In the Ottoman context, the legal institution of zimmet is best known through 
its evolution into the Ottoman administrative institution commonly known 
as the millet-system.41 The term millet had several interrelated meanings in 
Ottoman Turkish. It indicated “religion”, “confession” or “rite”, “religious 
community” and “part of a people” or “(sovereign) nation”. However, when 
speaking about the fully developed millet-system of the 19th century, it should 
be understood as a semi-autonomous and semi-extraterritorial ethno-
religious community.42 The original and most important millets of the Otto-
man Empire were the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian and the Jewish, repre-
senting the largest non-Muslim communities of the early Ottoman state 
Although there existed considerable differences between their internal 
organizations, the millets had similar functions within Ottoman administra-
tion. Representing their coreligionists at the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman 
government) were their religious leaders (the Greek and Armenian patriarchs 
and the Jewish chief rabbi), nominated by a council of their peers and con-
firmed by the sultan. Their obvious religious and representational functions 
aside, these leaders also headed the communities’ legal and administrative 
affairs; prerogatives that were also delegated to religious subordinates on the 
local level. This partial autonomy notwithstanding, they remained accounta-
ble to the sultan in all affairs, in effect functioning as non-territorial Ottoman 
delegates. Their most crucial responsibility was that of guaranteeing the 
payment of tribute to the Ottomans as a sign of their zimmi-communities’ 
submission to the ruler of Islam, the sultan. Known as cizye in Islamic law, 
Ottoman administration commonly also referred to this yearly poll-tax as 
haraç – the name of a land tax eventually completely converted into cizye by 
the Ottomans and, crucially, the general term for “tribute”.43 
The accelerating power and extent of the millets would eventually become 
an important factor in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by its 
European allies and adversaries, but the system’s 19th-century manifestation 
should not be confused with that of earlier periods. Certainly, the founda-
tions of the Ottoman millet-system were laid in the decade after the conquest 
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of Constantinople, when Mehmed II the Conqueror embedded the three 
religious leaders in the Ottoman central administration by recognizing them 
as millet başıs (ethnarchs); heads and representatives of their communities.44 
Nevertheless, at that time, and certainly still in the 17th century, the rigid 
compartmentalization and partial extraterritorialziation of society normally 
associated with the millet-system, was still a good century and a half off. 
At the time of its inception in the 1450s, the millet-system was above all a 
theoretical legal construct, the actual administrative application of which 
centered on Istanbul and was not empire-wide. The system provided the 
framework for a coherent organization and administration of the repopulat-
ed capital, but the authority the millet başıs’ exerted over their communities in 
the rest of the empire was often symbolical. Empire-wide millet-uniformity 
was only approached in internal affairs concerning religion (the millet başı as 
the ecclesiastical head of his religious sect) and internal justice (the millet başı’s 
function of chief justice of his millet), and even there not attained. As long as 
it did not go contrary to the fundamental precepts of zimmet and Ottoman 
law, the actual functioning of local zimmi-communities, internally as well as in 
relation to Ottoman authorities, would be left to local circumstances, peculi-
arities and wishes.45 
The process through which the millet-system developed from a theoretical 
legal construct into a more uniform and all-pervasive societal reality – “mil-
letization”, if you like – is complicated and still hotly debated. It involves all 
aspects of life (religious, social, economic, political and so on) of a number 
of communities within a vast and changing territorial expanse (the Ottoman 
Empire) over several centuries – from the taking of Constantinople in 1453 
up until its legal dismantlement with the proclamation of the Ottoman Law 
on Nationality of January 19, 1869) and the abolishment of its last remnants 
with the Treaty of Lausanne.46 In addition, the process also captured the 
empire’s foreign relations and destiny to the degree of becoming its major 
driver, which makes it all the more complicated to attempt the kind of de-
tached history the subject begs.47 One can easily see how difficult it would be 
to adequately position the 17th century on this scale, let alone to pinpoint the 
situation in Izmir in 1678. 
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Still, the wording of Ottoman official documents in referring to millets or 
their constituent communities can be used as a rough indicator of where the 
process of milletization stood in the 17th century. Most striking in this re-
spect is that… 
 
the term millet, in the meaning of ‘non-Muslim religious community (in the Ottoman Em-
pire)’, was by no means used exclusively or at all consistently before the 19th century. This 
turns out to be true even in documents where the notion occurs more or less regularly. So far, 
this regular use can only be demonstrated in some central organisations in the Ottoman 
Empire, but not in provincial or local administrations, tā’ife, for example, being a fre-
quently used alternative in the latter. Occasionally, millet and tā’ife are found in the same 
document next to one another with the same meaning, or also in combination … It rather 
looks as if the individual religious communities, which, on the local level, had to live under 
conditions which were varying according to place and time, in the perspective of the central 
government were seen as parts of religious and juridical communities which, under the lead-
ership of their (ecclesiastical) heads, ideally had an empire-wide dimension.48 
 
The prevalence of the term taife (meaning “a group, party, company of men”) 
in pre-19th-century Ottoman official documents (including all those from the 
17th century reviewed for this study) instead of millet is instructive. Taife was 
not only used to designate what would later be referred to as millets, but also 
a whole range of other groupings, such as religious denominations and sects, 
ethnic and professional groups, military units and so on. It was, in fact, re-
markably similar to the contemporary, now obsolete, European use of “na-
tion”.49 
I propose that the slight but significant semantic difference between the 
two terms and their use over time reflects underlying administrative attitudes. 
The reflection, to be witnessed in folder upon folder of Ottoman and Euro-
                                                     
 
48 Ursinus, “Millet”, 63b. 
49 See, e.g., Istanbul, BBA A.DVN.DVE 22/1 (AH 1091-1278 / AD 1680-1862), com-
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pean official correspondence and records, shows the substitution of taife by 
millet (as the preferred designation for Ottoman non-Muslim community in 
Ottoman and European parlance) to have gone hand-in-hand with those 
communities’ organizational consolidation and politicization under Europe-
an “protection”. Those later beholding the process of milletization in its 
advanced stages or near-completion most often proved either unable or 
unwilling to look back to before the 19th century and describe the non-
Muslim communities of earlier times as anything other than millets, perhaps 
slumbering; waiting to be kissed awake by Europe. This is not to say that the 
process of milletization, the shift from inclusion to exclusion, had not also 
begun to take place earlier on; it just did not materialize as early and suddenly 
as they maintained.50 
That being said, the second half of the 17th century did witness the first 
major European project to acquire the mass-protection of Ottoman Chris-
tians – as France’s “most Christian Majesty” Louis XIV labored to gain both 
the loyalty of the empire’s Catholics and Ottoman recognition of his partial 
suzerainty over them.51 While this attempt to extraterritorialize entire millets 
failed dramatically, the attempt was a sign of things to come, and other at-
tempts would meet with more success in the centuries that followed.52 
What contemporary documents in fact show is that Ottoman administra-
tion for the time still preferred the use of the imprecise catch-all category taife 
to any other single term that might serve to set the collective in question 
firmly apart from the larger fiscal or social whole. Although ethno-religious 
adjectives (Armenian, Jewish, and so on) would precede the term to qualify it 
further, the implication nevertheless is that to early modern Ottoman admin-
                                                     
 
50 For further clues as to the timing of “milletization” in Izmir, also see Frangakis-Syrett, 
Commerce of Smyrna, 34-37 and throughout). 
51 As his instructions to his ambassadors to the Ottoman court illustrate, Louis XIV’s pro-
ject – particularly after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 – also involved attempts 
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istrators the empire’s minorities were not hors catégorie or even of another 
category than the other kinds of taifes under their jurisdiction, at least for 
purposes of everyday administration. 
Of course there existed Ottoman towns and villages where non-Muslims 
were ostracized economically, socially, legally and politically, but there cer-
tainly also existed many places where their otherness was primarily and per-
haps even uniquely determined by their nominal liability to haraç, i.e. by their 
fiscal relationship with the state, and even that liability was often suspended 
if governance so required.53 As Kemal Karpat has argued: 
 
Consequently, it is extremely difficult to claim that the mere fact of being non-Muslim con-
ferred automatically a dhimmī status upon an individual. It is probably more accurate to 
claim that it was rather the administrative role of the individual which determined his tax 
status which, in turn, determined his social status both in Ottoman society and his own 
millet. … The implications of this basic principle is vital to understanding the evolution of 
the millets. It meant that since service to the state, and not religion, was basic in determin-
ing the payment of taxes and certain social ranking, changes in the functions of the pri-
mates were bound to affect their relations with the government and their status and function 
in their respective community regardless of religion.54 
 
So, more often than not formal and informal inequalities proved subject to a 
given individual’s value to the state, to his resulting status, and to his ability 
to leverage those to win more fiscal, economic, social, legal or political con-
cessions and advantages. 
 
If the millets of the 17th century were still abstract collections of coreligionist 
communities that left ample room for individuals and local groups to 
(re)negotiate their own boundaries with their particular Ottoman contexts, it 
follows that the conditions in which the members of these communities 
lived and worked must have varied considerably from place to place. One of 
the ways in which people’s social conditions manifested themselves most 
clearly to the administration and to foreign observers was through sumptuary 
spending and behavior, i.e. through choices of consumption, attire, conduct 
                                                     
 
53 On haraç-exemption in general, see Karpat, “Millets and Nationality”, 148-52; accord e.g. 
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and choices regarding company and venues. Such choices were by no means 
free in the Ottoman Empire. 
Laws restricting consumption and its social and physical settings to peo-
ple having a particular status, occupation, religion or sex were a regular fix-
ture of pre-modern and early modern societies, and became increasingly 
prominent throughout the 17th and 18th centuries as state elites attempted to 
protect social order and the markers of their social status from the en-
croachments of conspicuously consuming upwardly mobile subject classes, 
of their own and even of other religions. This desire to demarcate sections of 
society through restricting consumption was not limited to the ruling classes 
of the sovereign community however. Minority leaders also often promul-
gated, enforced and upheld the very same sumptuary or even stricter distinc-
tions to stimulate cohesion and social order within the minority group. Indi-
viduals often freely submitted to them because (appearing) to do so afforded 
them a measure of legal, social and even commercial security and protection. 
But many at times did not. 
Over the course of the 17th and 18th century Ottoman sumptuary laws 
were endlessly reaffirmed, and with increasing frequency, not merely as a 
tool for age-old social conservatism but as a focal point of the severe reac-
tionary backlash that gripped the empire in the wake of accelerating territori-
al losses and economic hardship.55 The sheer frequency of their reaffirmation 
confirms that they were not able to stem the tide of people choosing their 
own social destinies: court records and travelers’ accounts time after time 
bear witness to sumptuary behavior that was clearly transgressive, as they do 
to local administrative and public acceptance thereof. 
The most remarkable accepted transgressions against sumptuary laws oc-
curred in Ottoman centers of international commerce. There, ethno-
religiously diverse populations engaged in economic pursuits in which they 
were highly dependent on one another for success, and where such success 
made available the capital required for conspicuous consumption, while in 
the process also holding up sumptuary examples from other communities to 
emulate. Thus, Muslims and non-Muslims were officiously permitted to ride 
horses (in Kayseri, Aleppo and Izmir); to dress as Turks, share the same 
public baths and city quarters, and own, lease and let the same commercial 
and private real estate (in Aleppo and Izmir); and even to wear arms, drink 
alcohol and mingle with other sexes and faiths in taverns and theatres (Iz-
mir). 
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Such flexibility was probably common in many other Ottoman jurisdic-
tions and administrative spheres (although certainly not in all) and was not 
limited to sumptuary practice. In Izmir and Kayseri, for example, the testi-
mony of non-Muslims was regularly accepted in cases against Muslims.56 
Similar cases of local consensus flying in the face of the Ottoman socio-legal 
order abound. As a matter of fact – and this is something to ponder when 
considering the separation of communities that is supposed to have been of 
structural importance to early modern and modern Ottoman social order – 
there existed no Ottoman law against the regular joining of people of varying 
ethnicities or faiths in the workplace and in the all-important associations 
governing it.57 
                                                     
 
56 Jennings, “Zimmis (non-Muslims)”, 250-76 on Kayseri; infra on Izmir – I will not go in-
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Looking at what has been handed down to us about concrete sumptuary 
behaviors – or, in other words, about the public behavior of specific mem-
bers of specific taifes in specific places at specific times – it seems safe to 
conclude that there existed an Ottoman scale of permissibility in which cen-
ters of international commerce left the rest of the empire far behind. Con-
sidering the apparent and logical correlation between successful ethno-
religious economic interdependence and social tolerance, we might conclude 
that Ottoman laws concerning non-Muslims and their millets constituted an 
ideal that was never meant to be attained. Ottoman economic and social 
success in fact depended on it. To return to Karpat: 
 
Thus, while the basic millet was universal and anational, the small community had distinc-
tive local, ethnic and linguistic peculiarities. The millet system therefore produced, simulta-
neously, religious universality and local parochialism. The balance between religious univer-
salism and ethnic-cultural localism could be maintained as long as the economic and social 
organization remained intact, social mobility was low and the central government remained 
strong enough to maintain the status quo.58 
 
The observation that uniform legal and administrative principles, when con-
fronted with reality on the ground, generated (and, indeed, might have been 
meant to generate) widely divergent outcomes clearly has profound implica-
tions for the paradigm of the Islamic city. As the following will show, the 
history of our booming port city of Izmir defies and undermines such cate-
gorizations. Considering the city’s long history as a frontier crossing point 
and most successful international trade center, it is far more likely that the 
city’s Muslims and non-Muslims consistently shared more than they divided. 
If Izmir’s long pre-Ottoman history tells us anything it is that strict separa-
tions between populations were highly impractical in this specific geograph-
ic-economic setting and could never be sustained for long. The city’s history 
as a frontier, combined with the history of its meteoric rise in early modern 
times, seems to preclude the contract between Muslim, non-Muslim and the 
state being non-negotiable. 
 
But before discussing 17th-century Izmir’s Ottoman and European commu-
nities and their interaction any further to test this hypothesis, a last word 
should be said here about the composition of these two categories and about 
the spatial relation between them. The part of the city that will here be called 
“Ottoman” comprised all communities that were internal to the Ottoman 
legal system, that is; Turks, Arabs, Persians, Greeks, Jews and Armenians. 
They cannot properly be called subject-communities (reaya) since in Ottoman 
terminology that would exclude the tax-free soldiery and clergy, but they 
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were reaya-communities insofar as the majority of their members had reaya-
status. 
On the other hand, the part of the city we will call “European” comprises 
the communities that the Ottoman legal system considered foreign, notwith-
standing the fact that many members of these communities spent their entire 
lives in the Ottoman Empire. Naturally, this includes the French, English 
and Dutch, but also – less obviously – the Venetians and Genoese. Although 
the history of these communities went back at least as far as that of the city’s 
Turkish element, they never ceased being considered subjects of their city-
states and remained protected foreigners.59 
It is of course misleading to speak about a European Izmir; after the city 
was definitively conquered by the Ottomans there remained only an Otto-
man city. Nevertheless, Izmir’s European quarter might be regarded as a 
prolonged and condensed version of the Byzantine-Genoese city that had 
once retreated to the protection of the guns of the Genoese and Knights 
Hospitallers’ harbor castle. The designation “European Izmir”, then, refers 
to historical character, not to actual status. 
 
Family Multipliers 
Accurate demographical data are not available for the bulk of Ottoman terri-
tories prior to the first modern Ottoman censuses of the 19th century. This 
has posed considerable problems for socio-economic historiography, but 
these have been partially overcome by the creative use of Ottoman tax regis-
ters (tahrir defters). Unfortunately, the inventory of the tapu tahrir-series (ab-
breviated as TT) in the Ottoman archives lists few such registers for the 17th 
century. Izmir, for example, has only one, from AH 1105 (AD 1693/94), the 
other three dating from AH 929, 935 and 983 (AD 1522/23, 1528/29 and 
1575/76 respectively).60 
The near-absence of post-16th-century material in the series has led many 
to conclude that the Ottoman administrative practice of regularly surveying a 
certain area (at least every thirty to forty years, but more often depending on 
the intensity of that area’s demographical change) was abandoned at the 
close of the 16th century.61 In addition, it has been suggested that the majori-
                                                     
 
59 This “foreign” status was confirmed in the capitulations granted to these communities 
by the Ottoman sultans, which, in this respect as in many others, continued Byzantine law and 
practice (see, e.g., the fragment of the Genoese capitulation of 1304 in Dölger, Regesten 4, 41-
42). 
60 Istanbul, BBA TT 842 (AH 1105 / AD 1693/94); Istanbul, BBA TT 166 (AH 929 / 
AD 1522/53); Istanbul, BBA TT 148 (AD 935 / AH 1528/59); and Istanbul, BBA TT 537 
(AH 983 / AD 1575/76). 
61 “Our study, however, does not deal with the sixteenth but with the seventeenth centu-
ry, during which the situation was entirely different. Periodic, detailed population surveys were 
no longer compiled, and the surviving sources are scanty and of inferior quality”, Haim Ger-
ber, Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600-1700 (Jerusalem: The Hebrew 
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ty of the few registers that were compiled, were lost for posterity because 
Ottoman bureaucrats “had forgotten how to file”.62 It is undeniably true that 
the regularity and frequency with which tahrirs were conducted diminished 
overall and that the resulting registers are for the most part not to be found 
in the most appropriate archival series (the TT). Nonetheless, other, less 
likely, archival series reveal traces of a number of quite extensive surveys not 
listed in the TT-inventory.63 
One wonders, could our archival predicament be only partially due to Ot-
toman institutional failure or upheavals, such as the loss of considerable 
archives before Vienna in 1683, or the abrupt reorganizations and policy 
shifts that would typically follow other such dynastic or executive reversals? 
                                                                                                                        
 
University, 1988), 5. Accord. “It is of interest to provide some discussion of the types of 
sources available for the study of Ottoman demography in the seventeenth century. The 
period is considered a dark age. The preceding century was characterized by a great profusion 
of tax and population surveys conducted by the Ottoman empire in its provinces. … In any 
event, the great tax and population surveys come abruptly to an end at the end of the six-
teenth century, for a reason that still eludes us”, id., “Anthropology and Family History: The 
Ottoman and Turkish Families”, Journal of Family History, 14/4 (1989), 410. 
62 J.C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System”, Middle East 
Journal, 15/2 (1961), 148: “The correspondence reaching the Sublime Porte was assiduously 
collected; but the archivists – unlike their predecessors of the sixteenth century – had forgot-
ten how to file, so that it became impossible to keep track of commitments, negotiations and 
intelligence.” This cursory statement by a great scholar of Ottoman diplomatics and history 
has proven influential. Not only was it reproduced in Turkey by Belleten, 5/97-100 (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1961) and very recently in a prominent international handbook on dip-
lomatic history Christer Jönsson, Diplomacy (London: Sage, 2004), 2: 311, this conjectural line 
of thought echoes through in most modern scholarly contributions on the topic of Ottoman 
administrative breakdown and innovation. But compare, generally, with the narrative of the 
history of Ottoman bureaucratic specialization and professionalization in Carter Vaughn 
Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980); id., Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989); and with Faroqhi’s careful qualifying statements as repro-
duced in note 63. 
63 Cf. Suraiya Faroqhi, who has repeatedly toned down categorical claims that 17th-century 
surveys are virtually non-existent: “Tax registers were no longer compiled in coherent series 
after the reign of Murâd III. [r. AH 982-1003 (AD 1574-1595)]. However, individual registers 
were occasionally prepared both in the 11th/17th and 12th/18th centuries, and a whole group of 
Anatolian tahrīrs survives from the 1040s/1630s”, Suraiya Faroqhi, “Tahrīr”, EI2, x: 112b); 
“With the increase of tax-farming at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the expensive 
and labour-consuming compilation of tahrir registers was largely dropped … Occasionally, 
registers of taxpayers were compiled for one district or another even in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries … But comprehensive information on large regions was no longer avail-
able”, Suraiya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 92-93. Discussing this problem for Izmir, she notes that 
“After the tax register of 1575-6, no further count of the Izmir taxpayers survives and thus the 
population of the city can only be estimated. However a number of surveys was executed 
about 1070/1659-60, the results of which have as yet been located only as fragments”, Suraiya 
Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts, and Food Production in an Urban 
Setting, 1520-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 116. 
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Might it not also be a consequence of our own limited understanding of such 
events and how Ottoman administration worked to absorb them without 
being completely derailed? When documents you would normally expect in 
such and such an archive, series or folder are not to be found there that does 
of course not mean they do not exist. Historical circumstances might just 
have conspired to disperse and hide them from view. Whether we fully un-
derstand its particulars or not, there was always some bureaucratic logic at 
work. In the case of the drying up of centrally compiled and kept tax regis-
ters of entire provinces, for instance, it is clear that the fast-growing farming 
of taxes made centrally kept registers obsolete (after all, it would be the tax 
farmer’s task to administer and collect). But that is not to say that the infor-
mation that used to be contained in central registers was no longer collected 
– it was just not centrally collected and uniformly presented anymore. 
 
Most interesting as a source for miscellaneous registers are the Maliye’den 
müdevver defterler (abbreviated as MAD): a series of up to 26,000 miscellaneous 
Ottoman financial defters covering a period of five centuries (1427-1927) that 
was transferred from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Turkey to 
the Ottoman Section of the Prime Ministerial Archives in 1945. The four 
MAD-inventories for the years 1625-1700 consulted for this study – among 
account-books for practically every conceivable Ottoman fiscal unit and 
financial institution – list a great many non-continuous defters that offer a 
reworking or summarizing (icmal) of the data of recent surveys (tahrir-i cedid) 
to aid in the collection of specific taxes from individuals and particular 
communities.64 Several of these contain rare and otherwise unobtainable 
data, such as a defter-i cizye-i gebran covering the years AH 1070-1072 (AD 
1660-1662), which not only counts, but also lists, creed by creed, the names 
of all Izmir’s non-Muslim inhabitants liable to cizye, as gathered during a 
tahrir newly conducted by Vizier İsmail Paşa.65 
Apart from truly miscellaneous documents like this, the MAD-inventories 
also yield a number of large near-continuous series of such icmal defters. Two 
of these are of particular interest to us and will be returned to: the first is a 
series of around a hundred cizye-i gebran defters from AH 1087 (AD 1676/77) 
based on a new tahrir of Cezayir-i Bahr-ı Sefid conducted by one Mustafa; the 
second a series of a few hundred cizye-i gebran defters from AH 1099 (AD 
                                                     
 
64 Istanbul, BBA Katalog 124 (AH 1035-65 / AD 1625-55); Istanbul, BBA Katalog 125 
(AH 1064-87 / AD 1653-77); Istanbul, BBA Katalog 126 (AH 1087-1101 / AD 1676-90); 
Istanbul, BBA Katalog 127 (AH 1101-11 / AD 1689-1700). 
65 Istanbul, BBA MAD 14672 (AH 1070-72 / AD 1660-62): a detailed survey of the non-
Muslim population of Kuşadası, Manisa and Izmir. This particular defter is an exception in that 
it lists not only added totals, but also all individuals and, thus, should not properly be consid-
ered an icmal. We will return to the results of the survey infra. 
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1687/88) based on a new tahrir of Anatolia.66 Beyond the specific infor-
mation these documents contain, they are also useful in demonstrating that 
the once well-oiled Ottoman survey machinery did not suddenly grind to a 
near halt at the turn of the 16th century. On the contrary, they show that the 
demographical explosion that took place in Izmir in the second half of the 
17th century was recorded in at least three surveys (shortly prior to AH 1070, 
1087 and 1099; AD 1659/60, 1676/77 and 1687/88); an image that is mir-
rored in the documents on Istanbul, with surveys shortly prior to AH 1067, 
1084 and 1100 (AD 1656/57, 1673/74 and 1688/89). 
These surveys inevitably coincide with key developments in Ottoman 
(political) history, respectively: the end of the “Time of Troubles” and the 
restoration of order under grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Paşa (1656-1661); 
his successor and son Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s territorial restora-
tion, his preparations for the endowment of key parts of his territorial and 
political inheritance, and his gradual succession by his adopted brother Mer-
zifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa (1675-1676); and, lastly, Ottoman losses following 
the latter’s failure to take Vienna (1683), culminating in the loss of Hungary 
in the Battle of Mohacs (1687) and in sultan Mehmed IV’s deposition after a 
reign of 39 years (1687). If anything, such “coincidences” demonstrate that 
surveys could by the mid and late 17th century still be significant instruments 
of statecraft, at least if those managing the empire’s affairs were interested in, 
and capable of, serving the empire’s longer-term interests in tandem with 
their own. 
Even though surveys were still intermittently conducted in the 17th centu-
ry and bits of their contents are still available through the MAD archival 
series, the problem remains that these sources are not contiguous and most 
often abridged. This is to say they are not really fit for use as base material 
and should be treated with great caution in drawing comparisons. This 
shortage of the modern historian’s favorite socio-economic sources is one of 
the reasons that Ottomanist scholarship has largely shunned the age. Unchal-
lenged by hard quantifiable data divulging contrary trends and turning points, 
it seems to have regarded the age as a rather uninteresting stage between the 
oft-studied 16th and 18th centuries. Unjustly so, for the remarkable transition 
from that “classical” to that “early modern” Ottoman age of course took 
place in the century between the two. 
 
                                                     
 
66 Istanbul, BBA MAD 15157 (AH 1087 / AD 1676/77): a survey of the poll-tax payable 
by the non-Muslim population of Patmos (BBA Kat. 125/5096). In the inventory, this defter 
(no. 5096) is immediately followed by the rest in the series (nos. 5907-); and Istanbul, BBA 
MAD 14888 (AH 11 Rebi’ I 1099 / AD 15 January 1688): a summary survey of the poll-tax 
payable by the non-Muslim population of Izmir and environs (BBA Kat. 126/6746). The rest 
of the series spans the entire inventory, but particularly nos. 6707-6804 and 6808-6865. 
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The work of Haim Gerber – especially his studies on the court records of 
the city of Bursa – constitutes one of the most notable exceptions to the lack 
of interest in the 17th century. Out of frustration with the continuing absence 
of statistical data and with the resultant projection of figures from earlier and 
later periods on this “dark age”, he has sought ways to put the court records 
to innovative uses.67 One of these is to identify social and demographical 
indicators, equivalent to those that would normally be extracted from Otto-
man tax and population registers, so that court records might be used in 
cases where tahrirs are not available, or as a supplement to them. Regrettably, 
not only comprehensive tahrirs are lacking for Izmir after the 16th century; 
repeated earthquakes and fires have also destroyed its court records. Alt-
hough it is therefore impossible to replicate Gerber’s research for Izmir, his 
most important findings might still be put to good use – even in our case. 
The most basic demographic indicator is population size, but even for 
times and places where complete tahrirs are still available, coming up with a 
reliable figure is not easy. The problem is that Ottoman tax registers – de-
pending on the particular taxes they were meant to assess – list either tax 
units (one or multiple households per unit) or taxpaying subjects. In some 
cases the tax-exempt were also listed (though almost never exhaustively) and 
in others they were omitted entirely. Despite the fact that the names and/or 
numbers of tax-exempt male adults (soldiers, clergymen, foreign protégés 
and those engaged in various state-controlled professions such as mining and 
the guarding of roads and bridges) can often be retraced in various other 
registers, this invariably leaves one without any indication of the number of 
women, underage children and sometimes even non-productive males. To 
overcome this obstacle, a means is needed to translate the number of taxpay-
ing male adults or households in the surveys into a number representing the 
larger population taxed through a smaller slice of individuals representing it. 
If a more or less stable ratio between the two, or, in other words an average 
household or family size, could be identified, such a fixed multiplier would 
make coming up with a reliable number for a near-total population a relative-
ly straightforward task. “Near-total”, since tax-exempt and foreign house-
holds would never be included, as aren’t slaves – a sizeable and silenced slice 
of the population of every Ottoman city that is all too often forgotten. 
When the Ottoman tahrirs were opened up in the late 1930s, an average 
family size of “five plus” (married men times five, plus the number of single 
men) was considered reasonable for the Ottoman territories, but coefficients 
of six and upwards were also used.68 More than anything else, such figures 
                                                     
 
67 See Gerber, “Anthropology and Family History”, 410 and throughout. 
68 The figure five – in fact the first one applied to tahrir-data – was proposed by Barkan. 
He added (and this has often been forgotten) that it was something of an educated guess not 
fit to be applied to units significantly smaller than the total Ottoman population), Ömer Lutfi 
Barkan, “Essai sur les données statistiques des registres de recensement dans l'Empire 
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reflect now outdated anthropological notions about the great incidence of 
“extended family patterns” throughout the Middle East, as well as a once 
universal belief in the unchangeability of Islamic society. Numbers drawn 
from one geographical area and time were regularly and unscrupulously ap-
plied to subjects hundreds of miles and years removed. But since Fernand 
Braudel alerted scholarship to the exceptional population increase of the 16th 
century (in 1949 and – to a wider, non-Francophone audience – in 1972), it 
has become increasingly clear that coefficients that high have little validity 
beyond that century, certainly in Western and Northern Anatolia.69 Compari-
son with the age pyramids of other historical populations (by calculating the 
approximate percentage of adult males in the population and taking that to 
represent the percentage of taxpayers registered in tahrirs) have suggested 
that further downward adjustment to a minimum of three and a maximum of 
four are called for. Currently, even the high multipliers used for the 16th cen-
tury are under discussion, since that century’s dramatic increase in taxpayers 
is considered too high to be entirely attributed to increased fertility and de-
creased infant mortality. A doubling of the population within a century, 
without revolutionary nutritional and medical advances, is unlikely. If in-
creased state control (the registration and settling of nomads) and immigra-
tion (particularly of Jews from Europe and Armenians from Persia) are taken 
into account, the conclusion must be that a considerable part of the increase 
in taxpaying population is not attributable to natural growth. This in turn 
means that a considerable part of that growth was not the result of increased 
family size and should not be factored into a higher multiplier.70 
If the well-documented 16th century still poses such problems, where 
does that leave us with the 17th century, let alone 17th-century Izmir? What 
kind of multiplier should be applied to the fragments of tax surveys at our 
disposal and how do the results measure up to travelers’ estimates? Although 
comparison with similar historical populations might be useful in arriving at 
relatively reliable estimates for large segments of the Ottoman population, it 
is very risky business applying those to a local population for which little 
social evidence is at hand: the smaller the taxpaying population to which an 
extraneous multiplier is applied, the larger the risk that the impact of excep-
                                                                                                                        
 
Ottoman aux XVe et XVIe siècles”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 1/1 
(1957), 21. 
69 See generally Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe 
II (Paris: Colin, 1949). Braudel revised and augmented his work specifically for international 
publication, which first led to a revised and augmented French edition: id., La Méditerranée et le 
monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II (Paris: Colin, 1966). The translation of this second 
French edition became the first English-language edition: The Mediterranean and the 
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. The most fundamental revisions were made to include 
the results of Barkan’s work on the Ottoman tahrir defters. 
70 Cf. Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History, 88-92. 
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tional local circumstances – such as social and economic trends, or the ethnic 
background of population segments – on average family size is underesti-
mated. 
Gerber’s (abovementioned) article may offer a way out of this dilemma. 
On the basis of 2,300 estate inventories from the 17th century in the court 
records of Bursa (and some further corroborating evidence), he has conclud-
ed that not large “extended” families, but small “nuclear” families were the 
norm, even in the rural areas surrounding the city. He arrives at “an average 
family size of 3.65 in the city of Bursa and 4.9 in its rural environs – well 
below what we find in the modern Middle East or in other civilizations.”71 
After offering some explanations for these unexpectedly low averages (a high 
mortality rate due to bubonic plague, the in fact common experience of sons 
leaving their fathers’ family to establish their own, the abundance of free land 
in the Ottoman Empire), Gerber proceeds to the pivotal question: “how 
geographically dispersed was the pattern we have discovered in Bursa”?72 A 
tentative answer to this question is gathered from data available on the own-
ership and size of houses in 16th-century Istanbul, which appears to mirror 
the Bursa-pattern of small nuclear families. Gerber concludes that the typical 
family form must, by implication, have been nuclear in “the central areas of 
the Ottoman Empire prior to the 19th century”.73 In support of this generali-
zation, he argues that the conditions of security and rule-of-law – which were 
most strongly felt in the heart of the empire (i.e. in the geographical or tem-
poral vicinity of its capital, like Edirne, Bursa, or Izmir) – are generally 
known to have a tempering effect on family size: “such regions had fewer 
                                                     
 
71 Gerber, “Anthropology and Family History”, 413. Gerber himself had still advocated a 
multiplier of five shortly before the appearance of this article: compare with Gerber, Economy 
and Society, 9. Coefficients of 7 and 8 are, nevertheless, still considered reasonable for the 
Arab-Ottoman lands: Marcus, Middle East on the Eve of Modernity, 341. It is interesting to note 
that the difference between early modern average family size in the Ottoman central lands 
(Anatolia, the Balkans and the Aegean) and the Ottoman Arab lands (current Syria and further 
to the South) has parallels in our time: the current average Saudi family size is about 7 on 
average, but reaches “twenty in the eastern regions where the oil industry and affluent families 
are concentrated”. The Saudi “total fertility rate was 7.3, compared to the Middle East average 
of 5.7 and the average of 1.8 in the world’s high-income countries in 1990”, Mohamad Riad 
el-Ghonemy, Affluence and poverty in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1998), 143. By com-
parison, Turkey has a much lower total fertility rate of 2.5-2.6 and an average family size of 
around 4: Family Planning: World Fertility Rates 1973 to 1997 (20 June 2009), by Rotarian 
Fellowship for Population Development, http://www.rifpd.org/Resources/Family 
Planning.shtml (accessed 12 October 2011); V. M. Zlidar, R. Gardner, S. O. Rutstein, L. 
Morris, H. Goldberg, and K. Johnson, “New Survey Findings: The Reproductive Revolution 
Continues” (Spring 2003), Population Reports, http://www.k4health.org/pr/m17/index.shtml 
(accessed 12 October 2011); Thomas M.McDevitt, “World Population Profile: 1998” 
(February 1999), U.S. Bureau of the Census, http://www.census.gov/population/ 
international/files/wp98.pdf (accessed 12 October 2011), A-40. 
72 Gerber, “Anthropology and Family History”, 416. 
73 Ibid., 417. 
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security problems than outlying areas and may also have possessed other 
traits – such as urban society and an active government – supporting family 
nuclearization.”74 
 
Size and Composition of the Taxpaying Population in 1657/58 
The applicability of the Bursa-pattern to all Ottoman central lands prior to 
the 19th century (fortunately) need not concern us here. For our purposes, it 
is sufficient to consider whether and how Gerber’s multipliers can be applied 
to 17th-century Izmir. Although there is too little demographic data available 
to arrive at a firm base estimate, some indications of the size of Izmir’s 
population can be gathered from travelers’ accounts. At least six 17th-century 
travelers have left estimates; five of these are European and one is Ottoman. 
Four more European accounts, running up to 1739, may serve as additional 
context (see Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1: TRAVELERS’ ESTIMATES OF IZMIR’S POPULATION (1631-1739) 
 Turks Greeks Armenians Jews Europeans Given total 
Tavernier (1631) ≈60 p. ≈15 p. ≈8 p. 6-7 p. very few 90 p. 
Evliya (1657/58-1671) - - - - - 10.3 f. 
Spon (1675) >30 p. 9-10 p. - 12-15 p. - 55 p. 
De Bruyn (1678) majority <Turks <Greeks <Greeks fewest ≤80 p. 
Galland (1678) 15-16 f. 0.8 f. 0.13 f. 0.15 f. 217 p. - 
French consular report on earthquake (1688) 15-16 p. 
De la Motraye (1699) - - - - - 24 p. 
Tournefort (1702) 15 p. 10 p. 0.2 p. 1.8 p. 0.2 p. 27.2 p. 
Lucas (1714) 100 p. 20 p. 8 p. - - 128 p. 
Tollot (1731) ≈50 p. ≈12 p. ≈7 p. 6-7 p. few 78 p. 
Pockocke (1739) 84 p. 7-8 p. 2 p. 5-6 p. - ≤100 p. 
(p. = persons * 1,000; f. = families * 1,000)
Based on Iconomos, Étude sur Smyrne,  138-39; Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 93; Galland, 
Voyage à Smyrne, 105-27; Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 41-42. 
 
Without a doubt, the most interesting of these sources is Evliya Çelebi. A 
teller of tall tales, particularly about the world beyond Ottoman borders, his 
                                                     
 
74 Ibid., 419. Some further support for Gerber’s extrapolating interpretation is provided by 
Jennings, “Zimmis (non-Muslims)”, 226. Jennings, who has studied the 17th-century Ottoman 
court records of Kayseri – a South-Central Anatolian city with a population approaching that 
of Bursa at the end of the 16th century – extensively, uses a coefficient of 3 to 3.5 for the 
taxpaying adult male population to arrive at an estimated total population of this heartland 
city. Incidentally, the average Istanbul household (or hane), although slightly larger than during 
the previous centuries, was still relatively small and nuclear at the turn of the 19th century with 
3.90 persons per household in 1885 and 4.21 in 1907: Alan Duben, “Understanding Muslim 
Households and Families in Late Ottoman Istanbul”, Journal of Family History, 15/1 (1990), 72-
73. 
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Seyahatname (Book of Travels) nevertheless contains a wealth of information on 
Ottoman social history. The most revealing part of his description of Izmir, 
runs as follows: 
 
Some two thousand of the city’s houses [hanes] cling to the skirts of the upper castle. They 
lie among airy vineyards, mansions [sarays] with gardens, and mosques. Most of the public 
buildings [imaristans], however, lie on the plain below and along the seashore. In the year 
1068 [AD 1657/58] Ismail Paşa compiled a register of this city, according to which this 
city altogether counts ten Muslim quarters, ten limited to non-Muslims, ten Frankish and 
Jewish quarters, two Armenian quarters and one Gypsy quarter. These said quarters 
[mahalles] altogether contain ten thousand and three hundred richly adorned, perfect, 
flourishing and embellished brick buildings [kargir binas]. The mansions [sarays] are 
exquisite and the other houses [hanes] are beautiful. With its red tiled roofs and tulip 
beds it is an exemplary city, and conspicuously flourishing.75 
 
Evliya then goes on to list, and occasionally describe, 310 places of worship 
(mosques and prayer houses; camis and mescids), 40 seminars (medreses), 11 
bathhouses (hamams), 600 baths in private houses, 82 inns (hans and kervansa-
rays), 3 Koran schools (dar ül-kurans), 40 primary schools (mekteb-ı sıbyans), 1 
soup kitchen (imaret), 70 fountains (çeşmes; which were, he stresses, too few 
for a city this size), 17 fountains founded as charitable endowments (se-
bilhanes), 3,060 shops (dükkans; being the number from which the market 
inspector collected taxes), ‘exactly’ 300 merchant warehouses (mahzens), 40 
coffeehouses (kahvehanes), 70 soap factories (sabunhanes), 200 wine shops and 
taverns (meyhanes), 20 boza breweries (bozahanes), 20 dye-houses (boyahanes), 1 
saddle and leather market (saraçhane), 1 candle factory (şem’hane) and 1 cus-
toms shed (gümrükhane).76 
The information offered in the Seyahatname has been taken at face value 
too often. Yet, Daniel Goffman’s assesment that the account of Izmir is 
“brazenly hyperbolic” and will entice “historians into grave miscomprehen-
sions about the size and influence of the town” to my mind squanders too 
much of what little, and therefore valuable, evidence we have.77 There is no 
harm in being suspicious of Evliya’s enthusiastic tone or the numbers he 
gives. However, if they explicitly refer to census evidence, they merit more 
                                                     
 
75 Bu şehrin iki bin mikdari haneleri yukaru kal’a bayırlarına yapışmışdır Havadar bağ ve bahçeli 
saraylar ve camiler vaki olmuşdur Amma imaristanının çoğu aşağı düzde ve lebi deryada vaki olmuşdur Sene 
1068 tarihinde İsmail Paşa bu şehri tahrir etdüği sicillâtda masturdur Ol minvali meşruh üzre bu şehir cümle 
on müslüman mahallesi ve on kefere sınırı ve on Firenk ve Yahudi mahallesi ve iki Ermeni mahallesi ve bir 
Kıbtı mahallesi vardır Ve bu mezkûr mahalleler cümle on bin üçyüz mükellef ve mükemmel ve mamur ve 
müzeyyen kârgir bina sarayı ra’nalar ve sayir hanei zibalar ile kırmızı kiremitli lâlezar misal bir şehri ruşen 
âbâddır; Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 92-93. Accord Eldem et al., Ottoman City, 79; and Nuran Tezcan, 
Manisa nach Evliyā Çelebi: aus dem neunten Band des Seyāhat-nāme (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 46-47. 
76 Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 93 and 96. Accord Tezcan, Manisa nach Evliyā Çelebi, 46-47. 
77 Eldem et al., Ottoman City, 79. 
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careful consideration. In giving the number of 2,000 homes (or hanes), for 
upper Izmir and 10,300 buildings (or binas) for the entire city, Evliya explicit-
ly refers to his source: a tahrir compiled by one İsmail Paşa a decade and a 
half earlier. Far from being invention, this survey actually existed, as is evi-
denced by the derived register mentioned earlier.78 Naturally, numbers given 
in tahrirs are open to interpretation, but when it is certain that the one Evliya 
refers to indeed existed, we at least have an estimate firmly rooted in admin-
istrative reality. 
Still, the narrative poses serious problems. These have to do mainly with 
the text’s terminology and the time-lag between İsmail Paşa’s survey and 
Evliya’s description. We may wonder what is meant exactly by hanes and 
binas, and whether there is a possibility that Evliya tinkered with the termi-
nology of his source to better fit what he witnessed in 1671 – a good decade 
later; a considerable timespan in the life of a boomtown. So, what can we do 
to arrive at a feasible estimate for Izmir’s population in 1657/58? 
For our purposes, the central passage in the text is “These said quarters 
[mahalles] altogether contain ten thousand and three hundred richly adorned, 
perfect, flourishing and embellished brick buildings [kargir binas]. The man-
sions [sarays] are exquisite and the other houses [hanes] are beautiful.” The 
passage is not entirely clear on whether the number refers to the total num-
ber of buildings, which Evliya will have us believe were all brick (which we 
know for certain they were not from countless travelers’ testimonies to the 
contrary), or to the number of brick buildings with an unspecified ratio to 
wooden structures. One might also wonder about the combined structures 
(brick ground floor and wooden stories) so typical in the region. It is also 
uncertain whether his “brick buildings” include private residences, public 
buildings, or both. In any case, the proud assertion that Izmir was a grand 
town is not so much conveyed by the number from the tahrir (“ten thousand 
and three hundred”) as by the traveler’s definition of it (“richly adorned, 
perfect, flourishing and embellished brick buildings”). 
Considering how Evliya’s European contemporaries regularly described 
the structure and state of Izmir’s residential quarters, we should assume that 
                                                     
 
78 Istanbul, BBA MAD 14672 (AH 1070-72 / AD 1660-62). The full entry in BBA Kat. 
125 runs: No: 4722; Tarih: 1070-1072; Defter No: 14672; Sahife: 24; Cizye-i gebran defteri: Vezir 
İsmail Paşa tarafından Kuşadası, Manisa, İzmir ve Urla’da icra edilen cizye-i gebran tahrir-i cedidine aid 
müfredatle tahrir olub 945 hane ziyadesi olmakla bu suretle mahallinde hıfz olunub suret verilmek üzere arz 
olunduğunu ve 1071 tarihinde icali beyan edildiği hakkında meşruhat mevcuttur. The main header of the 
defter’s section dealing with Izmir (pages 11-16) reads as follows: kaza-ı İzmir ber-mūceb-i defter-i 
tahrir-i cedid-i vezir İsmail Paşa (“the kaza of Izmir according to the new[ly conducted] survey by 
vizier İsmail Paşa”). The sub-headers list Izmir’s non-Muslim communities, or nations, each 
followed by the names and total numbers of that nation’s men found liable to cizye: Cemaat-ı 
Ermeniyan (the Armenian nation, 61 names, page 11); Cemaat-ı Rumiyan (the Greek nation, 301 
names, pages 11-14); Cemaat-ı Yahudiyan (the Jewish nation, 271 names, pages 14-16). Finally, 
the dateline (page 20) is AH 1070 (AD 1659/60). 
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his enthusiasm here got the better of him. For instance, Antoine Galland, an 
exceptionally open-minded and thorough witness to Izmir’s situation, writes: 
 
Hormis celle [maisons] des Francs et quelque khans, il y en a un grand nombre qui ne 
sont bâties que de maisons de terre, ou de boue seulement desséchée, et pour avoir plus tôt 
fait, les maçons ont une caisse sans dessus et sans fond, longue d’environ trois pieds et de 
largeur de la muraille qu’ils veulent faire, qu’ils remplissent de mortier et qu’ils ôtent en-
suite d’abord qu’ils est un peu séché. … Après les maisons des Francs qui sont, comme je 
l’ai déjà remarqué, assez commodes et logeables, il n’y en a pas plus d’une vingtaine dans 
toute la ville qui soient considérables: toutes les autres ne sont que de bois et de planches, ou 
de terre et de boue. Il n’y a de longues rues que celle du quartier des Francs, celles des Ar-
méniens, deux au bazar qui sont plus larges que les deux premières. Pour les autres, outre 
qu’elles sont étroites, elles sont encore entrecoupées, tortues et sans ordre, de telle manière 
que la ville d’aujourd’hui est autant différente de l’ancienne qu’une chose laide et vilaine 
l’est d’avec une belle et bien proportionnée.79 
 
There is no matching this observation with Evliya’s, not even if European 
disparagement (at which Galland is not easily caught) would be allowed for 
as much as Ottoman pride. To make sense of this dissension, it would help 
to think about what tahrirs typically counted, namely families (represented by 
their adult males), tax/distribution units (consisting of one or several families 
per unit), or – less likely – dwellings. Since all of these were called hanes in 
Ottoman administrative parlance (a problem to which we will return below), 
it is very likely that Evliya, in speaking of 10,300 brick buildings (including 
exquisite mansions and beautiful houses), was actually paraphrasing the 
10,300 hanes of the tahrir.80 
Having thus arrived at a possible number of hanes for mid-17th-century 
Izmir, we should consider further the applicability of Gerber’s multiplier. As 
mentioned earlier, the smaller the taxpaying population to which an extrane-
ous multiplier is applied, the larger the risk that the calculated average family 
size is inaccurate due to differing local circumstances. Fortunately, mid-17th-
century Izmir fits Gerber’s main requirement: like Bursa, it lay at the center 
of the empire both in distance and in traveling time. 
Distance from the center aside, there are other noticeable similarities be-
tween these two specific cities that limit the margin for errors. These have to 
do with both cities being commercial centers: Bursa that of the “old” inter-
national trade in fine silk, Izmir that of the rapidly expanding “new” interna-
tional trade in bulky foodstuffs and coarser fabrics. Because of their interna-
                                                     
 
79 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 107-8, 110-11). 
80 This interpretation appears to be corroborated by Nuran Tezcan’s critical edition of the 
Seyahatname’s section on Manisa (which uses three codices, viz. Bağdat Köşkü 306, Topkapı 
Sarayı Kütüphanesi and Beşir Ağa 452 and Pertev Paşa 462, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi). In a 
summary of the section on Izmir, we read that “In allen Stadtvierteln befinden sich 10.300 
hāne”: Tezcan, Manisa nach Evliyā Çelebi, 46 (emphasis added). 
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tional transit function and lack of quarantine arrangements, both cities were 
regularly and severely plague-ridden. Due to their secure location close to the 
political center and their economic function and opportunities, both were 
characterized by relatively open and non-traditional societies stimulating 
nuclear family patterns. Furthermore, Izmir as well as Bursa had a sizeable 
population of bachelors and male passers-through that populated the cities’ 
many inns and bars; a contingent reinforced by the presence of considerable 
garrisons in the cities’ direct vicinity to protect the rich depots that these 
cities were.81 Such functional similarities all suggest that Gerber’s multiplier is 
suitable for estimating the total population of Izmir on the basis of the fiscal 
data cited by Evliya. 
There is, however, one major relevant dissimilarity between the cities; 
Izmir’s population of zimmis (Ottoman non-Muslims) was relatively larger 
and predominantly Greek, while Bursa’s was more modest in size and mostly 
Jewish.82 The question then arises whether differences in the population’s 
ethnical composition would not also have consequences for the city’s aver-
age family size. To be short, it is unlikely that it does. On the basis of a Ve-
netian census of 1700 and an additional Venetian document from 1702/11, 
Malcolm Wagstaff has recently calculated an average family size for the Pel-
oponnesus of 3.6 in urban communities and 4.17 in rural communities, argu-
ing that this should be considered the standard for most of 18th-century 
Southern Europe and at least parts of the Ottoman Empire.83 When this 
Greek average family size is compared to Gerber’s averages of 3.65 and 4.9 
respectively, it emerges that demographical trends in Ottoman cities at the 
heart of the empire applied across cultures and mostly developed in con-
formity with broader urban demographical trends.84 Apparently, the oft-cited 
                                                     
 
81 Although neither city hosted large numbers of soldiers within its walls, many were sta-
tioned nearby: in Izmir in the castle guarding the entrance to the harbor (Sancak(burnu) 
Kalesi, see Appendix 1, plates 2 and 4 and in Bursa in nearby villages and towns. See Gerber, 
Economy and Society, 9-10. 
82 See Suraiya Faroqhi et al., An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, vol 2: 1600-
1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 517-19. Accord George Wheler, Voyage 
de Dalmatie, de Grèce et du Levant (Amsterdam: Wolters, 1689), 185: 40,000 Turks and 12,000 
Jews in Bursa in 1675, but little to no Greeks and Armenians. 
83 Malcolm Wagstaff, “Family Size in the Peloponnese (Southern Greece) in 1700”, Journal 
of Family History, 26/3 (2001). 
84 Fully in line with the considerable similarity between the coefficients of Gerber for Bur-
sa (mainly Turkish population), Jennings for Kayseri (large Armenian population) and Wag-
staff for the Peloponnesus (Greek population), neither Barkan’s discussion of the Ottoman 
empire’s overall population, nor Jennings’ or Gerber’s urban studies (see supra and the bibliog-
raphy), have proposed diverging average family sizes for the various ethno-religious commu-
nities within their sample populations. When moving from the local crosscultural to the inter-
national, it is striking to see how little average family size even varied across much of Southern 
and North-western Europe’s towns and cities. The average for the Dutch towns of Gouda (in 
1622) and Leiden (in 1581), for example, was 3.9 and 3.4 respectively: E. K. Grootes, “Het 
 
 
59 
 
impact of “Islamic traditionalism” was limited to provinces at the empire’s 
periphery and to rural areas at the heart of the empire (where it still only 
generated a difference of 0.73) and was not of much consequence for the 
demography of urban centers such as Izmir. 
 
If an average family size of 3.65 for 17th-century Izmir is accepted, that figure 
can subsequently be used to calculate the city’s total population from Evliya’s 
rendition of İsmail Paşa’s tahrir (of AH 1068; AD 1657/58). Depending on 
what the number 10,300 is taken to represent – the number of taxpayers 
(most likely in a tahrir), the number of dwellings (closest to Evliya’s text), or 
the number of tax units (increasingly common in 17th-century tahrirs) – the 
calculation will result in a minimum, a middle and a maximum figure, respec-
tively. The minimum is calculated as the number of taxpayers times average 
family size: 10,300 • 3.65 = 37,595; say 37,500. 
The (middle) calculation, involving the number of dwellings, however, 
has one more variable that needs fixing. Since more than one family generally 
occupy one dwelling, an average ratio between dwellings and families must 
first be identified. In the industrial and post-industrial ages, the ever-
increasing number of stories and floor-areas of public housing blocks, 
apartment complexes, high-rises and skyscrapers, particularly in cities, has 
resulted in significantly higher numbers of families per dwelling than ever in 
human history. One might even wonder whether the designation “dwelling”, 
although common in urban planning, is really still compatible with the mod-
ern cityscape. In any case, that of the early modern age was typically that of a 
small number of towering stone government, religious and, sometimes, 
commercial structures bathing in a sea of one to three-storied wooden or 
mud-brick houses. This is not only how Izmir was time and again described 
by European residents and visitors, but also cities as diverse as London, 
Amsterdam, Paris, Istanbul and Alexandria. It was, to be short, the typical 
appearance of the 17th-century city. 
This similarity in building types and build-up across many Ottoman and 
other cities is reflected in the average number of families per dwelling; a 
figure that roughly ranges from 1.1 to 1.4 for most pre-18th-century cities, 
averaging at a conservative 1.25.85 As this is an average for private dwellings 
                                                                                                                        
 
jeugdig publiek van de “nieuwe liedboeken” in het eerste kwart van de zeventiende eeuw”, in: 
Het woord aan de lezer: zeven literatuurhistorische verkenningen, eds. W. van den Berg and J. Stouten 
(Groningen: Wolters Noordhoff, 1987), 81. 
85 The figures were obtained from Daniel Pasciuti, “A Measurement Error Model for 
Estimating the Population Sizes of Preindustrial Cities” (25 November 2002), Urbanization and 
Empire Formation Project, Institute for Research on World-Systems, University of California,  
http://irows.ucr.edu/research/citemp/estcit/modpop/modcitpop.htm (accessed 13 October 
2011). Pasciuti in turn relies heavily on Richard Alston, The City in Roman and Byzantine Egypt 
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and it therefore does not take into account Izmir’s dozens of hans (inns 
where multiple families at once lived and traded) and its one kervansaray (car-
avansary; a great inn), the average for this particular case should be slightly 
higher. If these altogether numbered an estimated 50 in the 1650s and on 
average housed 15 families instead of the 1.25 of private dwellings, another 
((15 - 1.25) • 3.65 • 50 =) 2,509.375 individuals have to be added to the cal-
culation.86 The result, then, is the number of dwellings times the average 
number of families per dwelling times average family size, plus the (addition-
al) inhabitants of hans: (10,300 • 1.25 • 3.65 = 46,993.75) + 2,509.375 = 
49,503.125; say 50,000. 
In the (maximum) calculation involving the number of tax units, the 
number of families per dwelling is substituted with the average number of 
families per unit. As briefly touched on above, the Ottoman tax unit poses 
several problems for the historian. The first problem is with its designation; 
hane – a homonym for “house”, “household”, or “family” also used for taxa-
tion purposes and as such very difficult to distinguish from it when used 
without further qualification. The second problem is with its size. The size of 
one unit depended on the total sum that the administration wanted raised, as 
well as on the relative wealth and size of the taxed households and of those 
around them. The hane as a variable tax unit was used for the levying of 
avarız-taxes. These taxes were originally collected on an ad hoc basis to gather 
funds for specific purposes like military campaigns (hence its name, avarız, 
from the Arabic root ‘arid, meaning “incidental”) but became increasingly 
frequent, until they were just another tool in the eternal battle to balance 
                                                                                                                        
 
(New York: Routledge, 2002) and Roger Finlay, Population and Metropolis: The Demography of 
London, 1580-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
86 On the number of hans and kervanssarays in 1670s-Izmir, and on their occupancy, com-
pare Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 96; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 104-10 and 144 ; Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 
327; and M. Münir Aktepe, “İzmir hanları ve çarşıları hakkında ön bilgi”, İstanbul Üniversitesi 
Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi, 25 (1971). Although the numbers of camis, mescids, medreses, 
hamams, hans, kervansarays, dar ül-kur’ans, mekteb-ı sıbyans, imarets, çeşmes, sebilhanes, dükkans, 
mahzens, kahvehanes, sabunhanes, meyhanes, bozahanes, boyahanes, saraçhane, şem’hanes and 
gümrükhanes given by Evliya under reference to his sources in local administration (kadi, voyvo-
da, muhtesib, etc.) are largely supported by Galland, as well as by other, documentary and ar-
chaeological, evidence (see, for instance, the other articles by Aktepe in the bibliography), they 
do concern the 1670s and not the 1650s. For lack of accurate information on the number of 
hans in that decade, it could be presumed that the number of hans rose in correlation with the 
number of taxpaying households (as established infra). Such an estimated increase of ((10,300 • 
100) / 16,580 = ) 62.12% over this 20-year period, ending in a number of 81, would give a 
number of ((81 • 100) / 162.12 = ) 50 hans for the 1650s. The estimates for the number of 
hans and the average number of families per han are admittedly rather loose, but because of 
the consistently great numerical superiority of the inhabitants of private dwellings over those 
of hans, even changing these variables will not significantly alter the rounded outcome of the 
final calculation (i.e. the rounded total of the number of inhabitants of private dwellings plus 
those of hans); the result will always fluctuate slightly short of 50,000. 
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provincial budgets. They were collected from units known as avarızhanes, 
with every avarızhane contributing an equal share of the total amount that was 
to be collected. Since each hane consisted of several households that contrib-
uted in proportion to their resources, both the height of the tax per house-
hold and the number of households per hane varied.87 There are not many 
who have ventured to publish figures for these variables, but Gerber has put 
forward the following averages for Bursa: 2.2 around 1640/41; 2.9 in the 
1670s; and 8.6 in 1696 (see Table 2). If we continue to presume that the 
demography and social indicators of Bursa and Izmir were broadly compara-
ble in the 17th century and that the number of households per hane increased 
in a steady, almost exponential fashion, we would arrive at a figure of ap-
proximately 2.5 for the number of hanes in Izmir around 1655; a couple of 
years before İsmail Paşa’s tahrir. The total taxpaying population would then 
be the number of tax units times the average number of households per unit 
times average family size: 10,300 • 2.5 • 3.65 = 93,987.5; say 100,000. 
 
TABLE 2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS PER AVARIZ-HANE (1640-1700) 
 
Based on Gerber, Economy and Society, 8.88 
                                                     
 
87 H. Bowen, “Awārid”, EI2, i: 759b-61a. 
88 Accord the very careful review of the avarız-problem in Nenad Moačanin, Town and 
Country on the Middle Danube, 1526-1690 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 215-19. Also see Gábor Ágoston, 
Guns for the Sultan: Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 119; Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the 
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Of these three estimates of Izmir’s residential population in 1657/58 – 
37,500, 50,000 and 100,000, omitting the tax-exempt and of course a consid-
erable number of non-residents – the last one can be discarded immediately. 
A taxpaying population of 100,000 at that time would have made Izmir one 
of the larger cities of the empire and even of Europe. It would have put it in 
the league of absolute centers of international maritime trade like Aleppo or 
Amsterdam (with a population of approximately 100,000 and 150,000 re-
spectively) and far ahead of major textile producing centers like Bursa or 
Leiden (estimated at about 40,000 and 65,000 respectively).89 
Although Izmir had been growing continuously since the middle of the 
16th century and most foreign consulates and merchants had abandoned 
Chios for it in the 1620s, the boom was only just starting and it would take a 
good hundred years more for Izmir to fully swallow up the trade of Chios 
and Aleppo, and for Izmir’s population to pass the six-figure-mark.90 The 
two remaining possible estimates (37,500 and 50,000) lie closer together due 
to the near-convergence of houses and households in the early modern peri-
od; and although the evidence certainly inclines towards İsmail Paşa’s tahrir 
having listed families instead of dwellings, there can be little objection to 
reconciling figures that similar while weighing them in proportion to their 
likelihood.91 With an estimated 40,000 taxpaying inhabitants (that is, taxpay-
                                                                                                                        
 
Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 49-50n14; 
and Bogaç A. Ergene, “ʿAwārıḍ”, EI2: “‘Awārıḍ were determined by the number of ‘awārıḍ 
households (‘awārıḍ khānes) in a specific district. The relationship of these tax units to real 
households varied over time and space. In the early tenth/sixteenth century, one ‘awārıḍ 
household was equivalent to one real household (Demirci). In later periods, one ‘awārıd khāne 
might have equaled from three to as many as fifteen real households, depending on the rela-
tive prosperity of the district.” 
89 Compare Gerber, Economy and Society, 12; Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, 
Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 621; and Marcus, Middle East on 
the Eve of Modernity, 338. 
90 See Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir kazasının sosyal ve iktisâdî yapısı 
(Izmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayını, 2000), 24-33; Goffman, Izmir and the 
Levantine World, 61-64; and Frangakis-Syrett, Commerce of Smyrna, 46. 
91 The evidence being; firstly, what is known about 17th-century tahrirs in general (i.e. that 
they are most likely to list either households or avarızhanes); secondly, that in the case of this 
particular tahrir the latter possibility can safely be discarded (since it would imply an unrealisti-
cally inflated population of around 100,000) and; thirdly and most importantly, that the defter-i 
cizye-i gebran (Istanbul, BBA MAD 14672 (AH 1070-72 / AD 1660-62)) that was based on the 
tahrir by İsmail Paşa in AH 1068 (AD 1657/58), does in fact list the names of non-Muslim 
heads of households (and their sons aged 14 and above) instead of avarızhanes. The interpreta-
tion of Evliya’s figure of 10,300 as being the number of (taxpaying) families in 1657/8, is 
further supported by comparison with the figures available for 1678. These 20 years witnessed 
a 62.12% increase in the city’s taxpaying families, with taxpaying non-Muslim families (those 
of zimmis found liable to cizye) making up 6.15 % of the total population in 1657/58 and 
6.51% in 1678. These figures will be discussed in more detail infra, but it is safe to say they 
correspond to the non-statistical data available for the period. 
 
 
63 
 
ers and their families) in the 1650s and an increasing pull on international 
maritime trade, Izmir already rivaled Bursa and was beginning to seriously 
threaten the dominance of Aleppo.92 
Together, the cizye defter and Evliya’s Seyahatname also provide us some in-
sight into the ethno-religious composition of Izmir’s population as it was 
recorded by İsmail Paşa in the middle of the 17th century (see Table 3). 
 
TABLE 3: COMPOSITION OF THE TAXPAYING POPULATION OF IZMIR (1657/58) 
 Families % of total
 
Total (T) 10,300 100.00
Greek (G) 301 2.92
Armenian (A) 61 0.59
Jewish (J) 271 2.63
Zimmi (Z=G+A+J) 633 6.15
Muslim (M=T–Z) 9,667 93.85
Based on Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 93; and Istanbul, BBA MAD 14672 (AH 1070-72 / 
AD 1660-62). 
 
Size and Composition of the Taxpaying Population in 1678 
As previously discussed, the only full tahrirs available for Izmir are of AH 
929, 935, 983 and 1105 (AD 1522/23, 1528/29, 1575/76 and 1693/94). Had 
the city’s growth been without spectacular interruptions from the 1570s to 
the 1690s, these last two tahrirs and the information in Table 3 might have 
been combined to create a population curve spanning most of the 17th cen-
tury. Positioning the 1670s on such a curve would have made it possible to 
infer a rough estimate for population size during that decade. Unfortunately, 
a spectacular interruption did take place on 10 July 1688 in the form of an 
earthquake of truly apocalyptical proportions which leveled three quarters of 
the city’s houses, torched half the city and left an estimated 15-16,000 dead, 
forcing many survivors to abandon its ruins.93 Although the city did recover 
from the blow and was already firmly back on its feet as the undisputed cen-
ter of Levantine trade by the beginning of the 18th century, the extent of the 
population’s destruction and subsequent reconstruction ensures that the 
1693/94-survey has no bearing on the pre-earthquake situation – even if the 
                                                     
 
92 Klaus Kreiser also shortly mentions an estimated 40,000 taxpayers in Izmir around 
1650: Klaus Kreiser, Der osmanische Staat, 1300-1922 (München: R. Oldenbourg, 2001), 10. 
93 Iconomos, Étude sur Smyrne, 128-31. 
Muslim Greek
Jewish Armenian
 
 
64 
 
estimated number of dead is accurate. 
Since we do have at our disposal a small number of post-1670 registers 
on military, customs, minorities’ and foreigners’ affairs (see the bibliography) 
the lack of Ottoman administrative sources on 17th-century Izmir is not ab-
solute. But it is deplorable nevertheless, since for all they can tell us about 
the daily goings-on of Izmir’s international trade or the details of cizye-
collection, these sources offer no quantifiable data on the city’s general, or 
even overall minority, population. Again, information has to be pried from a 
combination of travelers’ testimonies and the odd complementary defter; its 
relevance more inferred from our knowledge of general trends and data from 
earlier and later periods, than from the actual figures themselves. A glance at 
Table 1 will quickly reveal how hazardous it is to overly rely on travelers’ 
accounts: their estimates are far too incongruous to reconcile. Among them, 
however, there is one that stands out: An toine Galland. In giving numbers 
of families instead of four to five-figure totals for the number of Turks, 
Greeks, Jews and Armenians or the overall population as his fellow Europe-
an travelers did, this specific visitor reveals an interesting indebtedness to 
Ottoman sources. 
It was not at all unusual for European travelers to rely on local residents 
for their general descriptions (and often even for the narration of specific 
events which they would then claim to have witnessed themselves), but their 
information was typically gathered from a relatively small and fixed group of 
informants that was readily accessible to them from within the safe and com-
fortable confines of Izmir’s European quarter, from which many did not 
want or dare venture too far. These informants typically included European 
clergy, consuls and merchants, as well as their European and indigenous staff 
of chaplains, treasurers, secretaries, scribes; and guards, warehousemen, bro-
kers and dragomans (translators, interpreters, advisors and spokesmen all-in-
one). The latter group of mostly Greek and Jewish locals naturally dominated 
among the Ottoman informants, as they were just that by profession and 
were best equipped to bridge the language gap towards the most often non-
Turkish and non-Arabic speaking European visitor. 
An added difficulty with such indirect accounts is that both the travelers 
writing them down and their sources of course had their own private and 
professional agendas. More often than not these led to considerable distor-
tions. One can easily imagine, for instance, how seductive it was for Otto-
man Muslims, non-Muslims and Europeans to inflate the size of their com-
munity, for merchants to overstate the importance of their commerce, or for 
consuls to dwell excessively on the difficulties they had to overcome in the 
course of their duties. At the same time, any publishing travel-writer – being 
the early-modern equivalent of a modern best-selling fiction author – knew 
full well what sold back home and picked his informants’ brains for anec-
dotes that stressed the foreign and Oriental beauty of the Ottoman city and 
world or that exemplified the proverbial cruelty and avidity of “the Turk”. In 
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short, most accounts deal in a series of constantly reiterated and often literal-
ly copied commonplaces that essentially reflect not much more than the 
supply and demand of popular literary culture and crosscultural exchange. It 
is, therefore, no coincidence that the most interesting and informative Euro-
pean first-hand accounts of the 17th-century Ottoman Empire have been left 
by men who were equipped to go beyond the usual informants; men well-
versed in the Turkish, Arabic, Persian and modern Greek languages and with 
good Ottoman connections that at times even provided them with docu-
ments from their private libraries and the archives of the Ottoman admin-
istration.94 If such men – like Galland – also happened to be adventurous 
and inquisitive scholars, their accounts are all the more original and valuable 
for it. 
Best known for his, the first European, edition of Les mille et une nuits 
(Paris, 1704-1708) and for his studies on the faith of the Greeks (conducted 
in French ambassador De Nointel’s service from 1670 to assist in the envis-
aged French protection of Ottoman Christianity), Antoine Galland (b. 1646-
d. 1715) might easily be misconceived as a hostile Orientalist. Yet, his work 
lacks the slightest resemblance to crusading efforts like Michel Febvre’s Théa-
tre de la Turquie.95 Most interesting for our purposes are his Journal (1672-
1673) – the daily entries of which testify to his adventurous, open-minded 
and scholarly nature, as well as to his superb Ottoman connections – and his 
only very recently published Voyage à Smyrne (1678) – an unparalleled and 
highly detailed inventory of the city of Izmir in all its aspects, which he wrote 
for Parisian bookseller Barbin in the period between De Nointel’s decline 
and eventual disgrace and his own appointment as Louis XIV’s antiquary in 
the Levant in 1679.96 
In his Voyage à Smyrne, Galland provides us with a whole range of descrip-
tions, measurements and statistics concerning Izmir’s geography, topography 
and demography. He describes the city as a loosely shaped scalene whose 
sides he textually positions (see Map 2). 
According to Galland, his scalene has a perimeter of 7200 geometrical 
paces (a geometrical pace being 5 feet, or 1.524 meters) and contains 2,000 
to 3,000 dwellings (including 81 hans, or inns) housing 800 Greek, 130 Ar-
menian, 150 Jewish and 15,000 to 16,000 Turkish families in 13 quarters 
(mahalles).97 These statistics reflect Galland’s penchant for objective verifica-
tion – they constitute the main variables still used today in historical demog-
                                                     
 
94 Paul Rycaut and Dudley North immediately come to mind. For further reference, see 
generally Sonia P. Anderson, An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
95 Michel Febvre, Theatre de la Turquie (Paris: Edme Couterot, 1682). 
96 Antoine Galland, Journal d'Antoine Galland pendant son séjour à Constantinople (1672-1673) 
(Paris: E. Leroux, 1881); and Galland, Voyage à Smyrne. 
97 Ibid., 103-5 (“Situation géographique”), 104-10 (“Description topographique”). 
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raphy (built-up urban area, number of dwellings, number of families) and 
appear to have been gathered through personal observation in the field, as 
well as through the use of informants and Ottoman tax registers. Particularly 
the fact that he lists the number of families in conjunction with the number 
of quarters (and further along, their ethno-religious composition), points to 
tax data either directly or indirectly gathered from local Ottoman administra-
tors. In this respect, Galland’s approach resembles Evliya’s, although, con-
sidering the former’s scholarly aptitude and objectives, it is probably more 
reliable. 
 
MAP 2: TRIANGULAR OUTLINE OF IZMIR IN 1678 
 
Based on Map 1 and Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 104-7. 
 
If the demographic information provided by Galland indeed stemmed from 
tax registers, it follows that the numbers given concern the taxpaying popula-
tion and not the population proper (see Table 4). 
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TABLE 4: COMPOSITION OF THE TAXPAYING POPULATION OF IZMIR (1678) 
 Families % of total
 
Total (T=Z+M) 16,580 100.00
Greek (G) 800 4.83
Armenian (A) 130 0.78
Jewish (J) 150 0.90
Zimmi (Z=G+A+J) 1,080 6.51
Muslim (M) 15,500 93.49
Based on Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 107. 
 
As before, the total taxpaying population is calculated by multiplying the 
number of families by average family size: 16,580 • 3.65 = 60,517; say 60,000. 
 
Jewish Protection and Lump Sum Taxation 
However plausible Galland’s figures may be, it should be kept in mind that it 
is impossible to compare or verify them. This is particularly problematic 
since there is some internal and external evidence that might be considered 
conflicting. Externally, there is a cizye-i gebran defter for Izmir, dated 15 January 
1688, which gives alternative numbers of Greeks, Armenians and Jews.98 
Internally, further along in his description of Izmir’s population, Galland 
gives some widely diverging numbers of Jews. 
It is tempting to think that the 1688-cizye defter must have been an ante-
dated construct, meant to provide the Ottoman administration insight into 
the state of its tax base in the wake of the earthquake. It simply seems too 
big a coincidence for a population survey of Izmir to be abstracted by an 
Istanbul clerk while a few months later the very subjects and holdings it 
listed were being wiped out by a natural catastrophe. An exceptionally cruel 
twist of fate without a doubt, but it occurred nonetheless, for not only does 
the defter explicitly refer to a previously conducted survey, the existence of 
this pre-earthquake survey is further attested to by the MAD-series holding 
an extensive series of cizye defters from 1688 derived entirely from the same 
full tahrir of Anatolia.99 
The after all authentic cizye defter from 15 January 1688 lists the numbers 
of Greek, Armenian and Jewish taxpayers in Izmir and a number of other 
towns and cities in its vicinity (see the copy of the defter in Appendix 1, Plate 
10). In the case of the Greeks and Armenians it states that the numbers were 
                                                     
 
98 Istanbul, BBA MAD 14888 (AH 11 Rebi' I 1099 / AD 15 January 1688). 
99 See note 66. 
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taken from an older or previous survey (tahrir-i atık), while the numbers of 
Jews were obtained from a new or recent survey (tahrir-i cedid). Sure enough, 
the numbers for Izmir taken from the tahrir-i atık match those of our cizye 
defter taken from İsmail Paşa’s tahrir of 1657/58 (301 Greeks and 61 Armeni-
ans; see Table 3). The registered number of Jewish taxpayers of Izmir, 
meanwhile, dropped significantly from 271 in 1657/58 to 219 at the begin-
ning of 1688. The drop implied in Galland’s breakdown of Izmir’s popula-
tion is even higher than that recorded in the survey: from 271 in 1657/58 to 
150 in 1678. 
It is peculiar that these two sources speak of a drop in the number of 
Jewish taxpayers while all contemporary western observers stress that com-
munity’s growth – it certainly does not correspond to other historical evi-
dence for the city’s pull on European and Ottoman Jewry (particularly from 
Portugal, Chios and Salonica). In a way, the results of a tahrir are incontesta-
ble: if a certain number of households was deemed taxable, than that was the 
number of taxpayers as far as the Ottoman administration was concerned 
and the amount for which they were assessed was usually collected, if not 
from those surveyed (because of obsolete survey data), then from their fami-
lies, communities or landlords. What should be questioned, however, is the 
degree to which changes in the number of recorded taxpayers accurately 
reflected demographical reality, just as we should wonder whether European 
visitors cooped up in “Frank Street” (and this does not include Galland, who 
did in fact venture further out) were able and willing to interrogate their 
informants critically. Both these issues are succinctly illustrated by a passage 
from Galland’s Voyage. 
After his treatment of Izmir’s “situation géographique” and his “descrip-
tion topographique” (which include the previously discussed statistical data), 
Galland proceeds with the city’s population, community by community: first 
the “Franks” – the French, English, Dutch, Venetian and Genoese nations 
and the few Florentines, Siennese and Livornese; then the indigenous com-
munities – the Greek, Armenian, Jewish, Arab and Turkish taifes. As much as 
Ottoman administrative sources shine through in the rest of Galland’s ac-
count, so obvious is his exclusive use of European and zimmi-informants 
throughout these passages. The organization and functioning of the Jewish 
community, for instance, is discussed in such expertly detail that the infor-
mation must have originated from a well-informed (i.e. high status) insider. 
Concerning the Jews’ liability to the poll-tax (cizye; here, haraç), for instance, 
he tells us the following: 
 
Pour exiger le droit qu’ils sont obligés de payer au Grand Seigneur pour le carache, ils ont 
un député de chaque synagogue, qui se change de six mois en six mois, avec chacun un ad-
joint pour les secourir lorsqu’ils en ont besoin. Mais ces adjoints ne sont changés qu’à la fin 
de l’année, n’ayant point tant à travailler que les premiers. Ce droit est de 12000 à 15000 
piastres, parmi lesquelles il faut comprendre ce qui est nécessaire pour les frais communs de 
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la communauté. De 1500 familles qu’il y a parmi eux, il n’yen a que 500 qui contri-
buent, chacune suivant leurs richesses. Les plus accommodés payent 10 écus sur chaque 
3000, et les autres en diminuant jusqu’à un écu seulement. Mais il y en a deux, Joseph et 
Moseh Algranate qui, à raison de ce qu’ils sont riches, paient 100 écus chacun; ce qui leur 
revient quelquefois à 500 écus par an.100 
 
How, then, do these 1,500 families, with only 500 of them reportedly paying 
taxes, relate to the 150 families previously reported by Galland? And how 
can the drop from 271 to 219 recorded in the 1657/58 and 1688-tahrirs be 
explained? And finally, how do the two classes of information fit the same 
reality? 
 
It remains conjecture, but it seems there are two possible answers to the first 
question. One is that Galland (for reasons to be explored further on) was 
unable to obtain reliable Ottoman data on the number of Jewish taxpayers 
and neatly reduced the number of 1,500 to 150 to illustrate how few families 
actually paid cizye. This, however, would mean he was well aware of these 
contradicting passages in his work and if that was the case one would have 
expected him to correct or at least explain the difference in the editing pro-
cess. A more probable answer is that Galland felt no need to reconcile the 
diverging figures since he received them as such. As mentioned before, the 
way the figures are presented suggests they originated from different sources; 
the first (150 families) from Ottoman administration and the second (1,500 
families, of which 500 taxpaying) from Jewish informants – most likely from 
the same Josef and Moshe Algranate he refers to, not coincidentally the Eu-
ropean nations’ main trading partners. 
Since the 1688-tahrir explicitly refers to the last previous survey (tahrir-i 
atık) and since the figures taken over from that survey are those of the 
1657/58-tahrir, this confirms that no surveys were conducted during the 
intervening thirty years. Of course, comprehensive surveys coordinated from 
the capital were not the only administrative devices available to Izmir’s ad-
ministration; the local kadi (magistrate, notary public and tax collector all-in-
one) and tax farmers and their various deputies depended on their own, lo-
cally compiled or updated, registers in the exercise of their daily duties. Such 
sources were typically also consulted by well-connected travelers. Just as 
Evliya, by his own admission, used information provided by (among others) 
the local market inspector (muhtesib), so Galland will have relied on infor-
mation provided by Ottoman officials deeply involved in Izmir’s European 
affairs, like the voyvoda, who was responsible for the collection of taxes that 
had not been farmed out and for issues of public order related to those taxes. 
 
                                                     
 
100 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 140. 
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The second question is relatively easy to answer. In itself, a drop in the num-
ber of Jewish families assessed for cizye from 271 in 1657/58 to 219 shortly 
before the 1688-earthquake, can be attributed almost entirely to protection 
by Izmir’s European nations. During this interval the city became the abso-
lute center of Ottoman-European maritime trade and its close-knit and well-
organized Jewish community managed to (temporarily) capture an effective 
monopoly on commerce-related positions from the previously dominant 
Greeks.101 As bankers, dragomans, brokers and wholesalers for the Europe-
ans, a considerable number acquired the protection that European consuls 
were allowed to extend their native personnel under the Ottoman capitula-
tions.102 
This protection, originally intended to safeguard the confidentiality of Ot-
toman subjects in European diplomatic service, had several fiscal and legal 
advantages. One of these was their own, their families’ and their servants’ 
exemption from cizye, thus excluding them from any registered totals of cizye-
payers. The three largest nations (the French, English and Dutch) had over 
the years acquired an increasing number of dragomans; each held an average 
three over the last quarter of the century. In addition to these “actual” dra-
gomans, whose importance to their employers most often also lay in the fact 
that they were members of prominent families doing business with the Eu-
ropeans, the consuls of these nations appointed a number of “nominal” 
dragomans and vice-consuls. The purpose of appointing such nominal depu-
ties, or protégés, was to patronize even more local business elite by requesting 
the sultan to recognize their appointments and provide them with the neces-
sary documents. These diplomas (or berats) confirmed the protégé in his 
position and affirmed his right to protection under his employer’s capitula-
tions. 
A conservative estimate of the average number of nominal deputies nom-
inally employed by the consuls of Izmir’s three largest European nations 
would be five.103 If we make the informed guess that an average three of 
those will have been Jews, and if a combined estimated average of three 
servants and adult sons per appointee is included, the resulting minimum 
number of Jewish families freed from cizye through European – or, really, 
                                                     
 
101 See Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 87-92. Accord Eldem et al., Ottoman City, 
97-102; Daniel Goffman, “Jews in Early Modern Ottoman Commerce”, in: Jews, Turks, 
Ottomans: A Shared History, Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Century, ed. Avigdor Levy (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2002), 32-34; and Ruderman, Early Modern Jewry, 29 and 58. 
102 İnalcik, “Imtiyāzāt”, 1187a. 
103 Cf. Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 216 and 246n65; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684: Dagboek van 
Daniël-Jan de Hochepied, secretaris van de resident in Turkije, gehouden tijdens zijn reizen 
van en naar Turkije en van zijn verblijf in Smirna en Constantinopel, met afschriften van 
stukken betreffende het Nederlandse gezantschap in Turkije (1677-1680); The Hague, NA 
1.02.20 1088; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913; e.g.. 
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indirect Ottoman – protection would be (3 nations • (3 actual dragomans + 
3 nominal appointees) • 3 servants and sons =) 54 against a drop of 52 Jew-
ish taxpaying families recorded in the tahrirs. 
 
Even if we take into account the considerations above, it still eludes us how 
the information provided by Galland and that of the Ottoman registers both 
fit the same historical reality of a flourishing Jewish community. The remain-
ing discrepancy has two causes; one on the European side and another on 
the Ottoman. 
Firstly, European travelers to 1670s-Izmir, as mentioned earlier, could 
not help but notice the predominance of the Jewish community. Their fre-
quent assertions that it was up to half the size of the Turkish population 
should perhaps be attributed to its visibility and to the pride of their Jewish 
informants, but certainly also to their compatriots’ annoyance at being at the 
mercy of this community: 
 
The commerce of the Frank merchants is entirely directed by the Jews, for which purpose 
each merchant house has its own Jewish brokers (normally 3 to 4 per house) who reparti-
tion their brokerage fees amongst each other. To this nation of deceivers the merchants 
commonly defer, and must trust it with their affairs. 
Daniël-Jan de Hochepied (1678)104  
 
Ils ne vivent la plupart que de ce qu'ils gagnent en servant de sensal ou courtier aux mar-
chands francs qui ont chacun le leur, ne pouvant presque rien faire sans leur secours. Ils ga-
gnent plus ou moins suivant les achats de marchandises que font leurs marchands, lesquels 
leur donnent un tant pour cent. Les Anglais et les Hollandais ont plus de confiance en eux 
que nos marchands, en ce qu'ils leur donnent connaissance de toutes leurs affaires et qu'ils 
leur confient la clef de leur caisse. 
Antoine Galland (1678)105 
 
When a fresh merchant, or factor, comes to Constantinople, the first Jew, that catches a 
word of him, marks him for his own, as becoming his peculiar property, and calls him his 
mechant ; and so he must be as long as he stays. And, from this time, no other Jew will in-
terpose to deprove him of his purchase, but as soon rob an house as do it. And thus, by 
compact or custom among themselves, this sacred rule of right is established. On the other 
side, the merchant can no more shake off his Jew than his skin. He sticks like a bur, and, 
whether well used or ill used, will be at every turn in with him; and no remedy. Somewhat 
the rogue will get out of him in spite of his teeth., and commonly (besides pay) just so much 
more as he is trusted with: and the merchant cannot be without a Jew, nor change that he 
hath. The only expedient is to make the best of him, and never trust him upon honour. It 
is not a little convenience that is had by these appropriated Jews; for they serve in the quali-
ty of universal brokers, as well for small as great things. Their trade is running up and 
                                                     
 
104 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a (my translation). 
105 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 142. 
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down, and through the city, like so many of Job’s devils, perpetually busking after one thing 
or other, according as they are employed. If the merchant wants any thing, be it never so in-
considerable, let him tell his Jew of it, and, if it be above ground, he will find it. This is ac-
counted a common advantage; for there are multitudes of people, that have need of each oth-
er, and want means to come together; which office the Jews perform admirably. 
Dudley North (1670s)106 
 
Not only was this a mid-sized minority community wielding a disproportion-
ate amount of economic power, the fact that it was Jewish in particular will 
also not have alleviated the European nations’ frustration at a time so rife 
with religiously and politically inspired anti-Semitism. Although the passages 
quoted above are relatively mild, it was not at all uncommon for 17th-century 
European – or, for that matter, Ottoman – travelers to use pejoratives in 
referring to Jews, although we should add that many did not. Galland and 
Tournefort, for instance, wrote with barely concealed admiration about Jew-
ish communal organization and solidarity, and many travel accounts stick to 
more or less neutral observations about the community’s size and institu-
tions.107 
In much commercial and diplomatic correspondence, however, Jews tend 
to figure as untrustworthy business partners and dragomans – more often 
than not easy scapegoats for failings and complications not their own. The 
full extent to which European anti-Semitism could go can be gleaned from 
the correspondence of Dutch consul Van Dam (see Appendix 2, document 
9). The consul had been at odds with his nation’s Jewish brokers and their 
community over his nation’s outstanding debts and his taxing their nation’s 
goods at a discriminating tariff. Upon witnessing the Jews of Izmir and Am-
sterdam successfully working together to demolish his reputation at home 
and abroad he fell back on attempting to appeal to the States General’s reli-
gious prejudices by comparing himself to Christ condemned to the cross 
through a multitude of Jewish false accusations – which practice, he added 
(echoing the common European misperception of Islamic legal testimony 
against non-Muslims), their law permits if it is in their community’s ad-
vantage.108 
Although Van Dam’s attempts to cast his own mishandling in terms of 
the paradigm of Jewish duplicity failed, one can see how European residents 
and visitors will have confused the influence of Izmir’s Jews with their num-
ber. As for Ottoman testimonies; if they were indeed so numerous, Evliya 
would have certainly remarked upon it. Yet in discussing the district to which 
                                                     
 
106 Roger North, The Life of the Honourable Sir Dudley North … (London: John Whiston, 
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108 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677. 
 
 
73 
 
Izmir belonged, his only (disapproving) remarks on “excessive” non-Muslim 
presence concerned the multitude of Greeks purportedly living in nearby 
Bornova and the many Frankish ships and churches of Izmir.109 
But secondly, and more decisively, the number of European protégés is 
not the only cause of the discrepancy between the actual number of Jewish 
families and the number of Jewish taxpayers in the Ottoman records. Otto-
man registration of Izmir’s Jewish taxpayers was inherently inaccurate be-
cause of the methods used for the assessment and collection of this commu-
nity’s cizye. While the tax was collected from the members of most, if not all, 
Armenian and Greek communities on an individual basis, most Jewish 
communities obtained express sultanic permission to pay it collectively as a 
fixed lump sum (ber vech-i maktu’, literally meaning “in a fixed manner”). In 
cases where official permission for maktu’ payment was not forthcoming and 
collection of the tax had been farmed out, communities often made similar 
arrangements with the farmer.110 The system had advantages for both sides. 
On the collecting end, it saved the tax farmer the trouble of updating the 
records on the standard three-yearly basis and of having to find ways to re-
coup deficits from evasion or natural turnover. On the paying end, it allowed 
the community in question maximum control over the internal distribution 
of the tax load. 
Whether officially sanctioned or not, this is how the Jews of Izmir paid 
their cizye (in the 1670s and 80s at least), and they took full advantage of the 
possibilities offered by the maktu’-arrangement with Izmir’s cizye-collector 
(also the director of its foreign customs office) to lower the tax burden, and 
to transform the tax into an instrument for communal policy. 
Faced with a tremendous influx of Portuguese Jews and from the rest of 
the Ottoman Empire, as well as with the centrifugal potential of foreign 
protection, the overriding concern of Izmir’s established Jewish leadership 
was its continuing primacy, and the strengthening and enforcing of commu-
nal unity and solidarity. Very much in evidence in all spheres of Jewish life 
(professional and religious organization and practice, education, healthcare 
                                                     
 
109 Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 89 and 96-97. 
110 See İnalcık, “Djizya”. On the maktu’ arrangements of other Ottoman Jewish communi-
ties see Daniel Goffman, “The Jews of Safed and the Maktu’ System in the Sixteenth Century: 
A Study of Two Documents from the Ottoman Archives”, Journal of Ottoman Studies, 3 (1982); 
and Yaron Ben-Naeh, Jews in the Realm of the Sultans: Ottoman Jewish Society in the Seventeenth 
Century (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 2008), 148-53. Christian tributary rulers also regular-
ly collected their subjects’ cizye to be paid in lump sum to the Ottoman treasury. See, e.g., Ben 
Slot, Archipelagus turbatus: les Cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation Ottomane c. 1500-1718 
(Leiden: NINO, 1982), 79 on Naxus; and Marinos Sariyannis, “Notes on the Ottoman Poll-
Tax Reforms of the Late Seventeenth Century: The Case of Crete”, Journal of the Economic and 
Social History of the Orient, 54 (2011) on Crete. The resulting conflation of tribute and cizye, and 
the degradation of tributary rulers to tax farmers, is entirely in keeping with the Ottoman view 
of the world and its sovereign divisions. 
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and poor-relief, to name but a few), the fiscal elaboration of this policy was 
that each member of the community was assessed in proportion to his in-
come. The poorest two-thirds of the community were excused, and the re-
maining 500 paid at a redistributing relative rate of 0.033-0.33% (Galland’s 
“Les plus accommodés payent 10 écus sur chaque 3000, et les autres en 
diminuant jusqu’à un écu seulement.”), without any ceiling being applied. 
Even the – usually wealthy – members that had acquired European protec-
tion and were therefore exempt before Ottoman law, were still required to 
contribute. 
This joint responsibility for maktu’ meant that the entire community de-
rived substantial benefit from as large a number of members as possible 
acquiring exemption. So the community regularly put its entire weight be-
hind candidates for protection, and exerted maximum pressure on local au-
thorities to under-assess their liability. A drop from 271 Jewish taxpayers in 
1659/60 to 150 in 1678 (Galland) or 219 (tahrir) in 1688 – while all other 
evidence points to a sharp increase in numbers – does not occur of its own. 
It is no coincidence that the same fund (the tanza, as it was called in Levan-
tine parlance) in which the contributions for the maktu’ were collected, was 
also drawn upon to pay the extraordinary expenses of the community: it is of 
course a euphemism for all the legal costs, presents and bribes made to keep 
the community itself intact and its tax burden low. This, we might add, was 
not necessarily against local officials’ own interests, because by “beating 
down” the official worth of the cizye-farm (in return for unregistered com-
pensation), the price at which a renewal could be purchased also went 
down.111 
 
For the historian, the net result of this situation is that neither the figures 
local officials sent to Istanbul, nor those of the 1688-census should be con-
sidered as reliable as their officiality suggests. 
Luckily, Galland offers a way around the documentary consequences of 
the maktu’-system. Taking the lump sum’s 12,000 to 15,000 dollars as a start-
ing point and presuming that the difference in Galland’s range represents the 
included communal expenses, we can arrive at a new estimate of the number 
of adult Jewish males. To do so, we must divide the 12,000 dollars maktu’ by 
the 2 to 4 dollars cizye paid on an individual basis by the Greeks and Armeni-
                                                     
 
111 North, Life, 84: “Galata, over-against Constantinople, where all the Franks and a great 
many other Christians live, is a Town that belongs to the Queen Mother, the Revenue of it 
going to her Maintenance. The Farmers of the Rents for some Years past, to beat down the 
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privileged Persons, as Dragomen, who are Interpreters (and notwithstanding that both they and 
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Desire of their respective Ambassadors) and married Franks.” (emphasis added) 
 
 
75 
 
ans of Izmir.112 The (unrealistic) upper limit count would then be (12,000 / 2 
=) 6,000 – the (somewhat less unrealistic) lower (12,000 / 4 =) 3,000. With 
an average family size of 3.65 (i.e. 1 man, 1 woman, 1.65 children, of which 
0.825 female and 0.825 male, and most of them underage), an average cizye 
rate of 3.5 seems reasonable. This would yield a count of (12,000 / 3.5 =) 
3,429. Given the small difference with the lower count of 3,000 and the un-
certainty of the variables, it is sensible to stay with that figure. 
There is of course no way to ascertain that the height of the lump sum 
was indeed determined in this manner – and an increase from 271 individual-
ly listed cizye-payers in 1657/58 to an approximate 3,000 males included in a 
lump sum cizye-payment in 1678 may (still) seem on the high side. Neverthe-
less, the figure is not unrealistic when measured against Izmir’s exceptionally 
rapid economic and demographical development, added unto by the reloca-
tion of entire Jewish communities from all over the empire’s western fringes 
and beyond. And even if it stems from the same source, some reassurance 
about the calculation and the implied growth rate might be gained from Gal-
land’s estimate of the overall size of the community: his 10,000 souls very 
closely match the number we would arrive at by multiplying taxpayers by 
average family size (3,000 • 3.65 =) 10,9503.113 The addition of 10,950 more 
persons (taxpayers plus families) to the previous estimate yields a result of 
70.919.5; say an estimated taxpaying population of 70,000. 
More interesting, however, is to see what happens when the number of 
150 Jewish taxpayers in Table 4 is replaced with the 3,000 of the maktu’-
arrangement; the breakdown changes considerably (see Table 5). 
In discussing the comparative grain consumption of Izmir’s communities 
much further down in his description, Galland unwittingly validates our 
claim that his previous statements on community size should be adjusted for 
Jewish protection and lump sum taxation. Especially within the fixed-price 
Ottoman redistributive economy, grain took up a position of strategic im-
portance, and its production, distribution and processing was monitored and 
registered closely by the authorities. Galland apparently also had access to 
the resulting registers, or at least to a summary of their contents (probably 
                                                     
 
112 On the Greeks and Armenians paying cizye at an annual rate of 2 and 4 dollars (men 
between 15 and 20 years of age, and men over 20 resp.), see Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 230-34. Ap-
parently, the first bout of experimentation with cizye reform (that sought to achieve a transi-
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Sariyannis conclusion that from the 1670s onwards Crete and the Aegean islands were testing 
sites for a planned empire-wide implementation of the three-class system. 
113 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 140-41. 
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via the voyvoda, who was after all the official responsible for collecting the 
relevant market and retail dues), and declares that Izmir’s grain consumption 
amounted to 120,000 quillots per annum, 30,000 going towards the Jews and 
45,000 towards the Turks, with a further 6,000 being taken up by one French 
and one English oven for the European communities and their shipping.114 
The obvious implication is that in estimating the comparative size of Izmir’s 
Jewish community, a significant upward adjustment must indeed be made to 
compensate for the obscuration of Jewish tax-payers by the maktu’-
arrangement. 
 
TABLE 5: IDEM, ADJUSTED FOR MAKTU’ (1678) 
 Families % of total
 
Total (T=Z+M) 19,430 100.00
Greek (G) 800 4.12
Armenian (A) 130 0.67
Jewish (J) 3,000 15.44
Zimmi (Z=G+A+J) 3,930 20.23
Muslim (M) 15,500 79.77
Based on Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 107 and 114-41. 
 
Demographic Trends from 1657/58 to 1678 
When the data concerning the size and composition of Izmir’s taxpaying 
population in 1678 is contrasted with that of 1657/58, Table 6 emerges. 
The table shows a near-doubling of the taxpaying population between 
1657/58 and 1678 (coefficient of 1.89), with the non-Muslim part growing at 
a significantly higher rate than the Muslim part (coefficients of 6.21 and 1.60 
respectively), although still being only a quarter of the latter’s size. Assuming 
that the ratio between the number of taxpayers and the number of tax-
exempt was more or less equal for all communities over this 20-year period 
(and having made some adjustments to compensate for the exceptionality of 
the Jewish case), these general conclusions can be extended to the popula-
tion proper. 
 
                                                     
 
114 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 145-46. A quillot comprised 22 okkas, 1 okka equals 1.282 kil-
ograms, 120,000 quillots equals 3,384,480 kilograms of grain. 
Muslim Greek
Jewish Armenian
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TABLE 6: DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAXPAYING POPULATION OF IZMIR (1657-1678) 
 1657/58 1678 1657/58-1678 
 Families % of 
Zimmis
% of 
total 
Families % of 
Zimmis
% of total Abs. 
growth 
rate 
Rel. 
growth 
rate 
Total 10,300 - 100.00 19,430 - 100.00 1.89 0.00 
Greek 301 47.55 2.92 800 20.36 4.12 2.66 0.41 
Armenian 61 9.64 0.59 130 3.31 0.67 2.13 0.14 
Jewish 271 42.81 2.63 3,000 76.34 15.44 11.07 4.87 
Zimmi 633 100.00 6.15 3,930 100.00 20.23 6.21 2.29 
Muslim 9,667 - 93.85 15,500 - 79.77 1.60 -0.15 
Based on Tables 3 and 5. 
 
Concerning the composition of the non-Muslim part of the population, we 
can then conclude that although all non-Muslim communities registered 
growth (coefficients of 2.66, 2.13 and 11.07), the “original autochthonous” 
Greek community and the “older immigrant” Armenian community were 
being outstripped by the “newer immigrant” Jewish community (relative 
growth rates of 0.41, 0.14 and 4.87 respectively), which is indeed the tenor of 
most contemporary Ottoman and European sources. In fact, it looks as if 
the Jewish community grew at an even higher rate, since the ratio between 
the tax-exempt and the taxpaying was much higher for the Jewish communi-
ty than for the Greek or Armenian. It should not be forgotten, however, that 
the semblance of accuracy of the figures in the table is illusory, as they are all 
the result of repeated reinterpretation. Consequently, they should serve as 
indicators of general trends only. 
This having been said, the foregoing certainly still permits some interest-
ing observations to be made. To begin with, it has been shown that the years 
1658-1678 witnessed a near-doubling of the taxpaying population, which 
could well have meant a doubling of the overall population, particularly if the 
European communities are included. With a population rapidly approaching 
the hundred-thousand mark, Izmir was propelling itself into the range of 
important Ottoman cities. Furthermore, it has become clear that this rapid 
development reversed the 200-year-old trend of Turkification in favor of the 
non-Muslim communities, initiating a counter-trend towards the non-Muslim 
dominance to which the 19th-century designation “infidel Izmir” famously 
refers. Lastly, the coinciding of intense Jewish immigration with rapid growth 
in the volume of international trade going through the city, marks that com-
munity’s rise to numerical and economic ascendancy at the cost of the city’s 
older Greek and Armenian communities; a fact reflected in the capturing by 
Izmir’s Jews of almost all middlemen positions, previously the domain of 
Greeks and, to a lesser degree, Armenians. 
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The Tax-Exempt: From Elite to Underclass 
So far, in discussing the population of Izmir, we have spoken mainly about 
taxpayers and their families. In that discussion the tax-exempt have figured a 
number of times, but without any consistent qualification or quantification. 
Now that we have arrived at an estimated tax-paying population of 70,000 
for 1678-Izmir, let us see whether we can specify that segment of Izmir’s 
population further. 
The difference between the taxpaying population and the resident popu-
lation proper (including semi-resident visitors) was made up of protégés, 
administrators, military, clergy, the non-productive sick, old and destitute, 
slaves, and subjects laboring in state monopolies, pious endowments or as 
civilian guards or watchmen. That leaves us to guess at the size of a consid-
erable segment of the population, commonly estimated at 10-15% (which 
would add another 10,000 souls or so to the overall population of Izmir in 
1678).115 But even worse, other than fiscal sources are also largely silent on 
the lower classes, equally among the tax-exempt. This silence is especially 
unfortunate since if one takes the time to consider them, the movements and 
occupations of these laborers, servants and slaves can be seen to have 
brought them in regular contact with those of other cultures. 
In discussions about the proverbial cosmopolitan or tolerant character of 
Izmir, claims to that effect are often challenged through statements that 
contacts of diplomats and merchants with Ottoman officials should not 
count towards the incidence of crosscultural contact because they are formal, 
irregular and limited to elites – as if a tolerant attitude towards other cultures 
only amounts to something if it is shared across the entire society. Seen from 
this perspective, it will always be debatable whether a society at large is truly 
multicultural or cosmopolitan, warmly tolerant, or parsimoniously tolerant, 
its members of different cultures barely tolerating each other out of necessi-
ty. Although that is always a sensible question (and a steady antidote against 
“neo-Ottoman nostalgia” for early modern Izmir, or similarly lyrical descrip-
tions of medieval Granada, the American melting-pot, or Dutch multicultur-
alism), we might wonder whether cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism 
have not always been ideologies of the few (a question to which we will re-
turn further down).116 What, then, remains if we are to discount those same 
few, even if it is just because we cannot count them for lack of sources? 
The answer often is: little to nothing. But what we can see is that in Izmir 
(as in Granada; see note 26 and the accompanying discussion) crosscultural 
contact was pervasive, although it remains well-hidden under a triple layer of 
                                                     
 
115 Barkan, “Essai sur les données statistiques”, 21-22. 
116 “There are, of course, just as many who suffer from neo-Ottoman nostalgia, and pine 
for the tolerant society of the Ottoman sixteenth and seventeenth centuries”: Virginia H. 
Aksan, “Theoretical Ottomans”, History and Theory, 47/1 (2008), 114. 
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ethno-religious, class and fiscal silencing. So, let us take a look at the ex-
empted categories, whilst also taking note of the degree of their crosscultural 
involvement. 
 
Protégés we have already spoken of quite a bit, and we will discuss them 
some more below, but let us here simply estimate their number at a con-
servative 5 middleman-protégés for Izmir’s Dutch, English and French na-
tion (the Venetians and Genoese in Izmir do not appear to have protected 
commercial partners in this manner), with each having an average – automat-
ically exempted – 1 son and 3 servants with 1 son each. This would make the 
number of real and nominal dragomans and vice-consuls 35 – a negligible 
absolute number, even if it were double or three times as high, although we 
should remember it represented some of the city’s richest families and there-
fore had a far greater impact on public finance than numbers alone suggest. 
As brokers, translators, advisors and warehousemen for the Europeans, 
these prominent Jews, Greeks and Armenians, their offspring and their serv-
ants were in daily contact with European consuls, merchants, captains and 
crews on the one hand, and Ottoman wholesalers, merchants and officials 
on the other. They were the oil for Izmir’s crosscultural engine. If ever there 
was a truly cosmopolitan set, this was it. 
Administrators, meaning Ottoman officials in charge of Izmir’s admin-
istration, public order and justice, included the kadi (judge/chief administra-
tor), his naibs (assistants), the mufti (jurisconsult), the voyvoda (substitute gov-
ernor) and his troupe, including the subaşı (chief of police) and the muhtesib 
(market inspector), and numerous mukata’acıs and mültezims (tax-farmers) and 
guards (kapıcı), as well as all these men’s households. 
Izmir being a crown domain, its military contingent counted no fief-based 
cavalry (sipahis), but was made up completely of 2 castle wardens (dizdars), a 
regiment of Janissaries (yeniçeris; at least 10 employed as consular guards), 72 
guards (bostancıs) and perhaps some irregulars (sekban). Both administrators 
and military were in regular contact with Izmir’s Europeans because they 
were overseeing their dealings, were actively lobbied by them for favors, and 
often struck up mutual friendships to support mutually profitable favoritism 
and smooth official relations. 
Among the aforementioned officials, the kadi and the mufti were strictly 
speaking not administrators but clergy (ülema), just like those employed in 
running Izmir’s 310 mosques and prayer houses, its 40 advanced religious 
schools, 3 Koran schools, 40 primary schools, and its single soup kitchen. 
On the non-Muslim side, European and European-protected clergymen were 
in charge of the city’s seven churches (a Franciscan, Capuchin, and a Jesuit 
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church in the European quarter, and the native Greek Saint George, Saint 
Photina, Saint Veneranda and Latin Saint Polycarp).117 
To these categories of tax exempt should also be added an unknown and 
unknowable number of non-productive sick, old and destitute, as well as 
subjects enjoying exemption by virtue of their daily labor in the service of 
the state (laboring in the salt fields, as civilian guards or watchmen, and so 
on). The latter category will have had little to do with Izmir’s Europeans, 
other than guarding the stations along which merchandise found its way to 
and from Izmir’s Europeans, or than having to go through the heart of the 
European quarter on their way to another day’s work in the salt mines (see 
below). 
 
This leaves one last category to be discussed: slaves. Until its abolishment in 
1847 Ottoman slavery was widespread. Before the modern period, when 
slave labor drove the cotton industry, slaves were commonly used in elite 
households (as harem servants and guards), in the production of fine textiles 
(as weavers and dyers) and in brokerage, banking and trade (as most trusted 
agents).118 A vibrant commercial center of Izmir’s size would not only boast 
markets for grain, wood, fresh produce and caravan items, but certainly also 
another one, as tightly organized and overseen, for slaves.119 Ottoman legal, 
fiscal and executive registers do testify more fully to the regulation of slave 
markets and ownership in general, as well as to legal protection of what little 
rights slaves did possess.120 European diplomatic and travelers’ accounts turn 
to the subject occasionally, but always to relate only the financial conse-
quences of the grinding work of redemption or the most sensational ac-
counts of flight.121 Nevertheless, glimpses of everyday slavery in the center 
                                                     
 
117 See Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 89: Ve bu şehrin şeyhülislâmı müftisi ve nakibüleşrafı ve kethüdyeri ve 
yeniçeri serdarı ve cavuşu ve hünkâr bağçesinin bostancıbaşısı ve yetmiş added külâhlı bostancısı ve bir hâkim 
dqahi gümrük emini iki yüz bin altuna iltizam hükûmetdir Ve kal’a dizdarı ikidir Biri lebi deryadaki 
kal’ada biri dağda Seddi Kahriyye kal’asında hâkimdir Ve voyvodası ve muhtesibi ve şehir naibi dahi 
hâkimdir Askerî tayifesinden gayri cümle ehli hirefe hükûmet ider hâkimlerdir. The seven churches 
Evliya goes on to refer to will be discussed in more detail infra. 
118 Alan Fisher, “Chattel Slavery in the Ottoman Empire”, Slavery and Abolition, 1/1 (1980). 
119 I have not come upon references to Izmir’s slave market in European and Ottoman 
primary and secondary sources studied for this project, except for a confirmation of its exist-
ence by Slaars in Iconomos, Étude sur Smyrne, 46n82; and in Nicolas Chamfort’s famous late-
18th-century comedy, Sébastien Roch Nicolas Chamfort, Le marchand de Smyrne: comédie en un 
acte et en prose (Paris: Delalain, 1770). 
120 See Fisher, “Chattel Slavery”; William Gervase Clarence-Smith, Islam and the Abolition of 
Slavery (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2006), 85-93; and Ehud R. Toledano, Slavery and Abolition in 
the Ottoman Middle East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 54-80. 
121 Concerning flight, see, e.g. The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 50a-b – on the French and 
Venetian cases of 1679, in which the incoming French ambassador and Venetian bailo were 
held responsible for a significant number of slaves seeking refuge on their warships whilst 
they laid anchored off Seraglio Point in Istanbul (with the French resisting consequent visita-
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and along the margins of the Ottoman-European commercial system occa-
sionally do make it into European official archives and travelers’ accounts, as 
in Galland’s discussion of Izmir as a tour de Babel: “Un curieux des langues 
peut avoir le plaisir à Smyrne d’en entendre parler près d’une douzaine et 
d’apprendre celles qui lui plairaient le plus: l’arabe, le turc, le persien, 
l’arménien, le grec vulgaire, la langue de Russie parmi les esclaves tant hommes que 
femmes, l’hébreu, l’italien, le portugais, le français, l’anglais et le hollandais.”122 
Slavery was so common in Izmir as to be impossible to disregard completely. 
The most poignant testimony of how widespread slavery actually was in 
late 17th-century Izmir, is that which indicates that non-Muslims, be they 
Ottoman or European, kept slaves, even though this was in direct contraven-
tion of Islamic law, and oftentimes even of Ottoman law.123 The owning of 
slaves by Ottoman Jews all over the empire is widely attested, in the case of 
late 17th-centruy Izmir again by Galland, who feels the need to state that his 
estimate of the Jewish community’s size does not include their (Christian) 
slaves.124 
Just as surprising as Christian slaves being owned by Jews in Ottoman 
Izmir, are indications that European merchants also owned slaves – and in 
all probability Christian (or heathen?) ones at that, since any claims to own-
ership of Islamic slaves would never have been upheld in Ottoman territory 
(leading to immediate loss of such human property). References to slave-
owning by European merchants are very sparse, but its factuality and high 
incidence may nevertheless be inferred from the unsurprised and matter-of-
fact tone with which it was treated whenever mentioning it could not be 
avoided. In the case of the 1681-bankruptcy of the prominent Dutch mer-
chant J(oh)an(nes) van Breen, for instance, chief Dutch dragoman Willem 
Theijls, in charge of compiling an inventory of the merchant’s house and 
belongings, dryly navigates a house brimming with multicultural contradic-
tions (see Appendix 2, Document 13), most prominently the combination of 
the owner’s black Sunday dress, the goods of his “Greek” wife Elisabeth 
Violier and their (?) six children, and right next to the master bedroom a 
                                                                                                                        
 
tion by Ottoman troops, and the Venetians allowing it after having thrown the liberated slaves 
overboard to drown in the Bosporus’ rapids); or Galland, Journal, 133-34; The Hague, NA 
1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 6 December 1674; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob 
van Dam to States General, 11 July 1676 – on European slaves on Barbarian ships seeking 
refuge in Izmir’s European consulates. For a financial account of redemption work, see, e.g., 
The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Andreas Forestier to DLH, 4 December 1676. 
122 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 151 (emphasis added). 
123 See Joseph Schacht, An introduction to Islamic law (London: Clarendon Press, 1966), 132; 
Majid Khadduri, War and peace in the law of Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 
167; and Fisher, “Chattel Slavery”. 
124 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 141-42: “Entre 10000 âmes qu’ils peuvent être, sans compter les 
esclaves chrétiennes qu’ils ont, il y en a 200 qui demandent l’aumône, et 100 nécessiteux à qui l’on 
fait la charité en secret et aux frais de la communauté” (emphasis added). 
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“slave girls’ room, 1 large bed with its blankets and pillows for the same, and 
some boxes with their clothes.”125 
Another instance of European (Dutch) residents in the Ottoman Empire 
owning slaves may be encountered in a deposition dated 31 August 1672 by 
Dutch merchant of Izmir Christoffel Capoen. Finding himself taken hostage 
by two fellow Dutch merchants (Cornelis Rogier van Goor and Pieter 
Smout) over a complicated transaction concerning consular duties involving 
500 Lion Dollars of theirs handed over to him by the Venetian consul, he 
manages to jump from a second floor window to the safety of the French 
consul’s garden and make his way home. His partner, meanwhile, repeatedly 
sends their servant over to enquire about his whereabouts, and is told by the 
hostage takers’ slave Jusuf (Joseph), leaning out the window of Van Goor and 
Smout’s reception room, and speaking Italian, that his patrons are having 
dinner in the garden on the seafront and that there is no one from outside in 
the house.126 
Clearly, in delineating the web of crosscultural relations at work in late-
17th-century Izmir, the 10-15% tax exempted, from rich to poor to destitute, 
should be accounted for. 
 
Geography 
It goes without saying that more than a century of intense growth had a pro-
found impact on Izmir’s appearance. In the first half of the 16th century it 
had been a relatively insignificant market town straddling a small regional 
inner harbor protected by a castle (lower Izmir) and a populated mountain 
slope with a fortress that was quickly losing importance (upper Izmir), joined 
together by an ancient commercial district; a neutral ground that might be 
termed “middle Izmir” (see Map 1). By the second half of the same century 
this “double city” had been firmly cemented into one, adjoining an inner 
harbor that now primarily serviced the imperial authorities as a staging point 
for Ottoman naval expeditions in the Aegean and an interregional provision-
ing center for Istanbul’s palace and populace.127 A century later, in 1678, the 
port’s regional and interregional functions had been far outstripped by the 
unstoppable flow of international seaborne trade, and the Ottomans were 
                                                     
 
125 The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1060: Willem Theijls in Justinus Colyer’s chancery, 18 No-
vember 1681. 
126 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Christoffel Capoen in Jacob van Dam’s chancery, 5 Oc-
tober 1672. 
127 On twin or double cities, and their frequency, types and instances, in the Muslim 
world, see Ira M. Lapidus, “Muslim Cities and Islamic Societies”, in: Middle Eastern Cities: A 
Symposium on Ancient, Islamic, and Contemporary Middle Eastern Urbanism, ed. Ira M. Lapidus 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 60-69. On the Ottomans’ wish to reserve 
Izmir for provisioning tasks, as well as on European smuggling in strategic goods undercut-
ting this policy, see Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 7-10. 
 
 
83 
 
busy finishing a major reconfiguration of the city’s commercial and adminis-
trative infrastructure, designed to enhance their control and taxation of that 
same flow (see below). 
Since the inner harbor – too small and shallow to accommodate Western 
European shipping – remained the exclusive domain of Ottoman commer-
cial and naval vessels, European ships dropped anchor slightly further north 
of the inner harbor and its castle, opposite Frank Street’s jetties in the bay 
that was Izmir’s natural harbor. Again, the city’s focus had shifted, be it 
slightly, from the area east of the inner harbor towards the European quarter 
(Frank Street) and the (international) customs house, where a new commer-
cial center was taking shape (see Map 3). The rapid growth of the city’s pop-
ulation, meanwhile, had been accommodated by filling and expanding the 
old quarters and creating new ones. Unsurprisingly, the garden-rich plain 
behind Frank Street (previously considered too unhealthy for habitation) and 
the quarters adjoining it (inland from the new economic center) absorbed 
much of the latest growth. 
 
Towards a Plan of the 17th-Century City 
It is very difficult to go beyond this general description and elaborate further 
on the city’s 17th-century form and structure. The circumstances are identical 
to those surrounding our discussion of the size and composition of the pop-
ulation: although there is some relatively detailed information available for 
1678 and some additional context from the preceding and succeeding dec-
ades, it is a far cry from the survey data available for the 16th century.128 The 
tahrirs of AH 935 and 983 (AD 1528/29 and 1575/76) provide precise in-
formation regarding the number, location, functions, size and composition 
of Izmir’s quarters.129 Beyond that, there is only circumstantial commerce-
related evidence. Regrettably, this hides much of the city and its quarters 
from view, making a full urban geography unattainable and a partial one 
invariably biased towards the parts most associated with international trade; 
the non-Muslim communities and the northern half of the city (see Map 3). 
                                                     
 
128 The most interesting of these sources are: Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 88-100 (1671-
situation); De Bruyn, Reizen, 20-36 (1678-sit.), which includes a beautifully accurate and de-
tailed city panorama by the author (see Plate 1); The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684 (1678-sit.); Gal-
land, Voyage à Smyrne (1678-sit.); Jean Dumont, Nouveau voyage du Levant (The Hague: E. 
Foulque, 1694) (1691-sit.); the deed (vakfiye) of the Köprülü charitable endowment (vakf) that 
transformed Izmir’s commercial infrastructure at Istanbul, SLK MF 4027 (AH 15 Safer 1089 
/ AD 8 April 1678): Vakfiye-i Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1678-sit.); two French consu-
lar reports on the 1688-earthquake summarized in Iconomos, Étude sur Smyrne, 128-31 (1688-
sit.); and two receipts confirming the lease of houses at Leiden, UBL Legatum Warnerum 
Cod.Or. 1267 (AH 10-20 Şevvâl 1101 / AD 18-27 July 1690), fos. 5a-6a and 15b-16a (1690-
sit.). 
129 Istanbul, BBA TT 148 (AD 935 / AH 1528/59); and Istanbul, BBA TT 537 (AH 983 
/ AD 1575/76). 
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MAP 3: NORTHWARD SHIFT OF IZMIR’S ECONOMIC CENTER FROM 1570S TO 1670S 
 
Based on Map 2. 
 
Nevertheless, if we accept the inevitable shortcomings caused by the lack of 
sources and complement the information from the tahrirs with snippets from 
the 17th-century, it is still possible to roughly position the city’s quarters with-
in the general description above. 
The most effective way to do so is graphically, by delineating the city’s 
quarters on a plan of Izmir. Despite printed atlases and collections of city 
plans becoming exceedingly popular from the middle of the 16th century 
onwards (and remaining so throughout the 17th), these tended to concentrate 
on Europe and included only the most ancient and famous Ottoman cities 
(Cairo, Alexandria, Jerusalem, Damascus, Aleppo, Istanbul, Edirne, and in-
creasingly also corsair centers Algiers and Tunis), without exception neglect-
ing recent upstart Izmir. In another – more practical – cartographic category, 
that of the sea-chart, Izmir and its gulf are represented frequently, but as is to 
be expected considering the navigational purpose of such charts, the city 
itself figures marginally in them. 16th and 17th-century sea-charts of the Gulf 
of Izmir only rather clumsily depict the city’s coastline, inner harbor, upper 
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and lower castles and, in some cases, a token building or two (see the plates 
in Appendix 1). The total absence of anything resembling a city plan, or even 
a delineation of the overall built-up area, has forced scholars who wanted to 
visualize the information contained in the tahrirs of 1528 and 1575 to repre-
sent the quarters of the city as text within otherwise bare outline maps.130 
Due to the city’s increasing fame and the growing popularity of the travel 
account, the same does not have to apply to the 17th-century. As it gained 
importance to Europe, more and more European travelers flocked to Izmir. 
Concomitantly, the amount of space these travelers dedicated to the city in 
their accounts also increased, as did the scope and quality of their descrip-
tions – some even so far as roughly indicating the ethnic composition of 
areas of the city. Adorning these travelers’ descriptions is another type of 
illustration than the ones previously discussed: the panorama. Originally 
intended to enhance the attractiveness of commercial editions, panoramas 
now constitute an important historical source. For 17th-century Izmir, there 
are essentially two, not counting innumerable imitations: De Bruyn’s (from 
1678) and De Tournefort’s (from 1700) (see Plates 1 and 2). Of these, the 
former best suits our purpose, both because it predates the 1688-earthquake 
and because it is much larger, more accurate and more detailed than De 
Tournefort’s (and, for that matter, all others’ until well into the 19th century). 
Combined with his own and other travelers’ descriptions, De Bruyn’s pano-
rama makes it possible to project a reasonably accurate outline of the 1678-
city on a detailed 19th-century map. 
The earliest detailed city plan of Izmir was drawn by Lieutenant (later 
Commander) Thomas Graves and published in 1844 (see Plate 3). Cropped 
and tilted to correspond to De Bruyn’s panorama, it appears as Map 4. 
To clearly illustrate the situation of the 1678-city on the basis of this map 
from 1844, it has been altered in several ways: the map’s opacity has been 
diminished; the main geographical and man-made features have been identi-
fied and emphasized or colorized; the triangular area that Galland describes 
as being built-up in 1678 (see Map 2) has been spotlighted; the approximate 
position, orientation and field of vision of De Bruyn (when drawing his pan-
orama) have been added; and a number of adjustments have been made to 
the shoreline on the basis of his and De Tournefort’s panoramas as well as 
several travelers’ accounts. The result is shown as Map 5. 
 
 
                                                     
 
130 See, e.g., Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 12; Eldem et al., Ottoman City, 80; 
Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir, 23. But see Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis, Une société hors de 
soi: identités et relations sociales à Smyrne au XVIIIe et XIXe siècles (Paris: Peeters, 2005), 251 for 
another more detailed rendering and strategy, similar to the one taken in this study. 
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MAP 4: PLAN OF IZMIR IN 1844 
 
Detail from Graves, “City of Ismir or Smyrna”, with re-added legend for scale and 
orientation. 
 
The adjustments on the basis of panoramas and travelers’ accounts all con-
cern the shoreline and the structures along it. Most conspicuous is the reap-
pearance of the inner (or, galley) harbor (no. 16 in De Bruyn’s panorama), 
which was filled at the beginning of the 19th century to make space for a 
marketplace and housing.131 At the entrance to the inner harbor, the rectan-
gular lower (or, harbor) castle with its landward moat (De Bruyn’s no. 15) 
has been restored over the triangular battery that remained in the middle of 
                                                     
 
131 Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir, 20-21. By then, the harbor was heavily silted up 
and opening it up again made little sense because ships had grown so much in size from the 
16th century that they would not be able to use it anyway. It was more sensible to reclaim it for 
habitation. Today, as it was back then, the typical circular shape of the harbor is easily recog-
nizable within the city’s grid (see Plates 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8) – just as it is with Istanbul’s former 
galley harbor in the Kumpkapı quarter, see http://maps.google.com/maps/place?ftid= 
0x14cab99a4a1d22b3:0xbb396fd3b268797d&q=kadirga+limani+&hl=nl&ved=0CA0Q-
gswAA&sa=X&ei=XgrJTvrDOIrvjAfDsuHuCw&sig2=rp73V3q00dbxuyDLendusA. 
 
 
87 
 
the 19th-century. When the entire structure was finally torn down in 1870, its 
remains were used to further broaden Izmir’s quays.132 Although the overall 
shape of the shoreline was not altered between 1678 and 1844 (except 
around the inner harbor), a number of changes along the northern shore 
have been undone to revert to the 17th-century situation: the fully developed 
shore and large piers and harbor sheds of the 19th century have disappeared 
to make room for (from left to right) Frank Street’s guarded beach (beneath 
De Bruyn’s nos. 5-11), where boats loaded and unloaded the cargoes of ships 
 
MAP 5: IMPRESSION OF IZMIR’S SITUATION IN 1678; ENHANCED GRAVES’ MAP 
 
Based on Map 4. 
 
anchored in the outer harbor; the customs house-pier (De Bruyn’s no. 12) 
that had partly taken over this function in 1675; and the beach between the 
customs house and the castle, until 1675 the site of a shambles (open-air 
slaughterhouse), but now the location of the newly built covered market (De 
                                                     
 
132 Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir, 21. Also see Plate 8. 
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Bruyn’s no. 13). To the right of the inner harbor, on the southern part of the 
shore, the governor’s house, barracks and parade ground should be consid-
ered undeveloped; an empty beach with extensive burial grounds inland to 
the south and southeast (De Bruyn’s nos. 19-21). 
If we turn our attention from the shore to the city’s inland margins, com-
parison between De Bruyn’s panorama and the enhanced Graves’ map 
shows that the southern part of the city in the course of time completely 
swallowed the Greek and Armenian cemeteries (De Bruyn’s no. 19) to form 
the western arm of a fork stretching southwards along either side of the 
Urla-road. It also appears that the site of the ancient Greek Church of St. 
Veneranda (De Bruyn’s no. 18; reduced to rubble in the earthquake of 1688) 
had become a Turkish cemetery (in between the forked quarters), as had 
much of the mountain’s lower flanks further to the south. If we move fur-
ther inland, to the eastern arm of the fork between the Turkish cemetery and 
the ancient stadium (on the map, directly left of the text “Mount Pagus”), we 
notice that – like the western arm – it falls outside Galland’s triangle. A 
glance at the panorama, however, reveals that the city’s build-up was not that 
far removed from this imaginary line between the St. Veneranda and the 
ancient stadium; although the stadium is not visible in the panorama, a com-
parison of landmarks positions it in a slight depression between the wind-
mills highest on the hill and the build-up below them. Thus, it seems that at 
least part of the eastern fork was already in existence around 1678. This is 
confirmed when a line is drawn between the St. Veneranda and the ancient 
theatre (on the map, just north of the western side of the upper castle); when 
this line running straight along the right (or, southern) side of Galland’s tri-
angle is replicated in De Bruyn’s drawing (no. 18 to no. 3), it is indeed shown 
to have been crossed by the beginnings of the eastern fork. 
Of course, the sides of the scalene were nowhere as defined as the map 
suggests. In fact, before describing their situation, Galland was careful to 
point out that the absence of a city wall had caused the city’s margins to be 
ill-defined – his figure indicative of the city’s general shape only.133 Concern-
ing the left (or, northern) side of his triangle, for instance, Galland states that 
it was in reality “beaucoup interrompu par les jardinages” – a fortunate 
comment since this flat area is not visible in the panorama.134 Equally fortu-
nate, it seems, is that while Galland remains silent on the interspersion of the 
right (or, southern) side of his triangle, the panorama does depict some de-
velopment in that area. 
Although it is safe to assume that the 1678-city crossed and receded from 
the triangle’s left side at several points (due to the gardens and orchards 
along the distributary of the Meles), and that its build-up crossed the right 
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side (skirting Mount Pagus) at one point at least, it should be added that 
there are some distortions in the panorama. De Bruyn’s position and orienta-
tion, as indicated by the arrow on Map 5, were retraced by following the lines 
of perspective of the customs house, covered market and lower castle, which 
we know were built at right angles to a relatively even shore. Since the van-
ishing point of these lines lie slightly above the middle of the market’s roof, 
it seems De Bruyn did his shipboard drawing from the anchorage directly 
opposite that building. Yet, by his own account, it was when the Dutch con-
voy was waiting for permission to pass the castle controlling access to Iz-
mir’s bay (Sancak Kalesi; see “Chateau” on Plate 2 and “Sanjak Kalassi” on 
Plate 4).135 This would be consistent with the single angle at which the roof-
tops are depicted along the entire breadth of the coastline. However, the fact 
that the harbor castle is depicted in line with the mountain castle and the 
theatre, combined with the perspective chosen to depict the customs house 
and harbor castle at the heart of the drawing, suggests that the panorama was 
in fact composed from two locations: from the considerable distance of the 
entrance to the gulf and from the anchorage in the outer harbor closer by. 
The artist’s shift in position might have resulted in some deformation, not so 
much of the direct horizon that was the shoreline, but of the inland parts of 
the city further away. If the build-up to the right of the theatre was drawn 
from the outer harbor, it might very well be that this is actually a depiction of 
the part of the city to its left (that is the upper half of the right leg of the 
triangle), which is so pronounced in Galland’s triangle, yet seems so absent 
from De Bruyn’s drawing. All said and done, it seems wise to not to overly 
rely on the panorama where Izmir’s layout beyond the direct shore is con-
cerned. 
 
The City and its Quarters According to the Survey of 1528 
The information on Izmir’s quarters contained in the tahrirs of 1528 and 
1575 has been expertly analyzed and effectively presented by Kütükoğlu, so a 
short summary will suffice here.136 The tahrir of 1528 lists six quarters (ma-
halles) belonging to the jurisdiction (kaza) of Izmir: Faik Paşa, Mescid-i 
Selatinzade, Han Bey (Pazar), Limon (Liman), Cemaat-ı Gebran and 
Boynusekisi. Of these, the first five made up the city proper, the last being a 
nearby village administratively attached to Izmir. Of the total 224 families 
(hanes) and 75 unmarried men (mücerreds; bachelors and celibates) constituting 
the jurisdiction’s population, 50 and 11 lived in Boynusekisi, leaving, respec-
tively, 174 and 64 for the actual urban area. All members of the Greek com-
munity (the only non-Muslim community the surveys of 1528 and 1575 list 
for Izmir) lived together in one exclusively non-Muslim quarter, appropriate-
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ly referred to as “the community of non-Muslims” (cemaat-ı gebran). The other 
four quarters, as well as Boynusekisi, were registered as being fully Muslim. 
The distribution of the population over the five quarters of the city proper, 
then, is as seen in Table 7. 
 
TABLE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF IZMIR PROPER (1528) 
 Regis-
tered 
Individu-
als 
%
of 
Total 
Fam
ilies
Bache-
lors 
& Celi-
bates 
Exempted Muslims
High
er 
Cler-
gy 
Higher
Offi-
cials 
Salt-
pan 
Work-
ers 
Desti-
tute 
& 
Disa-
bled 
Faik Paşa 70 29.41 52 18 6 2 8 - 
Mescid-i 
Selatinzade 
61 25.63 43 18 1 - 5 2 
Han Bey 
(Pazar) 
39 16.39 30 9 2 - 4 1 
Limon 
(Liman) 
25 10.50 18 7 - - - - 
Cemaat-ı 
Gebran 
43 18.07 31 12 - - - - 
TOTAL 238 100 174 64 9 2 17 3 
Based on Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir, 25. 
 
Before these five older quarters can be located on the enhanced version of 
Graves’ city plan, we need to call to our aid another cartographic device; the 
tourist map. Since the modern equivalents of most historic quarters have 
already been identified by historians of the municipality and since city quar-
ters are commonly indicated on tourist maps, the whereabouts of the historic 
quarters on Graves’ city plan can be partly retraced by projecting modern 
maps over it. The two tourist maps that will be used for this purpose have 
also been reproduced as Plates 6 and 7. The resulting projections are shown 
as Maps 6 and 7. 
Comparison of the two maps clearly shows that the second one best fits 
Graves’ map. Nevertheless, the first has also been included, because it lists 
alternative, older, names for some quarters. Altınordu (in the top of the tri-
angle on the second map), for instance, is the modern equivalent of Faik 
Paşa (same location on the first map). Similarly, modern Kurtuluş and 
Namazgah (around the old agora on the second map) used to constitute Han 
Bey (Pazar) and Mescid-i Selatinzade, indicated on the first map as Pazary-
eri.137 
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MAP 6: TOURIST MAP (C. 1990) PROJECTED ONTO OUR ENHANCED MAP (1844) 
 
Based on Map 5 and Plate 6. 
MAP 7: TOURIST MAP (1992) PROJECTED ONTO OUR ENHANCED MAP (1844) 
 
Based on Map 5 and Plate 7. 
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The locations of Limon (Liman) and Cemaat-ı Gebran cannot be retraced in 
this manner, but this is not a problem since there is ample evidence (includ-
ing the tahrirs) that confirms what is already implied by their names and asso-
ciates the former with the inner harbor (İç Liman) and the garrison of the 
lower castle (Liman Kalesi), and the latter with the area further to the north 
and northeast, easily identifiable by its two historic Greek churches of Saint 
George (Hagios Georgios) and Saint Photina (Hagia Photini) and the Latin 
church of Saint Polycarp (see, from right to left, the three temple-shaped 
objects directly above the customs house on Map 5). The Greek churches 
were located opposite the entrance to what would later become Frank Street 
and the Latin church lay at the beginning of that same street. Indeed, our 
knowledge of Frank Street may serve as an additional aid, since we know that 
the non-Muslim quarter originated in the area around the abovementioned 
churches and developed with Frank Street as its westernmost border, it is 
easy to determine the location of Cemaat-ı Gebran and the direction of its 
development.138 
The five quarters of the city proper, then, can be positioned as shown in 
Map 8. 
The names of the quarters are not the only new additions to the map; the 
main streets visible on Graves’ map have also been highlighted. These are 
the streets of 1844, of course, but since no rigorous urban planning (like in 
Amsterdam and London in the 17th, Washington in the 18th, or Paris in the 
19th century) took place in the old quarters before the burning of the city in 
the War of Independence, the main street network of 1844 was the result of 
an uninterrupted process of evolution. If its relative continuity (as evident in 
Maps 6 and 7), past even the utter destruction of 1923, is any indication of 
the tenacity of the city’s main grid, there is little danger of anachronism in 
assuming that it will also have changed little over the previous centuries. 
The absence of far-reaching coordinated redevelopment aside, two inter-
linked positive factors also contributed to the continuity of Izmir’s street 
network. Firstly, the two main functions of the lower and lower-middle city, 
military and commercial, had been concentrated in the area directly east and 
north of the inner harbor long before the 16th century. In the second half of 
the 17th century these central areas were functionally supplanted by Cemaat-ı 
Gebran and Sancak Kalesi. By that time, however, the city’s build-up had 
already acquired the triangular shape noted by Galland and the main streets 
within that built-up area were already firmly in place. 
                                                     
 
138 Incidentally, Frank Street is not to be found on any modern map, since it has been re-
placed by a number of interspersed smaller streets. Its function as a thoroughfare has been 
taken over by two main roads, Cumhuriyet Bulvarı and Atatürk Caddesi; the first constructed 
over the old shoreline where the sea once washed over Frank Street’s beach, the second on an 
artificially extended coastal strip or kordon (see Plates 6 and 7). 
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MAP 8: QUARTERS OF IZMIR PROPER IN 1528 
 
Based on Map 5. 
 
Secondly, the city’s two main approaches – the road over the caravan bridge 
and the road to Urla – were in existence well before the 16th century. Before 
the renewed rise of Ottoman Izmir at the turn of that century, these two 
roads meeting in the city had been a single thoroughfare connecting the 
western Anatolian caravan routes to Chios, as an overland alternative to the 
sea-lane running from Aleppo to Chios.139 From Izmir, the caravan road 
crossed the river, where an arm branched off to follow the Meles upstream 
around Mount Pagus and towards the town of Buca, while the main road 
passed in between the ancient ruins of the bath of Diana and the mosaic 
pavement (thought to have belonged to the temple of Dionysus; see Plate 4) 
and from there continued on to the towns of Bornova (referred to by Evliya 
as mostly Greek; see above) and ancient Hacılar, from where it continued to 
                                                     
 
139 See Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 285-86. 
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central and northwestern Anatolia. The Urla road was not only a remainder 
of the old caravan route, but also Izmir’s sole landward connection with the 
district capital (at Urla) and the wider Karaburun-peninsula that defines and 
guards the city’s seaward approach. Since accessibility by road has been a 
precondition for the formation of administrative entities throughout history 
and since both Byzantine and Ottoman Izmir were part of maritime provinc-
es centered on Chios and the Karaburun-peninsula, it is certain this road’s 
importance went far back and had not only been commercial, but political 
and military as well. 
Together, the absence of major coordinated projects of redevelopment 
and the longevity of the roads connecting a stable central area to its wider 
hinterland and foreland ensured that the city and its main streets consistently 
developed along these outward axes and in amplification of them. It will not 
have gone unnoticed that a third approach has so far been ignored – because 
its characteristics were very different from those discussed above. This third 
approach, the coastal road running north from Frank Street, was not a thor-
oughfare connecting the city to any wider commercial network or adminis-
trative entity, but a short road to the saltpan located at the deep end of the 
bay (see Plates 4 and 5; now the location of the quarter of Alsancak, see 
Plates 6 and 7). Nonetheless, as the surveys of 1528 and 1575 and several 
historical maps attest to its prolonged existence, as well as to its continued 
importance to many city dwellers (see under “saltpan workers” in Tables 7 
and 8), it might well be considered a third, albeit minor, axis of development. 
Viewed in this light, Izmir’s triangular shape was not merely the automatic 
result of its natural boundaries (the river Meles, Mount Pagus and the sea). 
The river in particular might just as easily have been crossed – after all, there 
are plenty of examples of historical “double” cities developing on either side 
of a river. Rather, the three axes at the crossroads of which the city expand-
ed, played a pivotal role in determining the course and direction of growth. 
This strengthens the assumption that, in developing, the city’s main streets 
and quarters followed the overriding logic of these axes of development. In 
practice, this means that utilizing the main streets highlighted in Map 8 in 
visualizing Izmir’s growth is not as hazardous as it might seem at first glance. 
Returning to the quarters in Table 7 and on Map 8, we see that Han Bey 
(Pazar) is located at the crossroads of the main overland axes (the caravan 
road and the Urla road). This old commercial district (hence the addition of 
pazar, signifying market or bazaar, to its name) was centered on the ancient 
agora and was the linchpin that connected the upper and lower parts of the 
city. It is joined to the third overland axis (the salt road) and the inner harbor 
(the terminus of a fourth, overseas, axis of growing importance) by Limon 
(Liman). This quarter was the center of the lower city and facilitated both the 
commercial and military functions of the inner harbor. The former function, 
which generated the typically intricate structure still recognizable in the 19th-
century (see Map 4), was concentrated in the higher, northern, part of the 
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quarter between the harbor and Han Bey. Lower Limon was a garrison quar-
ter centered on the lower castle. Its regiment, however, was not included in 
the tahrir. 
North and southeast of these central but relatively small quarters lie the 
bigger three; Cemaat-ı Gebran, Faik Paşa and Mescid-i Selatinzade. The fully 
Greek-Orthodox population of the first, heir to Byzantine Izmir, rebuilt and 
repopulated its quarter after Timur’s devastation and swelled further as the 
city passed to the emirates for good and Turks from the hillside quarters 
populated Limon (1402 and after; see above). Together, Mescid-i Selatinzade 
and Faik Paşa constituted upper Izmir, where the bulk of the city’s Turkish 
population still dwelt. Mescid-i Selatinzade served the commercial functions 
of this part of the city in much the same way as upper Limon served those of 
the lower city (notice that both adjoin Han Bey). Faik Paşa, meanwhile, was 
the political and religious center of the upper city, as is illustrated by its con-
centration of higher clergy and officials (in the survey data from 1528). 
Looking at the quarters and their main functions, we can distinguish the 
beginnings of a process of internal diversification prompted by the unifica-
tion and consequent growth of the city. The development of a division of 
labor over areas of a city and this division’s reshuffling under circumstances 
of further growth or decline are processes central to urbanization.140 Izmir’s 
history as a double city becoming one makes these processes all the more 
visible. Where once both the lower and upper city had each displayed the 
primary urban features (commercial, political-religious and military), these 
were now slowly being redistributed under the pax Ottomanica. The eventual 
result was the concentration of commercial functions along the shore (inter-
regional-commercial around the inner harbor and international-commercial 
along the outer harbor), political and religious functions in the upper quar-
ters and manufacturing in between the two. After the upper castle had lost 
its function as a stronghold against depredations from the lower city and the 
sea, military functions were concentrated in the lower castle (which would be 
supplanted by Sancak Kalesi in the 17th century). In the 16th century, howev-
er, this division of labor was still in its beginnings, as were the economic and 
demographical developments behind it. 
 
The City and its Quarters According to the Survey of 1575 
By 1575, the number of quarters of the city proper had increased from five 
to eight, as shown in Table 8. 
 
                                                     
 
140 Cf. Burgess, “Growth of the City”, 154-56; Sjoberg, Preindustrial City, 11, 101 and 209-
11; Frederic C. Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1973), 155-56; Henri Lefèbvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991; 2009), 347; 
Savage, Urban Sociology, 39 and 122; and Saskia Sassen,  Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval 
to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 57-58. 
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TABLE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF IZMIR PROPER (1575) 
 Regis-
tered 
Individu-
als 
((F)+BC)
Differ-
ence 
with 
1528 
%
of 
Total
Bache-
lors 
& Celi-
bates 
(BC) 
Exempted Muslims 
High-
er 
Clergy
Saltpan
Work-
ers 
Desti-
tute 
& Disa-
bled 
Faik Paşa 83 +13 16.87 4 2 16 - 
Mescid-i Selatin-
zade 
56 -5 11.38 - 2 6 4 
Han Bey (Pazar) 92 +53 18.70 1 - 8 1 
Limon (Liman) 54 +29 10.98 - 1 9 - 
Ali Çavuş (new) 35 +35 7.11 - - 3 - 
Yazıcı (new) 32 +32 6.50 - - 7 - 
Şeyhler/Şaphane 
(new) 
30 +30 6.10 - - - - 
Cemaat-ı Gebran 110 +67 22.36 - - - - 
TOTAL 492 +254 100.00 5 5 49 5 
Based on Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir, 26-30. 
 
The table introduces three new quarters, Ali Çavuş, Yazıcı and Şeyhler/ 
Şaphane. In previous studies these quarters’ possible locations appear sur-
rounded by question marks. These express an uncertainty both illustrated 
and exacerbated by their being situated on otherwise nearly blank maps.141 
This uncertainty can be mitigated, however, with the help of the enhanced 
versions of Graves’ plan, travelers’ testimonies and some modern tourist 
maps. Previously, the built-up areas of 1528 and 1678 have been determined 
and displayed in a fixed projection in relation to a number of permanent 
landmarks. The uninterrupted growth (without major relocations) of Izmir’s 
population in the period between those years means that the build-up of 
1575 will have exceeded that of 1528, but will easily have stayed within Gal-
land’s 1678-outline. 
Within these limits, the direction of growth can be specified even further 
by eliminating any areas that would later accommodate the Armenian and 
Jewish immigrants that started arriving around the turn of the 16th century. 
Would the growth of the Greek and the Armenian and Jewish communities 
of Izmir have coincided with a decline of the Turkish population, some quar-
ters that had formerly been Turkish would certainly have passed to the mi-
norities. As it was, however, the growth of the Turkish population did not 
lag that far behind; between 1528 and 1657 it was at least as prodigious as 
the minorities’ (compare Tables 6 and 8) and between 1657 and 1678 it was 
indeed still growth, although at a lower rate than the minorities’ (see Table 
6). The lower social status of the non-Muslim population and the uninter-
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rupted growth of the Muslim population make it highly unlikely that the 
former (its growth notwithstanding) displaced any solid concentrations of 
the latter. To put it more emphatically; under such circumstances it was out 
of the question that institutionalized and well-defined Muslim quarters like 
the ones in the 1575-tahrir would become partly or entirely non-Muslim, let 
alone within a mere half century. Thus, the areas that were to house the Ar-
menian and Jewish communities in the 17th century (the Greek has already 
been accounted for with Cemaat-ı Gebran) should be considered largely 
undeveloped in the 16th, although some incidental spillover from the Muslim 
quarters might first have settled there. 
 
Which, then, are these areas that should be excluded as possible locations for 
the three new quarters, because they would later be inhabited by the Armeni-
an and Jewish communities? Some visual indications can be gathered from a 
French map from the first years of the 20th century, published in Karl Bae-
deker’s guide for European tourists visiting Izmir (see Plate 8). The map 
indicates a Quartier Turc hugging the full breadth of the northwestern slopes 
of Mount Pagus, a Quartier Juif between the agora and the (filled) inner har-
bor, a Quartier Arménien directly north of the Turkish quarter(s), a Quartier 
Grec north and northwest of the Armenian quarter and a Quartier Franc be-
tween the northern Greek quarter and the shore. Again, note the broadened 
quays: the 17th-century quays corresponded to the Eski Balık Pazarı (old fish 
market) and the Quai Anglais of the map and continued northeast from there; 
Frank Street was the street running directly behind it, renamed Sultan 
Djaddessi (Sultan’s Street) and continuing on as Medjidié Djaddessi (Street 
of Sultan Abdülmecid). If Baedeker’s map is given the same treatment as that 
of Graves in Map 8, but with the names of the quarters omitted and the text 
indicating the ethnic distribution brought to the front, the result is Map 9. 
Although centuries separate Baedeker’s map from the beginnings of Iz-
mir’s Armenian and Jewish communities, it displays considerable continuity 
where the various communities’ development is concerned. The addition of 
some minor qualifications will make it fit to help determine where the 
growth of the years 1528-1575 (and after) was directed. 
Map 9 clearly illustrates that the Quartier Franc and Quartier Grec had 
sprung from the quarter of Cemaat-ı Gebran, by comparison still embryonic 
in the 16th century. South of the Greek quarter, we see the Quartier Arménien, 
with the Armenian cathedral of St. Stephen at its westernmost border (see 
Plates 3 and 8 for a better view). Notwithstanding the fact that one of the 
most erudite works on the history of Izmir states that this was not the loca-
tion of the Armenian quarter at the time of the earthquake of 1688142 
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MAP 9: ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF IZMIR’S POPULATION IN 1905 
 
Based on Map 8; Karl Baedeker, Konstantinopel, Balkanstaaten, Kleinasien, Archipel, 
Cypern: Handbuch für Reisende (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1905; 1914), between 332-33. 
 
(a statement repeated in all modern works on Izmir) contemporary evidence 
shows that it certainly was. The confusion might have been caused by its 
name; “Apano-Machala (Haut-Quartier)”, which appears to have been inter-
preted as meaning “on the slopes of Mount Pagus”. It should be kept in 
mind, however, that the inhabitants of the miniature Europe along the 
northern seashore considered all quarters further inland as lying higher up in 
town, no matter whether these quarters were actually located on the plain or 
the hillside. This lies behind 17th-century European visitors to Izmir saying 
that “the Turks, Greeks, Armenians and Jews live in the upper city; the latter 
mostly together in one quarter”, while Galland simultaneously testifies to the 
St. Stephen lying in the Armenian quarter.143 That the early 20th-century Ar-
                                                     
 
143 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 42b. Similar statements can be found in, e.g., De Bruyn, 
Reizen, 27: “The Armenians and Jews mostly live in the upper city” and Jean-Baptiste 
Tavernier, Les six voyages de Jean-Baptiste Tavernier en Turquie, en Perse et aux Indes (Paris: n.p., 
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menian quarter did in fact evolve from the 17th-century quarter is corrobo-
rated by references to an Armenian street. Galland tells us “Il n'y a de 
longues rues que celle du quartier des Francs, celles des Arméniens, deux au 
bazar qui sont plus larges que les deux premières.”144 A quick look at Map 9 
shows he is speaking of Frank Street and the three streets carrying traffic 
from the caravan bridge westwards to the 17th-century city’s commercial 
center (the area northeast of the inner harbor). If the higher half of the 
northernmost of these three streets (above the southern end of Frank Street 
and running east off the St. Stephen) was indeed popularly called Armenian 
Street, this effectively identifies the quarter on either side of this street as the 
Armenian quarter.145 
The traveler’s statements above could be interpreted as suggesting that 
the Armenians shared their quarter with the Jewish community, or that the 
Jewish quarter was located in the same general area as the Armenian. In reali-
ty, however, Izmir’s Jews inhabited the area west of the agora in the 17th 
century as they still would in the beginning of the 20th (see Map 9).146 The 
old center of the Jewish part of the bazaar quarter is Havra Sokak (Syna-
gogue Street, see Plate 7; slightly left of Güneş, between the old inner harbor 
and the agora). This street – now officially known as 927th Street – was once 
lined with no less than nine synagogues and oratories, six of which are still in 
existence (in use, disuse, or at least identifiable) today.147 A further two syna-
gogues and one oratory can also still be found in streets nearby.148 Their 
geographical concentration, as well as the continuity evident in their being 
founded in an uninterrupted series from before the community’s formal 
establishment in 1605 until well into the 18th century, indisputably shows that 
the center of the Quartier Juif was as old as the community it housed.149 Of 
                                                                                                                        
 
1679), 83: “Les Turcs, les Grecs, les Armeniens & les Juifs demeurent sur la colline, & toute le 
bas qui est le long de de la mer n’est habité que par des Chrestiens d’Europe, François, An-
glois, Hollandois & Italiens”. Contra Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 136. 
144 Ibid., 110. 
145 This location is confirmed by geographical descriptions of its location in ibid., 89; 
and Iconomos, Étude sur Smyrne, 48-55. 
146 Today most of Izmir’s approximately 2,500 Jews live in the Alsancak-quarter, which al-
so houses the city’s Grand Rabbinate. 
147 These are Senyora or Gheveret, Portugal, Shalom or Aydinlis, Algazi or Kaal de Ariva, 
Nevrano or Hevra and Mizrahi. 
148 These are the synagogues Etz ha-Haïm (no. 5, 937th Street) and Bikur Holim (no. 40, 
İkiçeşmelik Street), and the oratory Bet Hillel (no. 23, 920th Street). 
149 The older synagogues can be dated as follows: Etz ha-Haïm (Byzantine), Senyora or 
Gheveret (16th ct.), Portugal (pre-1620), Gerush (id.), Shalom or Aydinlis (id.), Talmud Torah 
(id.), Mahazike Torah (pre-1622), Pinto (pre-1666), Galanté (c1666), Bakiche (17th ct.), Bikur 
Holim (1724) and Algazi or Kaal de Ariva (id.): Abraham Galanté, Histoire des Juifs d’Anatolie: les 
Juifs d’Izmir (Smyrne) (Istanbul: Imprimérie Baroque, 1937), 37-45 and throughout. The com-
munity’s history (up to its formalization in 1605) is discussed on 7-12, its distribution on 12-
16. 
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more recent date, however, was the eastern part of the quarter, away from 
the old center around the synagogues. This part would in time take up much 
of what had previously been the Muslim quarter of Han Bey (see Map 9), but 
the tahrirs show that this change in ethnic composition occurred after the 
16th century – perhaps after the massive displacement caused in the area by 
the earthquake of 1688, or as a gradual process over hundreds of years.150 
 
Now that the areas have been identified that were to host the non-Muslim 
communities from the late 16th and early 17th century onwards, these can 
safely be discounted as locations where the main thrust of the Muslim popu-
lation’s expansion of the years 1528-1575 was not directed. This does not 
mean that no Muslims settled in those areas, however. Ethno-religious sepa-
ration was not strictly observed in early modern and modern Ottoman Izmir. 
Although no non-Muslims lived in the Muslim quarters, many Turks certain-
ly did live in the city’s non-Muslim quarters. Similarly, there was also a great 
deal of residential mingling taking place among Izmir’s non-Muslim commu-
nities.151 This leaves the more elevated areas (the south-eastern part of the 
triangle in Map 9) as the only ones that could have absorbed the bulk of the 
growth of the four older Muslim quarters and the creation of three new 
ones. These areas lie on either side of the upper quarters of 1528 (in Maps 8 
and 9), confined by the later Armenian quarter to the north and the Urla-
road to the west. 
Kütükoğlu argues that the new quarter of Şaphane was in reality called 
Şeyhler, the former being a misreading of the tahrir’s text by previous schol-
ars.152 If this is indeed the case, the misreading was probably occasioned by 
attempts to identify a likely location for the quarter: şaphane translates as “al-
um-house” or “alum-factory” and şap, or alum, was used in tanning leather 
and dying fabrics. Such a reading, therefore, would suggest a location around 
the tan-yard (or tanneries) halfway along the distributary of the Meles (see 
the constructions built over this waterway in Map 4).153 But this location is 
problematic as Baedeker’s map shows the area to have later belonged to the 
Armenian quarter. Even if only the area taken up by the small Armenian 
quarter of the 17th-century (limited to the direct proximity of the St. Stephen) 
is discounted as a possible location, this would still leave too little room for a 
16th-century Muslim quarter around the tanneries. What’s more, such a 
miniscule quarter would have been separated from the city’s other Muslim 
quarters, which is unconvincing considering its spillover function. Instead, 
reading the quarter’s name as Şeyhler has led Kütükoğlu to identify it as the 
                                                     
 
150 The earthquake hit the lower lying areas the hardest: Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 43-47 
151 See, e.g., Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 107; and Istanbul, SLK MF 4027. 
152 Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir, 23n24. 
153 Which is indeed the location proposed by Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 12. 
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16th-century equivalent of the 19th-century quarter of Şeyh (also known as 
Yaycılar). This puts it neatly between the 1528-buildup and the location of 
the later Armenian quarter; that is, south and west of the modern Basmane-
train station (see Maps 7 and 8). Ironically, this re-legitimizes the Şaphane-
reading since the station’s name is a corruption of basmahane, signifying a 
place where fabrics are dyed and/or printed, which establishes it as a second 
location that historically housed dying industries. 
Of the remaining two quarters, that registered as Ali Çavuş has been 
identified as an early version of the quarter of Ali Reis (see Map 7; southeast 
of the agora), historically placing it southwest of Mescid-i Selatinzade.154 The 
last quarter, Yazıcı, is much more difficult to identify. In this case, there is no 
toponymical continuity, however vague, as with the other two quarters. We 
are forced, therefore, to rely on an estimation of the space available between 
the five quarters of 1528, the two already established new quarters of 1575, 
the 17th-century Greek, Jewish and Armenian quarters and the city’s general 
triangular shape of 1678. These limitations really only leave enough space for 
Yazıcı between Ali Çavuş and the future Jewish quarter.155 
With the three newest quarters topographically accounted for, it is now 
possible to represent the situation of 1575 graphically (see Map 10). 
 
Although Izmir had grown a great deal since its definitive unification in 
1424, the furrows left by a long history of duality were so deep that they 
were still clearly visible 150 years later. A slightly unequal distribution of 
growth had transformed the city: from the boomerang-shaped top-heavy city 
of the early 16th century into the hourglass-shaped late-16th-century one (see 
Maps 8 and 10). But its form was still reminiscent of an upper and lower city 
connected by a commercial corridor. In figures, the change can be represent-
ed by grouping the upper, middle and lower quarters together to compare 
the population-sizes of these parts in 1528 and 1575 (see Table 9). 
The table shows that the 16th century witnessed a moderate shift in popu-
lation from the higher to the lower-lying areas. This shift reflects three inter-
related trends that are characteristic of Izmir’s development from a modest 
market town and regional harbor to an international port city in the course 
of the 16th and 17th centuries: the unification of the double town and the 
consequent Turkification of the lower-middle city (1), the internationaliza-
                                                     
 
154 The quarter of Ali Reis already comes up in Ottoman documents from the 17th century 
and still exists today: Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir, 24. It is also listed in Istanbul, 
SLK MF 4027, 18r. 
155 Kütükoğlu’s map omits the quarter altogether (id., XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir, 23), 
while Goffman’s (which is dated 1650 but appears to have been based on the 1575-tahrir) puts 
it in the same location, but with Ali Çavuş below instead of above it (Goffman, Izmir and the 
Levantine World, 12). Unfortunately, neither author elaborates on the subject. 
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tion of the city’s economy and the resulting shift in economic focus (2) and 
the growing importance of the non-Muslim population (3). 
 
MAP 10: QUARTERS OF IZMIR IN 1575 
 
Based on Map 8; Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir, 23-24; Goffman, Izmir and 
the Levantine World, 12. 
 
TABLE 9: POPULATION OF UPPER, MIDDLE AND LOWER IZMIR (1528-1575) 
 1528 1575
 Quarters % of total Quarters % of total 
Upper Izmir Faik Paşa
Mescid-i Selatinzade 
55.04 % Faik Paşa
Mescid-i Selatinzade 
Şeyhler (Şaphane) 
Ali Çavuş 
41.46 % 
Middle Izmir Han Bey (Pazar) 16.39 % Han Bey (Pazar)
Yazıcı 
25.20 % 
Lower Izmir Limon (Liman)
Cemaat-ı Gebran 
28.57 % Limon (Liman)
Cemaat-ı Gebran 
33.34 % 
Based on Tables 7 and 8. 
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As discussed previously, Izmir was originally a double town with both parts 
dependent on an uninterrupted flow of commerce between the caravan road, 
the Urla-road and the inner harbor. This made the ancient agora at the junc-
tion of these crossroads the commercial center where the geographical op-
posites were united in the pursuit of worldly gain. Once the double town was 
united under the Ottomans, the commercial district around the agora (now 
identifiable with Han Bey) became the corridor through which part of the 
Turkish population of the higher town flowed towards the lower part. The 
incentive for this movement (the “pull factor”) was the growing commercial 
importance of Izmir’s harbor. As the port began to compete with Chios to 
become the Anatolian caravan route’s western terminus, international trade 
started to account for an ever larger share of the city’s economy. Manufac-
turing and the marketing of regional produce were slowly but certainly inter-
nationalized, regional commodities being exported along with the extra-
regional luxury commodities from the caravans. 
This change in economic orientation brought with it a shift of focus from 
the inner harbor and the crossroads to its west towards the shore along the 
outer harbor. Although this process was still in its beginnings in 1575, there 
is no doubt that it was already reflected in the exceptional growth of the 
“community of non-Muslims” – after all the main facilitator of the city’s 
Ottoman-European trade. The limited mobility between residence and em-
ployment characteristic of the pre-industrial age dictates that the size and 
density of an area’s population was closely correlated to that area’s economic 
importance, which implies that changes in the distribution of pre-industrial 
populations are a sound indicator of economic focus. A brief glance at Map 
10 is enough to confirm the validity of this rule, not only for 16th, but also 
for 17th-century Izmir: as its economy increasingly revolved around interna-
tional trade, the city’s population was drawn towards the shore, in the end 
creating the triangular shape noted by Galland. Judging by Graves’ map and 
the way in which one of the world’s largest port cities today envelopes most 
of the bay that made its fortune, this process continued well past the period 
under discussion. 
Now that 16th and 17th-century demographical developments and trends 
have been discussed and a necessary excursion into Izmir’s 16th-century ge-
ography has identified the physical margins of 17th-century growth, it is time 
to return to the city of 1678. 
 
The City and its Quarters According to Evliya and Galland 
Just as before, it is Evliya and Galland who provide us with the most elabo-
rate accounts, this time of Izmir’s quarters. In 1678, Galland counts eleven 
exclusively Turkish quarters, three quarters inhabited by Greeks, Armenians 
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and Jews, and one, Kasap Hazır, housing the Franks.156 Evliya, quoting İs-
mail Paşa’s survey of 1657/58 as his source, gives no less than “ten Muslim, 
ten exclusively Greek, ten Frankish and Jewish quarters, two Armenian quar-
ters and one Gypsy quarter”.157 
Evliya’s numbers seem suspiciously high, the more so since the total 
number of 16th and 17th-century historical quarters’ names come down to us 
barely amount to twenty – and that is including quite a few duplicates due to 
name changes.158 Then, there is another famous Ottoman man-of-letters, the 
historian-bibliographer-geographer Katip Çelebi (b. 1609-d. 1657; also 
known as Hacı Halifa), who speaks of “up to twenty quarters” in the mid-
17th century.159 
There is no way of checking these figures against official data as the orig-
inal detailed register of İsmail Paşa’s survey is not extant and the derived 
register that is extant (the aforementioned BBA MAD 14672) does not list 
quarters. The only way out is to revert to steering a course through contra-
dicting evidence in the hope of arriving at a sensible destination. Luckily, 
Galland has left us what might be a valuable clue: just before his ethnic 
breakdown of the city’s quarters, he speaks of a total number of thirteen, 
only to go on to count fifteen, which figure he confirms two paragraphs 
down. If Evliya’s numbers are considered in light of Galland’s contradictory 
statements, it appears that a course may yet be plotted. 
Galland’s and Evliya’s access to Ottoman fiscal data (be it directly or indi-
rectly) and the latter’s penchant for hyperbole have already been established. 
We have also seen that the joining of information from various sources and 
times typically led to internal contradictions that could slip by the author 
producing them. At the risk of reading too much into his unblinkingly giving 
us two different figures in a single sentence, it seems that Galland, when 
confronted with discrepancy in his sources, took the same route as before 
(concerning the number of Jews) and followed a short mention of the last-
known official figures up with more extensive contemporary or personal 
observations. 
Let us assume for a moment that Galland took his figure of thirteen quar-
ters from the last tahrir available to him, being the one conducted by İsmail 
Paşa in 1657/58, and that his figure of fifteen quarters represents the situa-
tion around his own visit in 1678. Then, let us ask ourselves whether it is not 
too much of a coincidence that Evliya’s “ten Muslim, ten exclusively Greek, 
ten Frankish and Jewish quarters, two Armenian quarters and one Gypsy 
quarter”, explicitly derived from İsmail Paşa’s survey, can be brought down 
                                                     
 
156 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 107-8. 
157 Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 93. 
158 Kütükoğlu, XV ve XVI. asırlarda İzmir, 23-24. 
159 Katib Çelebi, Kitab-ı Cihannüma (Kostantıniye / Istanbul: Darultibaat-ul Amire, 1065 / 
1654; 1145 / 1732, 669. 
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to Galland’s thirteen through a very slight syntactical reinterpretation: “ten 
Muslim, Greek, Frankish and Jewish quarters, two Armenian quarters and 
one Gypsy quarter’” Could Evliya’s account be the result of the reverse pro-
cedure? 
 
TABLE 10: AVG. NUMBER OF TAXPAYING FAMILIES PER QUARTER (1528-1678) 
Year Taxpayingfamilies 
Number 
of Quarters 
Taxpaying
families per quarter 
1528 238 5 47.6 
1575 492 8 61.5 
1657/58 10,300 13 792.3 
1678 19,430 15 1,295.3 
Based on Tables 6, 7 and 8; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 107-8. 
 
Evliya’s credibility aside, an increase in the number of quarters from eight in 
1575 to fifteen in 1678 does seem more consistent with the development of 
Izmir’s built-up space over this period: the space between the quarters of 
1575 and Galland’s 1678-outline indeed represents about half of the trian-
gle’s total area (see Map 10). On the other hand, such an increase seems 
remarkably slight when compared to the growth of the taxpaying population. 
If the increase in the number of quarters was proportionate to the growth of 
the city’s area, the relation between the number of quarters and the size of 
the population became increasingly disproportionate (see Table 10). Never-
theless, this would hold true even for much higher numbers of quarters. 
The table not only suggests that the filling and expanding of existing 
quarters played a larger role in accommodating population growth than the 
creation of new quarters, it also points to a rapid increase in population den-
sity. If we leave, for a moment, the uncertain confines of the 17th-century 
quarters and consider the city’s population in light of the area it occupied, we 
cannot but conclude that both population and administration faced a major 
challenge. 
Galland’s scalene delimits an area of just over half a square mile, or slight-
ly under one and a half square kilometers.160 As appears from the maps of 
the situation in 1528 and 1575 (see Maps 8 and 10), the main built-up area 
was about one third and one half, respectively, of the area later delimited by 
Galland. Dividing our population estimates for those same years (see Table 
10) by these areas results in the population densities shown in Table 11. 
                                                     
 
160 0.5 nautical mile equals 0.926 km. The triangle’s perimeter measures about 2.88 nauti-
cal mi, or 5.334 km. If the triangle is taken to be a scalene (which it indeed almost is), the 
length of the sides is 0.96 nautical mi, or 1.778 km, equaling 1.106 mi. This results in an area 
(0.5 • sides2 • sin60º) of 0.399 nautical mi2, 1.369 km2, or 0.529 mi2, a figure confirmed by 
other maps. 
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TABLE 11: DENSITY OF THE TAXPAYING POPULATION (1528-1678) 
Year 
Taxpay-
ing 
families 
Average
family 
size 
Taxpaying 
population 
Occupied
area  
in mi2 / km2 
Urban Density  
per mi2 / km2 
1528 238 4.90 1,166 0.176 / 0.456 6,625 / 2,557 
1575 492 4.90 2,411 0.265 / 0.685 9,098 / 3,520 
1657/58 10,300 3.65 37,595(49,503) 0.450 /1.164 
83,544 (110,007) / 32,298 
(42,528) 
1678 (16,580)19,430 3.65
(60,517)
70,920 0.529 / 1.369
(114,399) 134,064 / 
(44,205) 51,804 
Based on Maps 8 and 10; Tables 3, 4, 5 and 10. 
 
Please note that the figures in the table are not as accurate as the use of dec-
imals might suggest; these were only added to avoid the added inaccuracy 
inherent in doing calculations with round variables. Also note that the esti-
mated numbers of taxpaying families are interpretations of Ottoman fiscal 
data and travelers’ estimates, themselves contemporary interpretations. Fur-
thermore, the multipliers used were obtained from solid research, but on 
another region (Bursa and surroundings) and should be considered generali-
zations. They introduce a rather mechanical difference between average 
family size in the 16th and 17th century, presumably reflecting the evolution 
of Izmir’s typical family structure from one of the village to one of the city. 
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the areas are approximate be-
cause they were obtained from edited historical maps delineating city quar-
ters whose exact boundaries remain unknown. Lastly, the absence of similar 
data for the tahrir-year of 1657/58 has meant that this year’s area had to be 
derived from statistical context.161 
For all the leeway these interpretations allow in the table’s middle col-
umns, however, the jump in population density visible in the final column 
remains amazingly high, even if the calculation is done with our lower popu-
lation estimates (the figures between the brackets in the table). No matter 
how much we question the number of taxpaying families (and particularly 
the 1678-figure), the difference between 16th and 17th-century family size, the 
resultant size of the taxpaying population (several possible options in 
1657/58 and 1678), or the approximate area taken up within the 1678-
outline – any and all adjustments are simply dwarfed by the unequivocally 
explosive growth of the number of taxpayers in relation to the relatively 
                                                     
 
161 If we were to make a scale of average area growth per decade on the basis of our sam-
ple years (1528, 1575, 1657/58 and 1678), we would arrive at an average growth of about 
0.0174 per decade between 1528 and 1575 and about 0.0238 per decade between 1575 and 
1678. On such a scale, the estimated area in 1657/58 would amount to 0.543. The assumption 
of course is that the city’s area grew at a more or less constant rate, with an acceleration oc-
curring around 1575, at the time the city started booming. 
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modest area occupied. This is even more surprising when considering that 
these estimated densities are made up entirely of taxpaying bachelors and 
families, excluding what must have been a sizeable population of tax-exempt, 
visitors and slaves. 
 
To put this density of 134,064 taxpaying inhabitants (taxpayers and family) 
per square mile in historical perspective, we could look to one of the best-
conserved and most-researched historical cities; the booming provincial Ro-
man port-city of Pompeii. Such a comparison across many centuries may 
seem peculiar, but mid-17th-century Izmir shared a number of significant 
commonalities with Pompeii as it stood on the eve of its destruction on AD 
79: a comparable geography (on the seaside, at the far end of a large bay, 
with a sizeable natural harbor and a slightly sloping buildup, oriented to the 
windward side and protected in the rear by hills and mountains), function 
(port town, regional trade center, culturally diverse), life cycle-phase (previ-
ously booming Pompeii still recovering from the heavy earthquake that had 
struck it 17 years earlier, Izmir still removed a similar number of years from 
the peak of its original boom), size (probably similar if we include the area 
and population directly beyond Pompeii’s walls) and supporting technology 
(it would take until the 19th century until the infrastructure of waterworks 
and sanitation began to overtake that of Roman times). 
On the eve of its burial underneath Vesuvius’ pyroclastic flow and down-
pour of ashes, Pompeii housed an estimated 10 to 20,000 on the 0.25 mi2 
(0.647 km2) area within its walls.162 That makes the estimated population 
density of its walled-in area 40 to 80,000 persons per mi2 (15,456 to 30,912 
per km2); only very slightly behind the freshly booming Izmir of 1657/58. 
The neat Roman grid so vividly in evidence in Pompeii’s uncovered center 
has seduced many a visitor into contemplating a calm and orderly city, for-
getting not only about the mass of simple homes and winding streets that 
still lie buried underneath the Campanian landscape, but also simply about 
what such densities mean in reality. 
Anyone who imagines walled-in Pompeii to have been anywhere near as 
calm and orderly as its planned center suggests should know that its maxi-
mum estimated density of some 80,000 p/mi2 (30,912 p/km2) nearly equals 
today’s highest officially recorded urban density (that of Mumbai), and its 
minimum of 40,000 p/mi2 (15,456 p/km2) the 7th highest (that of Taipei), 
while the urban densities of modern western port cities like Amsterdam, 
                                                     
 
162 See Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, Houses and Society in Pompeii and Herculaneum (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), 95 and throughout. 
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Naples and New York amount to but 11,865 p/mi2 (4,581 p/km2), 10,619 
p/mi2 (4,100 p/km2) and 5,309 p/mi2 (2,050 p/km2) respectively.163 
 
Considering the enormous contrast the bustling chaos of a living Ottoman 
city and the stately wistful vestiges of the planned Roman city center shim-
mering beneath it, it is not difficult to see why many a visiting Renaissance 
man, remarking upon the city’s overcrowding, would lament the demise of 
the romanticized ancient grid: “Pour les autres, outre qu’elles sont étroites, 
elles sont encore entrecoupées, tortues et sans ordre, de telle manière que la 
ville d’aujourd’hui est autant différente de l’ancienne qu’une chose laide et 
vilaine l’est d’avec une belle et bien proportionnée”.164 Still, that such com-
plaints were already uttered in the 17th century is rather remarkable in light of 
future developments. For the city’s population would continue to grow for 
centuries to come, hitting the 200.000-mark in the mid-19th century.165 And 
that without significant expansion of its built-up area!166 And this is without 
even considering the increasing numbers of non-residents attracted to Iz-
mir’s ever-increasing commerce. Under such circumstances, would one not 
expect the city to have suffocated its own development? 
The solution to this apparent contradiction lies in the application of tech-
nological innovation to urban infrastructure. Improvements in building, 
utilities and transport can dramatically increase a city’s tolerance for higher 
population densities through increasing the number of floors of buildings, 
through providing adequate lighting, water supplies, waste disposal and sew-
erage and through building and maintaining paved roads, bridges and means 
of public transport. In our wealthier and individualistic modern age, such 
advances have tended to go hand in hand with demands for ever larger pri-
vate living space, largely nullifying the net effect of infrastructural advances 
on urban density. Nonetheless, this effect was not yet in play in the early 
modern city of Izmir. Life in the overcrowded city of the 1670s could only 
remain bearable and economically viable if adjustments were made to Izmir’s 
old town-like infrastructure. In other words; to survive Izmir needed an up-
grade to city-status, not just by being reattached administratively to the im-
                                                     
 
163 “The largest cities in the world by land area, population and density” (6 January 2007), 
CityMayors Statistics, http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/largest-cities-density-125.html 
(accessed 23 November 2011). 
164 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 111. 
165 Cf., e.g., Niyazi Berkes  and Feroz Ahmad, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (New 
York: Routledge, 1964), 141n8; Reşat Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World economy: The 
Nineteenth Century (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 151n45; Roger Owen, The Middle East in the 
World economy, 1800-1914 (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), 98; and Peter Sluglett, The Urban Social 
History of the Middle East, 1750-1950 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 159. 
166 In Map 5, compare the 1678-triangle and the build-up of 1844. 
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portant district of Aydın and the central province of Anatolia, or by fiscal 
interference by court, but also by modernizing its infrastructure. 
 
In Western Europe such projects were typically planned, funded and execut-
ed by the municipality or subordinate civic bodies. In the Ottoman Empire, 
however, such chartered local institutions were conspicuously absent from 
the political-administrative configuration. This is not to say that there were 
no Ottoman associations based on vocation (esnaf), religious profession (tari-
kat) or social status (eşraf and ayan), nor that these did not wield any influence 
in local politics – but these were not civic bodies in the western European 
sense and their membership was not necessarily limited to citizens or inhab-
itants of a given town or city. In fact, these associations had not come into 
being as a reaction to aristocratic and dynastic authority as they had in Eu-
rope. Rather, they functioned as an extension of the state, albeit with the 
capacity to exert considerable influence over the practical application of its 
policies on the local and regional levels. Along with the millets, this functional 
difference with Europe’s urban institutions has been considered so crucial as 
to warrant propositions that the term “city” should not be applied to Otto-
man urban phenomena (or, for that matter, to Islamic or Middle Eastern 
ones; see the quotations preceding the introduction). 
The third set of institutions to share in this dubious honor of often being 
viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to a modernity grafted on civic identi-
ty in particular and civil society in general, is the charitable endowment, or 
vakf.167 Although the vast majority of Ottoman public works was realized, 
administrated and maintained through this essentially benign class of institu-
tions, it was nevertheless regarded as a root cause of Ottoman backwardness 
by 19th and 20th-century western analysts from Max Weber onwards.168 And 
by the Ottoman and Turkish modernizers who undertook to act upon their 
diagnoses. In their view the trouble with vakfs was that they provided their 
public services not from budgets furnished by regular taxation and private 
investment (as in the West), but from incomes generated by movable and 
immovable holdings bequeathed to it ad infinitum by private benefactors. 
                                                     
 
167 See R. Peters et al., “Wakf”, EI2, ii: 59a-b. 
168 See Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam (London: Routledge, 1998), 124. Or, in his own 
words – Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, vol. 4: Herrschaft (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2009), 120: “Denn daß die höchst nachhaltige Immobilisierung akkumulierten Besitzes in 
Gestalt der Wakufgebundenheit – ganz dem Geist der antiken Wirtschaft entsprechend, 
welche akkumuliertes Vermögen als Rentenfonds, nicht als Erwerbskapital benutzte – für die 
ökonomische Entwicklung des Orients von sehr großer Bedeutung gewesen ist, nimmt Carl 
Heinrich Becker sicher mit recht an.” In the preceding and following pages it becomes clear 
that Weber considered the Islamic institution to be the source of similarly counter-capitalist 
institutions in Europe, from Spain to Germany. 
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Such a removal from free market circulation of what might by the 19th 
century have amounted to “three-quarters of the buildings and arable land in 
the empire” was regarded by Weber cum suis as a major if not the factor hin-
dering the healthy development of Ottoman private interest and capitalism, 
thereby blocking first civic and later civil progress (as well as full European 
economic hegemony).169 Whether or not the institution of vakf was indeed 
instrumental in the underdevelopment of market capitalism in the Ottoman 
Empire (and whether or not this was of direct consequence for its ability to 
survive in the periphery of the expanding western world economy), the view 
that up to three quarters of the assets in the Ottoman Empire was forever 
immovably fixed in place and function and played no role in the market 
economy is plainly absurd. 
Here, the problem is similar to that surrounding the question of whether 
or not Ottoman or Islamic cities really constituted cities. Essentially, the 
issue is not with the studied subject, but with the foreign conceptualizations 
used in studying it. When the very definitions of capital, enterprise, market 
and economy we use are formulated on the basis of European practice, how 
can functional equivalents elsewhere ever be recognized as such and meet 
the standards of those conceptualizations? They cannot. At least, not until 
they are destroyed and rebuilt completely after the European idea – in which 
case they will of course still never quite attain the ideal. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to suggest an Ottoman alternative to 
the selection bias inherent in the vakf-paradigm. That is something others 
(cited directly above and below) have already attempted with some success. 
We will here limit ourselves to describing the many roles and functions of 
Izmir’s main vakf, and leave for elsewhere the question if the functions of 
such vakfs indeed differed that much from the European civic and civil insti-
tutions to which they have been compared so unfavorably. 
 
The City and its Quarters According to the 1678-Deed 
Sound descriptions of the institution of vakf and its functions are very hard 
to come by. They invariably focus heavily on either its general legal founda-
tion or on its specific physical manifestations. In his superb case study of the 
vakfs of Ottoman Damascus, Richard van Leeuwen attempts to go beyond 
this dichotomy to arrive at a (Bourdieuan) approach that integrates both the 
vakf’s formal theoretical bases and its manifold practical expressions.170 He 
does so starting from the following schematic description of its functions: 
 
The proliferation of waqfs in Muslim societies in the course of time fostered the diversifica-
tion of their functions and characteristics. Essentially a waqf consisted of an object which 
                                                     
 
169 Peters et al., “Wakf”, 91. 
170 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991; 2010). 
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was endowed to a specific pious purpose for eternity. The founder (waqif) gave up his prop-
erty rights and determined the pious purpose and the regulations for the exploitation of the 
object, which became ‘the property of God’. The object was dissociated from the market cir-
culation and any form of alienation (sale, pawning, donation) was strictly forbidden. Waqfs 
were often founded for the benefit of mosques, which themselves also had the status of waqf. 
In such a case, agricultural lands were converted into waqf and their revenues destined to 
build and maintain a specified mosque and its functionaries. Waqfs could thus either be 
possessions yielding revenues and profit, or objects consuming these revenues and serving as 
religious or social institutions. At an early stage of the development of waqf regulations, the 
founder was allowed to designate himself and/or his family and descendants as the benefi-
ciaries of his foundation. Only after the extinction of his line would the revenue be allocated 
to a certain pious purpose (for instance, ‘the poor of Damascus’). He could, moreover, ap-
point himself and his descendants as trustees of the waqf, thus keeping control of the waqf 
possessions in spite of having relinquished the rights of ownership.171 
 
As was the case throughout the Ottoman Empire, Izmir’s inhabitants spent 
most of their public lives, as well as a significant part of their private ones, 
depending on the properties, services and employment of Islamic pious en-
dowments (vakfs). Not only were all major Muslim places of worship 
(mosques), learning (schools and libraries), and charity (soup kitchens) 
owned and maintained by such institutions, they also accounted for the con-
struction, governance, upkeep and security of most Ottoman roads, bridges, 
waterworks, inns, markets, and shops. 
In principle any paterfamilias with some capital, land or real estate to spare 
could endow it to pious purposes. By doing so he stood to gain socially and 
economically. He could appoint progeny or clients to administer his endow-
ment, thereby also enhancing his own and his family’s power of patronage 
for as long as the endowment was operated, which in turn encouraged sus-
tained good governance of the lands and buildings endowed. That endowing 
property was at once devout and socially and economically advantageous 
made the vakf the predominant mode of civil investment in the Ottoman 
Empire. Without it Ottoman society could never have survived as long as it 
did. 
While countless relatively modest provincial vakfs together formed the 
sinew of Ottoman civilization, it was their highly prestigious imperial equiva-
lents that made up its muscle.172 Endowed by patrons at the center of power 
                                                     
 
171 Van Leeuwen, Waqfs and Urban Structures, 11-12. 
172 Discussions of the vakf-institution usually distinguish between royal and other (smaller 
or provincial) endowments. I find the distinction between imperial and provincial or local 
endowments a more useful one, certainly within the Ottoman context. There existed a good 
number of Ottoman non-royal vakfs that rivaled royal ones in geographical dispersion, size 
and influence. If these can be seen to have served the needs of their founders and certain 
populations while also emphatically serving that of the imperial state and civilization, there is 
no point in suggesting that they were functionally different and belong in a separate category 
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(sultans, valides, vezirs, şeyhïlislams, etc.), and encompassing a wide range of 
public services (mosques, schools, bathhouses, inns, soup kitchens, foun-
tains, shops, warehouses, factories, customs houses and merchants’ apart-
ments) – often all at once – such endowments delivered public services of 
superior quality in an environment of dazzling grandeur. In the process they 
provided immense prestige and enduring political capital to their founders, 
who demonstrated their moral uprightness while simultaneously tying local 
elites to their households and networks of patronage through investment and 
employment. In this respect the social, political and economic roles of the 
institution did not differ that much from those of the institutions organizing 
public services in contemporary European cities. 
Quite apart from delivering such obvious advantages to their founders 
and the public, imperial endowments had another easily overlooked but 
more fundamental function. They renewed, affirmed and projected Ottoman 
civilization by forging new dependencies between imperial and regional cen-
ters, by legitimating its social, economic and political order in the eyes of its 
subjects, and by showing off its vigorous splendor and equitable greatness to 
the outside world it aspired to dominate. Although many vakf holdings were 
located in the countryside, most of their purposes were dedicated to support 
Ottoman urban civilization. Leaving aside discussions about its basic urban 
character or gradual urbanization, we might simply point out that it was “the 
city” in which this administrative and civilizing order could manifest itself 
most visibly and effectively to the highest number of Ottoman subjects and 
foreigners. In this manner the degree to which imperial endowments im-
posed administrative and cultural order on a city came to be an important 
marker for that city’s perceived importance – second only to administrative 
rank. 
 
By both measures the status of 1660s-Izmir lagged considerably behind the 
city’s real political, economic and cultural impact. It has already been noted 
that booming Izmir was still stuck with the commercial and cultural infra-
structure of an important town while its influence had far outgrown that 
status. This was due in large part to its relatively late incorporation into the 
empire: although the city itself was securely Ottoman from 1424 it only be-
came truly safe for full institutional investment and cultivation under the pax 
Ottomanica after its bay and the wider Aegean had also been secured with the 
Ottoman taking of Chios and Crete in 1566 and 1669 respectively. Although 
the Venetians, the Genoese, the French, the English and the Dutch had all 
relocated from Chios to Izmir at the turn of the 16th to 17th century and had 
perfected their own commercial networks and infrastructure there, Ottoman 
                                                                                                                        
 
from vakfs that were royal in the strict sense of being endowed by members of the Ottoman 
dynasty. 
 
 
113 
 
efforts to control the city’s development were mired in sustained dynastic 
crises and popular revolts and had to wait until the 1670s to be taken up in 
earnest. 
During the preceding century of rapid growth all infrastructural initiative 
in the expanding city had been left to small local endowments. As these 
proved unable to meet the accelerating requirements of Izmir’s population 
and trades, the European communities’ need to maintain their own private 
commercial infrastructure along Frank Street was continually underlined. In 
the absence of viable Ottoman alternatives nothing much could be done 
against the European trading partners’ monopolization of the handling of 
Izmir’s international trade. This left the Ottoman administration without the 
structural leverage it needed to effectively monitor and control the flow of 
trade through its territory. Although this problem did surely not go unno-
ticed on the Ottoman side the cost of adequate infrastructural renewal re-
quired in Izmir must have become prohibitive by the 1670s. Certainly it was 
bigger than any local or provincial personages would be willing or able to 
bear. In the end the challenge was taken up by the sultan’s second-in-
command, grand vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa.  
 
Why he did so will concern us a little further down; of more interest to us 
here is the extent of his vakf’s holdings, which are listed in the – fortunately 
still extant – endowment deed or vakfiye (see Appendix 1, plate 9).173 The 
document lists a host of possessions throughout the empire. Mosques, 
schools, bathhouses, inns, soup kitchens, fountains, shops, warehouses, fac-
tories, customs houses, apartments and lands were endowed in recently con-
quered or strategically important places in the Ottoman Balkans (in and 
around Uyvar, Kamenice and Belgrade) and on Crete (in and around Can-
dia), in the northern Anatolian village of Kedegire or Köprü (where the Kö-
prülü dynasty had its origins), in Istanbul and – of course – in Izmir.174 In the 
latter city, the vakf’s holdings comprised no less than seventy-three structures 
scattered over eleven quarters.175 
The way in which the vakfs numerous holdings in Izmir are positioned 
and described practically turns the vakfiye into an urban topography, be it a 
partial one. Typically, the enumeration of bequeathed buildings is structured 
as follows: I have devoted to pious uses my property of [name and/or kind 
of property], in the quarter of [name], next to [this or that structure, land-
mark or location], including [number of] rooms on [number of] floors, made 
                                                     
 
173 SLK MF 4027 – a Süleymaniye Library-microfilm of the original in the Köprülü Li-
brary. 
174 Uyvar is modern-day Nové Zámky in southern Slovakia; Kamenice is now Ukrainian 
Kamenetz-Podolsky; Cretan Candia is today called Irákleion; and the Turkish village of 
Kedegire, once more widely known as Köprü, now goes by the name Vezirköprü. 
175 SLK MF 4027, 17r-20v. 
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of [building material] and including [any additional property such as a garden 
or wall]. 
Fifteen items of real estate are listed following this pattern, all of them in 
the quarter of Kasap Hazır: 
 
TABLE 12: REAL ESTATE ENDOWED IN IZMIR’S KASAP HAZIR-QUARTER (1678) 
Based on Istanbul, SLK MF 4027, 17r-18r. 
 
To function properly, the endowed commercial facilities needed additional 
infrastructural support in the form of a reliable supply of drinking water. The 
existing unplanned water supply system that fed the city’s public fountains 
and institutions (as enumerated by Evliya, see note 34), however, did not 
carry enough water with sufficient pressure to allow feeding such extensive 
additions.176 This obstacle was overcome by the construction of a double 
aqueduct (kemer) that tapped the river Meles at a point of higher altitude and 
                                                     
 
176 See M. Münir Aktepe, “İzmir suları, çeşme ve sebilleri ile şadırvanları hakkında bir 
araştırma”, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi, 30 (1976), 135-37. 
Folio Item Description
17r a1 with known boundaries | comprising fifty rooms on the ground floor | and fifty-
four rooms on the second floor | newly constructed | of masonry | a great han (han-
ı kebir) 
a2 adjoining the great han | comprising seventeen rooms and a warehouse on the 
ground floor | and eighteen rooms on the second floor | of masonry | a small han 
(sagir han) 
a3 adjoining the great han | twenty-four shops (dükkanlar)
a4 designated the covered market (bezestan) | forty-four shops (dükkanlar) | with ware-
houses and rooms on the second floors 
a5 adjoining the back of the covered market | twenty-four shops (dükkanlar) | of 
masonry 
17v a6 opposite the gate of the covered market leading to the customs house | two ware-
houses (mahzen) | of masonry 
a7 in front of the covered market | towards the slaughterhouse of Hüseyn Ağa | with 
boundaries known to the inhabitants | a vacant lot (arza-ı haliye) 
a8 adjoining the covered market | [extending] over the sea | comprising eighteen 
rooms and a kitchen | and a small bathhouse with a warehouse and stable below | 
newly constructed | a customs house (gümrükhane) 
a9 [as] purchased property (mülk-i müşteram) | with known boundaries | another cus-
toms house (gümrükhane) | and two rooms on the second floor 
a10 a pastry cook’s oven (börekçi fırını)
a11 a sherbet maker’s shop (şerbetçi dükkanı) | and a room on the second floor
a12 with known boundaries | a Jews’ apartment (Yahudihane) | including all its belong-
ings 
a13 adjoining the Jews’ apartment | two apartments (hane) on the ground floor
a14 adjoining the Gülhane bathhouse | comprising many rooms on the ground and 
second floors | an apartment (hane) 
18r a15 adjoining the castle wall | on the beach | with known boundaries | two candle 
factories (şemhane) 
 
 
115 
 
delivered its water to a distribution point in the easternmost part of the city 
(see the two dotted lines in Plate 4).177 
Between the distribution point and its final destinations along the north-
ern seashore, the flow traversed the full breadth of the city from east to west. 
Along the way, it alleviated the general population’s shortage of freely availa-
ble drinking water through a network of fifty-eight public fountains. The 
fountains of this “vizier’s water(system)”, or vezir suyu, were part of Kö-
prülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s endowment and are therefore also listed in its 
deed (directly after the real estate in Table 12). Here, the enumeration of the 
holdings is much more summary, listing only a general (quarter and/or ward) 
and a precise location (street and/or house) for each fountain: 
 
TABLE 13: FOUNTAINS ENDOWED IN IZMIR (1678) 
                                                     
 
177 In Plate 4, the aqueduct’s intake is located in the vicinity of Homer’s Cave (the remains 
at this location are currently known as the Şirinyer aqueducts). From there, the aqueduct 
followed the Meles at a higher elevation towards Mount Pagus, with one arm crossing the 
river halfway between the inlet and Kadifekale (the remains of this crossover are currently 
known as the Yeşildere aqueduct). From there, it proceeded hugging the eastern slopes of 
Mount Pagus, delivering its contents to a distribution point slightly southwest of the caravan 
bridge and east of the quarter of Faik Paşa. The final stretch of the aqueduct is also visible in 
Plate 3, where it is accompanied by the inscription “Aqueduct begun by Visir Ahmet in 1674”. 
178 In fact, the vakfiye does not mention a quarter here – the reference to this first fountain 
in the list reads: ve yine medine-i mezburede Çukurçeşme demekle maruf bir çeşmeyi (“and in the afore-
mentioned city a fountain known as Çukurçeşme”). In an inventory that was made of the 
endowment’s fountains in 1912, however, the 17th-century descriptions of location are fol-
lowed by updated ones. Here, it is added that this Çukurçeşme-fountain is located in the 
vicinity of Kocakapı, “the great gate” (Aktepe, “İzmir suları”, 139). This places it in the area 
that would later become the quarter of Kocakapı, located slightly east of Faik Paşa and south-
west of the caravan bridge (see Maps 6 and 7, Plates 6 and 7). Incidentally, Aktepe’s list omits 
items b24 and b50, arriving at a total of fifty-six fountains instead of the original vakfiye’s fifty-
eight. Further comparison with our microfilm copy of the original vakfiye shows that the 
inventory consulted by Aktepe contains not only omissions but many misreadings as well. 
Folio Item Quarter Description
18r 
(cont.) 
b1 [Kocakapı (1)]178 known as Çukurçeşme
b2 Çiçek (2) on Sadıkzade Halil Efendi’s wall
b3 Ali Reis (3) on Abdülkadroğlu Hasan’s wall
b4 Pazaryeri (4) on Dellak el-Hac Mehmed’s wall
b5 Mahalle-i Cedid 
(5) 
along the thoroughfare | on the wall of Belci Ömer
b6 near the Uzun Hüseyn Ağa bathhouse | on the wall of el-Hac 
Mehmed 
b7 on Tavil Mustafa Çelebi’s wall
18v b8 on Şerbetçi Cafer Beşe’s wall
b9 Kefeli (6) on el-Hac Mustafa’s wall
b10 at the entrance to the three-road junction | on Kaymoğlu 
Ahmed’s wall 
b11 in Jews [the Jewish ward] | on a zimmi named Mihalaki’s wall 
b12 on Küçük Mehmed Ağa’s wall
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Based on SLK MF 4027, 18r-20v. 
b13 near the day-laborer’s market | on Kalaycı Murad’s wall
b14 on a zimmi named Karayani’s wall
b15 on the governor’s mansion’s wall
b16 on Kasap Bodur Ali’s wall
b17 at the fence| on Derzi Yorgaki’s wall
19r b18 Cami-i Atik (7) on el-Hac Hüseyn’s wall
b19 on Solak Mahmud Ağazade Abdülkerim Ağa’s wall
b20 on el-Hac Süleymanoğlu Mehmed Ağa’s wall
b21 on the corner of Ali Yazıcı’s house
b22 on el-Hac Halil’s wall 
b23 in Hazır Efendi street | on el-Hac Ali’s sons-in-law’s wall
b24 in the vicinity of the el-Hac Muhammed mosque
b25 in Palanduzoğlu street | on el-Hac Süleyman’s wall
b26 on the long road | near the Ümmehatı Hatun prayer house | on 
Süleyman’s wall 
19v b27 on Baba Hasan Bey’s wall
b28 on the el-Hac Mahmud mosque’s wall
b29 on Sabuncı el-Hac Hüseyn’s wall
b30 in Kara Hüseyn Ağa street | on Ali Yazıcı’s wall
b31 on el-Hac Hasan’s wall
b32 in the Kaplan Paşa market | in the middle aisle | at the entrance 
to the four-road junction | on the wall of a warehouse 
b33 on the Ahmed Ağa mosque’s preacher Abdurrahman Efendi’s 
wall 
b34 on Konyalı el-Hac Ömer’s wall
b35 in the vicinity of the el-Hac Hüseyn mosque
b36 Hatuniye (8) opposite the Demirci el-Hac Mehmed prayerhouse
20r b37 in the vicinity of the oratory | on el-Hac Osmanoğlu’s wall
b38 on es-Şeyh Mustafa Efendi’s wall
b39 on the abovementioned şeyh’s paternal uncle Mehmed Ağa’s 
wall 
b40 adjoining the pair of scales installed in a place called Tilkilik 
b41 on Osman Çavuş’s wall
b42 opposite the Mahmud Efendi holy mosque
b43 on Seyyid Ömer’s wall
b44 Hasan Hoca (9) on the Hasan Hoca school’s wall
b45 adjoining the gate of the sellers of roasted chickpeas’ inn
b46 in the vicinity of the courthouse | on the el-Hac Ebubekr 
school’s wall 
20v b47 in the middle of the grain market
b48 Kasap Hazır (10) on Aydınlıoğlu el-Hac Mehmed’s wall
b49 in the vicinity of the Hasan Beşe inn
b50 on Hewwa Hatun’s wall
b51 on Hasan Çavuş’s wall
b52 Frenk Mahallesi 
(11) 
opposite the French consul’s
b53 on the Hungarian consul’s wall
b54 on the inn’s wall | opposite the customs house
b55 inside the customs house
b56 in the vicinity of the castle
b57 in the vicinity of the bathhouse
b58 in the vicinity of the abovementioned bathhouse | inside the 
Jews’ apartment 
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With the help of our panoramas and maps, of an article giving the 1912-
equivalents for the fountains’ locations and of Izmir municipality’s excellent 
searchable digital map of the modern city, the descriptions of the fountains 
can be utilized to the fullest. Not only does it become possible to locate the 
listed quarters on Graves’ city plan (see Map 11), the descriptions also give 
valuable clues about these quarters’ spatial organization and ethno-religious 
composition. 
 
MAP 11: QUARTERS OF IZMIR IN 1678, AS LISTED IN THE ENDOWMENT DEED 
 
1. Çukurçeşme (1 fountain)
2. Çiçek (1 fountain) 
3. Ali Reis (1 fountain) 
4. Pazaryeri (1 fountain) 
5. Mahalle-i Cedid (4 fts.)
6. Kefeli (9 fts.) 
7. Cami-i Atik (18 fts.) 
8. Hatuniye (8 fts.) 
9. Hasan Hoca (4 fts.)
10. Kasap Hazır (4 fts.) 
11. Frenk Mahallesi (7 fts.) 
Based on Istanbul, SLK MF 4027, 18r-20v; Maps 9 and 10; Plates 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8; 
Aktepe, “İzmir suları”; İzmir Sayısal Kent Rehberi (n.d.), by İzmir Konak Belediyesi 
Bilgi Sistemleri Müdürlüğü, and İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Harita Şube 
Müdürlüğü, http://rehber.izmir-bld.gov.tr (accessed 2003; no longer available). 
 
As is to be expected, the new water system primarily serviced Izmir’s princi-
pal quarters, providing us with a topography of the city’s socially, economi-
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cally and politically central areas – which the endowment was after all de-
signed to support and promote. If the Greek and Armenian quarters (the 
locations of which have already been established) are included, most of the 
1678-city’s area is now covered. 
One of the first things to catch our attention is the appearance of many 
new quarters’ names, most often associated with areas already inhabited a 
century earlier. The frequent alternation of quarters’ names is a recurring 
phenomenon throughout the Ottoman Empire. Many quarters went by sev-
eral names, the choice for one or the other seemingly only depending on the 
preference of the person whose documentary testimony we are left to inter-
pret (for instance; the name Faik Paşa, although absent from the vakfiye, nev-
er went out of use). On the other hand, some quarters’ names did change for 
good (Mescid-i Selatinzade to Hasan Hoca for instance). Most often this was 
the result of the construction of new public facilities (mosque’s, schools, 
baths, and so on) and the quarters’ being identified through these facilities’ 
names. 
Besides name changes, comparison of Maps 10 and 11 also suggests that 
some quarters’ boundaries were redrawn. Considering that the Ottoman 
quarter was an important administrative unit, this redrawing might have oc-
curred in response to the increase in population density – as a way to main-
tain administrative manageability. 
As briefly touched upon above, the information in the vakfiye allows a 
number of observations to be made about the individual quarters, their cer-
tainty increasing with the number of references: 
 
1. Çukurçeşme (exclusively Muslim): This area between the caravan 
bridge and the top of Galland’s triangle was apparently not a quarter. 
The fountain (b1) might have been intended for use by travelers. 
2. Çiçek (exclusively Muslim): Its precise location is uncertain, but consid-
ering the course of the aqueduct and the structure of the vakfiye this 
probably refers to the area formerly associated with the Muslim quarter 
of Faik Paşa. In any case, Sadıkzade Halil Efendi (b2) is a Muslim name. 
3. Ali Reis (exclusively Muslim): The Muslim quarter formerly known as 
Ali Çavuş. Abdülkadroğlu Hasan (b3) is a Muslim name. 
4. Pazaryeri (exclusively Muslim): The Muslim quarter formerly known as 
Han Bey (Pazar); the old commercial center. Dellak el-Hac Mehmed (b4) 
refers to a Muslim; a dellak is a shampooer in a bathhouse (an exclusively 
Muslim occupation) and el-hac or hacı is a title reserved for Muslims who 
have completed the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina (and for Christians 
who have made the pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulcher). 
5. Mahalle-i Cedid (exclusively Muslim): Signifying “the new quarter”, 
appears to have been a matured version of the Muslim quarter of Yazıcı. 
The thoroughfare (b5) referred to is probably the eastern arm of the 
road coming in from Urla. Belci Ömer (b5), Uzun Hüseyn Ağa (b6), el-
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Hac Mehmed (b6), Tavil Mustafa Çelebi (b7) and Şerbetçi Cafer Beşe 
(b8) all indicate Muslim heritage. A belci is a maker or seller of spades and 
forks and a şerbetçi is a maker and seller of sweet beverages. 
6. Kefeli (fully mixed): A large commercial quarter (as also indicated by the 
presence of the day-laborer’s market (b13) put together from parts of 
the former quarters of Han Bey and Limon, extending far south-
westwards to include the Jewish quarter as a separate ward referred to as 
Yahudiler (b11; “Jews”). It enclosed most of the inner harbor, including 
the governor’s mansion (b15) on the far end of its western shore. The 
“fence” (b17) might denote a barrier between the Muslim and Jewish 
parts of the quarter. The number “6” on the map is located over the 
three-road junction (b10). el-Hac Mustafa (b9), Kaymoğlu Ahmed (b10), 
Küçük Mehmed Ağa (b12), Kalaycı (tinsmith) Murad (b13) and Kasap 
(butcher) Bodur Ali (b16) point to Muslim habitation. Mention of the 
zimmis Mihalaki (Jewish?; b11) and Karayani (Greek?; b14) confirm non-
Muslim settlement. Derzi (tailor) Yorgaki, although not referred to as a 
zimmi, must have been a Greek. 
7. Cami-i Atik (exclusively Muslim): Signifying “the ancient mosque”, this 
quarter was a completely new and exclusively Muslim quarter. It had ab-
sorbed most of the past century’s growth of the Muslim population and 
took up the entire lower right corner of Galland’s triangle (with the ex-
ception of the inner harbor’s shore). It was not only residential, but cer-
tainly also commercially oriented, as is evidenced by the presence of the 
Kaplan Paşa market (b32) and at least one warehouse (b32). The long 
road (b26) could be the western arm of the road coming in from Urla. 
All accompanying descriptions (b18 to b35) indicate Muslim occupation. 
A solak (b19) is a guardsman in attendance on the Sultan in processions, 
a yazıcı is a (letter) writer (b21 and b30), a sabuncı (b29) is a maker and 
seller of soap. 
8. Hatuniye (exclusively Muslim): A quarter consisting of (the western 
part of) Şeyhler/Şaphane and the northern fringes of Mescid-i Selatinza-
de and Han Bey. Again, the references (b36-b43) point to Muslim habi-
tation, to which we should add that most are religiously oriented (b36, 
b37, b38, b39, b42, b43). A şeyh (b38) is a head of a religious order, a sey-
yid (or şerif; b43) is a descendant of the prophet Muhammad, a çavuş (b41) 
is a pursuivant and halberdier of the sultan’s bodyguard. The place called 
Tilkilik (“craftiness” or “foxiness”) has often been associated with Iz-
mir’s Armenian population. However, as the Armenian quarter appears 
to have bordered on the obviously Muslim quarter of Hatuniye, this as-
sociation is probably not due to residence. It could be that the pair of 
scales (could it be a weighing-house?) to which the vakfiye refers (b40) 
was used for weighing the silk imported by caravans before its sale to the 
Armenian-dominated silk-weaving industry. 
9. Hasan Hoca (exclusively Muslim): Formerly the quarter of Mescid-i 
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Selatinzade. There are only four references to this quarter in the vakfiye, 
which could very well be an indication of some diminished importance. 
Since the 16th century the center of gravity had shifted even further to-
wards the city’s shore and middle and lower Izmir now housed a sizeable 
part of the Muslim population (in Pazaryeri and Kefeli, but particularly 
in the newer quarters of Mahalle-i Cedid and Cami-i Atik). Even so, the 
old center of Muslim habitation east of Pazar(yeri) was still the site of 
the kadi’s residence, or courthouse (b46); the city’s undisputed judicial 
and administrative center. It also still served commercial purposes, as is 
evidenced by the presence of the leblebici hanı (the inn of the sellers of 
roast chickpeas; b45) and the all-important ırgad pazarı (the grain market; 
b47). With its two mektebs (Islamic schools; b44 and b46), one of which 
was apparently part of a vakf important enough to name the quarter af-
ter, it also qualifies as a center of Muslim education. 
10. Kasap Hazır (fully mixed): Named after the open-air slaughterhouse 
(shambles) formerly located on the beach north of the harbor castle and 
comprising the old quarter of Limon, this quarter was the center of the 
endowment’s construction program – and the principal target of the vezir 
suyu. Kasap Hazır has often been confused with its Frankish (or Europe-
an) neighbor. Even the vakfiye is unclear about where the one ended and 
the other began: a8 places the customs house in Kasap Hazır, while b52 
refers to a fountain inside this customs house as lying in Frenk Mahal-
lesi, which quarter b56 erroneously suggests to have extended until just 
under the walls of the harbor castle. As the vakfiye also illustrates, how-
ever, Kasap Hazır is not to be confused with Frenk Mahallesi and was 
not European but Ottoman in character; it housed Muslim (b48-b51), as 
well as Jewish (the Yahudihane; a12) and Armenian (a han described by 
Galland179) institutions and inhabitants. 
11. Frenk Mahallesi (fully mixed, but predominantly European): Taking up 
the entire lower left corner of Galland’s triangle, this Frankish or Euro-
pean quarter was the last one to profit from the vezir suyu (b52-b58). This 
quarter and its organization will be the subject of the next part (on The 
European City). 
[..]. Unmentioned Armenian and Greek quarters (mixed, but predomi-
nantly Armenian, resp. Greek): The Armenian and Greek quarters were 
also inhabited by Muslims – who were present in all quarters (even the 
European). The Greek quarter also housed many Europeans, who chose 
to live there either out of necessity (due to lower rents) or choice (being 
in relationships with Greek women). 
 
                                                     
 
179 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 106. 
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Pluralism within and among 1678-Izmir’s Quarters 
Given the mixed character of all but Izmir’s exclusively Muslims quarters, it 
is misleading to speak of quarters as “Jewish”, “Greek”, “Armenian” or “Eu-
ropean”. Even if such ethno-religious designations are meant as shorthand 
for “the predominance of an ethnicity in a quarter”, or for “how an ethnicity 
is centered on a given quarter”, they all too easily obscure the non-uniform 
character of all Izmir’s northern quarters. It is much more useful to have a 
rendering that permits not only visualization of a group’s central area, but 
also its secondary areas, and how they overlapped with those of other 
groups. We then see (in Map 12): 
 
• Turks centered in the southern quarters, but also ever-present in the 
northern quarters where all of Izmir’s non-Muslims resided180; 
• Jews centered in their ward in the old market quarter of Kefeli, but also 
renting apartments and storehouses further east and in the new com-
mercial center of Kasap Hazır to the north181; 
• Armenians centered in their old Şaphane quarter, but following the flow 
of trade with extensions into the commercial centers of old Kefeli and 
new Kasap Hazır182; 
• Greeks centered in old Cemaat-ı Gebran, but also still present along the 
entire northern shore in rented apartments and hans at the southern and 
northern end of Frank Street.183 
 
                                                     
 
180 See, e.g., ibid., 108: “Il n’y à point d’autre nation que les Turcs qui demeure dans les 
onze premiers quartiers, comme je l'ai déjà remarqué, mais il se trouve des Turcs qui sont 
dispersés dans les quatre autres.” 
181 See, e.g., the Yahudihane of the vakfiye, and two contracts (temessüks) for the lease of 
apartments to members of the Jewish taife: Leiden, Leiden University Library, Legatum Warn-
erianum, Or. 1267, 5a-6a and 15b-16a (AH 10-20 Şevvâl 1101 / AD 18-27 July 1690). 
182 See, e.g., the Armenian han of the vakfiye, described by Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 106. 
183 See, e.g., the Greeks living in Kefeli according to the vakfiye, and the Greek han illustrat-
ed and described by Cornelis de Bruyn, Reizen van Cornelis de Bruyn (Delft, 1698), plate 2 
and 23-25. 
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MAP 12: ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION OF HABITATION IN 1678-IZMIR 
 
yellow = Turks blue = Jews red = Armenians black = Greeks green = Franks 
Based on Map 11 and all cited primary sources. 
 
Crosscultural Traffic in 1678-Izmir 
The vakfiye also adds unto other (previously discussed) information from 
tahrirs and European correspondence and accounts in a way that makes it 
possible to include systemic traffic between and through quarters to our 
map. 
The arrows in Map 13 represent the direction and flow of systemic cross-
cultural traffic in 1678-Izmir, which breaks down into the following recur-
ring movements: 
 
• Caravan merchants carrying goods to and from Kasap Hazır, over the 
caravan bridge and through the city; 
• Groups of Europeans on their way to and from their summer residences 
in the countryside and on archaeological excursions, or travelling else-
where overland; 
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• ships’ staff, crews, merchants and other visitors arriving at the customs 
house coming in or heading out; 
 
MAP 13: SYSTEMIC TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE QUARTERS OF 1678-IZMIR 
 
Based on Map 11 and all cited primary sources. 
 
• heavy traffic of all sorts between Frank Street, Kasap Hazır and the cus-
toms house, including of Ottoman notables and their retinues taking 
passage on European ships, and of customs guards heading out to guard 
the quays along Frank Street; 
• Ottoman and Barbary crews on shore-leave spilling out onto the inner 
harbor’s quays and heading out to roam the European quarters; 
• salt miners commuting between the Islamic quarters, through Frank 
Street, to the salt fields further north; 
• Ottoman notables visiting Frank Street’s consulates, merchant houses, 
taverns and theatres, the deputy grand vizier’s residence on the southern 
end of Frank Street, as well as the voyvoda’s pavilion (or playhouse) at its 
far end; 
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• Janissary guards commuting to and from their employment in Frank 
Street; 
• European and zimmi delegations and individuals crossing into the Mus-
lim parts of the city visiting Ottoman notables and officials, particularly 
the kadi’s and the voyvoda’s courts; 
• Europeans and zimmis crossing the breadth of the city on their way to 
and from the cemeteries beyond its southwestern limit; 
• Jewish middlemen constantly travelling between their ward, Kasap 
Hazır’s storehouses and markets, the customs house and Frank Street; 
• Armenians and Greeks heading out to their various employments in 
Frank Street, and Europeans heading in to their quarters for profession-
al, residential and leisurely purposes; 
• And, crossing the town in every which way and at every given hour, 
inspectors and guards on their route and countless people of all sorts on 
personal or professional errands (not included in the map). 
 
Perhaps the spaghetti of winding arrows in the map is not the most accessi-
ble way to illustrate an urban topography of systemic crosscultural move-
ment, of movements that were so integral to the city’s economy, demogra-
phy and geography that groups of inhabitants repeated them day after day, 
month after month, year after year, and even century upon century. Their 
point, however, is not to identify those movements precisely, or to trace their 
exact course. Rather, it is to impress upon us that the seemingly static veins 
of the grid were always alive with an intense and diverse pulse of crosscultur-
al traffic. What’s more, cohabitation, employment or meetings across cul-
tures were not that alone, they were always preceded and followed by travel 
through the city, and therefore by ever so many interactions with other cul-
tures. Similarly, we should always be aware that people of different cultures 
living together, employing each other, or simply meeting each other for 
business or pleasure unavoidably impacted either side’s outlook and probably 
also that of their direct environments. When speaking about the impact, or 
spill-over effect, of crosscultural contact it would have been more accurate 
(but even less legible) to have the arrows drag wide wakes behind them and 
to have them begin and end in huge oil-spill-like blots. 
A familiar trope to describe the supposedly superficial and haphazard in-
teraction of members of various millets is that of “people meeting on the 
stairs”. Let us for a moment go with that image… Imagine Ottoman Izmir as 
an apartment building housing the sultan’s deputies (the landlords), Turks 
(his family), Ottoman non-Muslims (the tenants) and Europeans (the land-
lords’ guests). In such a building, in which power equaled elevation, the sul-
tan’s deputies would occupy the penthouse, the Turks the 5th floor, the Jews 
the 4th floor; the Europeans the guest apartments on the 3rd floor, the Greeks 
the 2nd floor apartments, and the Armenians the 1st floor apartments. 
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But occupation is one thing, what about movement? The trope suggests 
that ethno-religious separation was near-total and fixed immutably, and that 
contact between the ethnicities on the building’s floors was mostly short and 
superficial: a simple nod or civilized platitude in arriving or leaving. However 
resourceful the trope might be, it fails to account for three complicating 
realities, namely ethnic mobility, professional mobility and social mobility. It 
supposes ethno-religious uniformity was strictly maintained in habitation, in 
faith, in religion, in marriage, in love and sex, in government employment, in 
private employment, in entertainment, in friendship, and so on. As if a build-
ing like this would have no need for janitors and bellboys – resident Jews and 
Greeks – running from floor to floor and apartment to apartment doing 
maintenance work, opening and shutting doors, operating the elevators and 
passing along notes in the service of the landlord and his family. And as if no 
employment or friendships would have been struck up across floors. 
The point of the trope of course is to suggest that an Ottoman society 
like Izmir’s was plural yet deeply segregated, that it could not have been 
cosmopolitan because its parts were so insulated and their interaction so 
limited by parochialism. The implication is that this was a society that merely 
tolerated otherness, and often barely so. This is not the place to delve too 
deeply into the question of how to delineate such complicated, changing and 
overlapping concepts as tolerance, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. 
Nor should we want to decide upon one of them and discuss how it suited 
late-17th Izmir. But we can afford ourselves a few more thoughts on the 
subject. 
Cosmopolitanism has recently been characterized as follows: 
 
So there are two strands that intertwine in the notion of cosmopolitanism. One is the idea 
that we have obligations to others, obligations that stretch beyond those to whom we are re-
lated by the ties of kith and faith, or even the more formal ties of a shared citizenship. The 
other is we take seriously the value not just of human life but of particular human lives, 
which means taking an interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance. Peo-
ple are different, the cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn from our differences. 
Because there are so many human possibilities worth exploring, we neither expect nor desire 
that every person or every society should converge on a single mode of life.184 
 
The historical record certainly testifies to the sense of shared humanity and 
personal interest signaled by Appiah; they are discernible in the writings of 
some of late-17th-century Izmir’s most lettered inhabitants and visitors. How 
many of their less erudite and communicative neighbors shared the senti-
ment and to what degree is unknowable, and pointless to discuss. Neverthe-
less, if we let the inhabitants’ ethnic, professional and social mobility do the 
                                                     
 
184 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (London: 
Penguin Books, 2006), xiii. 
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talking, it should be clear that crosscultural contact was not limited to pass-
ings-by. 
It has been shown above that nearly half of the residential floors of the 
building that was Izmir were ethnically mixed, and that all ethnicities com-
peted for additional footholds in and around the lobby that was Kasap 
Hazır, as well as in its two adjacent forums of Frank Street and Kefeli. Be-
sides the wild residential hotchpotch on the lower and ground floors, we 
have also taken a look around the lobby itself (the covered markets), in the 
service areas (the customs house, inns, warehouses, and brokers’ apart-
ments), in the elevators and on the stairs (the city’s thoroughfares), and have 
noticed the heavy crosscultural traffic continually moving through all of 
them. Naturally there were sections of this complex that were calm, neat and 
ethnically homogenous; the interiors of the residential wards that made up 
the quarters. But all around them was the never-ending, intense and undis-
criminating bustle of people of all sorts meeting up to do deals or simply to 
enjoy each other’s company or satisfy their curiosity. Forget about people 
inadvertently bumping into each other on their way out or coming in – in 
Izmir the non-private areas were the destination: the best opportunities pre-
sented themselves in the crosscultural tangle of the markets and the thor-
oughfares. 
Whatever container we would choose to sweep all that interaction into 
(tolerance, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism), it would always be too en-
compassing and too narrow at once. I propose to forget about such burden-
some concepts for now and simply attempt to remain conscious of what 
living and navigating the city really involved in the way of crosscultural sights 
and communications, and of the potential for crosscultural understanding 
and cooperation they carried as their frequency increased. 
It was the commercial and political side of this potential which the Kö-
prülü vakf was intended to unlock, organize, control and tap. So, before we 
move to the European side of the Izmirean equation, let us take a closer look 
the vakf’s founder Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and his Köprülü dynasty, outline the 
extent of their involvement in Izmir’s affairs and explore the intended and 
unintended effects of their interference. 
 
The Köprülüs, Their Endowment and Its Impact185 
Obviously, the Köprülü vakf’s Izmir program was a singular undertaking. 
The vastness of the project is all the more striking if one considers that it 
was not carried out as part of a royal endowment intended to forever serve 
the reputation of the ruling dynasty. This endowment, though actively sup-
                                                     
 
185 A shorter version of this section was previously published in honor of my dear mentor 
as “Köprülü Imperial Policy and the Refashioning of Izmir”, in: Ottoman Izmir: Studies in 
Honour of Alexander H. de Groot, ed. Maurits H. van den Boogert (Leiden: NINO, 2007). 
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ported from court, was planned, funded and executed by a grand vizier with 
little more than a decade in power behind him, but it rivaled most royal ones 
in size and influence. 
Who, then, was this Köprülü vizier, what guided his attention to Izmir, 
and what was the immediate impact of his involvement in that city’s eco-
nomic, political and social fabric? Any retelling of Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü’s 
rise to the grand vizierate and his involvement in Izmir has to begin with the 
ascension of his dynasty’s founder, Mehmed Köprülü, and the state of affairs 
he was called upon to remedy – and should end with their successor Mer-
zifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa’s heading down the road to Vienna. Although 
that campaign did not end the dynasty, it did mark the high point of the 
dynasty’s power and influence, as well as its consistent and methodical inter-
ference with Izmir. 
The three consecutive grand vizierates of scions of the renowned Kö-
prülü family spanned nearly the entire second half of the seventeenth centu-
ry. Mehmed Paşa Köprülü held the office of grand vizier from 1656 to 1661, 
when he was succeeded by his son Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, who 
held the position until 1676. His successor was his adopted brother, Mer-
zifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, who held the post until 1683 and should be con-
sidered an important beneficiary, partaker and promoter of the Köprülü 
legacy of statesmanship.186 Together, the grand vizierates of these three Kö-
prülüs constitute a remarkably resurgent yet stable quarter of an otherwise 
stormy Ottoman century. 
 
When Mehmed Paşa Köprülü took over the reins of executive power on 15 
September 1656 he inherited an empire paralyzed by dynastic, bureaucratic, 
military, monetary and fiscal mismanagement. Among his most pressing 
concerns were a major ongoing crisis surrounding the sultanate and the em-
pire’s highest offices, an Ottoman-Venetian war of more than a decade that 
was quickly becoming catastrophic, and a seemingly unending series of upris-
ings throughout the empire and particularly in Anatolia. The history of the 
protracted period of troubles predating the Köprülüs’ rise is also relevant 
here, because it highlights the near-miraculous turnaround their policies 
managed to effect.187 
                                                     
 
186 On Merzifonlu Mustafa Paşa and his reign, see C.J. Heywood, “Karā 
Mustafa Pasha, Merzifonly, maktūl”, EI2, iv: 589b-92b; and my “‘A most agreeable 
and pleasant creature’? Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa in the Correspondence of 
Justinus Colyer (168-1682)”, in: The Ottoman Capitulations: Text and Context, eds. 
Maurits H. van den Boogert and Kate Fleet (Rome: Istituto per l'Oriente, 2003). 
187 For the basic historical context of Kösem’s rule as well as the Köprülü period, I have 
relied primarily on İsmail Hami Danişmend, İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, vol. 3 (Istanbul: 
Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972); Joseph von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (Pest: C.A. 
Hartleben, 1827-36); and Robert Mantran, Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman (Paris: Fayard, 1989). 
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The dire state of the empire in 1656 had many causes, some external and 
beyond the Ottomans’ control. Nevertheless, the seizure of power by the 
sultan’s harem in the person of Kösem Sultan Mahpeyker had proved to be 
an important factor in exacerbating an already insecure situation. Not be-
cause “harem rule” as such was necessarily bad – it could be an effective way 
to cushion the effects of rule by inadequate sultans while maintaining imperi-
al authority and stability by continuing the dynasty.188 But Kösem’s purpose, 
it appears, was never primarily to protect the sultanate but to control it at any 
cost. From Sultan Ahmed I’s death in 1617 until her own murder in 1651, 
Kösem had done everything she could to secure her prominent place at the 
center of power. This included having suitable candidates for the sultanate 
passed over or killed, and even engineering the deposition of reigning sultans 
to have them replaced with her own creatures, who were invariably either 
mentally incapable or still minor when they ascended the throne (see Table 
14). 
 
TABLE 14: HAREM RULE FROM 1617 TO 1648 
Sultan Reign Reign ended by Principle relationship Main protector 
Mustafa I 1617-1618 deposition brother of Ahmed I Kösem Sultan 
Osman II 1618-1622 deposition &
execution 
son of Ahmed I &
Mahfiruz Haseki Sultan 
Mahfiruz Haseki 
Sultan 
Mustafa I 1622-1623 deposition brother of Ahmed I Kösem Sultan 
Murad IV 1623-1640 natural death son of Ahmed I &
Kösem Sultan 
Kösem Sultan 
Ibrahim I 1640-1648 deposition &
execution 
son of Ahmed I &
Kösem Sultan 
Kösem Sultan 
Mehmed IV 1648-1687 deposition son of Ibrahim I &
Turhan Sultan 
Kösem Sultan > 
Turhan Sultan 
 
Two notable exceptions were the rules of Osman II and Murad IV. The first 
was enthroned in opposition to Kösem’s influence. His deposition and exe-
cution in 1622, after a reign of merely five years, brought an end to his at-
tempts at fiscal and military reforms and marked the renewed ascendancy of 
Kösem. The reign of Murad IV, who had become sultan at the age of eleven, 
started under the regency of Kösem and with all the familiar troubles. Any 
policy or vision regarding government and administration seemed to be lack-
ing as she went through eight grand-viziers and nine defterdars between 1623 
and 1632. This insecurity of office caused a veritable mass migration as high 
officials desperately tried to secure their positions by maneuvering their de-
pendents (from their own households and other clients) into all echelons of 
central and provincial administration. The gravity of the resulting discontinu-
                                                     
 
188 Cf. Christoph K. Neumann, “Political and diplomatic developments”, in: The Cambridge 
History of Turkey, vol. 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 48; and Aksan, “Theoretical Ottomans”, 119. 
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ity in the state’s affairs became apparent as large rebellions flared up all over 
the empire and the Safavid Şah reopened hostilities and managed to take 
Baghdad. 
No doubt prompted by this deteriorating state of affairs, Murad ended 
his mother’s regency and assumed control in 1632, initiating a policy of se-
vere purges and reactionary measures, which under the grand vizierates of 
Tabaniyası Mehmed Paşa and Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Paşa managed – for 
the moment – to stabilize the empire. The blueprint for their policy was 
Koçi Bey’s Risale, which advocated a return to the imagined perfections of 
the Ottoman classical age that was considered to have ended after the reign 
of Süleyman the Great. This “Ottoman fundamentalism” included the fol-
lowing suggestions for imperial policy: the restoration of the grand vizier’s 
independence; the neutralization of the influence of palace favorites; putting 
a stop to the high frequency of rotation of offices, particularly regarding 
governors(-general); the dismissal of ignorant clergy (ulema) and their re-
placement with learned men; the restoration of sumptuary laws; the 
(re)distribution of feudal fiefs (timars) to worthy men only; ending the prac-
tice of distributing timars as other forms of tenure.189 
These suggested measures amounted to a rather desperate attempt to un-
do the superficial manifestations of a series of profound economic and socie-
tal changes that had their origin in the longer sixteenth century (see further 
below). Of course, forcing a 17th-century society back into an early-16th-
century mold could never be an adequate long-term answer to the challenges 
of the money economy and the pressures exerted on the empire by the 
evolving economic world-system. Not because the outcome – the semi-
peripheralization of the Ottoman economy in the nineteenth-century (see 
below) – was inescapable, but because new economic realities and challenges 
required new solutions and strategies. But although they were out-of-sync 
with the age, the measures at least restored some predictability and account-
ability to Ottoman rule. 
After Murad had died of an illness in 1640 and his demented brother, Ib-
rahim I, had taken the throne, the Ottoman fundamentalist policy unraveled 
as quickly as Kemankeş Kara Mustafa Paşa’s fortunes. Confronted with re-
newed attempts by Kösem to obtain control over the highest offices of state, 
he held out for four more years before being dismissed and executed. Thus 
began another period of rapid deterioration, continuing well into the sultan-
ate of Ibrahim’s minor son, Mehmed IV. Even the downfall of Kösem in 
1651 and the assumption of the regency by her daughter, Mehmed’s mother, 
                                                     
 
189 How far the reality of appointments to the executive branch became removed from the 
ideal is vividly portrayed, quantified and reasoned in Rifaat Ali Abou-el-Haj, “The Ottoman 
Vezir and Paşa Households, 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report”, Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, 94/4 (1974). 
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Hatice Turhan brought no relief, as no less than 18 grand viziers, 12 şeyh ül-
Islams, 23 başdefterdars, 18 kapudans and countless provincial governors were 
changed – and, more often than not, executed – like small coinage between 
1644 and 1656. 
Amidst this administrative chaos Kösem’s clique, particularly the sultan’s 
teacher, Hüseyin Efendi Cinci Hoca, in 1644 managed to plunge the empire 
headlong into an unprovoked war with Venice (and eventually with half of 
Europe) over Crete. The war, which Kemamkeş Kara Mustafa Paşa had 
done his utmost to prevent and which commenced almost immediately after 
his execution, directed scarce resources from the central and provincial 
treasuries towards the war effort, and also from the enormous and increasing 
number of clients upon which the rule of the harem depended. 
The results were predictable: a doubling of salaried government person-
nel, an enormous budget deficit, riotous unpaid soldiery, the levying of huge 
extraordinary taxes (of up to 50% on timars, for instance), the institutional-
ized venality of offices, radical and uncompensated devaluations of coinage, 
revolts and counter-revolts, and the erosion of Ottoman power in the prov-
inces. But worst of all were the Venetian blockades of the Dardanelles, Is-
tanbul’s lifeline for communications and provisions, from 1650. In 1656, the 
last year of the blockade, the defeat of the Ottoman naval expedition sent 
out to break it, the subsequent abandonment of Limnos, Samothrace and 
Tenedos by the Ottomans and the seemingly imminent siege of the capital 
caused great panic in Istanbul. Food prices rocketed and the sultan momen-
tarily took flight to Üsküdar. It was under these circumstances that the sul-
tan-mother called the elderly and relatively unknown provincial governor, 
Mehmed Paşa Köprülü, to the grand vizierate. He accepted the appointment 
only after she had sworn a formal oath guaranteeing him absolute independ-
ence and freedom from interference. 
Within the five short years of his grand vizierate Mehmed Paşa, an erst-
while protégé of Kemankeş, managed to repair most of the damage caused 
by the rule of the harem – and more. Numerous rebellions were suppressed 
both in Istanbul and the provinces, and a number of severe purges were 
carried out to prevent them flaring up again. Simultaneously, the causes of 
the rebellions were addressed when the grand vizier considered them reason-
able. Government expenses were cut drastically to balance income and ex-
penditure, making the payment of state wages and stipends more reliable.190 
                                                     
 
190 According to Evliya Çelebi: “In 1067 (1656) Köprülü Mehmed Paşa was made inde-
pendent grand vizier. Since the Ottoman state was in turmoil, he killed 400,000 celalis in Ana-
tolia, 17 viziers, 41 begler-begs, 70 sancak-begs, 3 mollahs, and a certain Moroccan cabbalist 
named Şeyh Salim. He balanced the revenues and expenditures of the Ottoman state, erasing 
three years of arrears and also accomplished several conquests”: Robert Dankoff, The Intimate 
Life of an Ottoman Statesman: Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588-1662) as Portrayed in Evliya Çelebi's “Book 
of Travels” (“Seyahat-Name”) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 55. 
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Köprülü’s firm hold on power also meant less uncoordinated reshuffling in 
Ottoman administration as a whole. Officials could now be relatively sure of 
their continued employment if they deserved it. Although the grand vizier 
was in the habit of rotating key posts on an annual basis in order to prevent 
the holders of these offices forging potentially threatening local and provin-
cial alliances, the prospect of reappointment was in fact a leap forward from 
the uncertainty of previous times. 
On the international front Mehmed Köprülü’s activities were limited but 
successful. They were aimed first and foremost at the direct survival of the 
Ottoman Empire and at maintaining its physical integrity. Careful not to 
stretch the empire’s still recuperating resources too thin, he concentrated his 
efforts on lifting the Venetian blockade, retaking the islands which had been 
lost to Venice a short time before, and replacing the rebellious Transylvanian 
vassal prince George II Rakoczi with Arkos Barcsay after the Ottoman army 
had taken Varad (Grosswardein). 
 
Before he died of old age in 1661, Mehmed Köprülü had secured his own 
succession for his son, Fazıl Ahmed. With the empire’s domestic affairs rea-
sonably well in order, the task fell to him to marshal the resources necessary 
to secure the empire’s northern and western borders (with Italy, Austria, 
Russia and Poland). The son’s stabilization of the periphery thus followed 
the father’s stabilization of the central lands and the capital. Fazıl Ahmed 
Paşa first concern was the northern borders. Continuing his father’s cam-
paign in support of the new vassal king of Transylvania and the securing of 
Varad (Grosswardein), in 1663 Fazıl Ahmed took Uyvar (Neuhäusel) on the 
Austro-Hungarian border, a town on the road to Vienna, which was now 
only 150 tantalizing kilometers from the Ottomans’ grasp. 
After the peace of Vasvar (Eisenburg) formally ended hostilities on 10 
August 1664, and once the renewed demarcation and fortification of the 
northern frontier had been completed, Fazıl Ahmed’s attention turned to the 
festering issue of Crete which had been draining the empire’s resources for 
two decades. No doubt considering full Ottoman mastery of the Eastern 
Mediterranean basin too important a prize to let go after such investment, he 
rejected several Venetian overtures for peace and managed to take Candia 
(Heraklion) in 1669 after a prolonged and massive siege. Once again turning 
around to the northern frontier, Fazıl Ahmed then supported the Dniepr 
Cossacks against the Zaparogue Cossacks – making sure the Ottomans 
would not lose the overland connection with the vassal Crimea Khanate and 
mastery of the Black Sea. The subsequent effort to broaden and buffer the 
corridor connecting the two resulted in a number of campaigns against Po-
land, and the conquest of Kaminiec (Kamenetz Podolski) in 1672 and nearby 
Hotin in 1674. Only a week after he had secured – partly through his adopt-
ed brother and proxy Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa – advantageous posi-
tions and peace on the empire’s western and northern borders, and having 
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for the moment kept at bay the resurgent powers of western and eastern 
Europe (France and Italy in Crete; Muscovy and Poland in Ukraine and 
Podolia) Fazıl Ahmed Paşa died from the effects of a stroke. 
 
The further implementation and consolidation of Fazıl Ahmed’s conquests 
and policies fell to Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, who indeed followed Fazıl 
Ahmed’s policy prescriptions right up until his catastrophic siege of Vienna 
and the subsequent Austro-Hungarian onslaught (how he did so precisely 
will concern us later on). But what were these policies? From the summary 
of events above it becomes clear that the Köprülüs’ principal aim was the 
restoration of Ottoman power and territories, first inward, then outward. 
The record of their actions consistently suggests that this aim was promoted 
through an evolving yet coherent set of policies that dictated which political 
associations, acts and attitudes should have priority over others. Whatever 
their policy implied precisely (and this will be discussed throughout the re-
mainder of this text), it certainly differed significantly from the reactionary 
type (as taken straight from Koçi Bey, and pursued by, among others, Murad 
IV). Their commands, correspondences and other communications – alt-
hough they often forcefully reaffirmed neglected Islamic principles in law, 
economy and society to support Ottoman claims to sovereignty – nowhere 
betray any kind of systematic attempt to turn back the clock to an earlier age. 
To find out what the Köprülüs’ policy alternative to Ottoman fundamen-
talism might have looked like and, more to the point, to get an idea of what 
part Izmir was meant to play in it, we should take a close look at the timing, 
composition and operation of the Köprülüs’ largest single investment; their 
endowment. 
 
It is easy and tempting retrospectively to interpret a series of historical events 
as the results of a deliberate policy. This danger is particularly great when we 
lack policy statements of the kind produced by modern bureaucracies, or by 
that of Louis XIV’s administration in France, for example. Can we ever dis-
cover the long-term perspective of someone like Fazıl Ahmed Paşa without 
superimposing our own policies ex post facto? How can we hope to accom-
plish this without documents which explicitly reveal motivations and policy 
statements? 
Although it does not solve the problem entirely, Fazıl Ahmed’s vakfiye is 
one document that can take us a considerable distance beyond the mere 
reading of grand events – a political testament of sorts. It describes a project 
larger than the ones bequeathed by countless other wealthy and powerful 
Ottomans, surpassing even many royal endowments in ambition and scope. 
As we have seen, in Izmir alone it provided an extraordinarily large number 
of institutions for the benefit of both the public and professionals, as well as 
contributing to the status and influence of its founder. 
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What distinguishes the Köprülü vakf form earlier and contemporary elite 
endowments, however, is that the classical form of its deed actually masks 
this particular endowment’s radical departure from classical physical form. 
The purpose of all major Ottoman urban vakfs was to express piety, to in-
crease social capital, to gain influence and to add missing functions to a site 
thereby transforming it into a functioning micro-model and mirror of an 
ideal Ottoman urban civilization. More often than not such acts of piety and 
conviction, whether self-serving or not, were simultaneously acts of politics 
and of policy, of economic and of social engineering, like the constructing of 
a mosque-complex in recently-conquered lands or the construction of a 
mosque with bazaar, seminar, lodgings and so on in the burnt Jewish Istan-
bul neighborhood of Eminönü.191 
Although this was certainly also the case with the Köprülü endowment it 
nevertheless deviated considerably from the accepted forms and purposes of 
the institution. The Köprülüs took a very novel approach to the functional 
distribution of their endowment’s facilities: the properties endowed in Uyvar, 
Kaminiec and Candia were all designed to support these cities’ military infra-
structure; those in Istanbul and Belgrade were overwhelmingly “civilization-
al” (religious, educational, etc.); while the 73 structures and properties en-
dowed in Izmir served commercial purposes exclusively. This might not 
seem exceptional since Uyvar, Kaminiec and Candia were already primarily 
military bastions, while Istanbul and Belgrade already had prominent civiliza-
tional functions, and while Izmir was by now a well-established economic 
center. 
Exactly so, but there is a telling difference between a city having a specific 
function because of historical circumstance and a city being purposely desig-
nated to further specialize in a particular function, as happened here. If the 
Köprülüs would have wanted to rebrand commercial upstart Izmir as a cen-
ter of Ottoman civilization they would have invested lightly in its commercial 
infrastructure and heavily in its religious and educational facilities, or – since 
the city’s commercial infrastructure was dangerously makeshift and out of 
the Ottomans’ control – perhaps equally in both. As it happened, they chose 
to strengthen Izmir’s commercial capacity at the cost of all other functions 
Ottoman cities normally fulfilled. 
That this was a purposeful expression of a carefully planned policy (to 
curb European contraband trade and stimulate Izmir’s economy in the ser-
vice of the empire and, of course, the Köprülü household) would be in evi-
                                                     
 
191 See Marc David Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman 
Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 81-104 on the Yeni Camii complex in 
Eminönü. The complex was a pet project of Mehmed IV’s mother Hatice Turhan and was 
erected on the site of Istanbul’s confiscated Jewish ward destroyed in the great fire of 1660. 
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dence throughout the remainder of Köprülü rule, but is already implied by 
the sheer amount of planning and investment that went into the endowment. 
The endowment’s cities were carefully selected, properties were acquired 
and converted, effective and beneficial uses were sought out, building plans 
were commissioned, major construction teams were put together to work for 
years on end, and personnel was picked and hired to run the endowed insti-
tutions. 
It is safe to say that from the moment construction of its properties be-
gan, the Köprülü vakf and its benefactors dominated Izmir socially, econom-
ically and geographically and tied the city to Köprülü power. This was a radi-
cal reassertion of central authority after decades of semi-independence and 
ineffectual rule.192 Through their project the Köprülüs established a degree 
of control otherwise unattainable. They not only determined what the city 
was going to look like, but also how it was to be lived, worked and interacted 
in. Their hiring of (army) architects and engineers, of workmen, of adminis-
trators, as well as their determining which professions and, ultimately, pro-
fessionals would operate from what sites under what conditions, also gave 
them and their proxies considerable influence; over who would live, work and 
interact in which part of it. 
When it was completed, the endowment not only comprised the city’s 
central meeting points and its most important markets, warehouses and 
shops, it had also become the main employer of its educated population and 
had profoundly changed its outward appearance. The imperial might and 
splendor projected by the endowment, however, not only radiated outward 
across the bay to visitors arriving by sea, it also communicated to Izmir’s 
Ottoman elite (ayan) and European communities, that after a century of dis-
order, instability and waning influence, the Ottoman center intended to take 
full control of the economy of Izmir and its hinterland. Relations between 
taifes would be redefined, and any local informal arrangements the ayan and 
the Europeans had set up (and perhaps the beginnings of a budding interna-
tionally-oriented civic identity) would be broken up. Still, the assertion of 
Ottoman power could work to the advantage of local Ottoman and Europe-
an power brokers – as long as they adjusted and cooperated: ayan would be 
coopted by the Köprülü household or vakf; European officials would see 
their consular and ambassadorial duties increased through the curbing of 
smuggling. I said “take control” and not “retake”, because the measure of 
control over Ottoman-European trade that was aspired to was greater than 
any accomplished, or even attempted, before. Few would have failed to un-
                                                     
 
192 Cf. Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 26-33, 132-35, 138-46. According to 
Goffman, the reconfiguration and ignition of Izmir – the one that irreversibly primed and 
launched it into the European semi-periphery – took place during such a period at the turn of 
the 17th century when Istanbul was too busy to notice. Thereafter, this process could at best 
be contained, but never reversed. 
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derstand the language and ultimate message of this imperial project, if only 
because its changes to the cityscape were too dramatic to be overlooked. 
 
In the foregoing we have seen how, historically, the northern part of town 
had been Christian (Armenian, Greek and Latin, later European), the south-
eastern part being inhabited by the various Muslim communities (Turkish, 
Arab, Persian) with a ward adjacent to the inner harbor reserved for the 
Jews. Originally these two parts had been two separate and opposing towns, 
one Byzantine and one Turkish, that met in the market district of Han 
Bey/Pazar(yeri). When the towns merged in the sixteenth century under the 
Pax Ottomanica, their economies fused as well – the former parts, however, 
retaining much of their specialized economic functions. Generally speaking, 
the Latin/European quarter’s economic activities focused on international 
seaborne trade (shipping from the outer harbor); those of the Armenian 
quarters focused on textile manufacturing and marketing; while the Greek 
quarter facilitated both with middlemen. The Muslim quarters fulfilled all 
other, regular, economic functions, but with a heavy emphasis on supplying 
Istanbul with regional produce and with luxury items arriving through the 
southern arm of the Anatolian caravan route (on Map 11; coming in over the 
caravan bridge, stocked in warehouses between the lower castle and items 6 
and 10, and shipped from the inner harbor). Predictably, the necessary finan-
cial services were provided by the Jewish ward. 
As Izmir and its seaborne trade were increasingly integrated into interna-
tional markets from the middle of the seventeenth century onward, and as 
more and more ships anchored in the outer harbor and more and more 
goods were sold from European and Greek warehouses in the northern 
quarters, the city’s economy had been pulled ever further from the Otto-
mans’ grasp as they were too embroiled in war, revolt and dynastic reversal 
to do much about it. The construction of an Ottoman alternative in the form 
of a fully up-to-date commercial district in the quarter of Kasap Hazır, fi-
nanced and controlled by the grand vizier’s family and staffed with that fami-
ly’s local clients, was designed to redirect the flow of commerce from the 
European quarter’s quays and warehouses and seize back control (if not 
initiative) in a movement of unprecedented intensity and ambition. Under 
the Köprülüs, it was clear, the Ottomans would tolerate and even stimulate 
international trade and local and regional arrangements, but within appropri-
ate limits and only as long as they could be seen as working towards the ben-
efit of their empire and its population.193 
                                                     
 
193 The Köprülüs’ effort to reclaim, centralize, sponsor and appropriate commercial activi-
ty from the periphery might well be interpreted as forming part of a transition from pre-
industrialism to modernity. In Western Europe, this process – state incorporation of interna-
tional trade – came to be known as mercantilism. 
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To complete the attempted reorientation of the city’s economy, the en-
terprise was complemented with a new set of rules by which the city’s Euro-
pean merchants had to abide. No longer were they permitted to freely shuttle 
goods between ships in the outer harbor and their warehouses along Frank 
Street, only to declare an estimated amount to customs afterwards. Accord-
ing to contemporary estimates, this arrangement had enabled them to smug-
gle up to half the value of their total trade at major personal gain and at the 
minor cost of paying off the Ottoman watchmen along the quays: 
 
The aforesaid merchant ships drop anchor … right in front of … Frank Street. The mer-
chant houses there have double entrances: one in the front and one in the back, on the sea-
shore, the latter of which is of great commodity and advantage to them …, in particular for 
smuggling and defrauding customs, at which the Smirniotes in general are very adept. All 
the more so because, when caught, they don’t risk much beyond being charged customs at a 
double rate, which, at worst, is no more than 3% of all cargo according to the imperial ca-
pitulations. And to avoid being subject to that danger, the individual merchants usually 
manage to come to an agreement with the guards and inspectors of said customs, who tend 
to be highly corruptible, to fix the matter for half the amount.194 
 
Naturally, it was a setup detrimental to the interests of the Ottoman custom-
er (a tax farmer) and, because of the looming devaluation of his tax farm, to 
those of the state. With the completion, in 1675, of the new customs house 
(uc gümrüğü), constructed and leased out by the vakf, however, all goods were 
to pass through there to be physically assessed by the customer and his 
deputies. An added discomfort for the Europeans, and at least a number of 
their middlemen, was that the vakf’s warehouses and markets, all but one 
adjacent to the customs house and firmly in Ottoman hands, were now in 
serious competition with their own further north. And yet, the Europeans 
could not object too much without incriminating themselves, for no-one 
could openly deny Ottoman claims that such structural improvements as had 
been made to the city’s commercial infrastructure could only promote com-
merce.195 
                                                     
 
194 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a-b) (my translation). 
195 See Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 105-6: “La rue, que ces maisons forment du côté de la 
ville avec celles qui sont vis-à-vis, est longue, à la vérité, mais elle est forte étroite. L’on trouve, 
au bout, la grande douane pour les marchandises de dehors où le douanier fait sa demeure. 
C’est un bâtiment nouveau, qui n’est que de bois et bâti sur pilotis, avec une grande avance de 
planches soutenue en l’air, sous laquelle la mer bat, avec des degrés pour monter et descendre 
à la mer et pour décharger les balles de marchandises. Les marchands sont beaucoup mortifiés 
de cette nouveauté, parce qu’on les oblige d’y faire aborder ce qu’ils veulent débarquer ou 
embarquer pour être fouillé et examiné afin que les droits ne soient point frustrés et pour 
empêcher les marchandises de contra bande, qui étaient auparavant fort fréquentes lorsque 
chacun débarquait directement à son magasin, ou qu’il embarquait pour envoyer aux vais-
seaux. On dit que les consuls n’en sont point fâchés parce que les marchands ne peuvent rien 
soustraire à leurs droits, en faisant embarquer quoi que ce soit à son insu, pouvant avoir con-
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The customs house was the first major new structure of the endowment 
to be completed (full completion of its assets would take two more years). 
This suggests that customs reform was indeed a cornerstone of the policy 
the endowment was set up to support. The imperial writ dictating that from 
then on European ships unload their cargoes at the customs office was dis-
patched to Izmir at the end of July 1675 by express imperial messenger 
(çavuş).196 There was considerable resistance from the European communi-
ties, but by 15 November of that year all attempts to undo the order had 
come to nothing and the foreigners had no choice but to comply. By the 
Dutch consul’s own admission, neither the various consuls of Izmir, nor 
their superiors in Istanbul stood to gain from blocking execution of the or-
der: given that most of their incomes were paid from consular and ambassa-
dorial duties over the same goods, the widespread evasion of duties hit them 
as much as it did the customer.197 Even if they had countered the order full 
force, however, the Köprülüs’ investment would have been too great for 
them to give in and revert to the previous arrangement. 
Leading the effort to wrestle European economic activity in Izmir under 
Ottoman sovereignty would be Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa.198 When 
illness forced his adopted brother to lay down his public functions in July 
1676, he not only inherited the functions of the grand vizier but also his 
position as the head of the family’s political-administrative network or 
“household” and its policies, as well as control over the state’s and the fami-
ly’s assets with which to realize them – first and foremost the as yet uncom-
pleted endowment in Izmir. 
                                                                                                                        
 
naissance de tout par le mémoire de la douane. Le douanier ne se contente pas de cette inno-
vation: il veut aussi que les vaisseaux demeurent devant la douane et que personne ne 
s’embarque ou débarque, soit marchand, soit marinier, qu’on ne le fouille partout.” 
196 The Hague, NA 01.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 22 August 1675: “Some days 
ago a çavuş or bailiff from Adrianople arrived here on horseback, with a written order or 
commandment, personally signed by the grand Turk, and therefore named a Hatt-ı Şerif …, 
which is of great force and should be obeyed pertinently; that all Frankish or Christian ships 
are henceforth commanded to visit the customs house, unload their cargo there, and pay 
customs in the same manner as is usual in Constantinople” (my translation). 
197 Ibid.; id.: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 20 September 1675; id.: Justinus Colyer to 
Jacob van Dam and the Dutch Nation of Izmir, 20 September 1675; id.: Jacob van Dam and 
Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 25 September 1675; id.: Justinus Colyer to Jacob van 
Dam and the Dutch Nation of Izmir, 4 October 1675; id.: Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation 
Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 14 October 1675; id.: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 14 October 1675; id.: 
Justinus Colyer to Jacob van Dam and the Dutch Nation of Izmir, 21 October 1675; id.: Jacob 
van Dam and Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 24 October 1675; id.: Jacob van Dam to 
DLH, 15 November 1675; and The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 14 May 
1676, 7 June 1676, and 3 September 1676. For a brief summary of the English point of view, 
see North, Life, 111-12; and Anderson, English Consul, 3-4. 
198 More on Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa’s reformalization of Ottoman-European rela-
tions under “Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman Control”. 
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Once the endowment was up and running and the (re)regulation of Eu-
ropean commercial activity was adequately supported by law and enforce-
ment, the new grand vizier followed it up with a policy aiming to (re)regulate 
the European communities’ formal status. Again, the aim was to counter the 
ever growing liberty taken by their “impudent” European guests, this time 
not by forcing their trade back into the Ottoman economic mold, but by 
underlining the unilateral quality of their sultanic privileges (capitulations) 
and diplomas (berats) through limitation and revocation, reestablishing their 
proper place within Ottoman law and administration and renegotiating their 
practical application.199 
While Ottoman reactionary politics had always inclined towards having as 
little to do as possible with these foreigners and their commerce, the Kö-
prülüs were clearly aiming for full control and profit. That is, for the strict 
physical, legal and social subjugation of Ottoman-European contact to the 
rules of Ottoman society and (distributive) economy; and for incorporation 
of the European nations in the Ottoman system under the same system of 
group-autonomy that served the empire’s minorities. 
 
With the Köprülüs’ major investment Izmir’s appearance had been trans-
formed from that of a smugglers’ paradise and regional port supplying Istan-
bul, to that of a major Ottoman commercial center and a true focus of em-
pire. The upgrade heralded a drive for increased Ottoman control which, if it 
was to be consistently followed up with matching legislation and administra-
tive practices, would significantly curtail the uncommon liberty the European 
merchant communities of Izmir had become accustomed to. The city’s pre-
viously discussed provincial and fiscal reassignment seems to have further 
signaled the firmness of the Köprülüs’ resolve to bring it more fully into the 
imperial fold. On another (more informal) level the vakf also tied local elite 
(ayan) to the imperial center through the investment and employment oppor-
tunities it offered. 
The direct cause of this drive to give Izmir an imperial upgrade and tie it 
to the Köprülü family and its fortunes was the Cretan experience: while try-
ing desperately to secure the necessary provisions for their troops laying 
siege to Candia, Fazıl Ahmed and his deputy Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa had 
encountered growing obstruction from Izmir’s non-Muslim wholesalers and 
European merchants. Their smuggling of raw materials and staple foodstuffs 
to the defenders of Candia had dealt a triple blow to the Ottoman effort: 
firstly in lost taxes, secondly in taking up ships’ holds desperately needed by 
the other side, and thirdly in providing the defenders with goods earmarked 
for the besiegers. Now, with the war over and the western frontier pushed 
back from the Aegean and past the Peloponnesus, the time had finally come 
                                                     
 
199 On berats and their proliferation, see, generally, Van den Boogert, The capitulations. 
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to integrate what was still essentially a frontier boom town and a provision-
ing port fully into the Ottoman administration and economy. 
Stabilization and incorporation appear to have been the Köprülüs’ an-
swers to the challenges posed by the increasing pull of the emerging eco-
nomic world-system. And although it may seem a conservative strategy and it 
included at least some of Koçi Bey’s prescriptions, it was not reactionary or 
Ottoman fundamentalist in essence. In this respect, European observers 
were correct when they complained that Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa – the 
Köprülü to whom the burden to integrate Izmir’s Europeans ultimately fell – 
cared about only two things; power and money, for the attaining of which he 
was very willing to trample what they considered to be their capitulatory 
“rights” (but which were in fact privileges). What they failed to appreciate 
(and how could they?) is that to the Ottomans the capitulations were instru-
ments, not goals. It seems that proper and strict subjugation of foreign mer-
chants and their commerce to the laws of the realm was fully in accordance 
with the logic of the Ottoman polity and was instrumental to being a good 
Köprülü grand-vizier. Whether it was a legal, ethical or even reasonable goal 
to pursue, was beside the point. If stabilization and incorporation were the 
purpose, the attitude with which they were to be attained was one of ruthless 
subjugation. 
How this policy played out in practice will be the theme running through 
the following part’s survey of the “The European City”. 
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The European City 
 
 
 
In short, among the possessions of the Ottoman dynasty there are two-hundred and sixty 
populous trading ports. Of these cities importing and exporting cargo, the port of Izmir is 
the most famous. For in all the world there are eighteen unbelieving [Christian] kings that 
have befriended the Ottoman dynasty and all their balios [consuls of the Italian city-
states] and consuls reside there. And their merchants bring products from all over the face 
of the earth and goods from all the peoples of the world. Every year a thousand ships come 
and go to have their goods sold in this city of Izmir. Thus, this place has become a truly 
shining trading port adorned with bustling quays. And because of these malevolent Frank-
ish ships arriving, half the city of Izmir resembles the land of the Franks [Western Eu-
rope]. And if someone strikes an unbeliever of rank, doormen and watchmen immediately 
encircle the man and, without showing any mercy whatsoever, bring him straight before the 
judge. Whether the judge kills him or the unbelievers, then and there the corpse is lost to the 
Muslims. On one side, therefore, the place is sinister like Malta and modeled on the land of 
the Franks. But because of the charm of this city’s light-blue sky there are such attractive 
tavern-waiters, young monks and unbelieving unripe beauties with their locks let down – as 
to bring the minds of lovers still further to the same disorder as that of a beauty’s hair.200 
Of such qualities are the beauties born of the tavern-keep. And the markets and bazaars 
of this Frankish quarter are very richly adorned. In its public squares stand seven churches, 
which they call places of worship, where they can perform their corrupted rites and evil cere-
monies. These are sinister places brimful with Patriarchs and priests. And all the houses of 
the polytheists [those professing the Holy Trinity, here; Greeks and Armenians] 
are in the northern part of the city; many more houses of impious unbelievers [here; 
Franks] being situated among the buildings along the [outer] harbor’s shore. In going 
back and forth between their ships and [these] their houses in boats, they always fire a 
canon from every ship [in salute]. As it is their custom to do so night and day, the city of 
Izmir is never spared the canons’ noise. 
Evliya (1671)201 
 
History 
Considering 17th-century Izmir as a double city consisting of distinct Otto-
man and European parts not only strengthens our awareness of the city’s 
                                                     
 
200 Here, Evliya draws heavily upon the Persian-Ottoman lyrical tradition to sing the 
praises of Izmir’s Frankish quarter. The motif used is that in which intoxication with the love 
of God is likened to the intoxication caused by the consumption of inordinate amounts of 
wine. In this topos the object of the metaphorical alcohol-induced enamoredness is the person 
filling the glasses; the tavern-waiter. This is usually a young monk since the Islamic prohibition 
of alcohol meant that wine was only (supposed to be) available in Christian monasteries. 
Cleverly toying with the possibilities offered by both the unsuspect language of the accepted 
literary topos and the absence of gender in the Turkish language, however, Evliya is in fact 
paraphrasing the very real alcoholic and (hetero)sexual pleasures to be had in the taverns of 
the European quarter (see infra). 
201 Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 96-97 (my translation). 
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history as a frontier; it also forces us to think about what defined and sepa-
rated the city’s parts in the minds of its inhabitants and visitors. As such, the 
interest of Evliya’s description above not only lies in its being a rare Otto-
man narrative description of the city’s situation, but also in its providing a 
clear illustration of contemporary attitudes towards the city’s constituent 
communities. While everyone, be they Ottoman or European, seemed to 
agree wholeheartedly upon the basic polarity between the Turkish and 
Frankish zones, the status of the Armenian, Greek and – to a lesser degree – 
Jewish elements was never so clear. The following sections will discuss the 
historical causes of this ambivalence, its development in light of a growing 
European presence, and the history of that privileged presence as embodied 
in the Ottoman capitulations. 
 
From “the Community of Non-Muslims” to “Frank Street” 
As the foregoing has shown, the dichotomy between East and West, land 
and sea, Muslim and Christian, Turk and Greek played an important part in 
shaping Izmir, in body as well as in soul. Due to the geographical characteris-
tics of the city’s location this dichotomy was translated to one of North-
South, lower-upper on the ground. Among other things, it is apparent in the 
location of the city’s two fortresses and in the distribution of its population 
over quarters according to creed. 
After the Battle of Manzikert (1071) opened up Anatolia to the full thrust 
of Central-Asian migration, centuries of growing Turkish population pres-
sure, a crushing Mongolian invasion (Timur Lenk’s of 1402) and the subse-
quent restoration of the Ottoman emirate had combined to press Izmir’s 
Byzantine/Greek population north; ever further away from the ancient ago-
ra, the inner harbor, and eventually from the last vestige of its former inde-
pendence, the lower castle. Guarded opposition, always at least partially mili-
tary, was superseded by cautious cohabitation. A cohabitation, nevertheless, 
in which the former frontier still lingered as ethno-religious and administra-
tive separation. The definitive incorporation, in 1424, of a now marginalized 
Greek element into the Ottoman polity, although not doing away completely 
with the lingering frontier of a status aparte, did formally dissolve the Greco-
Turkish duality. 
This did not, however, mean the end of the East-West dichotomy in Iz-
mir. For as the Greco-Turkish dimension was losing relevance (through 
increased incorporation of the Greeks into the Ottoman polity), the East-
West quality of Izmir’s inner frontier was given a new lease on life by Latins 
(and later Franks) representing the Western side of the equation. We have 
already noted how the Venetians and Genoese had acquired increasing pow-
er in the region, leading to a formalization of the Genoese presence in Izmir 
in 1304, how a Frankish contingent had taken the lower castle in 1344, and 
how Latins and Franks had conjointly taken over where the Byzantines were 
forced to leave off. With the departure of the Knights Hospitallers in 1402 
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and the Ottomans firmly in control of the city and its bay from 1424, the 
military and political power of the Latins no longer extended to the Anatoli-
an coast. Nevertheless, their commercial influence, though diminished, 
seems to have been uninterrupted. 
There is no definitive proof for it, but in all likelihood the presence of 
Latin and perhaps even Frankish resident merchants in Izmir survived the 
string of Seljukid, Byzantine, Aydınoğlu, Timurid and Ottoman takeovers. 
Mercantile evidence apart, as much is also suggested by the existence of priv-
ileges awarded the Venetians and Cyprus by the Seljuks of Rum in 1207, the 
Genoese by the Byzantines in 1304, the Holy League (i.e. the Papacy, Venice, 
the Knights Hospitallers and Cyprus) by the Aydınoğlus in 1348, and the 
Genoese and Venetians by the Ottomans starting from the mid-14th century 
onwards.202 Although Izmir is not explicitly referred to in these documents, 
the frequency with which it was fought over, was used as a naval (victualing) 
base, and was maintained as the regional seat of government does signal an 
unceasing desire to capture it for its commercial riches and implies that the 
various rulers must have pragmatically protected its commercial routes and 
ventures in times of military upheaval and administrative transition. It is this 
pragmatism that accounts for the common practice among all heirs to the 
Byzantine possessions to confirm the privileges awarded by their predeces-
sors and often to extend them significantly. 
 
Given the continuity of Izmir’s status as commercial center during many 
otherwise tumultuous stretches of its history, it is fair to assume that the 
Genoese quarter of 1304 with its loggia, bath, bakery, church and so on was 
in fact the first incarnation of 17th-century Izmir’s Frenk Mahallesi. Even so, 
one should take care not to ascribe too much value to the continuity of Eu-
ropean trade through Izmir. It would be tempting to construe its history as 
one of steady growth, promoted by stable resident “foreign” merchant 
communities somehow impervious to the vicissitudes of the great historical 
changes that were occurring in the region. In fact, though a general need was 
felt to protect the city’s international commerce, its masters did not com-
mand the full length of the trade routes running through their territories. On 
their end they could attempt to keep the risks and costs of transport to a 
minimum and guarantee proper conditions for an uninterrupted flow of 
commodities, but what happened further along the routes was beyond their 
control. 
                                                     
 
202 For the texts here referred to, as well as others, see, e.g., İnalcik, “Imtiyāzāt”, 1182b-83a 
and throughout. See also Dölger, Regesten 4; and Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics. 
There are many corpora of Byzantine, pre-Ottoman and Ottoman privileges, treaties and 
capitulations and even more discussions of their history. See the bibliographies of the articles 
cited above for further reference. 
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Aside from fluctuations in supply and demand, the fortunes of individual 
European nations trading through Izmir – as elsewhere – also very much 
depended on the policies of their home governments, not only with regard 
to commerce but, more decisively, to questions of war and peace. Venice, for 
instance, spent much of its life as a republic aggressively pursuing absolute 
mastery of the Eastern Mediterranean. Not content with competing against 
the Genoese and others for a piece of the trade plying between Western 
Anatolia and the Levant to the Western Mediterranean seaboard, its ambi-
tion was instead to conquer it entirely, entrepots and ports of call included. 
This drive for imperium naturally put it at odds with Western Anatolian pow-
ers, provoking an endless string of wars with their Byzantine, Genoese, Ay-
dınoğlu, and Ottoman competitors.203 By comparison, Genoa’s more modest 
policies put it at an advantage where trade with stronger Western Anatolian 
partners was concerned. While Venice was time and again barred from par-
ticipating in Izmir’s trade because of its “win or lose all”-attitude, the contin-
ued presence of Genoa’s merchants gave it an edge in knowledge of local 
circumstances and the cultivation of trade networks, which it would use to 
its advantage as long as its alliance with the Spanish Crown gave it enough 
leverage to out-trade its rival.204 
The political and military fortunes of a nation surely had consequences 
for its capacity to trade on its own terms. At the same time, a reversal of 
fortune did not necessarily mean the end of a nation’s trade. Halting trade 
requires more commitment and control than many a modern state can mus-
ter (compare, for instance, problems with modern unilateral or even multilat-
eral embargos), let alone any medieval or early modern state could.205 In a 
sense, this should not come as a surprise, as trade has a greater claim to eter-
nity than the relatively recent inventions of the empire, the dynastic state or 
the nation-state. The appropriation of trade nodes, routes and income is 
central to the process of state formation, the state’s struggle to impose itself 
and steer and appropriate trade for its own purposes ageless (in our current 
age of globalization and the multinational this should be more apparent than 
ever). Consequently, trade with the enemy is of all times and places, and pre-
Ottoman and Ottoman Western Anatolia is no exception. Most often, 
                                                     
 
203 See Lane, Venice, 406-21. Lane, perhaps over-sympathetically, attributes Venice’s drive 
for Ionian and Morean dominion to the need to prevent future incursions into the Aegean. 
204 On Venetian and Genoese trade in the Ottoman emirate see, generally, Fleet, European 
and Islamic Trade. Herman van der Wee, “Structural changes in European long-distance trade, 
and particularly in the re-export trade from south to north, 1350-1750”, in: The Rise of Merchant 
Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, ed. James D. Tracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) is more concerned with larger trends and 
structures, and does take the comparison into the 17th century. 
205 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington: Institute for International 
Economics, 1985), 4-10 and throughout. 
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though not always, such trade has been illicit – conducted under the cloak of 
darkness or, by daylight, under flags of other nations. 
In the Levant, trading under another nation’s flag typically also meant 
paying consular fees (consulage) to that nation’s representative and enjoying 
his protection under a capitulatory regime, which could be regarded as ac-
quiring a second “nationality” abroad. The resultant fluidity in the composi-
tion of merchant communities renders unreliable any statements about any 
given nationalities’ absence from Izmir: as much as they hold true legally and 
officially, they tell us little about any nationality’s physical presence or ab-
sence. This means that our conclusion about the existence and composition 
of a pre and early-Ottoman “European Izmir” is necessarily couched in fairly 
general terms, namely that a mostly Genoese merchant community of vary-
ing size, and possibly including other Latin and Frankish nationalities, ap-
pears to have survived along Izmir’s northern shore amid the tumultuous 
replacement of the Byzantine by the Ottoman Empire. 
The survival of Izmir’s European element meant that as Izmir’s Greek el-
ement was absorbed into the expanding Ottoman polity and the city’s inner 
frontier seemed to dissolve, another element “foreign” to the Ottoman sys-
tem was there to take its place as “the other”. Thus, the frontier between 
Ottoman and non-Ottoman shifted to run between the Greek quarter and 
the European part of the city along the northern shore later called Frank 
Street (see Map 11). 
 
The Changing Character of the Frontier 
Speaking about the polarity between Muslim and non-Muslim being super-
seded by one between “Ottoman” and “non-Ottoman” can be misleading: it 
seems to suggest a superseding of religious by national loyalty. In fact at-
tempts at creating a real Ottoman national identity encompassing all the 
empire’s subjects only date back to the mid-19th century (most notably with 
the Ottoman Law on Nationality of January 19, 1869), and even then proved 
unsuccessful. It is equally true, however, that the concept of nationality in 
the modern sense, and of an international law based on it, was already matur-
ing in Europe at the time we are discussing.206 
Just as was the case with the eventual solidification of Ottoman millets, 
the supersession of religion by nationality as a foundation and embodiment 
of sovereignty and statehood for now still remained primarily a theoretical 
proposition, applicable to actual practice in fits and starts as circumstances 
                                                     
 
206 See Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 42-59 on “The Rise of the States-System” and the codification of 
interstate relations that would develop into international law; and Jane Burbank and Frederick 
Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011), 181-84 on the interaction between absolutism, the expansion of 
sovereignty, commercial ambition and interaction, and international law. 
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dictated. Ages of theoretical refinement, of confrontations with practice and 
of eventual syntheses lay ahead; and on the ground loyalty would for a long 
time still be commanded primarily by kin groups, professional associations 
and religious affiliation. The mindset we clumsily call “early modernity” defi-
nitely existed, in 17th-century Europe, and through the flow of people and 
goods also in the Ottoman world. But as European and Ottoman societies 
adapted to the economic, social, religious and political challenges of the early 
modern age through their own versions of early modernity, there was no 
sudden break with previous organizing mechanisms and systems, or the be-
liefs and behaviors associated with them. A specifically early modern sensi-
bility, and the institutions through which it thrived and developed, existed 
side-by-side with what was eventually to be relegated to the past. In an Ot-
toman setting this might mean that the developing notion of the “nation” as 
a more restrictive ethnic or sovereign entity might coexist with its corpora-
tive interpretation (as with taifes; “nations”, in the now archaic sense), per-
haps even being applied to the very same collective and its members. The 
chances of this happening of course increased with the cultural distance be-
tween the beholders. 
 
As the standardized wording of Ottoman capitulations, diplomas and orders 
makes clear, the Ottomans considered European representatives first and 
foremost as members of Christendom (kudvet-i ümera-’ı ’l-millet-i ’l-mesihiyye), 
representing the interests of a specific Christian ruler or state (Nederlanda 
elçisi/konsolosu), as well as advancing those of that nation’s resident merchant 
community and its protégés (Felemenk gemileri bayrağı altında yürüyen tüccar taifesi 
or Nederlanda ve ona tab‘i olan bazergan taifesi’).207 This Ottoman perspective 
(and the capitulatory system it engendered) could accommodate European 
diplomats representing the interests of their compatriots residing in Ottoman 
lands (like millet başıs), and even their simultaneously serving those of the 
foreign states they served (as proper elçis). But the realities of Ottoman-
European contact and exchange were infinitely more tangled than this. 
Throughout the 17th-century Dutch representatives in Istanbul repeatedly 
sought from Ottoman court official confirmation of the capitulatory article 
that “The consuls and dragomans who are employed by their ambassador are 
exempt from tribute, kassabiye-tax and extraordinary taxes (tekalif-i ‘örfiyye), as 
has become usual.”208 Ottoman officials were particularly disinclined to abide 
by the part where dragomans employed by the Dutch were exempted from 
haraç.209 They often implicitly or explicitly disputed the legality of Ottoman 
                                                     
 
207 See Istanbul, BBA A.DVN.DVE 22/1. 
208 A.H. de Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History of the Earliest 
Diplomatic Relations, 1610-1630 (Leiden: NINO, 1978), 255. 
209 Hence the frequency with which reaffirming orders (fermans) to that effect were re-
quested (and obtained) by European representatives. See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 
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zimmis’ being freed from the very tax that marked their submission to Otto-
man dominion, and their enjoying the fiscal and legal privileges extended to 
Franks while simultaneously remaining under Ottoman rule and relying on 
Ottoman justice and protection when it suited them. But this was missing 
the point: the improvised status halfway between Ottoman and European of 
which these fiscal privileges were part had been intended to enable native 
diplomatic staff to handle their employer’s sensitive information without fear 
of undue fiscal, legal (or extra-legal) Ottoman pressure to divulge it. As such, 
it initially served its purpose well enough. 
This perception of functional effectiveness changed as the selling of 
nominal vice-consulships and dragomanships became standard practice in 
the second half the 17th century as a result of the intense competition be-
tween the European nations for the third-party carrying trade. European 
representatives’ selling Ottoman diplomas to their Ottoman wholesalers cum 
brokers cum money-lenders in an attempt to monopolize their trade and local 
networks unhappily coincided with the privatization, and the Köprülüs’ sub-
sequent maximization and politicization, of the collection of the very same 
taxes. The tensions around the seemingly practical and mundane question of 
fiscal liability, brought to the surface by European commercial aspirations 
and Ottoman administrative developments, in fact had their deeper causes in 
a series of cultural misconceptions which were at play throughout the tecton-
ics of Ottoman-European contact but which converged on both sides’ di-
verging classification of communities (socio-economic, professional, reli-
gious, fiscal, sovereign, national) and what obligations and rights member-
ship thereof entailed. Consider the example of the Jews of Izmir and their 
relations with the Dutch: 
 
In 1668 Dutch resident Justinus Colyer reports home that he has obtained an 
imperial order (ferman) addressed to the customer of Izmir that he is not to 
collect haraç (cizye) from the brokers of the Dutch nation.210 During this peri-
od, the brokers to the Dutch nation are invariably Portuguese Jewish sub-
jects of the sultan. As far as Ottoman administration is concerned this dou-
ble-sorted them into the ethno-religious taife of subject Jews and the profes-
sional taife of simsars (middlemen/brokers). Membership in both is officially 
organized and marked by fiscal and legal obligations and entitlements deter-
mined and explicitly conferred by Ottoman censuses and diplomas. Crucially, 
the order must have mentioned dragomans instead of brokers (as countless 
others do, and don’t, respectively). In reporting back home Colyer attempted 
                                                                                                                        
 
64a-65a: additional privileges obtained during Dutch resident Justinus Colyer’s first audience 
with substitute grand vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, 6 August 1668; and The Hague, 
NA 1.02.20 1088: Inventory of fermans etc. regarding the Dutch nation, 1690-1709. 
210 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a. 
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to cover up that the nominal dragomans he arranged this confirmation for 
were in fact his nation’s brokers: he did not want to over-inform the home 
authorities about the risky business of reselling Dutch protection and Otto-
man tax-exemption. 
However reliant they were on their Jewish dragomans and brokers finan-
cially, diplomatically and commercially – and although, perhaps out of sheer 
economic necessity, they had a higher tolerance for them than their fellow-
Franks – individual Dutch nations nevertheless preferred to give them the 
minimum protection they required and to stop far short of letting them into 
their nation and having them partake in national decisions or enjoying Dutch 
legal and fiscal privileges fully. It must in fact have been clear to all con-
cerned (be they Ottoman, Jewish, or Dutch) that a nationalization of mid-
dlemen was not in anyone’s interest and, in any case, forbidden by Ottoman 
law. The downside of this flexible and oblique arrangement was that neither 
side was exactly sure how neutral and/or trustworthy those men in the middle 
really were. Nor was it clear whether these berat-holders (beratlıs) were the 
nations’ clients or, in fact, their patrons. 
In this respect, it is telling that Dutch consul Van Dam expressed worries 
that Izmir’s Jewish leadership was attempting (and with some success) to 
fully subject the Dutch consul and merchants to its own interests.211 What’s 
more, failure to comply with the commercial demands of the Jewish nation 
would frequently be retaliated with a “battelation”, i.e. a formal embargo by 
the city’s Jewish community.212 Such embargoes were so detrimental to 
Dutch interests that they were considered unbearable and to be avoided or 
cut short at any cost. Their influence over the flow, conditions, and compo-
sition of Ottoman-Dutch trade begs the question whether Izmir’s Jews were 
really just buying and selling in the service of the Dutch, or if it would be 
closer to the truth to claim that the Dutch carried trade for the Jews in ex-
change for a cut of the extra profit they made from trading under the Dutch 
capitulations. 
For the Dutch, it always remained to be seen to which nation and justice 
the Jews of Izmir would turn to achieve their aims. Would it be to the Jew-
ish, to the Dutch, or to the Turkish? Seen from the Dutch point of view, 
Jewish loyalty was first and foremost to the Jewish taife, which the Dutch 
almost considered to be at once an ethno-religious grouping and a profes-
sional association – one that had Dutch affairs in a stranglehold and could 
and would manipulate them if it was in the community’s interest. It would 
seem Izmir’s Jews considered their statuses as Dutch protégés and Ottoman 
                                                     
 
211 Disdainfully adding “as it is in the habit of doing with its own people”: The Hague, 
NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677. 
212 For instances of embargoes, see, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to 
DLH, 10 February 1677; and The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 
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subjects as supplementary, and only truly relevant in so far as they impacted 
their fiscal, commercial and legal affairs. Indeed their attachment to the 
Dutch nation or their Ottoman overlords was not sentimental or principled; 
such adherence was strictly reserved for (and claimed by) their own tightly 
organized community. 
It was within this context of national meanings and attitudes that, in Feb-
ruary 1677, the Dutch consul to Izmir Jacob van Dam received a petition by 
the Jewish creditors of his nation demanding their outstanding loans to be 
repaid immediately. Since the document was not in Dutch but in a pidgin 
form of Italian used by all nations in the Levant for international communi-
cation (as a lingua franca), it was apparently intended for broader dissemina-
tion and/or reuse outside the Dutch nation. The loans with which it dealt, by 
now amounting to 7,254.50 Lion Dollars, had been taken out from 1671 to 
forward representative expenses that Izmir’s Dutch merchants had not been 
willing and/or able to meet, particularly in light of the near-annihilation of 
Dutch Levant trade during the Dutch War of 1672-1678 (with England, 
France, Cologne, and Munster). The Jewish creditors in question were 
“Abraham Leon, Efraim Arditte, Nisim and Jeuda Amatto, and Haim Al-
granatte, sons of Ishac Algranatte, Hebrew merchants of this place”, all of 
them Portuguese-Jewish Ottoman subjects of Izmir and in all likelihood 
Dutch protégés.213 
Shortly after the initial Algranatte/Amatto-petition Van Dam was handed 
a memorandum by the Jewish creditors, adding that non-compliance would 
force them to bring the matter to the local kadi’s court.214 Their willingness 
to do so and their warning against it are illustrative of three attitudes that 
                                                     
 
213 The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Haim Algranatte, Jehuda Amatto and Nisim Amatto to 
Jacob van Dam, undated [shortly before or on 10 February 1677]. The Algranatte, Amatto 
and Arditte in this correspondence are more commonly referred to as Algranati, Amato and 
Ardit – all still current names in Izmir and beyond (cf. Mathilde Tagger, “Epitaphs of the 
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Dam to States General, 8 April 1679. Arditi family members also figure as English protégés in 
1702/3, cf. Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 246n65. 
214 The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 10 February 1677. 
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typically motivated and underlied crosscultural contact in Izmir: firstly, that 
the Jewish creditors felt secure enough as Ottoman subjects to bring to 
Turkish justice a case against the Dutch that did not necessarily require its 
intervention from a jurisdictional point of view (since it involved non-
Muslims only and might therefore have been settled in any consular or Jew-
ish court); secondly, that neither party trusted the other’s national justice 
enough to rely on it decisively, and that neither national justice was expected 
to rule objectively in such high stakes cases; and thirdly, that the kadi’s court 
(mahkeme), representing the ultimate law of the land, would predictably rule 
in favor of those holding adequate written proof supported by credible wit-
nesses (here; the Jewish creditors and their nation) without paying too much 
interest to the relative status or power of the parties or to secondary evi-
dence or testimony – which discouraged clandestine trading and ensured that 
the European nations avoided Turkish justice as much as they could for fear 
of inadvertently inviting further official scrutiny of their affairs. 
The matter that brought the issue of the old debt to a head was the total 
breakdown of wider commercial relations between the Jews and Dutch of 
Izmir over the tariff according to which the latter were to tax the former for 
their consignments with them. The Jews were unconvinced that the Dutch 
consul indeed extended them considerable courtesy (courtoisie) and taxed their 
goods for consular and ambassadorial duties at a significantly lower rate of 
one to two-thirds of that paid by the merchants of his own Dutch nation 
under the old tariff.215 As a result, the Jews had refused to pay consulage 
over their latest consignments and demanded Van Dam show them the con-
cept of the new tariff that the Directorate had sent over for annotation. The 
consul defended himself saying that in applying the old tariff with courtesy 
he had followed common practice as he had found it upon his arrival, and 
that he would tax them according to the new tariff if and when it had been 
formalized. But in the meantime the Dutch had in fact already begun apply-
ing the concept tariff to their own trade, while taxing the Jews as of old.216 
Van Dam’s high-handed final opinion was that the Jews had no ground to 
complain and should simply be glad to be allowed to enjoy Dutch protection 
because their trading under the Dutch flag already saved them 2% to 4% in 
Ottoman customs duties (because of the capitulatory privilege reducing their 
customs rate to 3%). 
                                                     
 
215 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677: “Me-
morie of notitie hoedanigh de coopluyden van onse Nederlantsche natie en die van de 
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The Jewish protégés responded by registering their protest against this 
discriminatory and unlawful practice in the chancery of the English consul, 
and by having their communal authorities declare an embargo against the 
Dutch. This fourth Jewish batellation against the Dutch in under ten years 
completely halted Dutch trade in Izmir precisely at the time it had finally 
started to return.217 With Dutch buying, selling and shipping completely 
halted because of the embargo by his nation’s Jewish wholesalers, brokers 
and financiers, Van Dam fell back on his trademark undiplomatic pighead-
edness and retreated into an exasperated and righteous indignation, perhaps 
hoping the Jews would lift their boycott as soon as the Dutch spring convoy 
sailed onto the horizon. 
Apparently the consul had unwisely underestimated the importance his 
Jewish protégés attached to percentage points of fiscal advantage gained or 
lost, as he had the swiftness and heaviness of the influence they could wield 
back home. A mere two and a half months after they had turned to the Eng-
lish to register their complaint, the nation’s creditors handed Van Dam a 
severe reprimand and resolution by the States General concerning his treat-
ment of them. This order of 21 December 1676 was not sympathetic justice. 
It showed that the Jewish protégés knew perfectly well how to mobilize their 
interests over vast stretches of Europe, via Italy, and all the way to the coast 
of the North Sea. They had managed to obtain a formal complaint from the 
Grand Duke of Tuscany (on behalf of the influential Jewish community of 
Livorno) and had arranged for Amsterdam’s wealthiest Jewish merchant 
Jacob de Pinto to take up their cause and have the DLH and the States of 
Holland and West-Friesland lodge a formal complaint with the States Gen-
eral on their behalf.218 
Having remained oblivious to the forces that had been aligned against 
him back home (due to a considerable lapse in the relaying of correspond-
ence), Van Dam was caught completely off-guard by the reprimand and 
responded with a sincerely emotional yet shockingly disrespectful reply to 
the States-General. In it he vehemently defended himself against the com-
plaints made by Jacob de Pinto of Amsterdam on behalf of the Jews of Izmir 
to the effect that he unjustly treated them as third-party shippers on Dutch 
vessels. Dismayed by the highest Dutch authority’s bending to outside pres-
sure at the cost of its own representative abroad, he stressed how Izmir’s 
Jews controlled Dutch trade as Ottoman subjects and with full Ottoman back-
ing. Going on to explain that they had expected to be included in the new 
tariff on equal footing with “Christian subjects of our lands”, but had found 
to have been categorized by Dutch authorities as foreign merchants shipping 
with the Dutch, Van Dam surmised that their complaint – far from being 
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provoked – served only their own particular interests without reckoning with 
the interests of the United Provinces, or with those of its respective Jewish 
inhabitants. According to Van Dam, the disloyal and self-serving attitude of 
Izmir’s Jews was exemplified by their demanding fiscal treatment as Dutch 
nationals, while also simultaneously and continuously attempting .to get the 
utmost from their association with the Dutch by calling upon Ottoman au-
thorities to the detriment of Dutch national interests.219 
The States General in their turn responded by giving Van Dam permis-
sion to leave his post and return to Holland to speak in his own defense 
(unfortunately for Van Dam they subsequently retracted this permission for 
fear that he would leave too many loose ends and would fail to return to his 
post).220 None of this, however, forestalled their second formal reprimand to 
Van Dam, which was issued 12 July 1677.221 In the meantime, the Dutch 
nation’s Jewish creditors still had nothing to show for their efforts but a lot 
of unrest within Dutch ranks. Which is why on 21 August 1677 they again 
threatened to go to the kadi if the nation’s debt of 7,254.50 Lion Dollars was 
not promptly settled.222 
Stuck in Izmir without any prospect of defending himself in person, Van 
Dam on 22 October 1677 offered the States General another emotional but 
informed written defense. In it he (presciently, as we will see later on) 
warned them not to overextend their protection of Ottoman Jews lest it 
might appear to the Ottomans as an attempt to nationalize its subjects (and 
their wealth). I will here reproduce part of his plea (in my translation) be-
cause it touches directly upon the problem of nationality in crosscultural af-
fairs in the early modern Ottoman Empire: 
 
Meanwhile I feel obliged to stress beforehand, as a loyal minister should, my fear that it 
will prove perilous for some Jews, born to this country and thereby being reayas or subjects 
of the Grand Turk, to be admitted to our protection and thereby to be allowed to enjoy the 
privileges enshrined in our capitulation, most specifically concerning the payment of customs, 
which is what they covet most, as was told to me a while ago by one of the most notable Jews 
                                                     
 
219 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677. That 
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here, that he wanted to acquire our protection for that reason alone, because he and his na-
tion were being severely maltreated by the customer, while still having to pay 6-7% for their 
goods, where our nation only pays 3%, so that I fear that the customer here will oppose this 
on his own strength, or will write Constantinople to say that this state of affairs hurts the 
Grand Turk’s treasury as far as his income from customs is concerned, which might well 
invite an avania, especially since the Turkish ministers are looking for ways to levy avanias 
from the Franks (Christians), and the more so this vizier, who is very covetous.223 
 
In the end Van Dam was forced to stay on for another ten years, overseeing 
repayment of this and the nation’s many other debts as Dutch trade with 
Izmir continued to pick up. Yet the problematic relation between protection 
and nationality remained unsolved. (In a way it survived into our modern 
age, which saw the unilateral Ottoman abolition of the capitulations in Sep-
tember 1914, their forced restoration by the Allies in August 1920 in the 
Treaty of Sèvres, the violent disentanglement of Izmir’s nationalities with the 
city’s destruction by fire in September 1922, and finally the proclamation of 
the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923.) This is not to say that attempts 
were not repeatedly made to determine and fix the boundary between pro-
tection and nationality, but the documentary record certainly merits the con-
clusion that all parties concerned (European consular authorities, protégés, 
Ottoman administration) were less than consistent in their attitudes toward 
either status and the grey areas in between – perhaps because such clarity 
allowed too little room for local manoeuvering. 
A case in point is an inventory of Ottoman imperial orders (fermans) re-
garding the Dutch issued from 1690 through 1709. The first orders restate 
the principle that no Ottoman customs may be demanded from consular 
staff (including dragomans; i.e. beratlıs/protégés) and that no poll-tax may be 
demanded from native staff. Then, in 1694, the Dutch request and obtain an 
Ottoman order to the effect that “Portuguese Jews, after having resided in 
Ottoman lands for longer than a year, have to pay duties and customs as 
subjects of the land”, signaling that the Dutch authorities had made up their 
minds and intended to draw a hard line between its own Portuguese subjects 
and their relations in the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of the territorial 
fluidity within the said Jewish community. National sovereignty was clearly 
catching up with ethno-religious group identities as a determinant of legal 
status. Still, all the following orders collected in the inventory are blanket 
restatements of the previous orders that no customs and poll-tax may be 
demanded or collected from any Dutch beratlı.224 
                                                     
 
223 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam to States General, 22 October 1677 (re-
produced here as Appendix 2, document 9). 
224 The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088. In his 1975 dissertation, Necmi Ülker refers to the orig-
inal Ottoman transcript of the ferman in Istanbul, BBA MH 108 (AH 1107 / AD 1695/96): 
Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 232. 
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The case of the Jews and Dutch of Izmir (and Amsterdam) perfectly illus-
trates the diverse interpretations and interactions of the concepts of protec-
tion (professional and religious) and nationality (ethno-religious, geograph-
ical, and sovereign) at play in an early modern center of crosscultural trade 
like Izmir. Throughout the period, and between all Izmir’s European and 
minority communities (whether Jewish, Armenian, Greek, or Dutch, English, 
French, Italian) similar discussions were taking place (though not necessarily 
as pronounced as the one in our example). Both the European and the Ot-
toman states appear to have been looking for a mutually accepted delineation 
between communities whose members they considered subjects (or even just 
preferred trading partners225), to discover time and again that the individual 
“subjects” (or “partners”) in question were increasingly adept at slipping past 
their national (or monopolistic) constructs. 
As we have seen, such exceptional room as the convergence of historical 
acceleration and cultural distance created could lead to many misunderstand-
ings. These were not necessarily destructive; not for the states on either side 
(because their commerce depended on able middlemen whether they liked it 
or not), and certainly not for the middlemen in question. Belonging to one, 
or more often, several “nations” or taifes and being aware of the way in 
which the meanings attached to those categorizations shifted and multiplied 
across time and geography could carry a lot of promise for someone plying 
between cultures. By purposefully framing either side’s understanding of the 
other, their relations, and his role in them in terms advantageous for his 
trade the middleman could carve out a narrative space between them that 
was his to inhabit and thrive in. In the words of Richard White, who invent-
ed “the Middle Ground” as a specific field of socio-historical analysis, in an 
explanation of behavior that neatly applies to the utilization of various inter-
pretations of the concept of “nation” by Ottoman-European middlemen: 
 
By middle ground I meant, I realized in ways that I did not fully grasp when writing the 
book, two twinned things. First, I was trying to describe a process that arose from the will-
ingness “of those who … [sought] to justify their own actions in terms of what they per-
ceived to be their partner’s cultural premises.” Such actors sought out cultural congruencies, 
either perceived or actual.” These “often seemed – and, indeed, were results of misunder-
standings or accidents.” Such interpretations could be ludicrous, but it did not matter. 
“Any congruence, no matter how tenuous, can be put to work and take on a life of its own 
if it is accepted by both sides.” This was and is a process of mutual and creative misunder-
standing.226 
                                                     
 
225 See, e.g., Dutch demands that “all foreign nations, coming to enjoy Dutch protection, 
should address [the Dutch consul] in writing and therein declare to adhere to that protection 
and renounce all others” (my translation): The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to 
DLH, 6 December 1674. 
226 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650–1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), xii. 
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Such strategic dissimulation, even if it used instead of openly resisted the mindsets 
and conditions of the larger collectives to which allegiance was still owed, is 
typically what early modernity had to offer in the way of individualism.227 
Mostly disingenuous but sometimes blatant, individualism such as this 
was an increasingly available alternative to assume in the “unimaginable cha-
os” of identity that marked the transition from the Middle Ages to moderni-
ty.228 If that is the diagnosis for Europe’s heartlands, it is not surprising that 
the condition was even more pronounced in further-off centers of European 
trade like Izmir. Although contemporary and pre-WWII sources mostly hide 
it to present a city neatly segregated along communal or national lines, his-
torical evidence indicates that a willfully constructed, maintained and elabo-
rated social, economic, legal-administrative cross-over zone that – within 
boundaries – permitted individuals considerable leeway did in fact exist be-
neath the deliberately constructed dominant narrative of organized and po-
liced segregation so often attested to. This mental middle ground comprised 
three fields of structural crosscultural interaction: inter-European, European-
Ottoman non-Muslim, and European-Ottoman Muslim. 
 
In the first field, due to physical proximity and cultural similarity, interaction 
was intense in all spheres, in the form of social, economic and legal-
administrative cooperation and competition. It was not unusual for consuls 
of one nation to simultaneously take on representational tasks for others.229 
Resident or passing Europeans who were not automatically sorted under a 
specific nation’s diplomatic authority through the automatic protection of a 
capitulation freely sought that of any they preferred.230 This spirit of mutual 
                                                     
 
227 On the theory, practice and history of dissimulation, specifically in early modern Eu-
rope, see Jon R. Snyder, Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy in Early Modern Europe (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2009). 
228 James B. Collins and Karen L. Taylor (eds.), Early Modern Europe: Issues and Interpretations 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 13 and 9-17. 
229 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 122: cover of the folder (Francesco Lupasoli is ap-
pointed chancellor to the Dutch consulate of Izmir); and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123: Dutch 
Nation Izmir to Jacob van Dam, 25 May 1668 (the Dutch nation is informed of the likelihood 
that their chancellor Lupasoli might be hanged for being a Venetian spy, and request his 
dismissal). Cf. O. Schutte, Repertorium der Nederlandse vertegenwoordigers, residerende in het buitenland: 
1584-1810 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 302-80. 
230 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 13 September 1675 
(concerning the protection of the Danish subject “Marco di poco Broes”, elsewhere in the 
correspondence referred to as “Mattio de la Broen” and “Marco di P.sz Broen”); The Hague, 
NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 4 December 1676 (in which Dutch resident Colyer 
discusses the delivery of the child of one Abraham Meijer, “a Swissman, who acting as factor 
for a number of Dutch merchants, incurred a considerable bankruptcy on their account, and 
for that reason moved from Dutch jurisdiction to French protection”); and id.: John Finch to 
Justinus Colyer, 22 October 1677 (where English ambassador John Finch complains to his 
Dutch colleague about consul Van Dam affording protection to a Venetian bankrupt by the 
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politeness (with the occasional violent aberration) was generally also in evi-
dence during official occasions, festivities and outings.231 
What was accepted for persons, was even more common for ships, and 
doubly so for goods: ships routinely changed flags en route, and often sought 
the protection of other nations’ fleets.232 Considering that foreigners’ (for-
estiere) goods made up a large part of any cargo leaving Izmir, it made sense 
for all fleets to award any friendly ship additional protection when needed.233 
                                                                                                                        
 
name of Pizzimano, previously denied any further Venetian and, shortly before also, French 
protection). As for visiting travelers registering with consular authorities on arrival (a practice 
called “immatriculation”): although they commonly did so with the consul of their own nation 
(see De Bruyn, Reizen, 22: immatriculates with Dutch consul Jacob van Dam; The Hague, NA 
1.02.22 684, 22b: idem; and Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 71: immatriculates with French consul 
Henri Dupuy) this was not without exception (see, e.g., Dumont, Nouveau voyage, 271 (imma-
triculates with Dutch consul Daniël-Jan de Hochepied)). 
231 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 151: Daniël-Jan de 
Hochepied’s and Cornelis de Bruyn’s descriptions of the Dutch and French nations’ joint 
celebration of the Peace of Nijmegen. For Izmir’s Dutch treasurer’s complaint about the 
excessive costs involved, see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 22 
January 1679. On an Anglo-Dutch excursion to Ephesus, see, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 
684, 23a-b; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 28-34. On intermingling in the countryside, where all na-
tions held summer residences cum hunting lodges, see, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Nico-
las Legouche in Jacob van Dam’s chancery, 14 August 1674 (although this and the following 
documents deal with the violent consequences of a dispute between members/protégés of the 
French and Dutch nations). Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 133 also mentions the Anglo-French 
violence of Easter 1678. 
232 Cf, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676: Particuliere aantekeningen en briefwisselingen van 
leden van de familie De Hochepied; afschriften van stukken betreffende algemene politieke 
aangelegenheden, betreffende de Nederlandse politiek in de Levant en betreffende het consu-
laat in Smyrna, verzameld door de consul Daniel Jan de Hochepied; verzameling afschriften 
van stukken betreffende de Levantse handel in het algemeen, betreffende de internationale 
politiek, alsmede van brieven, ontvangen en verzonden door de Nederlandse consuls te Smyr-
na en van akten van de Nederlandse kanselarij aldaar, 1611-1685. This reconstruction of 
Dutch consular archives (shortly after their loss in the 1688-earthquake) by De Hochepied 
contains much valuable and scarce information – among which a 1676-memorandum by the 
DLH detailing Dutch shipping with Izmir from 1668 to 1671 (i.e. during its greatest success, 
just prior to the Dutch War of 1672-1678); and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der 
Merct to DLH, 25 September 1679 (Dutch treasurer Jacobus van der Merct commenting on 
the departure of the latest Dutch convoy, taking one English and two French vessels along). 
233 See, e.g., id.: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 10 December 1674 (on English ship The Hunter, 
or Il Cacciatore, being taken by Tripolitan corsairs, and the subsequent requests for restitution 
and compensation lodged with English consul Paul Rycaut, among which a large claim by 
Dutch factor François Schregels – the (mis)handling of which prompts Van Dam to add that 
this is part of the reason why the English have lost the profitable carrying trade to the Dutch); 
id.: Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 14 October 1675 (in which 
Van Dam complains that all cargo off the last English convoy, whether it be French, Dutch, 
Venetian, Genoese, Jewish, or Armenian, has been taken to customs and kept there, the 
English treating the Dutch as if they were subjects of the sultan); id.: Jacobus van der Merct to 
DLH, 29 August 1676 (in which the Dutch treasurer of Izmir calculates the consular duties 
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But inter-European contact in Izmir was not limited to business and pleas-
ure, it was equally pervasive in both the most exalted and the most prosaic 
spheres of life. Both religious establishments, menial employment and shops 
along the eastern (landward) side of Frank Street provided ample occasion 
for structural inter-European contact.234 
The image of this outpost of multinational yet heavily integrated Europe-
an civilization along Ottoman Izmir’s bay proved highly seductive to con-
temporaries (and moderns), who often got caught up in the romance of a 
miniature outpost of Western values and practices doggedly resisting a full 
Ottoman embrace. As a result, too little has been made not only of the fre-
quency and depth of European contact with Ottoman non-Muslims and 
Muslims, but also of the specifically Levantine social and cultural forms these 
communities embraced and shared in order to be able to interact and move 
around as smoothly as possible. This middle ground of language, dress, so-
cial norms and commercial practices was a delicate mix of Italian and Turk-
ish forms, modes and styles. Inherited from the Latin communities that pre-
dated the Ottoman conquest of Anatolia, the Black Sea and the Aegean (i.e. 
the Levantines), this Levantine way was the proven commercial and cultural 
standard to which, until well into the 19th century at least, all newcomers had 
to adjust as rapidly as possible to survive and thrive as Westerners in the 
Ottoman world. The adjustment was not necessarily a difficult or halfhearted 
one – as much is gathered from the enthusiasm with which especially Dutch 
merchants employed and stuck with Italianized versions of their names (even 
in letters home), their easy conversion to Mediterranean tastes in food, drink 
and interior decoration, and the apparent ease with which they switched 
between Turkish and formal European and Sunday dress and, one might 
add, habits and morals (although the French appear to have been more 
steadfast in their sumptuary preferences – being known for always going 
about as French gentlemen, and as a consequence continually having their 
tricome hats knocked off their heads by Muslim varmints).235 
                                                                                                                        
 
collected from foreigners’ goods in the most recent Dutch convoy); and id.: Jacobus van der 
Merct to DLH, 24 November 1678 (idem for 1678). 
234 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 24a (where De Hochepied says that “most arti-
sans or workers used by the Franks … are most all French subjects, native to Marseilles and 
its surroundings” (my translation)) and a similar statement on 39a; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 
114 (on the French nation of Izmir “Il y a de plus 40 ou 50 familles qui font au moins 160 
personnes: de gens tenant auberge, médecins, apothicaires, chirurgiens, barbiers, tailleurs, 
cordonniers. J'y ai vu aussi deux médecins qui ne sont pas mariés. II y en a de plus une ving-
taine qui ne sont pas mariés tant tailleurs que cordonniers et cuisiniers, qui sont la plupart au 
service des Anglais et des Hollandais.”); The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a-b; and Galland, 
Voyage à Smyrne, 113-27 (on Frank Street’s three Roman Catholic churches – Jesuite, Capu-
chin, and Franciscan – and their mixed congregations and protectors). 
235 See, e.g., throughout The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124, where the members of the Dutch na-
tion often sign with Italianized versions of their names (a few, in italics, consistently sticking 
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In discussing the cultural flexibility of European merchants whose suc-
cessful business kept them in Izmir (and Istanbul) for years on end, we have 
automatically arrived at the second field of crosscultural contact making up 
Izmir’s mental middle ground; that between European and Ottoman non-
Muslim. It will be apparent from the foregoing and the following pages and 
chapters that contact between the two was intense in the professional sphere 
(in trade, retail and services) – but not only there. European merchants 
spending many years, and often the rest of their lives, in Izmir and Istanbul 
often became fully integrated in Levantine society. Naturally, these men were 
not only well at home in their brokers and wholesalers businesses and 
homes, but as a consequence also in their wider quarters, inns, taverns and 
                                                                                                                        
 
to the Dutch spelling however): Marco di Pietro Broen, Giovanni Calkoen, Christoffel Capoen, 
Giovanni Charelles, Abraham en Daniel Cosson, Jacob en Henrico van Craijesteijn, Giovanni 
Eijgels, Benedetto Gluck, Adriano Groeninx, Dionis Houset, Arnout Kerkrinck, Cornelio van 
Laer, Giovanni Lepla, Gasparo de Lespaul, Guglielmo Marcquis, Henrico Mesteecker, Gio-
vanni de Moll, Cornelio van Persijn, Pietro van de Poel, Guiglielmo van Pradelles, Philippo 
van der Sanden, Francois and Galenus de Schregel, Daniel de Slachmulder, Guglielmo Slaers, Huberto 
Snellewaert. That this was not common practice among Dutch (Levant) merchants in general 
or within specific merchant families, may be inferred from The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 219b-
220a: a petition by Amsterdam’s Levant merchants to the States General. The petition figures 
many fathers and elder brothers of Izmir’s Dutch merchants, who sign their names in proper 
Dutch spelling. See, e.g., Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 146-49; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 27-28 on the 
consumption of Izmir’s Franks. The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 151 
on the food and drink served in the double feast thrown by the Dutch and the French to 
celebrate the Peace of Nijmegen. See, e,g,, The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 43b and 77b-80b, 
highlighting both the advantages (in moving about beyond non-Muslim areas) and discrete 
disadvantages (offending Muslims) of going about a la turca (while behaving as Christians). 
See, e,g,, The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1060: Willem Theijls in Justinus Colyer’s chancery, 18 No-
vember 1681, details the Italian-Dutch-Turkish interior of the house of Van Breen, as well as 
his keeping of slavegirls, his family life, his Turkish dress, his Sunday dress, and so on; Gal-
land, Voyage à Smyrne, 121-22 speaks of 23 Dutch Izmir merchants, of which 3 are married to 
local women; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 13 March 1678, 
on the 3 Dutch Istanbul merchants married locally; and, id.: Justinus Colyer to States General, 
6 July 1678, on the problem of protecting merchants married to local women. See, 
e.g., Dumont, Nouveau voyage, 315 and 334, on European merchants use of prostitutes and 
concubines (315): “Plusieurs de nos Francs qui craignent le sous Bachi, en ont puis de cette 
sorte [temporary marriage licenses obtained upon payment to the kadi], car il n’y a pas de 
sureté ici à voir les filles de joye, quant même elles seroient Grecques, les Turcs étant la dessus 
tout-à-fait intraitables. Je ne sçay quelle raison les fait agir, car ils ne croyent point du tout que 
la simple fornication soit un peché, & toutefois ils ne soufrent pas un lieu public; le sous Bachi 
en fait une recherche si exacte, qu’il ne lui en échaperoit pas un, & quant il surprend un 
homme sur le fait, il faut qu’il finance, & considerablement, autrement les coups de bâton 
jouent leur jeu. Quant à la pauvre malheureuse, on l’a fait promener par la Ville, montée sur 
un âne, avec une tripe de boeuf au cou, le visage tourné vers le derrière de la bete, & tenant la 
queuë à la main au lieu de la bride, après quoi elle est venduë esclave au premier acheteur. 
Accord. De Bruyn, Reizen, 154, on, respectively, temporary marriage (kebin) and “The treach-
ery of the Greeks. The head-tax for male children. The faults of Greek women. The dangers 
of Franks consorting with them. The punishment of Greek women prostituting themselves.” 
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brothels (as vice versa). Intermarriage also was not uncommon: almost invar-
iably with Ottoman Greeks, never with Jews and almost never with Armeni-
ans (although “Greek” sometimes figured as shorthand for all non-Jewish 
and non-Armenian Ottoman Christians).236 
The third field, that of structural interaction between Izmir’s European 
Christians and Ottoman Muslims, is at once the most and the least visible of 
the three. Official relations between the two are well documented, as in audi-
ences and other national presentations with the city’s kadi and other officers 
and administrators (legal and administrative interventions and protests, the 
giving of presents upon festive occasions, and so on).237 On the other ex-
treme, and barely leaving a trace in the sources, we encounter private rela-
tions between Europeans and Ottoman Muslims: acquaintances, friendships 
                                                     
 
236 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b, on Izmir’s Venetian consul Lupasoli having 
married locally; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 13 March 
1678, on François de Brosses, Jan van Breen en Jan Croesen (Dutch merchants of Istanbul) 
having done the same, as well as on the many local wives of the French; idem: Justinus Colyer 
to States General, 23 April 1678, on Colyer’s Dutch doctor Henning Wolde’s local wife; The 
Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 25a-b, on Samuel Pentlow (English merchant of Izmir)’s local wife; 
Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 115, on the French Capuchin parish where “c’est ordinairement le 
père supérieur qui fait les fonctions paroissiales, et qui fait le prône en grec vulgaire pour se 
faire entendre aux femmes, qui sont presque toutes du pays, quoique mariées à des Français 
ou à d'autres Francs …”. The “local” wives of Jan van Breen, his partner François de Brosses, 
and Jan Croesen are identified (throughout The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 01.03.01 98, 1.02.20 
1060 and 1.03.01 124) as Elisabeth Violier, Luisa Violier, and Maria Violier, all daughters of 
master watchmaker Jean-Pierre Violier of Geneva (“Jean Pierre VIOLLIER (1618-)” (21 
September 2008), Société Genevoise de Généalogie, http://www.gen-gen.ch/?a=20&p=473& 
Perma=1&IndFN=Jean+Pierre&IndLN=VIOLLIER&OrigIndID=71839&BYearFrom=161
8&BYearTo=1618 (accessed 5 June 2011)), and in any case not Greeks (although often re-
ferred to as such). A register of marriages, contracted in private houses by the ministers of all 
European representatives, includes two marriages of Jean-Pierre’s (the first marriage by Samu-
el Roger, chaplain to English ambassador John Finch, the second by Dutch minister Eduard 
Danckertsz), testifying to the enduring interwovenness of the Swiss watchmakers of Istanbul 
(subjects of the sultan) and the capitulatory nations. On the Greek wife of Samuel Pentlow, 
and the trouble she encountered upon her husband’s demise because of their house in the 
Greek quarter and her status as an Ottoman subject, see my “Towards Classifying Avanias”. 
On European-Greek prostitution and concubinage, see note 235. 
237 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22b-23a, on an audience of the Dutch nation 
with the Kadi of Izmir concerning the taking of provisions by the Dutch Smyrna-fleet; and 
The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 29 December 1677; id.: “discrepant 
thirteen” of the Dutch Nation of Izmir to DLH, 13 December 1677, on consul Van Dam’s 
preparations to repatriate, including the formal presentation of his self-appointed substitute 
(Johan Calkoen) to the kadi, and the other nations’ congratulations on the occasion; id.: Jaco-
bus van der Merct to DLH, 30 April 1679, being an account of Dutch consular duties (and 
their expenditure towards salaries and presents for dragomen, Janissary guards and Ottoman 
officials) from 1675 to 1679; accord., for the English nation, Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 224n48, 
listing presents made upon the arrival of an English convoy to Izmir’s kadi, customer, gover-
nor, naip, Greek metropolitan, castle guardian, voyvoda, Janissary chief, mufti, and three ayan. 
 
 
160 
 
and familial relations.238 Obviously, there existed a large grey area between 
these sub-fields of European-Ottoman Muslim contact; that of wheeling and 
dealing. Here, Europeans and Ottomans fused the professional and the pri-
vate to mutually strengthen and support professional and private relations. 
This is where clients, employees, servants and slaves became advisors, inves-
tors, friends, and patrons – where the principal character of relationships was 
invested with added meanings to make them as complete and inseverable as 
possible. To those trying to control what was happening on the ground this 
was a zone of corruptibility and immorality, to those on the ground in Izmir 
(and Istanbul, and Aleppo, and elsewhere) it was that of commercial reality 
and necessity.239 Lest we imagine the heart of Izmir’s mental middle ground 
as an idyllic harmony, it was in fact a place of rampant illegality and bribing: 
all European sources from Izmir testify to continuous efforts of every Euro-
pean nation to have Ottoman officials allow all manner of illicit dealings 
(smuggling, theft, prostitution, coining, and so on), as they do to Ottoman 
                                                     
 
238 As glimpsed in, e.g., North, Life, where comings and goings at the English embassy are 
discussed in some detail; Galland, Journal, records many passing acquaintances and persistent 
friendships with Ottoman Muslims; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124, throughout the folder detail-
ing the disputes of 1672, 1674 and 1675 between consul Van Dam and his nation, where we 
read that Dutch factors Legouche and Van Broen (part of a the “disobedient band of 13” that 
had formed against Van Dam) were lodged in the countryhouse of Izmir’s voyvoda in Seydiköy, 
where they invoked their Ottoman host’s authority when under threat from their own consul 
(one imagines they, as well as Franks of other nationalities, were also occasionally entertained 
in the voyvoda’s köşk (pavilion) at the far end of Frank Street (see infra)); The Hague, NA 
1.02.22 684, 25a-b, on deceased English merchant Samuel Pentlow’s close friendship with 
chief customer Hüseyin Ağa. 
239 See, e.g., Laurent d’Arvieux, Mémoires (Paris: C.J.B. Delespine, 1735), i: 125-27 on a 
comedy performed at the French consulate in 1657, with Muslim families attending; The 
Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Justinus Colyer to States General, 19 June 1673, where Colyer 
requests permission to hire the grand vizier’s private doctor Alexander Mavrocardato as his 
own; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, October 1677, for expens-
es declared “general” by consul Van Dam, but disputed as being “private” by his nation (pre-
sents to his dragomans, to the kadi, to the naip upon his wedding, to Derviş Ağa, to the sons 
of Kara Mustafa Paşa, towards bloodmoney for a Turkish mariner found dead on the consul’s 
doorstep, to the voyvoda upon the circumcision of his son); The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: three 
accounts of Pieter Smout for the years 1672-74 testifying to the merchants regular trade rela-
tions with two Muslim merchants; id.: Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus 
Colyer, 14 October 1675, on Derviş oğlan (or; ağa), secretary to the province of Bosnia and 
“great friend of the nation” offering his services to the Dutch in their attempts to undo the 
new customs regulations; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 43a, on a Turk living in Kadifekale 
being employed by customer and consuls to look out for ships and announce their imminent 
arrival; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 1 May 1678, in which 
Colyer informs the States General that he has hired Alexander Mavrocordato, by now the 
Porte’s chief dragoman, to promote Dutch affairs while away on campaign with the grand 
vizier; and, id.: DLH to States General, 13 September 1679, where they second 
Mavrocordato’s hiring, complement his past efforts on behalf of the Dutch, and request that 
the gratuity awarded him not exceed 500 Lion Dollars. 
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power brokers’ actively seeking rewards in return for the promise of shutting 
their eyes. 
 
If we observe 17th-century Izmir with questions of individual and group 
identities in mind, it becomes apparent that its long history as a frontier and a 
center of crosscultural trade added extra flexibility and options to the relation 
between individual and nation, to relations between individuals from differ-
ent nations, and to relations amongst nations. This historically determined 
flexibility with regard to individual and group nonconformity had served the 
city, its merchants and their home governments (in Istanbul/Edirne as in 
Europe’s capital cities) well as long as the latter did not manage to truly pro-
ject their jurisdiction to Izmir’s quays. That is; as long as rules were made in 
the centers and it was left up to local culture and initiative to deal with, 
around or without them to everyone’s satisfaction. 
But from around the middle of the 17th-centuy, when cities, dynasties and 
states were starting to settle into a new balance after the manifold challenges 
of the long 16th century, they increasingly came to view such crosscultural 
freewheeling as a challenge to their authority and a liability for their mercantil-
ist policies of protectionism and expansion.240 The growing appetite and 
capability of early modern states for systematically enhancing their sovereign-
ty put a particularly heavy strain on the nations and nationals of Izmir. The 
marshaling of assets and populations in the service of monetary and territori-
al expansion not only required further fiscalization and centralization, but 
also stricter allegiance and obeisance. This limited the opportunity for sincere 
feedback (voice) from those who had to implement (i.e. live and trade with) 
policies thought up elsewhere, making it more likely that they would voice 
their objections by privately disregarding public policies and resisting their 
practical implementation (a dissimulated exit).241 One of the outcomes of the 
stress put on the mental middle ground described above was that it became 
more compact and was hidden from view even further. 
The increase in pressure to identify more fully with the needs and wishes 
of one‘s state was most strongly felt among the European communities, who 
had after all been furthest removed from the power projected by their cen-
ters. Until the early 17th century these communities had been pragmatic 
groupings of merchants centered around whoever, against a modest fee, 
would and could best protect their interests. Whether these representatives 
were fellow countrymen or not was of little importance; allegiances could be 
switched as circumstances dictated and formal organization was minimal. A 
                                                     
 
240 On mercantilism, its development, and its variations across Western Europe and the 
wider world, see Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the 
World Economy in the Second Millennium (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 227-310. 
241 On “voice” and “exit” see Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to 
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
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Dutchman, for instance, could come from the Spanish or the United prov-
inces and might choose to seek the protection of the Dutch consul, but also 
that of the Venetian, the French or the English. The choice made could de-
pend on personal preference, religious affiliation or quite simply on the kind, 
origin and destination of the merchandise he was shipping. Although it 
proved exceedingly difficult for home governments to change this situation 
and turn Levant commerce to their own profit and direction (i.e. integrate it 
into their wider economic policies), they all made continuous and concerted 
efforts to do so; in the course of the 17th century a barrage of rules, proce-
dures and orders was issued through which the European nations in the 
Levant were formally (re)constituted and demarcated from each other.242 
Efforts at reconstitution and demarcation were not limited to the Euro-
pean communities amongst themselves. A logical next step towards the “na-
tionalization” of the Levant merchants and their trade was demarcating them 
from the Ottoman context, affirming the frontier between Ottoman and 
non-Ottoman and securing a designated and increasingly extraterritorialized 
European zone in Izmir. One method of doing so was through the con-
sistent misinterpretation of the capitulations – regarding them not as revoca-
ble privileges awarded by the sultan, but as treaties carving self-administered 
European enclaves out of Ottoman territory – and the bringing subsidiary 
administrative rules and measures in line with this interpretation.243 Another 
was the administrative and moral discouragement of more than polite rela-
tions between European merchants and locals.244 The purpose of such inter-
                                                     
 
242 Such as new tariffs (in which the diverging rates paid by nationals and protégés were 
laid down per commodity), oaths of allegiance to the home authorities and its representatives, 
procedures detailing where diplomatic assistance was warranted and where not (particularly 
where national and personal financial liability began and ended, especially in cases in which 
national lines were blurred by intermarriage or international over-familiarity), and so on: The 
Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 32a-35b; Heeringa, Bronnen 2, #59; W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “Het ‘in 
train brengen’ van het in 1675 voor de Levant ontworpen formulier (1675-1680)”, Bĳdragen 
voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 4/7 (1909). My “Towards Classifying Avanias” 
compares Dutch and English efforts to limit the liability of their nations, institutions and 
states for private and professional crosscultural liberties taken by individual merchants. To no 
surprise, it turned out that separating the private from the professional and the crossculturally 
modest from the licentious to determine a subject’s right to diplomatic assistance was imprac-
tical, if only because in cases where personal or national attachments and losses involved were 
deemed too great, nations and representatives were strongly inclined to turn their burden (i.e., 
of cases that had escalated beyond the possibility of local resolvement through silent diploma-
cy) over to the authorities back home by presenting them as unprovoked injustices brought 
upon them by the typically untrustworthy, avid and cruel “Turk”. 
243 See İnalcik, “Imtiyāzāt”. 
244 In cases where Dutch- or Englishmen who were less than popular with their repre-
sentatives and/or nations got into trouble that could be attributed to careless or over-
ambitious crosscultural enthusiasm, diplomatic and national indifference could be severe. See, 
e.g., the case of the lethal beating received by secretary to the Dutch embassy François de 
Brosses (1680) in the Ottoman Imperial Council (see infra), or the unsympathetic representa-
 
 
163 
 
pretations and the resulting measures was, firstly, to prevent the alienation of 
the subjects and capital of the expatriate community, and, secondly, to make 
the frontier between Ottoman and non-Ottoman impermeable in all but 
commercial matters – and then only in one direction, namely that from Ot-
toman to non-Ottoman. Combined with the first European efforts at pro-
tecting Ottoman Christians en masse and at circumventing the controlled 
Ottoman economic system with its wholesalers and inflexible pricing, these 
attempts amounted to the European quarter being used as a base of opera-
tions for expansion.245 
The increasing push and pull exerted by the home governments caused 
considerable friction in the European communities of Izmir. Their members 
– some merchant “adventurers” in the truest sense – had grown accustomed 
to relative freedom from many of the restraints Western society imposed on 
them. In essence, they had been able to do as they pleased as long as the 
books were kept in order, as profits were regularly remitted to their princi-
pals back home, and as any quarrels with Ottoman officials were solved on 
the local level. For some, there were not many temptations beyond those of 
a commercial nature (smuggling, usury, to name but a view) and the promise 
of their families back home, their religion and culture, and their loyalty and 
obedience kept them in place. 
Many others, though, assumed lifestyles that would have been impossible 
and unacceptable back home; deviating from their proper social station, 
abandoning the church, or taking on Ottoman customs. Such individualistic 
freedoms were not easily abandoned once acquired and made sure that part 
of the European merchants of Izmir (or Istanbul for that matter) would 
always respond to the home governments’ pull by pulling back harder. Aside 
from the unappealing prospect of returning fully to the fold of a nation pro-
gressively subdued by all the institutions of state and religion from which 
they had managed to free themselves, the more independent merchants’ 
objections were above all practical. The biggest fortunes were to be made by 
not relying on the consular and commercial system of your nation too much 
(nor, we should add, too little), by bridging the divide and cultivating allianc-
es with local officials and families beyond the scope of competitors, princi-
pals and the state, in short; by not accepting a rigid physical or mental 
boundary between Ottoman and non-Ottoman.246 
                                                                                                                        
 
tion of English merchants Gabriel Smyth and John Ashby, who – left to fend for themselves 
as they dealt with the blowback from the disputed inheritance of their friend Samuel Pentlow 
– were extorted to bankruptcy, threatened with torture, and thrown into a dungeon (1678) 
(my “Towards Classifying Avanias”). 
245 On the successes and failures of Dutch (and other nations’) attempts to capture Otto-
man mohair trade at its source in Ankara, see Kadı, “Natives and Interlopers”, 84-133. 
246 This was particularly apparent during the period of greatest Dutch success in Izmir 
(from around mid-century until the Dutch War of 1672), when more than half of the Dutch 
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Although merchants’ home states condemned any crossing to the Otto-
man side, they welcomed movement in the other direction. As much as they 
disapproved of European merchants crossing over to become clients of 
some Greek or Jewish wholesaler, they did approve of Greek or Jewish Ot-
tomans tying themselves to Frank Street.247 
 
The contradiction apparent in attempting to enforce a physical and mental 
boundary, only to encourage incoming traffic across it, aptly illustrates the 
requirements of late-17th and 18th-century European policy in the Levant. If 
the purpose was to enhance sovereignty, jurisdiction and economic control, 
the method was to extend it over as many people and sources of wealth as 
possible. In a colonial situation such expansion would typically occur at the 
cost of a weaker native authority and would be directed outward from a 
fortified European center, or “factory”. In the Levant, there could be no 
physical or direct expansion against Ottoman will and all such attempts were 
necessarily indirect and limited to increasing economic leverage and fostering 
religious bonds. 
In this way, Izmir’s European quarter slowly but certainly became not a 
base of operations for expeditions into the Ottoman interior, but a commer-
cial and religious center that, instead of focusing on direct economic expan-
sion, increasingly aimed at accumulating jurisdiction and loyalty through 
protection and greater economic interdependence. This process, however, 
was only just beginning in the period under discussion here: Louis XIV’s 
                                                                                                                        
 
nation systematically evaded consular duties and jurisdiction, and did well by it. See all the 
Dutch archival series in the bibliography; and W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “De klachten, 
tusschen 1672 en 1675 ingebracht tegen Jacob van Dam, consul te Smirna (1668-1688)”, 
Bĳdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 4/6 (1907); id., “Het ‘in train brengen’”; id., 
“De dertien “discreperende” kooplieden te Smirna (1685-1687)”, Bĳdragen voor vaderlandsche 
geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 4/8 (1910); id., “Een lang uitgestelde reis: episode uit onzen 
Levantschen handel”, Bĳdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 5/4 (1917). For the 
English and the French, see also, generally, North, Life; Galland, Journal; and the other refer-
ences supra in the extensive notes (230 through 239). 
247 As much is clear from the protection policies of the French, English and Dutch. See 
(resp.) Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 216: M. Barbier, M. Fouribée, Sr. Zacharie Vulaque, Sr. Mousé 
Abenassera, Christofy Amira, and Isaac Abenassera (French dragomans of Izmir in 1700); 
idem, 246n65 (English protégés of Izmir in 1702/3): Paulo di Giorgio, Nicolachi di Luco, 
Jeanachy di Giorgio, Christophero di Paulo, Cercheis di Sapher, and Zaccaria di Jacob (dra-
gomans), Mose Arditi, Abram Arditi, Babriel di Pietro, and Morat di Avanee (sons of drago-
mans), Aratoon Sapher (broker to Sercheis Chellabee), Yanny di Luvanis (butler), Dimitreée di 
Arvas (underbutler), Nicola di Monali (baker), Francesco di Billio (gardener), Marco di Macale 
(undercook), Georgio di Pietro (undercook), Antonio di Gasoar (lise), Arvas di Mirian (lise), 
Batista di Giorgio (minister), Antonio de Noir (barber), Giovanni di Crokio (fiddler), and 7 
servants to the dragomans); Appendix 2, document 1 (selected dragomans of Izmir in 1671): 
Constantin Amira (Dutch), Michael Attalas (Venetian), Isaac Berbignan (Dutch), Porlo 
Homero (English), Spiro di Niccolo (Genoese), Giacomo Sandernara (Dutch); and Appendix 
2, document 9 for the Dutch protection of Ottoman Portuguese Jews.  
 
 
165 
 
France was as yet the only state to have declared its promotion official poli-
cy.248 Although the larger European nations in the Levant had always com-
peted with each other for the favors of their districts’ most powerful com-
mercial players and communities, the number of protégés had remained 
fairly modest as a result of effective Ottoman bureaucratic controls on the 
Ottoman diplomas arranging protection (berats).249 Whether the number of 
individually protected persons (i.e. beratlıs) went up significantly as European 
projects for extending and deepening sovereignty gained momentum is 
doubtful, but it is certain that Louis XIV’s attempts at acquiring French pro-
tection over whole nations of Ottoman Christian (i.e. not through individual 
berats, but through the insertion of new articles in the French capitulations) 
indeed formed an integral part of his policy towards full French mastery of 
the Levant trade.250 
 
In considering the drive to increase sovereignty and the impossibility of out-
right expansion as coming to redefine Izmir’s East-West boundary, we have 
so far overlooked one crucial aspect: ideology. Relatively closed to Europe-
ans and relatively open to Ottoman Christians and (to a lesser extent) Jews, 
the physical and mental boundary between Ottoman and European Izmir 
was near absolute for Ottoman Turks. Although early nationalisms were 
inclusive when compared to modern-day exclusive (ethnicity-based) interpre-
tations, including Muslims was considered beyond the pale (unless they were 
Christian converts to Islam wishing to revert) – all the more since it would 
challenge Ottoman sovereignty to the detriment of European diplomatic and 
mercantile interests. 
As it turns out, the incorporation of the “Community of non-Muslims” 
into the Ottoman polity, the European quarter’s subsequent assumption of 
the role of the “other”, and the inherent transformation of Izmir’s East-West 
divide from one based primarily on religion to one based on nationality did 
                                                     
 
248 See notes 51 and 52. 
249 Maurits van den Boogert has written extensively about Ottoman procedures and con-
trols on protection through Ottoman diplomas (berats) indicating employment by a European 
representative: id., “European Patronage in the Ottoman Empire: Anglo-Dutch Conflicts of 
Interest in Aleppo (1703-1755)”, in: Hamilton et al., Friends and Rivals; id., “Consular 
Jurisdiction in the Ottoman Legal System in the Eighteenth Century”, in: Ottoman Capitulations; 
Van den Boogert, The capitulations. The Ottomans carefully recorded which nations were 
provided with how many berats (and often also for whom). However, there were occasional 
attempts to recall all outstanding berats for verification: these were not aimed at taking stock of 
an otherwise unknowable amount of berats issued, but rather at uncovering any that were 
deemed to be held in contravention of a stricter interpretation or change of the legal criteria 
underpinning their original issuing. 
250 On French plans for a monopoly on trade (and, therefore, protection) in the Levant, 
and the Ottomans’ reaction to them, see below under “Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion 
of Ottoman control”. 
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not fully override the previous situation. Formally, the frontier now separat-
ed European and Ottoman, but to many (be they Ottoman Muslim, Otto-
man non-Muslim or European) this new divide was above all an echo of the 
old religious frontier, formal differences notwithstanding.251 
The result was complex, and indicative of the shifting identities of early 
modern Europe: a situation in which there were as many mental and physical 
frontiers as there were parties involved. First of all, many Europeans and 
Turks regarded the Christian communities of Ottoman Izmir as a sort of 
appendage of the European quarter, culturally in any case. These communi-
ties themselves, meanwhile, cherished their middlemen-positions in justice as 
in commerce. Although they will have felt a measure of spiritual affinity with 
Frank Street’s Christians, most were keenly aware that their advantageous 
position as European protégés depended first and foremost on their alle-
giance to the sultan; i.e. on their remaining Ottoman subjects.252 Running 
through the main currents of such group attitudes was a broad range of un-
dercurrents; the diverse attitudes of people living diverse personal and pro-
fessional lives. 
 
Within the formally clear but otherwise murky setup described above, Izmir’s 
Jews occupied a particular position, both geographically, administratively, 
economically and socially.253 As we have seen, geographically, the Jewish was 
the only non-Muslim community incorporated in the Turkish part of the city 
and as such clearly distinct from the Christian quarters to the north. Admin-
istratively, the Jews constituted an organized minority (taife) like the Greeks 
and Armenians, but their more defined internal organization and relative 
proximity to Turkish power enabled them to obtain additional communal 
                                                     
 
251 Cf., generally, Turner, Frontier, where the development of a distinct frontier society is 
conceptualized as passing through three phases, corresponding to three waves of increasingly 
deep settlement (that of the pioneer, of the settler, and of men of capital) washing over each 
other and pushing the frontier ahead of them. (19-20) “As successive terminal moraines result 
from successive glaciations, so each frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a 
settled area the region still partakes of the frontier characteristics.” (4) In the same vein, we 
might conceive of Izmir’s proceeding Ottomanization as changing the status and character of 
the city’s polarity without completely supplanting its older characteristics; culturally, Izmir’s 
new (national) frontier retained an undercurrent of the older (religious) frontier. 
252 It is easy to overstate this inter-Christian affinity. In reality, an age-old and deep chasm 
separated the Eastern and Western churches. It was only in the 17th century that the West 
began sustained efforts to increase its understanding of Eastern rites, partly out of scholarly 
interest, partly with the goal of reuniting the church. European traveler-scholars such as Paul 
Rycaut enthusiastically catered to this demand: Paul Rycaut, The Present State of the Greek and 
Armenian Churches, Anno Christi 1678: Written at the Command of His Majesty (London: John 
Starkey, 1679). 
253 Cf. Minna Rozen, “The Ottoman Jews”, in: Cambridge History of Turkey 3, throughout, 
but especially 259-63, comprising “The Jews vis-à-vis the Ottoman state”, “The Jews vis-à-vis 
the ambient society” and “The ambient society vis-à-vis the Jews”. 
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privileges, such as the payment (and manipulation) of their poll-tax as a fixed 
lump sum (ber vech-i maktu’). Economically, they relied on their diaspora net-
works throughout Europe and the Middle East to trade and invest, in turn 
investing profits in loans to Ottoman and European merchants alike.254 
From this strong basis in international trade and helped by the leverage ac-
quired through finance, they managed to displace the Greeks as chief part-
ners and middlemen (financiers, wholesalers, warehousemen, dragomans, 
shippers) to the Europeans in the second half of the 17th century (a position 
the Greeks would later recapture under British patronage).255 Socially, the 
Jews were at their common disadvantage. In the Middle East they were 
viewed with the familiar combination of disapproval and apprehension, 
though decidedly less so than in Europe and with correspondingly less dis-
ruptive consequences for their lives and livelihoods. 
Relative closeness to the Turkish center, stronger communal emancipa-
tion, economic influence, lower social standing with Europeans than with 
Turks: such factors determined, and were further determined by, the Jewish 
taife’s preferment of strengthening autonomy under Turkish rule over gravi-
tation towards Frank Street on any other than its own terms. Highly indica-
tive of this attitude is the community’s preference for Turkish courts and 
procedures, especially in cases against European debtors. Jews almost never 
applied to consular courts and were well-represented at the local kadi’s court: 
 
Ils entretiennent aussi un des leurs auprès du cadi sous le nom de kiaia [i.e. kethüda, or 
commissioner], lequel est instruit de toutes les procédures de la justice, pour être comme 
leur procureur et leur avocat, et ils lui font une pension de 150 écus pour sa peine, qui était 
autrefois de 400 écus.256 
 
As a consequence of these circumstances and attitudes, Izmir’s Jewish ward 
– firmly integrated in the Turkish part of the city yet also separated from it, 
closely involved with the European nations yet remaining at arm’s length – 
took no part in the blurring of inter-Christian socio-religious borders in the 
northern part of the city and became the preferred (though often reviled) 
intermediary and buffer between European and Turk. 
                                                     
 
254 See Braudel, Mediterranean (1995), 802-26, esp. 817-20; and Francesca Trivellato, The 
Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern 
Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), generally, but esp. chapters 1 (Diasporic 
Families and the Making of a Business Partnership, 21-42), 4 (Between State Commercial Power and 
Trading Diasporas: Sephardim in the Mediterranean, 102-31), 6 (Commission Agency, Economic Infor-
mation, and the Legal and Social Foundations of Business Cooperation, 153-76), and 8 (Ergas and Sil-
vera’s Heterogeneous Trading Networks, 194-223). See the legal opinions (response) under Part II: 
Trade and Other Professions in the Sephardi Diaspora in Matt Goldish, Jewish Questions: Responsa on 
Sephardic Life in the Early Modern Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
255 See Kadı, “Natives and Interlopers”, 150-54. 
256 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 141. 
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The Capitulations 
In the preceding paragraphs we have sketched the development of the fron-
tier between Christian and Turk, and later European and Ottoman, in Izmir. 
First the physical and mental displacement of the native Greek element by a 
Latin one; then the Latin quarter’s evolving into a European quarter; and the 
rise of absolutism, mercantilism, religious protectionism and proto-
nationalism, with all the consequences this entailed for community identities 
and loyalties. Out of necessity those sketches were rather rough ones. They 
were of processes and trends not easily identifiable with the specific docu-
mentary sources or the specific historical events of traditional history. And 
although the state, diplomacy, politics and administration indeed account for 
a mere fraction of history, we shall for now have to neglect the personal, the 
social, the economic and many other spheres of life in order to arrive at a 
more coherent history of European presence in the Ottoman Empire, and, 
by extension, in Izmir. 
The most convenient thread to follow for such a history is that provided 
by the succession of Ottoman capitulations.257 From the Ottomans’ entry 
into the Balkans in 1352 to their definitive abolishment through article 28 of 
the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, these privileges and their precursors embodied 
the legal framework for all Ottoman relations with Europe. Adopted from 
various types of treaties and charters of preceding polities (the Byzantine, the 
Seljukid, the Mamluk, &c.), the instrument in Ottoman hands developed into 
a coherent system for the governing of international relations at home. The 
history of these Ottoman capitulations is a complex one, but as their origins 
and development are crucial to understanding the conditions under which 
European nations were present in the empire, we should devote some atten-
tion to it before moving on. 
 
As was the case with most previous regimes in the region, the Ottomans did 
not maintain reciprocal relations with the European states with which its 
subjects traded. Instead, all permanent relations with such states took place 
on Ottoman soil. Previously, it had been common in the region to regard 
international diplomacy and local commercial relations as belonging to dif-
ferent if occasionally overlapping spheres. According to this logic, terms of 
peace were negotiated between heads of state through their representatives, 
while commercial charters were awarded to individual merchants or commu-
nities through their own. Certainly, terms of peace could include stipulations 
on the administration and the trading conditions of foreign communities, but 
this often amounted to little more than the incorporation in a treaty of such 
abovementioned terms of trade. In short, though commercial privileges 
                                                     
 
257 For the Ottoman capitulatory system, see İnalcik, “Imtiyāzāt”; and Van den Boogert 
and Fleet, Ottoman Capitulations, throughout. 
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could be inserted in a wider treaty between two polities, their application 
would still be restricted to specific communities in specific places. 
The Ottomans’ most significant innovations in adopting the practice of 
awarding capitulations were twofold: they vastly increased their geographical 
and administrative scope and with the increased leverage thus created, used 
them as instruments for diplomatic and commercial policy. As their realm 
grew and their economy increasingly became a redistributive one, the view 
that commercial relations must be inextricably bound up with diplomatic 
relations became dominant in Istanbul. In their own response to the chal-
lenges of the age, and on a par with Europe’s mercantilist and centralizing 
policies, the Ottomans, partly out of political ideology and partly out of the 
very real necessity to cater for Istanbul’s wolverine appetite, thoroughly in-
strumentalized their international commercial relations. Diplomatically, this 
translated into a practice in which the awarding of privileges served as the 
proverbial carrot to entice European states into alliances, while their possible 
withdrawal was the stick with which to beat them back to the preferred polit-
ical course if they seemed to stray. Of course this approach only worked so 
long as Europe needed Ottoman trade more than the Ottomans needed 
Europe’s (and when this balance definitively shifted in Europe’s favor in the 
nineteenth century, it was Europe that increasingly wielded the capitulatory 
stick). 
As mentioned earlier, the process through which the Ottomans adopted 
and expanded capitulatory practice dated back to the mid-14th century. By 
that time the advancing emirate had far outgrown the political vacuum be-
tween Byzantines, Latins and the Turcoman successors of the Seljuks of 
Rum in Bithynia and needed to secure its position amongst and against them. 
Being the frontier principality that it was, it seized on the possibilities offered 
by its position at the node between three major political and commercial 
complexes by playing the balance between them through intensified alliance 
politics, simultaneously increasing the commercial scope of its alliances. This 
is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of the exact timing and 
degree to which various predating instruments for conducting foreign com-
mercial and political relations contributed to the full-fledged Ottoman ca-
pitulations of later date; let us merely note that it combined aspects of three 
interrelated strands of instruments adopted by the Ottomans (in chronologi-
cal order): localized commercial privileges, peace treaties with commercial 
clauses, and privileges granted to tributary states.258 A short discussion of 
                                                     
 
258 There are now two approaches to, or perspectives in, the historiography of the Otto-
man capitulations: the older one regards them first and foremost as being descended from 
(bilateral) commercial privileges and peace treaties, and only belatedly joined to (unilateral) 
tributary instruments; the revisionist sees a reverse relation and regards the tributary relation-
ship as the essential inherited characteristic of the evolved capitulatory system. The first per-
spective has been promoted by contemporaries and moderns alike, partly to support claims 
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these more or less consecutive strands and the capitulations that superseded 
them may serve to introduce which nationalities were present in Izmir under 
what historical-diplomatic conditions. 
With regard to pre-Ottoman (localized) commercial privileges, it should 
be said beforehand that these are too many in number and diplomatically 
and geographically too varied for their history to be summarized in an order-
ly fashion. Suffice to say that it was common practice among pre-Ottoman 
regimes, be they Christian or Muslim, to attract commerce to their territories 
by conferring formalized privileges on favored trading partners.259 If their 
relations with the privileged parties allowed it, Ottoman conquest of the 
territories concerned was usually followed by confirmation, and often exten-
sion, of such previously awarded privileges. 
It is important to note, however, that the character and scope of these 
privileges did not develop linearly. Depending on the period and place from 
which one proceeds, they can be seen as having developed from bilaterally 
agreed treaties to unilaterally awarded privileges or conversely; and from 
empire-wide to local validity or the other way around. We need not go into 
the former development too much here. Instead, let us merely state the basic 
law governing capitulatory relations: a polity’s capacity for unilateral action is 
as great as its relative power. This is to say that as one party acquires power 
and another loses it, the nature of the agreements between them will change 
too – if not on paper than at least on the ground. 
As for the latter development; it is clear that the oft-cited capitulations 
the Fatimid and Mamluk rulers of Egypt granted to France, Venice, Genoa, 
Castile and Aragon, the Kingdom of Cyprus, Naples, Ancona, Marseilles, 
Crete and Narbonne from the 1150s to the 1390s, became more limited and 
local in character as Mamluk power waned and as first Seljukid, then Turkish 
rulers selectively confirmed them.260 A similar movement occurred at the 
opposite, northwestern end of the Anatolian power vacuum, as the retreating 
Byzantine empire was succeeded by various Turkish principalities that chose 
to continue the privileged status of the Venetians, Genoese and other Latins. 
Conversely, the rise of the Ottoman successors to this combined Byzantine-
Latin-Central-Asian heritage signaled the approaching end of such diplomat-
                                                                                                                        
 
that France’s capitulatory relationship with the Ottomans went straight back to (pre-Ottoman) 
Mamluk and Fatimid treaties. It is also apparent in İnalcik, “Imtiyāzāt”. In a landmark article 
on the historical development of the Ottoman capitulatory regime (A. H. de Groot, “The 
Historical Development of the Capitulatory Regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the 
Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries”, in: Ottoman Capitulations) recently pioneered the sec-
ond approach, building a strong case for retracing the diplomatic and legal origin of the Ot-
toman capitulations to tributary relationships and documents. For further reading and refer-
ence on and from both perspectives, also see the various contributions to the same volume. 
259 See note 258 and supra under “The City as a Frontier”. 
260 See De Groot, “Historical Development”, 578. 
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ic fragmentation. As Ottoman power grew and centralized, individual local-
ized privileges would increasingly be absorbed into wider Ottoman interna-
tional arrangements such as peace treaties. 
 
The first Ottoman peace treaty usually associated with the inception of a 
uniform capitulatory regime is that concluded with Genoa in 1352 against 
Venice. It was followed by similar peace treaties with commercial dimen-
sions: a treaty with the Holy League (Venice, Byzantium, Genoa, the Knights 
Hospitallers) in 1403, confirmed with Venice in 1411, and followed by a 
string of renewals and confirmations until 1479, but also at least two separate 
treaties with the Knights Hospitallers and one with the King of Naples.261 
Although much of the phraseology and organization of the Ottoman capitu-
lations proper can be retraced to them, there is one crucial difference, name-
ly that these documents were bilateral (and in the case of treaties with the 
Holy League even multilateral), where the defining character of the later 
Ottoman capitulations is their unilateralism.262 
It is in the third strand, that of the documents codifying tributary rela-
tionships, that we first encounter the insistence on unilateralism that would 
become the hallmark of Ottoman dealings with Europe. Proceeding in large 
part from the abovementioned corpora and incorporating several other local 
pre-Ottoman treaties, concessions and laws, the privileges granted to the 
Republic of Ragusa (modern Dubrovnik) from 1430, to the Latin communi-
ties of the former Genoese colonies of Galata (in modern Istanbul) and Scio 
(Chios) from 1453, and to the previously Venetian-protected Duchy of Nax-
os (i.e. the Cyclades) from 1537, betray a strong Ottoman preoccupation 
with somehow bringing relations with non-Muslim states (and their subjects) 
more fully in line with Islamic law. Unilateralism was to be instrumental to 
the Ottomans’ attempts. 
It is no coincidence that this phase in the development of the capitula-
tions coincided with the Ottomans’ taking Constantinople (in 1453) and 
establishing the seat of government there. What for a century and a half had 
been one of many Turkish emirates in Asia Minor, was by now clearly be-
coming a real empire, with aspirations to boot. It has been said that “empires 
have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be 
the international system”.263 In the Ottoman case, this might be considered 
doubly so, since the state religion, Islam, was imperialist in the truest sense. 
It formally distinguished only between a “land of Islam” and a “land of war” 
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Diplomatics, 104-84. 
262 De Groot, “Historical Development”, 578-80. 
263 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 21. A good introduction to 
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and regarded the complete absorption of the second into the first as its ulti-
mate fulfillment.264 Imbued with this ideal of empire, yet also confronted 
with the reality of limited power and the necessity of economic continuity, 
the Ottomans restyled their relations with trading partners, allies and be-
friended states. Although most of their predecessors’ and their own concrete 
policies were continued, and although the negotiations leading up to new 
capitulations and the language used in them betrayed a waning bilateral herit-
age, their theoretical, legal, basis was reconfigured to correspond more close-
ly to the new balance of power, as well as to Islamic law. As far as the Otto-
mans were concerned the relationship between foreign powers and the sul-
tan would no longer be one of more or less equal partners, but one of peti-
tioner and petitioned. 
It is easy to see why the instruments best suited to the Ottomans’ pur-
poses were those regulating their relations with tributary states. Not only is a 
formal tributary relationship the embodiment of asymmetry between other-
wise autonomous states, it also takes up an unclear position somewhere be-
tween the domestic and the foreign spheres. In a legal-religious system that 
left no space for lasting peace, truce or relations with non-Muslims from 
beyond the “land of Islam” (dar ül-Islam), it formed the perfect model to 
fashion other lasting foreign relations after. 
The first fully independent state to receive capitulations in the proper uni-
lateral sense was Venice.265 After a string of Ottoman-Venetian peace treaties 
from 1408/9 to 1479 the sultan’s dealings with the Republic of St. Mark 
acquired definite tributary form in 1482. Although the previous treaties had 
already included a number of tributary arrangements for Venetian posses-
sions or protectorates under Ottoman overlordship (viz. in the Archipelago, 
Crete, Cyprus, Albania and Dalmatia) and although Venice’s diplomatic rela-
tions with the sultan had therefore already been an amalgam of tributary and 
independent relations for some time, their form had remained bilateral. 
The capitulation granted by Beyazid II in 1482 changed the diplomatic 
form and legal basis of relations, though not their scope and practice. It was 
preceded by negotiations commenced by the sultan, included the adjustment 
of mutual boundaries and previous tributary arrangements (remission of a 
tributary debt of 100,000 ducats and confirmation of a yearly tribute of 5,000 
                                                     
 
264 See supra under “The Status of the Non-Muslim Communities”. 
265 I.e. in truly unilateral diplomatic form, see De Groot, “Historical Development”, 579): 
“… ‘proper’ capitulations, in the accepted meaning of charters of fiscal and commercial privi-
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instead of the old 10,000), its further contents corresponding in large part to 
that of the 1479 peace treaty. The continued privileges, all of which would 
also find their way into the capitulations later granted to Venice and its com-
petitors, were the following: 
 
… mutual prohibition of damage and offence, reciprocal obligations of restitution of booty, 
reciprocal permission of sojourn in each party’s territories with exemption from special levies 
and duties; inclusion of the Duchy of Naxos; reciprocal assistance at sea to merchant ships 
and men of war alike; punishment of piracy; prohibition of reprisals for debts incurred by 
each other’s subjects; restitution of fugitive non-Muslim slaves or payment of compensation 
to their owners of 1,000 akçe; refraining from appropriating shipwrecked goods; attribution 
of intestate inheritances of Venetians to the state of Venice in the absence of any heirs; 
permission for the bailo to live in Istanbul with his “embassy family” and recognition of his 
jurisdiction over the Venetian community with the right to invoke the assistance of the Ot-
toman chief of police (subaşı) of Istanbul.266 
 
As the above summary of its circumstances and articles makes clear, the 
Venetian capitulation of 1482, though unilateral in form, was still in fact 
bilateral in context and content. In De Groot’s words, this peculiar concoc-
tion made it possible for the Ottomans “to reduce the reality of lasting 
peaceful foreign relations with the ‘unbelievers’ of the dar al-harb to the legal-
ly acceptable fiction of these being no more than domestic arrangements 
fitting with the legal principle of aman, safe-conduct to be given to non-
Muslim visitors to the dar al-islam or of hudna, truce with the enemies of Is-
lam, or even of zimma, legal protection given to non-Muslim subjects. For-
eign commercial and political relations, which were in fact conducted on a 
basis of reciprocity and bilateralism, could thus, by subtle legal formulation, 
be reduced to administrative ordinances of the home government, in one 
word to fermans, sultanic commands.”267 
A policy of “deliberate obfuscation” using the Islamic legal terminology 
of safe-conduct, truce and protection thus enabled the sultan to maintain he 
was acting in accordance with Islamic legal theory while the reality of daily 
practice showed him to be at lasting peace with Christian partners and allies, 
even allowing their nationals to settle in the empire. The legal justification 
through which aman, hudna, and implicitly even zimma, were awarded to ca-
pitulatory powers and their subjects went something as follows: privileges 
had not been awarded to harbi (i.e. those from dar ül-harb, the “land of war”) 
persons or states per se, but only to those that had acquired the sultan’s pro-
tection or safe-conduct (‘aman) through offering him a promise of sincere 
friendship (dostluk) and/or submission (ubudiyyet). His acceptance of that 
promise and his oath (‘ahd) to uphold the truce (musalaha) as long as the con-
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dition of friendship was met and mutual benefit derived from it, had quali-
fied them as protégés (müstemin) and permitted them to remain in Muslim 
lands for the space of one year without becoming non-Muslim subjects 
(zimmis) liable to the poll-tax payable by obedient non-Muslims (cizye; haraç). 
This temporary legal arrangement was complemented with an implicit one, 
namely that the unworkable one-year term for liability to the poll-tax need 
not apply as the merchants operating under capitulatory privilege did so as 
subjects of tributary states, not through any temporary personal arrangement. 
From the Ottoman viewpoint – and this brings us back to the imperial 
aspirations mentioned earlier – relations with the capitulatory communities 
living in the empire lay in the domestic sphere. Initially this had been a legal-
theoretical proposition only, but in the course of the 17th century (when 
maximization of sovereignty became a key driver for European and Ottoman 
foreign policy) the Ottomans increasingly utilized the legal fiction of an Ot-
toman-European tributary relationship as a stratagem to keep Europe’s dip-
lomats and merchants at bay and claim and assert Ottoman dominance in 
relations. The concretization of the tributary fiction in Ottoman relations 
with Europe for a while had the desired effect between 1666 and 1683, as 
practical relations were reconfigured and European merchants, diplomats, 
trade organizations and even states and sovereigns became increasingly cir-
cumspect in their dealings with Ottoman administration and in mercantile 
practice (as detailed below under “Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of 
Ottoman Control”).268 
Accordingly, these communities’ administrative and legal status within 
Ottoman administration should be fashioned in likeness of the millet’s (see 
the discussion in “The Status of the Non-Muslim Communities”): the consul 
should function much as a millet başı (the officially sanctioned head and rep-
resentative of his millet) and a lump-sum tribute was collected in lieu of the 
individual or lump-sum poll-tax paid by zimmi-subjects. In official language 
the process of obfuscation and incorporation was especially pronounced as 
the same terminology was applied across the empire’s domestic and foreign 
affairs. The terms taife and millet, for instance, were employed for both non-
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Muslim and capitulatory communities and haraç was used to designate both 
the poll-tax payable by non-Muslim subjects (originally cizye) and the tribute 
due from tributary states. 
From the European viewpoint, however, this legal window-dressing for 
internal Ottoman consumption mattered little as long as practical relations 
were conducted on the old footing and previous privileges were continued or 
augmented. And so, the drive for ever more advantageous Ottoman capitula-
tions could proceed in earnest, with the Serenissima obtaining renewals and 
confirmations of her 1482-capitulation in 1513, 1517, 1521, 1540, 1567, 
1573, 1575, 1576, 1595, 1604, 1615, 1619, 1625, 1641, 1670, 1706, 1733, and 
1734.269 This drive for increased privilege acquired a competitive edge when 
the Ottoman-Venetian-bred system was extended to include other states, 
namely France from 1569 (renewals and confirmations in 1581, 1597, 1604, 
1618, 1673, and 1740), England from 1580 (followed up in 1601, 1604, 1614, 
1624, 1641, 1662, and 1675), and the Dutch Republic from 1612 (and, again, 
in 1634 and 1680).270 
 
Within the sequences above a number of decisive evolutions in the capitula-
tions’ form, contents and functions may be discerned. On a general level, 
there is the transition from the capitulations’ codifying a real tributary rela-
tionship to their formulating a symbolic one. As is to be expected, this shift 
coincides with the capitulatory system’s application beyond the semi-
tributary Ottoman-Venetian relationship, that is to say, with the first proper 
French capitulation of 1569. In this newly invented symbolic tributary rela-
tionship, the act of requesting privileges and promising friendship figured as 
submission and the presenting of gifts as tribute. In the course of the further 
development of the capitulatory system, the originally explicit references to 
such “submission” and “tribute” increasingly became implicit. 
At the same time that the tributary nature of capitulatory relationships 
was becoming ever less explicit, a seemingly contrary development from 
bilaterality to unilaterality was also taking place. 
                                                     
 
269 See Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics; De Groot, “Historical Development”; 
İnalcik, “Imtiyāzāt”. Five administrative copies of Venetian capitulations are extant in the 
dedicated register in the düvel-i ecnebiye (Istanbul, BBA A.DVN.DVE 16/4 (AH 1081-1111 / 
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270 See, e.g., De Groot, “Historical Development”; and İnalcik, “Imtiyāzāt”. 
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We have discussed how the growth of Ottoman power and imperial aspi-
ration led to a reorganization of international relations, away from the equali-
ty of bilateral treaties and towards the supremacy of unilateral capitulations (a 
development that was mirrored in that towards incorporation of the Europe-
an communities on the ground on Izmir). It has also become clear that this 
was at first mostly a matter of style and form, not of content; a matter of 
bridging the gap between the legal responsibility resulting from Ottoman 
claims to Islamic empire on the one hand and maintaining the necessary 
commercial relations and political alliances with dar ül-harb on the other. The 
resulting ambivalence in the capitulations was of the essence for the Otto-
man sultans: mighty as they were, their power would always fall short of 
being able to force a truly unilateral international relationship upon the ca-
pitulatory states, or of asserting their legal initiative and lawmaking power 
(‘örf) through sultanic law (kanun, including the capitulations) without taking 
account of Islamic law (şeriat). This being said, the 17th century certainly saw 
efforts in these directions and as the capitulatory system matured its legal 
ambivalence and bilateral heritage were increasingly – though never defini-
tively – done away with. Both, seemingly contradictory, developments may 
be regarded as expressions of sultanic power, towards the Ottoman and 
wider Muslim world on the one hand and towards Europe on the other. 
On the level of the privileges granted there were three interconnected 
processes at play; the augmentation of privileges, their theoretical validity for 
ever wider stretches of Ottoman territory, and their extension over an in-
creasing number of nations. We cannot discuss here the evolution of all the 
capitulatory privileges in the course of over four centuries, but let us discuss 
the most important ones consecutively. 
The Ottoman capitulations were originally designed to enable Venetian 
merchants to trade with Ottoman territories in safety and on advantageous 
terms. Therefore, their oldest and most important articles date back to the 
first proper Venetian capitulation of 1482 (also see De Groot’s quotation 
above). It established the following basic rules: safe passage, reciprocal assis-
tance at sea, restitution of booty and shipwrecked goods, compensation for 
fugitive non-Muslim slaves, punishment of piracy, diplomatic protection of 
non-capitulatory merchants and their goods, advantageous customs rates for 
capitulatory trade, exemption from other internal Ottoman duties (market 
taxes, administrative taxes and so on), permission to sojourn in the sultan’s 
dominions without danger to life or belongings, representation by consuls 
and ambassadors, these representatives’ jurisdiction in exclusively communal 
affairs, their non-liability for debts incurred by their nationals, and their right 
to invoke the assistance of the Ottoman chief of police (the subaşı). 
Later Venetian capitulations fine-tuned or added unto many of these arti-
cles, most importantly those concerning Ottoman court-cases involving 
Venetian subjects and protected persons (first Venetian witnesses were made 
admissible, then it was specified that such cases could only be heard when 
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the dragoman of the Venetian nation was present) and those dealing with 
tribute/poll-tax (married and unmarried Venetian merchants – and, by impli-
cation, protected persons – residing in Ottoman lands would not be liable to 
haraç).271 
With the French acquiring their first fully Ottoman capitulation in 1569 
privilege increased significantly. In 1517 the sultan had already confirmed 
France’s Mamluk privileges for Egypt, but now these were extended over the 
entire Ottoman realm in a full Ottoman grant. In one sweep (and with one 
article) France obtained all privileges contained in the Venetian capitulations, 
as well as some additional ones: “assistance and salvage in cases of French 
shipwreck; freedom of traffic; individual legal responsibility; execution of 
French testaments or delivery of intestate inheritances to the consul; release 
of French slaves; exemption from the payment of cizye; obligatory presence 
of the dragoman of the French at trials before the kadi; internal French law 
suits within the competence of the French consul; visitation of ships only at 
Istanbul and the Dardanelles (Çanakkale, Kale-i Sultaniye) on departure; 
friendly salutation at meeting on the high seas of French and Ottoman 
ships”.272 
In 1581 the French were explicitly granted the (previously exclusively Ve-
netian) right of extending diplomatic protection to non-capitulatory nations. 
Already implied in the article of the 1569-capitulation stating that all Vene-
tian privileges would be applicable to the French, it was now explicitly con-
firmed that the protection of the French flag could be extended to the Vene-
tians, the Genoese, the English, the Portuguese, the Catalans, the Anco-
nitans, the Ragusans, and any other nations that the French had protected in 
the past. Furthermore, France was given permission to set up consulates in 
Alexandria, Tripoli, Algiers and any other Ottoman ports designated for 
international trade. 
France’s and Venice’s institutional advantage came to an end when the 
English were awarded their first capitulation in 1580. It was based on the 
Venetian and French capitulations then in effect and consequently included a 
similarly reduced customs tariff of 5% for English exports. The English 
removal from Venetian and French protection dealt a sensitive blow to the 
interests of the older capitulatory states. Not only were their rising English 
competitors now permitted to compete with them under their own private 
jurisdiction (signifying a significant loss in consular and ambassadorial duties 
for protected goods), their acquiring the same tariff also meant competition 
on equal terms. This situation was compounded in 1601, when England 
gained the capitulatory privileges of a reduced customs tariff of 3% and pro-
tection of the up-and-coming trade from the Dutch seafaring provinces, and 
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again in 1604 when France’s new capitulation explicitly removed the Vene-
tians and the English from French protection.273 
In 1612 the Dutch received their own capitulation, modeled after the 
most recent French and English capitulations. The Dutch were at once 
awarded the reduced tariff of 3% and were expressly permitted to open con-
sulates in all designated Ottoman ports (factories/scales), including in the 
ordinarily restricted ones on the Black Sea and those of Alexandria, Tripoli 
of Syria, the Archipelago, Tunis, Algiers and Cairo.274 The striking generosity 
of privilege awarded a new capitulatory state aside, this capitulation was 
noteworthy for something other as well: it marked the disappearance of the 
instrument’s most important reminder of tributary origin. Although the 
Dutch presented the sultan with gifts around the amount previously explicit-
ly accepted as tribute from Venice, France and England, no payment of trib-
ute was mentioned in their capitulation. 
 
The disappearance of references to tribute as a precondition for relations 
does not mean that all language reminiscent of tributary relations had disap-
peared. Its formulae continued to echo through in the vocabulary of unilat-
eralism: “with letters sealed by sincere friendship”, “the requests contained 
therein”, “the petition for friendship and privilege”, “the petitions were met 
with acceptance”, “as long as [the States General] will remain steadfast in 
friendship and devotion following this aforementioned promise, I too accept 
their friendship”.275 Stripped of all references to tribute, however, the fixed 
sequence of phrases that had previously marked the exchanges leading up to 
the fastening of a tributary bond, did little more than lend a tributary slant to 
a testament of full sultanic power and prerogative. 
Nevertheless, the omission of direct references to tributary relations sig-
nals an important development with regard to the capitulations’ legal basis. 
With it, the chancery of Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) was taking another step 
away from the instrument’s bilateral heritage, but not automatically towards 
greater conformity with Islamic law. Over the years – as capitulations had 
been awarded to the non-tributary states of France, England and the Dutch 
Republic and as the articles they contained had become wider in scope and 
relevance – it had become apparent that they embodied an institution rather 
than an ad hoc-arrangement. Confronted with the increasingly ritualistic char-
acter of the capitulations’ tributary basis and exchanges, but also with a form 
of open-ended truce and protection (hudna and ‘aman) that could hardly be 
justified outside a tributary arrangement, the Ottomans were taking ever 
more care to compensate by stressing their basis in sultanic initiative and 
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their unilateral character. The removal of references to tribute further nar-
rowed the capitulations’ already shaky basis in Islamic law (şeriat) since the 
proper Islamic legal conditions of safe-conduct (‘aman) had never fitted ca-
pitulatory relations to begin with. In response, their diplomatic form was 
made significantly more majestic and unilateral, so as to stress their basis in 
the legal alternative of sultanic initiative (‘örf). Beginning in the reign of Ah-
med I we can discern a preference for the heavier diplomatic forms of the 
full ‘ahdname (letter of promise, i.e. capitulation) or the sultanic letter (name-i 
hümayun) over the more straightforward sultanic order (the ferman) and its 
fiscal variant (the berat, or diploma). It seems that the legal ambivalence al-
ready hinted at a few paragraphs earlier was indeed less a static given than a 
balance to be tipped in the sultan’s favor. 
Until the mid-18th century no further changes of significance were made 
to the capitulations’ form and legal principles (except perhaps for their in-
creasingly figuring as supplements to peace treaties). The competition over 
their privileges continued unabated however. In 1665, Genoa was removed 
from French protection with her own capitulation and (like the Dutch in 
1612) was at once awarded the reduced customs tariff of 3%. More im-
portantly, the French in 1673 acquired precedence over the other capitulato-
ry nations, saw their right of protection over non-capitulatory foreigners 
confirmed, were accorded the protection of Frankish ecclesiastics and of 
French and other western Christians on pilgrimage, and finally saw their 
customs tariff also reduced from 5% to 3%. Through their capitulation of 
1675, the English were extended all privileges previously granted to France, 
Venice, Poland and other capitulatory states, including protection of non-
capitulatory foreigners. 
The coping stone of the capitulatory system followed more than a half-
century later, in 1740, when the French were the first to be awarded most-
favored-nation status. Henceforth any increase in privilege awarded other 
nations could automatically also be claimed by them. As more and more 
other powers acquired similar status, the once separately awarded charters 
became a homogenous textual corpus from which all recognized foreign 
partners could draw. 
 
Demography 
Now that a short history of the Ottoman capitulations has introduced a 
more formal chronology to our discussion of the European presence in the 
Ottoman Empire and has highlighted the capitulatory conditions under 
which subjects of European states lived and traded in Ottoman port cities 
and their satellites, it is time to focus on the structure within which these 
subjects operated in Izmir specifically. Our summary history above has 
shown the following capitulatory states to be operating in the Ottoman Em-
pire in 1678: Genoa (under her capitulation of 1665), Venice (capitulation of 
1670), France (capitulation of 1673), England (capitulation of 1675), and the 
 
 
180 
 
Dutch Republic (capitulation of 1634). As is attested to by Galland (as by 
other sources), merchants of all these states were indeed living and trading in 
Izmir.276 
The administrative structure supporting and, to an extent, governing 
these merchants’ expatriate lives and trades was the result of a complicated 
interplay between administrative powers – viz. the issuing of capitulations 
and additional orders by the Ottoman central government, of commercial 
directives and diplomatic instructions by European central governments and 
trade organizations, and of decisions by local Ottoman officials based on 
local administrative practice and records. Certainly, the capitulations set the 
general conditions for their presence in terms of commerce, administration 
and representation: they stipulated the tariffs according to which customs 
would be paid; barred certain strategic goods from trade; specified how, 
where and when customs would be collected; created an internal jurisdiction 
by indicating in what cases Ottoman officials should not become involved 
and when they could be called on for assistance; and appointed a representa-
tive at the “Threshold of Felicity” (Istanbul), empowering him to nominate 
deputies to represent the merchant communities in his care.277 
Yet, the capitulatory regime indeed only set the general conditions under 
which trade was to be conducted. The results of application (and non-
application) to the practices of daily life and trade varied heavily under the 
influence of nationality, local circumstance and historical timing. More di-
rectly put, the lives and trades of all European nations in the Ottoman Em-
pire were organized differently in accordance with the history, needs and 
wishes of their governments and principals back home and they proceeded 
in various towns and cities under conditions determined by local and interna-
tional trade, administration and relations. Perhaps the best way to understand 
how capitulations and capitulatory practice relate, is to compare them to a 
civil code and the practice of everyday life, respectively. Although civil law 
invisibly insinuates itself into our lives to become part of our morality and 
daily conduct, it in fact rarely swings into full view as we go about our every-
day lives.278 In fact, we often navigate the law’s edges of permissibility, regu-
larly zigzagging over its edges and back again. It is only when such transgres-
sions result in civil conflict, since they are not acceptable to all parties in-
                                                     
 
276 See Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 113-27 and 150-51. 
277 It should be stressed that what the Europeans considered to be their representatives’ 
accreditation by the sultan, was their appointment upon nomination as far as the Ottomans 
were concerned. According to the same logic consuls and vice-consuls were nominated by 
their chief in Istanbul or institutions back home and appointed by the sultan. 
278 See Kitty Calavita, Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 37: “The ability of law to create social realities 
that appear natural by inventing many of the concepts and categories we think with, means 
that it insinuates itself invisibly into our everyday worlds and wields extraordinary power.” 
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volved (or made so by mitigating negotiations), that the law (and its en-
forcement) come into action.279 Just as civil law does not effectively govern 
our lives, so the capitulations did not govern foreign presence and trade in 
the Ottoman Empire. 
What the capitulations did do, is provide the legal-administrative frame-
work for European merchants’ activities in the Ottoman Empire. Through 
them, European representatives were appointed to the Porte (the Ottoman 
government) and put in charge of the consuls in the factories. What the Ot-
tomans expected from these consuls was not outlined in the capitulations 
exclusively, but was worked out in more detail in fiscal ordinances (berats) 
issued by the Porte to complement the capitulations. These documents were 
handed over to their bearers, the consuls, to be produced to Ottoman offi-
cials as legal proof of the competences the bearer had received from the 
sultan. For all practical purposes these were “diplomas”, listing the consuls’ 
duties and rights with respect to Ottoman administration and to their nations. 
Through their adjusting and formalizing existing consular practices and tying 
them in with the international diplomacy of ambassadors and resident en-
voys, the capitulations imposed a preferred, increasingly uniform, formal 
structure and hierarchy on all European affairs in the empire. As discussed 
previously, actual commercial and administrative practice within the structure 
thus set up was then adjusted through commercial directives and diplomatic 
instructions from Europe, as through the policies of local Ottoman officials. 
This is not to say that between this Ottoman legal framework, European 
governments’ and trade bodies’ interpretations of it, and its application by 
local officials, there was barely room to maneuver. By leaving the practical 
administration of international commerce in the hands of lower officials in 
charge of day-to-day administration the Ottomans had for most of the 17th-
century made sure that there was no unnecessary interference by high-level 
officials, so that – within the fiscal and economic limits that were deemed 
essential to the Ottoman system – a zone of contact was maintained in 
                                                     
 
279 See Calavita, Invitation to Law, 34: “E. Adamson Hoebel Karl Llewellin (1941) … pieced 
together a picture of a traditional system of law organized around two main functions. The 
first was to set the parameters for ordinary life so people could ‘go around in more or less 
clear ways’ (20), ‘trouble cases’ inevitably arose – for example, in the form of disputes or 
egregious violations – and then law made a flamboyant entrance to clean up the ‘social mess.’ 
As Hoebel and Llewelllyn found with the Cheyenne, law in contemporary Western society sets 
the ground rules and stays in the background, only commanding attention when trouble 
comes. We nonetheless sense its routine strictures … The impulse to abide by law’s re-
strictions may vary across time, culture, social class, personality type, and punishment severity 
(a topic of what are called compliance studies), but even violators usually modify their behav-
ior to minimize detection.”. This process is a significant part of “the gap between the law-on-
the-books and the-law-in-action” that is “a canonical concern for law and society scholarship” 
(ibid., 9). 
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which Ottoman and European merchants could fend for themselves and 
deal with each other in relative freedom.280 
To return to our discussion of the relation between law and the practice 
of everyday life: the fact that two (or more) parties (and subsidiaries) in rela-
tions may collude to act against law (here; the capitulations) does not have 
consequences in and of itself. In a manner, transgressions are in the eye of 
the beholder, and if its contemporary beholders saw no problem with what 
they were arranging between themselves, who are we to decide that one party 
must have been forcing another through bribes or threats, even if there ap-
pear to have existed some misgivings about the collusion. In analyzing capit-
ulatory relations – or really, counter-capitulatory relations – allowance should 
be made at every level for the possibility that transgressions were in fact (and 
perhaps against the impression given by the documentary evidence available) 
often the result of agreements between those pulling the strings on that spe-
cific level and in that given context. Such an interpretation – according to 
which law is a guide to action in case of irresolvable disputes between those 
directly involved instead of a set of rules everyone must necessarily always 
obey – neatly fits early modern society and administration in general, and the 
Ottoman’s in particular. In the Ottoman Empire, as in many other societies, 
law was “one of the major points of contact between state and society” and 
first and foremost an instrument for the resolution of conflicts (i.e. “restitu-
tive”), as opposed to a semi-sacral system for exemplary punishment per se 
(i.e. “repressive”).281 Seen in that light, European utterances of frustration 
with Ottoman legal or administrative proceedings were probably as often the 
sore loser’s complaints about failed exchanges and compromises, as expres-
sions of sincere shock about perceived corruption. 
The more or less uniform diplomatic hierarchy achieved through sultanic 
decree happened to be a perfect conduit for extending the already noted 
European drive towards centralization to the Levant. In this, joining com-
mercial to diplomatic affairs by bringing consuls definitively under the juris-
diction of ambassadors proved especially effective. As chosen headmen gave 
                                                     
 
280 See Faroqhi, Economic and Social History 2, 480-83: “The Ottoman State and Foreign 
Traders”. But see Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, where the argument is set forth that 
“Izmir in the late sixteenth century blossomed into a regional market and commercial hub … 
despite Istanbul’s objections” (18), and that Izmir’s low-level administration was a conse-
quence of Ottoman inability or unwillingness to recognize the city’s international develop-
ment for the overwhelming trend it was and take timely administrative measures to protect 
their own interests from that development’s unwanted consequences.  
281 Haim Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 2-3. Although the two systems do not exist separately: every 
society maintains some kind of balance between the two, see Calavita, Invitation to Law, 10-29: 
“Types of Society, Types of Law”, and 30-50: “Law in the Everyday, Everywhere”). For the 
Ottoman context specifically, see, generally, Fariba Zarinebaf, Crime and Punishment in Istanbul: 
1700/1800 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); and Gerber, State, Society. 
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way to consuls firmly embedded in diplomatic hierarchy, the often irregular 
correspondence to and from the factories became more regular and detailed. 
Partly in response to the wish of those higher up to remain informed of what 
happened under their authority, the increase in correspondence was certainly 
also the natural result of the heightened answerability that came with the 
stricter definition of merchants’, consuls’, ambassadors’, trade organizations’ 
and governments’ duties and responsibilities. If higher authorities can be 
held responsible for your actions and will in turn hold you to account for 
them, it is best to keep minute and verifiable records (preferably of the kind 
that cast you in a favorable light). Hence the identification of hierarchically 
organized administration, i.e. bureaucracy, with the production of written 
records, filing and archiving. It is thanks to the 17th-century formalization of 
consular affairs that many details from the lives and trades of European mer-
chants in the Levant were committed to paper at all, and it is bureaucratic 
practice we should thank for enabling us to study organized series of such 
papers in a number of European national archives. 
So, between these papers and the available Ottoman ones, what do we 
know about capitulatory practice in Izmir on a non-individual, national, lev-
el? What was the place of the European quarter within the city’s administra-
tion and society? And how were its Genoese, Venetian, French, English, and 
Dutch parts made up and organized? 
 
Measures of Liberty 
As Evliya makes abundantly clear, Izmir’s Muslims will have cared little for 
the difference between the city’s Franks and its Greeks and Armenians. The 
only thing many will have felt they needed to know was that these were 
Christians not Muslims. They will no doubt have noticed the Franks’ differ-
ent dress and housing, as well as the exaggerated and improper pride and 
pomp with which processions of these “unbelievers” regularly marched 
through the city on their way to audiences or funerals. Perhaps they will even 
have considered their privileged status with a mixture of envy and disap-
proval, or simply with disinterest. But whether they were envious of the lib-
erties and advantages permitted these foreigners, disapproved of their unbe-
coming displays of status and wealth, or looked on them with a stoicism 
born from the certainty of being far superior – it will not have escaped them 
that here were unbelievers permanently residing in the land of Islam to 
whom not many laws of that land seemed to apply. If Izmir’s Muslims 
couldn’t be bothered with the finer points of Christian doctrine, they will 
have found it all the more difficult to make sense of the leeway afforded the 
Franks in comparison to the subjected Greeks and Armenians. 
The incomprehension and irritation caused by a position so special being 
occupied by nations considered inferior was never quite grasped by the Eu-
ropeans. On their part, they appear to have had – or at least showed – little 
sensitivity for the tension between Islamic law, sultanic law and administra-
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tive practice their somewhat demanding presence could occasion. Just as 
many Muslims will have preferred to think of the subjects of the capitulatory 
nations as a peculiar kind of zimmis, and therefore equally dependent on the 
goodwill of the Islamic community, so most Europeans claimed a measure 
of independence not fully warranted by their müstemin-status. They envisaged 
an alafranga-life of far greater freedom than back home, under full protection 
of the Ottoman state, but with few obligations for them to fulfill in return. 
Since the hazy status of the non-Ottoman nations was bred into the Ot-
toman capitulatory system, the measure of liberty and autonomy permitted 
the Europeans in capitulatory practice was perpetually in flux. The inherent 
distance between conflicting Ottoman and European interpretations of ca-
pitulatory status could only effectively be bridged by shared interest. Such 
shared interest, particularly in a situation where several nations were compet-
ing against each other for most favorable conditions, was necessarily of a 
volatile nature. If this was already the case in Istanbul, it was even more so in 
the factories, where local officials were more often than not primarily occu-
pied with interests that yielded results within the short term of their tenure. 
Plainly, this bridge, this constantly renegotiated “middle ground” of shared 
interest, could be a cut-throat place of fast business, short-term yields and 
fierce competition for economic and political leverage. As a cut-throat mar-
ket, it was also a place where professional conflict easily spilled over into the 
personal sphere. There were some alleviating circumstances, however. 
Within the European quarter, a sense of shared Christian-European cul-
ture softened at least some of the edge of professional competition – alt-
hough increasingly less so as the 17th century witnessed the evolution of a 
loosely organized European community of merchants into a number of more 
tightly organized and competing trading nations. Then there was the timeta-
ble of economic activity, in which the biannual arrival of convoys from Eu-
rope (in July-August-September, and in January-February-March) occasioned 
periods of frantic buying and selling alternated by long spells of relative inac-
tivity during which merchants of all nations sought each other’s company for 
entertainment and vacationing.282 Furthermore, the fact that the Ottoman 
economy was a redistributive one meant that European merchants did not 
operate in a free market and therefore did not compete with each other in all 
aspects of trade. In buying and selling competition was limited and relatively 
                                                     
 
282 See, e.g., De Bruyn, Reizen, 22-23; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22b, on the plague 
regularly visiting Izmir, the Europeans’ fleeing to the countryside, and/or locking themselves 
in their houses with some other families to combat boredom; De Bruyn, Reizen, 28, on Euro-
pean hunting, fishing and feasting; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: The “discrepant” Dutch 
merchants of Izmir to DLH, 14 August 1674, on several conflicts fought out in and around 
Seydiköy; Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 43: “most Europeans did not do business during weekend and 
either vacationed in their cottages located outside of Izmir or else were hunting in the coun-
tryside”; and the examples of international excursions and travel cited supra. 
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indirect, centering not on the conditions obtained from producers but on 
those obtained from a limited number of wholesalers (as well as, not to for-
get, from providers of contraband). Instead, the points of fiercest competi-
tion between European merchants were favorable shipping rates and tax 
duties – which is where Ottoman administration re-enters the equation.283 
It appears that in Izmir the bridge between Ottoman and European may 
have been broader, the distance it covered less forbidding, than in Istanbul 
or Aleppo. In Istanbul, the seat of supreme imperial authority, infinite care 
was always taken to safeguard the distance between the court and European 
envoys. If, in an audience, an European was permitted to walk this bridge 
and enter the presence of the sultan, it was not on his feet, but in prostration 
and without being able to enter into conversation. It was not much different 
formally meeting with higher officials: face-to-face communication was spo-
radically permitted (through a translator of course), but wholly on the Otto-
mans’ conditions.284 Any real business of deliberation and negotiation was 
conducted by sending go-betweens (dragomans) back and forth between 
residences. It was easier arranging matters lower down in hierarchy, although 
the close proximity of sultanic and grand-vizieral power generally made offi-
cials tread carefully; arrangements and personages were easily overturned.285 
                                                     
 
283 See, e.g., North, Life; 123; Daniel Goffman, “Izmir: from Village to Colonial Port City”, 
in: Eldem et al., Ottoman City, 87-93 and 105-10; Faroqhi, Economic and Social History 2, 517-20; 
Elena Frangakis-Syrett, “Commercial Growth and Economic Development in the Middle 
East: Izmir from the Early 18th to the Early 20th Centuries”, in: Ottoman Izmir, 7-8 and 
throughout; Kadı, “Natives and Interlopers”, 18-45. 
284 There are countless contemporary descriptions of audiences with Ottoman high offi-
cials and the sultan. For a good summary of the protocol and procedures involved, see the 
article on the divan-ı hümayun (imperial council) in Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Encyclopædia 
metropolitana (London: B. Fellowes, 1845), 18: 153-56, and esp. the section on the diplomatic 
audience at 156: “Capíjís Báshís support the stranger under the arm with one hand, and bow 
down his head with the other. The ambassador then delivers his speech, which is repeated in 
Turkish by the Dragoman of the Porte to the Grand Vezír, and by him to the Sultán. No an-
swer is returned, except in very extraordinary cases.” Also see the examples in the section on 
Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa infra. 
285 See North, Life, 58-66, where North recounts various dealings and sincere friendships 
with several holders of high office, his having constructed a “sopha room, wherein he might 
receive, and entertain the Turks, that came to visit him, after their own way”, his borrowing a 
sancak bey’s galley slaves for construction work, his selling his house to a rich Turk to rent it 
back to avoid any problems upon his eventual repatriation, his private cultivation of the chief 
customer, how he made loans to the palace and other high officials and made sure they were 
repaid, and his audience with the sultan (“The great officers about the Grand Signor, with 
whom he had transacted, and (with such respects as became him) familiarly conversed, told 
his Majesty that there was now, in the city of Constantinople, an extraordinary gower [unbeliever], 
as well for person as abilities, to transact the greatest affairs; and so, in the ordinary conversa-
tion with the Grand Signor, he was often named for somewhat considerable, besides his 
acting as hasnadar of the English nation under their ambassador. The Grand Signor declared, 
he would see this extraordinary gower; and accordingly the merchant was told of it; and, at the 
time appointed, an officer conducted him into the Seraglio, and carried him about until he 
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In Aleppo, the restrictions imposed on European merchants were stricter 
than those in Istanbul. Merchants appear to have had difficulty moving 
around freely, periodically locked themselves in reserved national hans, had 
frequent conflicts with local guilds and eşraf (the fraternity of descendants of 
the prophet) upon venturing out, and – like the city’s general population – 
suffered excessively from overbearing (military) governors-general 
(beylerbeyis). As much is confirmed by contemporary accounts.286 
By contrast, Izmir’s Europeans were allowed a greater measure of private 
and professional liberty, both as individuals and as nations. This difference in 
attitude may be attributed to several factors. Qua mentality, Aleppo was an 
old regional center of Arab civilization with a mostly indigenous population, 
instead of a heterogeneous frontier town. Economically and socially too, its 
characteristics were not those of the frontier town and the trading port, but 
rather those of the ancient caravan center (relaying part of its well-organized 
luxury trade through the small ports of Alexandretta (modern Iskenderun) 
and Latakia. Conjuncturally, its international export business was (temporari-
ly) eclipsed by Izmir. Aleppo’s marketing of the locally and regionally pro-
duced goods Europe increasingly sought as industrial input lagged behind 
Izmir’s, with a contracting market being the result – and if growth ends and 
crisis looms, it is always the outsider or “other” who suffers disproportion-
ately, if not economically then at least socially. 
Izmir, on the other hand, was a much younger Ottoman boom-port with 
a largely imported population, inevitably better geared to accommodating 
outsiders and “otherness”. It had overtaken Aleppo as demand from Europe 
shifted from the luxury goods brought by long-distance caravans to the re-
gional produce of Izmir’s fertile hinterland (it lay closer to the new source, 
shortening the expensive overland route, as had previously been the case 
with Aleppo). The predominance of regionally produced exports also gave 
the regional population a greater stake in the international trade going 
through Izmir, even if it was mostly indirectly. 
But most importantly for our questions, Izmir’s administration appears to 
have developed in such a way as to specifically accommodate and facilitate 
                                                                                                                        
 
came to a little garden, and there two other men took him by the two arms, and led him to a 
place where he saw the Grand Signor sitting against a large window open, in a chamber not 
very high from the ground; the men, that were his conductors, holding each an arm, put their 
hands upon his neck, and bowed him down till his forehead touched the ground; and this was 
done more than once, and is the very same forced obeisance of ambassadors at their audienc-
es. After this, he stood bolt upright as long as the Grand Signor thought fit to look at him; 
and then, upon a sign given, he was taken away and set free again by himself, to reflect on this 
his romantic audience.”). Again, also see the section on Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa infra. 
286 See Bruce Masters, “Aleppo: The Ottoman Empire’s Caravan City”, in: Eldem et al., 
Ottoman City, 46-47 and throughout; as well as the work on 18th-century Aleppo by Van den 
Boogert (in the bibliography) and Marcus, Middle East on the Eve of Modernity, 75-101 and 145-
54. 
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(rather than roughly impose itself on) the city’s history of crosscultural trade 
and the diversity it thrived on. That is also how official interference with 
Izmir was generally interpreted during the restoration of Ottoman power in 
the region under grand viziers Mehmed Köprülü and his son Fazıl Ahmed 
Paşa. With his successor Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa’s taking over the reins of 
power, however, high European hopes that the restraint and benevolence of 
Köprülü-power they had experienced would be continued, were abruptly 
smashed. Or were they?  
 
Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman Control287 
Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa (c1635-25 December 1683), third vizier from 
the famed house of Köprülü, is to this day remembered as one of the most 
terrible Ottoman statesmen to have ever held office. In the course of his 
career as grand admiral (1661-1666), deputy grand vizier (1663, 1666-1670, 
1676), and ultimately grand vizier (1676-1683), the opinions held of him by 
the European representatives in Istanbul – even before the fiasco of Vienna 
– declined steeply from “a wise and experienced person, of a smooth behav-
ior” to “this grievous oppressor of all Christendom”.288 
At first sight, the reason for Kara Mustafa Paşa’s unpopularity with his 
European contemporaries appears to have been money, which he extracted 
from their communities in a “stream of avanias during the years 1676-
1683”.289 But surely Kara Mustafa was not the first grand vizier to do that; 
his two adopted relatives and predecessors Mehmed and Fazıl Ahmed Kö-
prülü, for instance, were responsible for some famous reportedly unjust (i.e. 
in violation of the capitulations) financial demands and penalties of their 
own without their reputation with the Europeans suffering greatly from it. In 
fact, all their complaints aside, Europeans living and working in the Levant 
seem to have been realistic enough to regard commercial and legal disputes 
with their hosts as part of the trade. 
If the accustomed commerce-related conflicts are not wholly responsible, 
what, then, made relations with Kara Mustafa so unbearable and, more im-
portantly, is there any need to reconsider the received image of him? The 
following pages will argue that there is indeed such a need, and that under-
standing how the historical distortion around his person was produced, as 
well as what it hides from scrutiny, is of the essence for our understanding of 
                                                     
 
287 A shorter version of this section was previously published as Olnon, “‘A most 
agreeable and pleasant creature’?”, in: Ottoman Capitulations. 
288 Paul Rycaut, The History of the Turkish Empire from the Year 1623 to the Year 1677 
(London: John Starkey, 1680), 333; G.F. Abbott, Under the Turk in Constantinople: A Record of Sir 
John Finch's Embassy, 1674-1681 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1920), 359. 
289 Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 591a. On avanias – Ottoman demands on European 
nationals, deemed unjust and in violation of the capitulations – see my “Towards Classifying 
Avanias”. 
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Izmir at this crucial junction in its history, of the Ottomans’ and Europeans’ 
designs for it, and of how they worked out. 
The general image we have of this grand vizier is to no small extent de-
termined by the emotionally charged descriptions of his character by his 
European contemporaries. As a matter of fact, the sheer number of vehe-
ment denouncements historians have had to account for, has made it very 
difficult for them to consider the history of his rule in a detached manner. In 
this respect, it is worth noting that there exists no Ottoman equivalent to the 
European litany handed down to us. 
An explanation for the extreme dislike displayed by the Europeans might 
be sought in Kara Mustafa’s policy of ruthlessly subjecting even the most 
fundamental diplomatic rules and capitulary articles to the conjunctures of 
his rule, or – put more favorably – to the needs of the state he served. To 
illustrate the shape this deliberate policy took and the manner in which it 
transformed how Kara Mustafa was perceived even before the Vienna cam-
paign, we will take a look at the correspondence of Justinus Colyer, Dutch 
envoy (first resident, then ambassador) in Istanbul from 1668 to 1682. From 
his correspondence a small collection of encounters will be presented that is 
both illustrative of the attitudes with which this statesman and the European 
representatives sent to his government approached one another, as it is in-
dicative of the policies and politics underlying these attitudes. 
Where the correspondences of the other European representatives in Is-
tanbul become extremely hostile immediately after Kara Mustafa’s becoming 
grand vizier, Colyer’s is one significant exception begging to be explained. 
Unfortunately, Colyer’s correspondence has not received the same measure 
of attention as that of De Nointel, Finch or even his Venetian colleagues. 
This we can attribute to the fact that it is in the Dutch language and con-
cerns the eventually declining commerce of a geopolitically important but 
minor European power. But this relative insignificance is also an advantage, 
for it allows us to compare between Kara Mustafa’s politically laden relations 
with the French, English and Venetian envoys and his politically neutral 
relations with the Dutch. An added advantage of regarding the period 
through Justinus Colyer’s correspondence is that his envoyship (1668-1682) 
encompasses almost completely Kara Mustafa Paşa’s stay as deputy grand 
vizier and grand vizier (1666-1683), thereby providing a unique opportunity 
to trace his exceedingly terrible reputation in a continuous fashion and with a 
oneness of voice. 
But before going over to Colyer’s correspondence, let us first establish 
more firmly the nature of Kara Mustafa’s reputation and the stations mark-
ing his rise to power. 
 
On 6 August 1668 Dutch Resident Justinus Colyer had his first ever audi-
ence at the Ottoman court in Edirne (Adrianople). Quite impressed with the 
entire proceedings and with his auditor in particular, he entered the following 
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“Description of the person, stature and years of the Caimacam of Adriano-
ple” in his day book: 
 
The said caymacam is twenty eight to twenty nine years of age, of great intellect and elo-
quence; a most agreeable and pleasant creature. He has a large broad beard, and is of aver-
age stature. He never wears gold, silver or silk clothing; this being a general order of the 
empire, but solely applicable to the grand vizier and the said caymacam, so as to avoid them 
stooping to avanias for the sake of splendid robes.290 
 
Interestingly, the kaymmakam, or deputy grand vizier, referred to is indeed 
this very Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, would-be conqueror of Vienna in 
1683, and a strong candidate for the title of most vilified Ottoman statesman 
in history. Considering this, one might be tempted to ascribe Colyer’s sympa-
thetic description to his inexperience at the time. He had first arrived in the 
Ottoman Empire only five months earlier and had not yet been in direct 
contact with those at the top of Ottoman hierarchy. But in another equally 
positive account of this official from the – more experienced and considera-
bly more authoritative – hand of Paul Rycaut (English consul in Izmir from 
1667 to 1678), dated 1680, he is referred to as “a wise and experienced per-
son, of a smooth behavior, and a great courtier”.291 Furthermore, in a report 
prepared in 1675/76 for the marquis de Nointel, French ambassador in Is-
tanbul from 1670 to 1679, it is said that “L’humeur du Pacha est fort bonne, 
quoiqu’elle soit un peu prompt.”292 
But these and other such statements may be considered exceptions. Much 
more current are the extremely hostile accounts, mostly of later dates. In the 
relazione of his embassy, Giovanni Morosini di Alvise, Venetian bailo in Is-
tanbul from 1675 to 1680, tells us that Kara Mustafa Paşa was “Nato per 
castigo de’ popoli in luogo oscuro dell’Asia in vicinanza di Trebisonda [Trab-
zon; sic] e tra il più vili domestici” and that he was “tutto venale, crudele e 
                                                     
 
290 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 63b. The published version of this daghregister, and partic-
ularly Colyer’s description of Sultan Mehmed IV, later caused great scandal in the Dutch 
Republic and such an international incident that the States General had to denounce and 
retract it: “A pained, morose and extremely melancholy creature. A large scar on his counte-
nance, which Sultan Ibrahim his father, with the intent of killing him, inflicted on him with a 
knife. A sharp nose, two pointy erected moustaches and no beard beneath. He has no less 
than seven fistulas or fontanels. Is absolutely no lover of women, but more so of hunting. 
Cruel and very bloodthirsty at heart.” The printed version: Justinus Colyer, Oprecht journael, … 
(The Hague: Heirs of H. Jacobz. van Wouw, 1668). 
291 Rycaut, History of the Turkish Empire, 333. For general overviews of Merzifonlu Kara 
Mustafa’s life and career, and for the opinions Paul Rycaut and other contemporary commen-
tators held of him, see Anderson, English Consul, 242 and throughout; and Heywood, “Karā 
Mustafa Pasha”, throughout and esp. the bibliography at 592a-b. 
292 Galland, Journal, ii: 197. 
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ingiusto”.293 Around 1680/81 John Finch, English ambassador in Istanbul 
from 1674 to 1681, characterized him as “a Vesier who is of a temper to doe 
anything for money and nothing without it” and referred to him as “this 
grievous oppressor of all Christendom”.294 
Nor did the initial enthusiasm of our positive commentators persist. On 
27 February 1679, eleven years after his first meeting with Kara Mustafa, 
Justinus Colyer’s admiration had turned into severe frustration as he de-
scribed him as “extremely avid and intransigent in all his dealings”. He was 
joined in this by Jacobus van der Merct, treasurer to the Dutch consulate in 
Izmir, who wrote home on 21 October 1681 describing him as “a griffin 
with ravenous claws, since he proceeds solely with violence and sheer tyran-
ny” and by Jacob van Dam, Dutch consul in Izmir from 1668 to 1689, who, 
on 4 March 1679, described “a man of great enterprise and exorbitant pro-
cedures against the Christian nations”.295 Judgments became even harsher 
after the events before Vienna had run their course. In the second edition of 
his great History (published in 1700) Rycaut remembered him as “a person 
of violence, rapine, pride, covetousness, false, perfidious, bloody, and with-
out reason or justice”.296 
Modern history has felt little need to add or adjust. Kara Mustafa was un-
til relatively recently still universally recognized as a “despote de basse es-
pèce, barbare corrumpu, qui porta au plus haut degré l’avidité d’argent pro-
verbiale des Turcs”, and now at best as “un vizir assez exceptionnel tant dans 
ses exigences financières que dans sa xénophobie”.297 
It should come as no surprise that an event like the second Ottoman 
siege of Vienna, which caused considerable panic throughout Europe, would 
mar forever the reputation of the person responsible (although the stark 
contrast with the opinions held in the West of that first Ottoman besieger of 
Vienna, Süleyman the Magnificent, raises some interesting questions in this 
respect).298 After all, it is the winners who write history. But even when leav-
ing the Vienna issue aside and concentrating on the 25-odd years of Kara 
Mustafa’s career preceding his downfall, it becomes clear that something had 
already gone terribly wrong in his relations with the European representa-
                                                     
 
293 My italics. Nicolò Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet, Relazioni degli stati Europei lette al 
senato dagli ambasciatori Veneti nel secolo XVII, vol. 1: Spagna (Venice: P. Naratovich, 1856), 207. 
294 Abbott, Under the Turk, 359. 
295 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to the States General, 27 February 1679; 
The Hague, NA 01.03.01 125: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 21 October 1681; The Hague, 
NA 01.03.01 98: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 4 March 1679. 
296 Paul Rycaut, The history of the Turks: Beginning with the Year 1679 … until the end of the year 
1698, and 1699 (London: Robert Clavell, 1700), 1. 
297  A.C. Stourdza, L’Europe Orientale et le Rôle Historique des Maurocordato (1660-1830) (Paris: 
Plon, 1913), 9; Robert Mantran, Istanbul dans la Seconde Moitié du XVIIe Siècle (Paris: Adrien 
Maisonneuve, 1962), 548. 
298 Cf. G. Veinstein, “Süleymān”, EI2, ix: 832b-42a. 
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tives and communities much earlier on. That “something” – as indicated 
above – lies at the heart of our investigation. 
 
Little can be said with certainty about Kara Mustafa’s life before his first 
becoming a public figure in 1656.299 Most probably, he was born in the vil-
lage of Marınca near Merzifon around 1635 as the son of a cavalry officer 
(sipahi), who was said to have served under Köprülü Mehmed Paşa during his 
career in the Asian provinces.300 It is not certain when, but at some time 
during his youth, probably as a teenager, Kara Mustafa was introduced into 
the Köprülü household to enhance his opportunities of starting an adminis-
trative career, as was common for ambitious and intelligent Ottoman youths 
with well-connected fathers. Köprülü had him educated alongside his natural 
son Fazıl Ahmed; an indication that Kara Mustafa enjoyed a position of 
some preference to other iç oğlans (young servants/pages) taken into the 
household. He is reported to have held a number of positions within the 
household’s inner service (enderun; privy), eventually being employed as Kö-
prülü Mehmed Paşa’s telhisci (referendarius; “the official who presents his em-
ployer’s memoirs and reports to the sultan”) shortly after his assuming the 
grand vizierate on 15 September 1656. It was in this capacity that, in Sep-
tember 1658, he brought Sultan Mehmed IV the news of the Ottoman ar-
my’s taking of the Transylvanian fortress of Yanova. As a reward the sultan 
made him küçük mirahor (master of the lesser stable).301 On 15 February 1660 
Kara Mustafa was promoted to the governor-generalship of Silistria (Silistre 
beylerbeyiliği; on the Walachian border). In April 1661 he superintend the 
journey of Tarhan Sultan (the sultana-mother, or, valide sultan) from the court 
in Edirne to Istanbul, after which he was promoted to the rank of vizier and 
appointed to the governorship (valilik) of Diyarbakr.302 
Upon the death of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa and his son Fazıl Ahmed’s 
succession to the post of grand vizier (31 October/1 November 1661), Kara 
                                                     
 
299 What we do know has been skillfully summarized in Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 
which is not only an excellent overview of Kara Mustafa’s life and career, but also a very good 
guide past all the pitfalls in the European and Ottoman accounts recording his rise and fall. 
Also see Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i ʿOsmani (Istanbul: Matbaa-yi Amire, AH 1308-1316 / AD 
1890-1898), 402, which, however, is erroneous in its chronology. 
300 On the different positions Köprülü Mehmed Paşa held during these years see M. 
Tayyib Gökbilgin  and R.C. Repp, “Köprülü”, EI2, v: 256a-63a (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 256b-
57b. 
301 A function which brought him into close contact with the sultan, since it involved the 
“care and maintenance of the sultan's privy stable or khāss ākhūr located in the second court 
of the Topkapı Palace opposite the kitchens” and particularly of “a small number of excep-
tional show horses belonging to the sultan personally”: R. Murphey, “Mīr-ākhūr”, EI2, vii: 
88a. In this context it should be remembered that Sultan Mehmed IV was called avcı (“the 
hunter”) for good reason: J.H. Kramers, “Mehemmed IV”, EI2, iv: 982a-b. 
302 For the regency of Tarhan Sultan and the Köprülüs, see ibid. 
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Mustafa Paşa was appointed grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet (kapudan-ı 
derya; kapudan paşa), which he remained until February 1666. While retaining 
his kapudanlık, he also became deputy grand vizier (sadaret kaymmakamı) dur-
ing Fazıl Ahmed’s Hungarian campaign of 1663.303 This made him both the 
second and third highest ranking official of the empire. His tenure as grand 
admiral was largely taken up by naval preparations for Köprülü’s prolonged 
campaign for the final reduction of Venetian-held Crete (the last campaign in 
the drawn-out War over Candia, 1645-1669). 
In the extensive reassignment of posts preceding the departure of the 
grand vizier’s army for Crete, Kara Mustafa was first removed from the of-
fice of kapudan and promoted to the rank of second vizier (February 1666), 
and subsequently made deputy grand vizier again (9 May 1666), which he 
remained for the full duration of the grand vizier’s absence from court (15 
May 1666-27 June 1670).304 As during his kapudanpaşalık, Kara Mustafa’s 
activities as kaymmakam were aimed largely at sustaining the grand vizier’s 
efforts on Crete. Apart from the setback of being demoted to the rank of 
third vizier (31 July 1666) to make room for the promotion to second vizier 
of another favorite of the sultan, his tenure and standing at court seem to 
have been relatively secure during this period. After the capitulation of Crete 
(5 September 1669) and the grand vizier’s return to Edirne, Kara Mustafa 
was dismissed from his sadaret kaymmakamlığı, but maintained his rank and 
popularity with the sultan as a courtier and rikab kaymmakamı (deputy of the 
stirrup).305 
He joined the Polish campaign of 1672 as a reasonably successful 
commander, and was appointed chief plenipotentiary to negotiate a cessation 
of hostilities that turned out to be very favorable to the Ottomans 
(annexation of Podolia; protection of Ukraine). Although holding no high 
administrative office for some four years, his influence at court remained 
undiminished; as part of the circumcision festivities held in Edirne he was 
affianced to the sultan’s youngest daughter (i.e. became namzed, 29 May 
1675).306 
                                                     
 
303 From April to November: Danişmend, İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi 3, 431-32. 
304 Ibid., 436-40. 
305 Rikab, literally meaning stirrup, was used to refer to “the service of the sultan or simply 
his presence”. “It is from this connection that we have the use of the words rikāb-ı hümāyūn or 
rikāb in the sense of interim or substitute. When the Grand Vizier moved from place to place, 
the government was thought to go with him and there was appointed “to the sovereign a 
substitute for the Grand Vizier who was called rikāb kā’immakāmı”: J. Deny, “Rikāb”, EI2, viii: 
529a. 
306 For descriptions of these festivities, at which all European representatives at the Porte 
(the Ottoman government) were expected to be present, see John Covel, “Extracts From the 
Diaries of Dr. John Covel, 1670-1679”, in: Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant, ed. J. 
Theodore Bent (London: Hakluyt Society, 1893), 171-…; and Yusuf Nabi, Vekāyi‘-i hıtān-ı 
şehzādegān-ı hazret-i sultān Mehmed Gāzī, available in transliteration as A.S.Levend, Yūsuf Nabi’nin 
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The year 1676 marked the ending of the grand vizierate of Köprülüzade 
Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and his succession by Kara Mustafa Paşa. During the last 
phase of Ahmed Paşa’s illness, his public functions had already been taken 
over by Mustafa (from 28 July 1676 onwards). Then, on 3 November 1676 – 
while accompanying the sultan from Istanbul to Edirne in the capacity of yol 
kaymmakamı – he received his appointment to the highest post of the empire; 
a post he held until his execution in Belgrade on 25 December 1683. 
 
So when and how was it, that this promising statesman, so strongly 
connected to the Köprülü house and careers, and expected to continue the 
policies of his predecessors with respect to the European merchant 
communities residing in the empire, begot this reputation of terror? 
Strikingly enough, it was not during his years as kapudan (23 December 
1661-6/19 February 1666), an office which by its nature implied a 
considerable amount of contact with European shipping. What’s more, the 
port city of Izmir, home to the largest and richest European trading 
communities of the empire, was under threefold control of the 
kapudanpaşalık: The city itself was freehold property (hass) of the chief 
secretary of the admiralty (tersane-i ‘amire kethüdası), who administrated it 
through a kadi (judge cum civil administrator); the province (or sancak) of 
Suğla of which it was part, with its capital at Urla, was governed by a derya beyi 
(fleet governor) appointed by the kapudan and answerable to him alone; and 
as part of the kapudan’s beylerbeyilik (governor-generalship) the security of the 
city, its bay, its province, and even part of its hinterland and surrounding 
shorelines, the upkeep of its fortifications, and the availability of vital 
supplies were all the direct responsibility of the kapudan himself.307 We can 
be absolutely certain that the European communities and their consuls and 
ambassadors would have commented extensively upon any unfriendly 
behaviour. But even during Kara Mustafa’s active command in the region 
throughout 1662 nothing much out of the ordinary was reported. 
                                                                                                                        
 
Surnâmesi (Istanbul: n.p., 1944). Her name is given as “Küçük Sultān” by Heywood (id., “Karā 
Mustafa Pasha”) and Süreyya (id., Sicill-i ʿOsmani). Yılmaz Öztuna gives “Emetullâh (Ümmî) 
(Küçük) Sultan”: Yılmaz Öztuna, Devletler ve hanedanlar, vol. 2: Türkiye (1074-1990) (Ankara: 
Ku ̈ltu ̈r Bakanlıg ̆ı, 1989), 202. As for the age of the parties, in October 1676, when the actual 
marriage had not yet taken place, Colyer estimated that of Kara Mustafa as forty, and that of 
his fiancée as three: The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 9 October 1676. 
307 On the tersane-i ‘amire (the imperial dockyards; the home base of the kapudan paşa), the 
derya beyi, the kapudan-ı derya and his beylerbeyilik of Ceza’ir-i Bahr-ı Sefid, see, generally, 
Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devletinin … teşkilātı; id., “Bahriyya, 3: The Ottoman navy”, EI2, i: 947a-
48b; B. Lewis, “Daryā-begi”, EI2, ii: 165b; S. Özbaran, “Kapudan Pasha”, EI2, iv: 571b-72b; 
C.F. Beckingham, “Djazā’ir-i Bahr-ı Safīd”, EI2, ii: 521b-22a. 
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It is at the very end of his service as kapudan and during his succeeding 
tenure as sadaret kaymmakamı (9 May 1666-17 June 1670), that we start to 
hear the first complaints (308) about Kara Mustafa: 
 
[He] was subsequently put in charge of naval preparations for the planned final reduction 
of Crete. His actions at this time, in attempting to commandeer for transport purposes ships 
of the European maritime powers, were resisted by their representatives at the Porte, and 
contributed materially to the exaggerated accounts concerning him which became current in 
Europe.309 
 
Although these commandeering actions were not taken lightly at the time, 
they were not the reason behind what Heywood rightly terms “the 
exaggerated accounts”. Naturally, there was much protesting and posturing. 
But after all was said and done, irritations had not run so high as to 
overcome prudence – as we may infer from the positive descriptions of 
kaymmakam Kara Mustafa of still later dates. The Europeans in the Levant 
were well aware of the sensitivity of the issue of Crete and of the immense 
importance the Porte attached to the final attempt to gain the entire island. 
As their petitions make clear, they also realised that in this, Kara Mustafa was 
merely following orders. At this point, the most irritating side to his 
behaviour would have been his unwillingness to accept bribes to make the 
commandeering-problems go away. This willingness to forgive (if not to 
forget) is evident in Colyer’s correspondence on the case of d’Oude Tobias 
(the ship “The Old Thobias”): 
Having arrived in Izmir aboard a Dutch convoy of seven ships on 12 
April 1668 to take up their positions as Dutch consul of Izmir and Dutch 
resident to Istanbul respectively, Jacob van Dam and Justinus Colyer were 
summoned before the local kadi on 30 April 1668. There, they were 
confronted with a ferman (command; order) from Istanbul drawn up “in the 
first quarter of the noble moon of Zilkade, in the year 1078”.310 In it, 
kaymmakam Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, who had just returned from a 
                                                     
 
308 There had been some commandeering of French vessels in 1661, but this was rightly 
perceived to be a consequence of France’s strained relations with the Ottoman Empire during 
the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1645-1669. Duparc’s Recueil des instructions 29 provides a clear 
overview of the Ottoman-French controversy during this period. 
309 Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 590b. On Kara Mustafā’s commandeering of Eng-
lish shipping, see Anderson, English Consul, 174-78; - of French shipping, see Paul Masson, 
Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Hachette, 1896), 12 and 
throughout; - of Dutch shipping, see W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de Levant”, De 
Navorscher, 56/10 (1906), 527-31. 
310 Between 13 and 22 April 1668. 
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stay at Lárisa with the sultan311, ordered the requisitioning of a Dutch ship 
for grain transports from Izmir to Köprülü’s besieging army on Crete: 
 
Command of the Grand Signor, given to his kaymmakam of Constantinople, addressed to 
the kadi, kapıcıbaşı [commander of the guard], gümrük emini [customer; customs 
collector] and Dutch Consul of the scale or port of Smyrna. / Be it known unto you that 
my highest order will be; that, it being very necessary at present that larger quantities of 
grain be sent to the island of Candia, 25,000 kilos of grain will be sent thither from the 
scale of Smyrna on a Dutch ship, being big and strong, which will be chartered, and the 
moneys needed to that end, will be taken, and you will pay those to them [the Dutch] out 
of the revenue of the aforementioned scale and the customs, and draw up a public act of the 
money given them. And my notable command also orders that the said grain be laden into 
the said ship as soon as possible, and will be dispatched in all hurry and haste to the said 
island, …312 
 
Van Dam and Colyer immediately went to work, attempting to have the 
order reversed. They petitioned the kadi of Izmir, the grand vizier, as well as 
his kethüda (steward; personal representative) Mahmad Ağa, calling upon 
them to honor the article of the Dutch capitulation designed to protect the 
Dutch against commandeering (angariye; corvée) – but to no avail. 
The Dutch capitulation then in force was that of 1612 (confirmed in 
1634). The only article that dealt with commandeering was article 47: 
 
ve kalyūnları u gemileri her kangı iskelede olursa tamām gümrüklerin ‘ahdnāme 
mücibince verdikden soñra ba‘zı angariye içün alıkomayalar ve angariye teklīf eylemeyeler 
/ After their galleons and ships have paid full customs duties according to the capitulation 
in whatever scale it may be, they may not be detained for some corvée (angariye) nor may it 
be proposed.313 
 
Naturally, the kaymmakam was also aware of this article and had 
circumvented it by not exacting angariye pure and simple, instead turning it 
into a forced lease, just as he had done, and would continue to do, in similar 
                                                     
 
311 “so as to observe more closely the progress of the siege of Kandiye”: Heywood, “Karā 
Mustafa Pasha”, 590b. 
312 See this dragoman’s translation and several other documents on the case in The Hague, 
NA 1.03.01 123, specifically: Jacob van Dam and Justinus Colyer to DLH, 5 May 1688. The 
Dutch had been relatively fortunate, as the French had already been forced to send eleven 
ships and several more requisitioned French and English ships were awaiting departure in 
Izmir harbor. The reason behind this bout of Ottoman commandeering was that the 
Venetians had recently destroyed seven large Ottoman ships off Crete: Van Dam van Isselt, 
“Avaniën in de Levant”, 527-29. 
313 De Groot, Ottoman Empire, 244 and 257. Angariye (“angary” in English) is the requisi-
tioning by a belligerent state of neutral possessions, and refers to the right of belligerents to 
destroy or use in case of need, neutral possessions within their territory or on the open seas, 
be it in defence or in attack: Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal op CD-Rom (Den Haag: Sdu 
Uitgevers, 2000). 
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cases with the other European trading communities. But there is a more 
significant reason for the failure of the petitions; the near-complete control 
both the grand vizier and his deputy exerted over the chain of authorities 
involved in the order and in fact over practically every official concerned 
with the administration of foreign commerce. During the administrations of 
Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa the 
offices of poll-tax collector of Istanbul, poll-tax collector of Izmir and Chios, 
customs collector of Istanbul, customs collector of Izmir and Chios, and 
steward of the grand vizier were all firmly linked to each other, to the palace-
faction (sultana-mother; valide) and through friendship, marriage, and 
employment to Fazıl Ahmed’s as well as Kara Mustafa’s households.314 
Faced with so formidable a network of alliances, the Dutch stopped 
petitioning and decided to give in. In a general meeting of the Izmir nation it 
was decided to use “d’Oude Tobias”, the most run down barge they could 
muster.315 The nation bought the ship from its captain for 10,200 pieces of 
eight (reals), which it advanced with interest.316 In the end, the ship never 
made it past Chios for fear of cruising Venetian men-of-war. It had lain there 
for three months before Colyer, during his first audience with Kara Mustafa, 
pledged to indemnify the Ottomans for half its cargo and obtained 
permission to have it unloaded and released.317 The Old Thobias returned to 
home waters in 1669 and was never to return to the Levant again. Part of the 
10,220 pieces of eight was recouped by reselling the ship to its captain, and 
the interest and costs of the ship’s release by collecting an additional consular 
duty of 1,25 % from the next Dutch convoy to arrive in Izmir.318 
6 May 1668, the day after the Dutch nation of Izmir had decided to place 
d’Oude Tobias at the Ottomans’ disposal and had agreed upon an 
apportionment of the projected costs of the resident’s first audience at court, 
Colyer embarked for Istanbul to take up his embassy. His ships arrived there 
on the 25th and he entered the city in procession on the 31st. After settling in, 
preparations immediately began for the journey to Edirne, where he and Van 
                                                     
 
314 See Table 15 infra. 
315 As much is admitted in the correspondence home, but may also be verified from a list 
of all Dutch ships (incl. the ambassadorial and consular duties levied from them according to 
the worth of their cargo) that made port in Izmir between 12 April 1668 and 31 October 
1671. The convoy under commodore Hendrik van Toll with which Van Dam and Colyer had 
arrived in Izmir, had included seven merchantmen; “The Old Thobias” was about 60% small-
er than the bigger vessels in the convoy: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 204b-9b: DLH to States 
of Holland and West-Friesland, 1676. 
316 In the Levant in 1668 the common exchange rate of the piece of eight, or (eight-)real, 
was about 110 akçes (that of the Lion Dollar 100 akçes). See note 320. 
317 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a. 
318 Van Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de Levant”, 537. 
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Dam would present their credentials.319 Having received 28,000 akçe from 
Kara Mustafa to meet preliminary expenses, Colyer and his train left for 
Edirne July 26th.320 Van Dam and his train left Izmir on the 19th and the two 
parties met up outside Edirne on the 29th. During its stay in Edirne from 3 to 
24 August, the Dutch delegation felt it was treated with extraordinary 
magnanimity, receiving gifts and treatment on equal footing with the 
representatives of the Porte’s most valued European allies, particularly from 
Kara Mustafa.321 
This partiality was also in evidence during Colyer’s audience with him; he 
not only received the resident with courtesy, but also acceded to Colyer’s 
every request concerning mercantile affairs, issuing four dragomans’ berats to 
Colyer and no less then fifteen fermans in favour of the Dutch to several 
Ottoman officials in Istanbul, Izmir and Chios.322 When he left Edirne, 
Colyer had good reason to look upon Kara Mustafa as positively as he did. 
 
The remainder of Kara Mustafa’s tenure as kaymmakam passed without the 
Dutch coming into any major conflict with him. In the course of 1669 and 
1670, there were some trade related disputes between a number of Dutch 
factors of Izmir and their Ottoman creditors, felt by the Dutch to have been 
                                                     
 
319 For the full account of Colyer’s arrival in Istanbul and his audiences at Edirne, see 
Colyer, Oprecht journael. 
320 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 53b-54a. In the Levant in 1668 28,000 akçes were worth 
about 120 Venetian ducats, 255 Spanish eight-reals, or 280 Dutch Lion Dollars: Şevket 
Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 144. According to Colyer’s account of 17 September 1668, the total expenses of the 
audience amounted to 7,500 Lion Dollars: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 73a. This amounted 
to slightly more than Colyer’s total annual salary as it was fixed in 1675 - 5,000 eight-reals and 
7,500 guilders: Schutte, Repertorium, 308. At the time one eight-real was reckoned worth slight-
ly more than 2.5 guilders (a rix-dollar). By way of comparison, the fixed part of the salary of 
the kadi of Izmir was 500 akçes per day (appr. 1,825 Lion Dollars a year), a captain or a pilot in 
the service of the Dutch navy received a monthly salary of about 30 guilders (appr. 144 Lion 
Dollars a year), a sailor of about 11 guilders a month (appr. 52 Lion Dollars a year): respec-
tively, Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 89: “Ve beş yüz akçe mevleviyyetdir”; J.G. van Dillen, Van 
Rijkdom en Regenten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 439-80; and C.R. Boxer, The Dutch 
Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (London: Hutchinson, 1965), 337-41. 
321 These were specified as the German Emperor, the Grand Duke of Moscovy and the 
King of Poland. Kara Mustafa bestowed 25 vests (tabards) upon them, which was a considera-
ble honor since the French and English had never received more than 12. Gifts from the 
sultan included 10 live sheep, 100 hens, 50 white breads, 20 sugar breads, 20 wax candles, 25 
eight-reals a day for the table, 230 eight-reals for furniture: W.E. van Dam van Isselt,  “Eenige 
lotgevallen van Jacob van Dam, consul te Smirna van 1668-1688”, Bĳdragen voor vaderlandsche 
geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 4/6 (1907), 102-3. 
322 Normally, audiences would be given by the sultan and his grand vizier, but since Fazıl 
Ahmed was in Crete conducting the siege, deputy grand vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa observed 
his functions. These dragomans’ berats (diplomas for the embassy’s interpreters) and fermans 
(imperial orders) have all been lost, but fortunately an elaborate description of their contents 
does still exist in The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a. 
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instigated by the kadi of Izmir for his own profit. Kara Mustafa’s 
involvement in these seems to have been limited to adjusting them; that is, to 
negotiating settlements between the parties (informally) as referee and 
(formally) as acting president of the divan-ı hümayun (“the imperial council”; 
the Ottoman cabinet and supreme court in Istanbul). Although the rulings in 
all these cases were in favour of the Dutch, there was some irritation about 
the expenses they had to make to get the cases heard to begin with, and 
about the “fees” Kara Mustafa charged for his services. 
In March 1670 all European ships then in the harbour of Izmir were 
commandeered for troop transport. This time the order came directly from 
Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, who was demobilising his army from Crete 
after its capitulation (4 September 1669). Consul van Dam managed to get a 
number of ships sailing under the Dutch flag released from this duty by 
sending his chief dragoman to Crete with a petition and some presents. 
Some problems with the kadi of Izmir aside, matters were resolved with 
relative ease. Kara Mustafa, whose importance as kaymmakam was declining 
steadily as the grand vizier resumed the reins of government, was not 
involved.323 
Upon his brother’s return to the court in Edirne in 27 June 1670, Kara 
Mustafa was relieved of his office of sadaret kaymmakamı. Perhaps having 
fallen out of favour with Fazıl Ahmed (for having schemed against him 
during his long absence, it was rumoured), he was removed from real 
administrative power. But the grand vizier did not stop there; he also 
loosened Kara Mustafa’s grip on the administration of foreign trade by 
ridding himself of his “particular friend” customs collector Hüseyin Ağa (I), 
for whom Kara Mustafa had procured promotion from the Izmir to the 
Istanbul customs.324 
Just as the war with Venice over Crete had prompted his father Mehmed 
Köprülü to invest in Izmir’s defences (325), so Fazıl Ahmed now focussed his 
attention on the city and initiated the Izmir-leg of his vakf’s construction 
program. The new bedestan and gümrük were completed in 1675, but building 
                                                     
 
323 See generally, The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6911; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124; The Hague, 
NA 1.02.22 676 204b-9b; id. 684, 73b-80a; Van Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de Levant”, 533-
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324 The customs collector of Istanbul was also the empire’s chief customs collector, to 
whom all other customs collectors were answerable. These officials were tax-farmers; they 
purchased their “farm” (iltizam), i.e. their right to collect customs, on an annual basis through 
a bidding procedure. The relation between Kara Mustafa and Hüseyin Ağa (I) figures promi-
nently in all contemporary accounts, but see Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 123 and 170-71 in 
particular. Galland tells us Hüseyin Ağa felt the grand vizier might move against him and left 
his post to make the pilgrimage (hacc), which was a common method of officials out-of-favour 
to get out of the way before they got hurt. 
325 On Mehmed’s strengthening of Izmir’s defences, see ibid., 103; and Iconomos, Étude 
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on the other structures continued under Kara Mustafa’s supervision until 
their completion in 1677.326 This meant that the introduction and 
enforcement of the accompanying procedures was left up to Kara Mustafa, 
whose reputation in the eyes of the Europeans would diminish considerably 
because of his determination to position the vakf and make the most of its 
potential for trade regulation and taxation. 
Kara Mustafa Paşa had survived the reversal which had been the result of 
the return of the grand vizier through the personal protection of the sultan. 
After two years at court he rebuilt his career during Fazıl Ahmed’s Polish 
campaigns, in which the sultan took an active interest. During these 
campaigns he proved himself a capable commander and tough negotiator. In 
1672 he concluded a cessation of hostilities with the Poles at Buçaş 
(Buczacz), which was so harsh that the Polish Diet refused to ratify it, 
opening the door to the Polish and Ukrainian campaigns of ’73, ’74, ’75 and 
’76.327 As the grand vizier’s health declined (from November 1674 onwards) 
Kara Mustafa’s power increased, a process culminating in his assuming the 
functions of grand vizier in July 1676 and finally in his appointment to the 
grand vizierate in November of the same year. 
 
The first months of Kara Mustafa’s grand vizierate were spent in Edirne; 
with the latest news from court reaching the European representatives in 
Istanbul through their own and the Porte’s dragomans. A change of grand 
viziers usually brought about considerable changes in the empire’s key posts 
and all news was feverishly analysed for hints of the new administration’s 
policy regarding European political and mercantile affairs. 31 January 1677, 
Colyer first reported home on the subject: 
 
The changes regarding the high ministers of this realm since my last of 9 November of the 
previous year, are the following. The paşas or governors of places and frontiers adjoining 
Christendom have been moved and have most been sent to other governorships in Asia 
Minor. The kaymmakam of Constantinople, kapudan paşa, or admiral of the sea, and the 
bostancıbaşı, being the chief forester, have all been continued in their charges. Süleyman 
Ağa, chief secretary [kethüda] of the late grand vizier, has been made master of the great 
stable [büyük mirahor]. One of the sultanas or concubines of the grand signor, called the 
wife sultana [haseki sultan], was delivered of a young princess. The paşa, recently 
appointed by the Porte over that of Tunis, was violently rejected by its inhabitants, and has 
returned here. That paşa, to obtain that governorship, spent vast treasures, and principally 
to the aforesaid Süleyman Ağa, who alone enjoyed 600 purses from him, each purse being 
500 rix-dollars. The current grand vizier having become acquainted with this, as well as 
with the exorbitant moneys that the bostancıbaşı of Adrianople, one of the favourites of the 
grand signor [the sultan], who was to construct a new building there for the sultan’s women 
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(during the emperors stay here last year), is charging for it, has brought both great men to 
account; such that much is feared for their persons. The entire court will return here towards 
the month of March, at which time the Christian ministers will have to personally 
congratulate him on his high office with extra presents.328 
 
All considered, Colyer thought it safe to conclude that Kara Mustafa would 
continue most of the policies of his predecessor, and it was hoped that this 
would be in the same spirit of uprightness for which Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was 
remembered, by the Dutch and the English at least. The almost immediate 
reappointment of Hüseyin Ağa (I) as chief customs collector, although not 
welcomed in equal measure by all European merchant communities, seemed 
at least to confirm their expectations. Less then a month after the new grand 
vizier’s festive return from Edirne of April 12th, French ambassador De 
Nointel, ranking highest among the European representatives in Ottoman 
protocol, was the first to put the assessment of the corps diplomatique to the 
test. 
Because of their at times barely concealed sympathy and even intelligence 
and military support for the Austrians during the 1664 Battle of Saint 
Gotthard and for the Venetian defenders’ efforts on Crete, the French had 
not been on good footing with the Köprülüs. Previous French ambassadors 
had personally suffered the consequences of their own and their king’s 
actions, to the extent of being imprisoned in Istanbul’s Yedikule tower.329 In 
spite of this recent history, Louis XIV and Colbert had developed great 
designs for the Levant and for the future of Ottoman-French trade and 
relations, and expected the Ottomans to cooperate. The plan was to gain a 
complete French monopoly of the Levant trade and full and exclusive access 
to the Red Sea and the overland trading routes connecting the Mediterranean 
to the Far East. With these instruments the French would displace the other 
European trading nations from the Levant as well as the East India trades. In 
this vision, the Ottomans would cooperate for the sole purpose of increasing 
tax revenue: they would have greater control over the flow of trade through 
their domains, with the added advantage of adding to their revenue taxes 
from the rerouted Cape trade now flowing through their territories. Apart 
from the Ottomans’ commitment to these grandiose designs, ambassador De 
Nointel (1670-1679) was expected to obtain the Porte’s sincere apologies for 
its treatment of his predecessors, and acknowledgment of his status as equal 
to the sultan and as standing above all other rulers. 
                                                     
 
328 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Justinus Colyer to States General, 31 January 1677; The 
Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 31 January 1677. 
329 On Ottoman-French relations during the grand vizierates of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, 
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Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü had no intention of signing over the empire’s 
entire international trade to one nation for the delusion of gaining more 
power through it. Aiding France as it was engaged in a series of wars for the 
domination of Europe’s richest entrepot the Dutch Republic (the Franco-
Dutch and Franco-Allied wars of 1672-1678) was not an attractive 
proposition to the Ottomans. This not least since France had proven itself 
fickle in its friendship during his own and his fathers Cretan and Austrian 
campaigns, and since the king of France was arrogating for himself a rank 
equal to his own lord’s. He had renewed France’s capitulation in 1673, giving 
it rights equal to the English and confirming its right to protect French 
clergy in the Ottoman Empire (which, incidentally, they went on to willfully 
misinterpret as their right to protect all Christians in the Ottoman empire, 
including those – Orthodox, Protestants – that had strayed from the mother 
church) and had left it at that. Now, with a new grand vizier heading 
government, De Nointel was ordered to see if he could revive their plans, at 
the very least (re)gaining undisputed precedence over the representatives of 
all other nations. 
Due to De Nointel’s insistence on an adjustment of protocol in favour of 
the French, his audience of 2 May 1677 ended in utter disaster, wasting any 
chance of French diplomatic success with the Ottomans for years to come 
and destroying De Nointel’s career in the process. The Dutch resident 
gleefully described the audience and the subsequent course of events in a 
letter to the Board of Directors of Levant Trade, dated 24 May 1677, which 
merits extensive quotation because of the insight it provides into Kara 
Mustafa’s politics and the European envoys’ response to it: 
 
The second instant [2 May 1677] the first audience with the current grand vizier was 
permitted to the Lord ambassador of France; who, having ridden on horseback from his 
palace [the French embassy in Pera] to the channel [the Golden Horn] with very 
great pomp in the morning, having passed the same in twenty barges, and having arrived in 
that prince’s seraglio [serail], was led into the room of the kethüda or chief secretary of the 
grand vizier, where he was told to await the return of His Excellency from the divan (being 
the [supreme] court). Three hours had passed before the said minister was advised that 
the grand vizier had left the divan, and another hour before he was advised to come to the 
audience chamber. This long and unusual waiting being perceived as an affront (which it 
indeed is) by the French ambassador, deliberately inflicted on him in the presence of the 
assorted nations, His Excellency, entering de said audience chamber and seeing the seat of 
the grand vizier (being a bench or stool on top of a large sofa covered with tapestries, which 
is a place elevated one and a half feet) and his own beneath the said sofa on the floor, at 
once instructed his chief dragoman to pick the bench up and place it on top in the front of 
the sofa. Which having been thus executed, His Excellency too stepped onto the sofa, and 
intending to seat himself on the stool, was at once given notice that his place was not on top, 
but beneath the aforementioned sofa. This disconcerted the said ambassador to such a degree 
that he himself took the said stool up from the front of the sofa, and placed it close and to 
the right-hand side of the seat or bench of the grand vizier (which was high above), at once 
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seating himself on it. Many great men of the empire being present there, and the grand 
vizier having been informed by them and by his chief page of that act, immediately ordered 
Mr. Alexander Mavrocordati [Mavrocordato], chief dragoman of the realm, to explain 
to the ambassador his error and add that he should kindly refrain from an action so 
extravagant. But this falling on deaf ears, the çavuşbaşı, being the chief executor of orders, 
was commanded to de facto remove the said stool from the sofa and put it down on the floor 
where it had been placed before. He [the çavuşbaşı] presently and with great fury 
appeared in the audience chamber and in a loud voice, and with an attitude of perfect 
contempt for his people, ordered the said bench (on which the ambassador was seated) to be 
taken from under him. Which was executed with such skill that the Lord ambassador 
could scarcely save himself from tumbling down. Seeing himself stripped of all honour and 
civility, but on top of that showered with all sorts of public ignominy and vicissitudes, and 
doubtlessly fearing worse, he stepped off the said sofa and departed, saying in parting that 
(if he were treated in such a fashion) he did not even want an audience with the grand 
vizier. Which having been reported to His Excellency, prompted the following response 
from him: let him have it with him who be damned, then. The following afternoon and 
evening the grand vizier, of his own accord and with great courtesy, had the Lords 
ambassadors of England and of Venice, as well as the States General’s minister, yours 
truly, informed of his wish to receive them the next day. To this day, this courtesy has never 
been practiced by any grand vizier. But the current, after all being no less highly placed than 
his predecessors, wanted merely to find out how the other ministers would look upon the 
encounter described above. The Lord English ambassador responded that his indisposition 
didn’t allow him to perform the said call, this because (so I have been informed), firstly, the 
grand vizier had given precedence to France in that ceremony, and, secondly, that he, being 
an ambassador of a king who did not yield to France, now found himself implicated in the 
actions of the said French ambassador. The Lord ambassador of Venice, and the States 
General’s minister have not felt those impediments, and as a consequence have not attached 
ourselves to the circumstances of another, but have in this adhered to the old custom, namely 
that the Christian ministers, be they from a king or from a republic, in their first audience 
with a newly appointed grand vizier of this realm are generally received below the sofa. And 
had the Lord ambassador of France not previously been treated with such disdain as having 
to wait for so long, I am sure that he would not have let himself be carried to such 
extremities. The 3 instant [3 May 1677] at ten in the morning the aforesaid Venetian 
minister had his audience seated on a stool below the sofa, during which some difficulties 
occurred because the chief dragoman of that republic wanting to mediate, the grand vizier 
objected and ordered the abovementioned Mr. Mavrocordati to relate what the ambassador 
wanted to make known. At first not being obeyed in this, the affair stood to end very badly 
for the chief dragoman on account of the grand vizier’s quick-temperedness, but the Lord 
ambassador prevented this with great foresight by shortening his compliment.330 
 
Colyer had his own audience that same day and was again received with 
exceptional courtesy, being allowed as a mark of respect to ride his horse 
through the palace gate, past the guardsmen and officials lined up across the 
outer court, and right up to the palace steps where he was received by the 
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Porte’s abovementioned chief dragoman, Mavrocordato. He was not taken 
to the steward’s office to wait, but was led straightaway to the audience 
chamber, where he was again welcomed by Mavrocordato, who showed him 
his stool beneath the sofa and introduced him to the chief officials of the 
empire. The grand vizier presently appeared amid loud cheers, greeted the 
ambassador in passing by bringing his right hand to his chest and bowing his 
head, and stepped onto the sofa. The grand vizier’s bench and Colyer’s stool 
were picked up and put directly opposite one another, one on top of the 
sofa, the other below it. Being seated, Kara Mustafa personally bid him 
welcome, referring to him as “Lord ambassador” (“elçi bey”). Colyer thanked 
him, congratulated him on his appointment, and presented him with the 
required gifts. While coffee, sherbet, rose water and incense were brought in 
and taken, he and Kara Mustafa Paşa discussed Europe’s current wars, with 
Mavrocordato interpreting the whole time. The audience ended with the 
usual ceremony, the grand vizier taking his leave of Colyer with two nods of 
the head.331 
Regarding the French and English ambassadors’ audiences, Colyer tells us 
that De Nointel afterwards tried to obtain another audience by “capitulating” 
on the subject of the stool, but was denied one, while the English 
ambassador, John Finch, had gone into hiding in his country house. He also 
mentions that the resident of Genoa had not been able to obtain an 
audience.332 Colyer ends his letter with the remark that “the government 
under the current vizier will to all appearances be very severe”, which, 
however, was not in reference to his contacts with Europe, but to the 
methods by which he eliminated any internal threat to his position, as is 
illustrated by a list of the high Ottoman officials whose severed heads had 
recently been displayed in front of the palace and in Istanbul’s public places. 
 
It is at this juncture that we see Kara Mustafa’s reputation receive its first 
serious and irreversible dents; less then a year into his grand vizierate and as 
a direct consequence of his first rapports in that capacity with the European 
representatives in Istanbul. The failed audience exasperated De Nointel and 
Finch (who had inadvertently and without necessity allowed himself to be 
drawn into a similar position). Stalling audiences was a proven tactic of the 
                                                     
 
331 On Ottoman ceremony in general, see A.H. de Groot, “Marāsim, 4: In the Ottoman 
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Ottomans to gain space for political manoeuvring and to make it clear to the 
Europeans that audiences and privileges were not a right but a grant. But 
categorically being denied an audience was something usually reserved for 
states on the brink of war with the Ottomans. Strictly speaking, it rendered 
the capitulations of the states involved worthless. For without confirmation 
of their privileges, the ambassadors had no supreme authority to turn to in 
case of disputes. 
In their letters home, both the English and French ambassadors 
attributed what had happened exclusively to what they considered to be the 
base character and ignorance of the grand vizier. Capitalising on prejudices 
prevalent in Europe at the time to masquerade their own inadequate 
handling of the affair, they suggested that the cause of the grand vizier’s 
refusal to grant them an audience was the “proverbial arrogance and avidity 
of the Turks”; meaning that he was trying to find out what they would be 
willing to sacrifice for a second chance and took pleasure in humiliating 
them. Unfortunately, these biased explanations have found their way into 
even much of the more recent literature on Kara Mustafa Paşa, in which he 
is invariably described as an extortionate xenophobe. Explanations like these, 
however, ignore the fact that Colyer had no problems whatsoever during his 
audience; quite the contrary. To ascribe this to his willingness to go along 
with Kara Mustafa in sitting below the sofa or in using the Porte’s dragoman 
Mavrocordato is also not quite convincing, for it fails to account for the 
marked difference between the events preceding the actual audience of De 
Nointel and that of Colyer. 
If we credit Kara Mustafa with slightly more capabilities and insight, and 
take the international arena in which he was operating into consideration, a 
more realistic picture emerges. In light of the evidence available on his 
conduct throughout his grand vizierate, we may certainly assume that, 
confronted with the excessive demands of Louis XIV and his ambassador, 
he did his utmost best to press home the point that the sultan and his 
ministers considered themselves superior to the French king and his 
emissary. But any explanation of what took place during and following these 
audiences, should also take into account Kara Mustafa’s preoccupation with 
European affairs and their bearing on the Ottoman position. Not only was 
his grand vizierate marked by an endless succession of campaigns against 
Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia, this preoccupation was also evident in 
his diplomatic contacts with Europe. In this respect, it is more than revealing 
that he continued Fazıl Ahmed Paşa’s experienced foreign affairs advisor 
Mavrocordato, and, what’s more, personally insisted on making active use of 
his expertise in all his contacts with the European envoys.333 If we add to this 
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the fact that in giving audiences Kara Mustafa regularly inquired after the 
latest political and military developments in Europe and – in doing so – 
proved well-informed about its wars (334), it becomes clear that his diverging 
treatment of De Nointel and Colyer must be considered a calculated political 
act. After all, the Dutch were fighting a war for their very survival as an 
independent nation against an alliance headed by France, and this survival 
was considered by many as a crucial obstacle to any further increase in the 
French king’s power and realm. All of which is not to say that Kara 
Mustafa’s diplomacy was as clever as his predecessors. 
Almost seven months later, the antagonism that was the result of the 
events of 2 and 3 May had still not been mended. 25 November 1677 saw 
the end of the month of Ramadan and the start of the festivities marking the 
breaking of the fast (şeker bayramı). On this day, the foreign envoys usually 
sent their dragomans to congratulate the grand vizier during an audience and 
present him with gifts to a certain fixed value. But the interpreters of English 
ambassador (Finch) and Genoese resident (Spinola) were refused their 
audiences: the former because his employer had avoided having his ever 
since the “stool”-incident, the latter because he had already been in Istanbul 
for two and a half years without having presented his credentials and the 
gifts from his kral (king).335 Here too, it was claimed that the sole motive 
behind Kara Mustafa’s behavior was his lust for money. But just as with the 
first audiences discussed above, the grand vizier’s treatment of the Dutch 
and Venetians contradicts this. 
After intense negotiations the grand vizier agreed to receive Finch and 
Spinola as soon as possible (but without setting a date), provided they 
compensated for their previous disrespect by adding to their usual gifts 
“current gold sequins” to the value of 5,000 Lion Dollars for the grand 
vizier, and the same to the value of 1,000 Lion Dollars for the grand vizier’s 
steward and the reis ül-küttab (secretary of state). This increase in gifts worried 
                                                                                                                        
 
was not only Fazıl Ahmed’s and Kara Mustafa’s foreign affairs advisor but also their, as well 
as the sultan’s, personal physician. On the Phanariotes, see J.H. Mordtmann, “Fener”, EI2, ii: 
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Europe Orientale. 
334 Another example: “Il est fort curieux de nouvelles et lorsque M. le Bayle de Venise eut 
audience, il s’informa fort de l’état des guerres de la France avec l’Espangne, l’Allemagne et la 
Hollande”, Galland, Journal, ii : 205. See also Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 591a. 
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the other representatives, who complained that the English and Genoese had 
increased their gifts regardless the consequences of their actions for the 
other nations. Their worries proved premature however, for the presents 
offered by Colyer and Venetian bailo Morosini were graciously received, 
although they had not been increased.336 
 
Up until this point, the European representatives in Istanbul had not been 
unanimous in condemning Kara Mustafa Paşa. The rather obvious 
distinction between those denouncing him and those considering him as 
severe but fair a grand vizier as his predecessor, was whether they were 
treated as representing allies or foes. This in its turn depended on the 
geopolitical situation as well as on the manner in which they approached 
him. 
This changed between 1 and 18 January 1678. On that last day, Colyer 
informed the States General that “every day, we see the maxims of this 
present government incline more and more to the extreme prejudice of all 
Christian nations”. The immediate cause of his alarm was an order (ferman) 
issued by the grand vizier: 
 
Now the grand vizier at the beginning of this month had notice given to all Christian 
public ministers that each of them should hand over to a specially commissioned kadi a list 
of all his merchants that had got married in these parts, of the names and number of his 
dragomans, and of the names and number of his indigenous servants; and also that all 
consuls and dragomans of the entire realm would within the space of three months have to 
request new berats from the Porte on pains of being considered ordinary subjects; and, 
regarding the dragomans of this country, that they will have to pay the haraç to which all 
natives of the realm that are not Turks [i.e. Muslims] are liable, which is in direct 
violation of all capitulations.337 And for all these matters no other explanation can be 
given, except that it is the will of him who holds the power to carry them out. The specific 
purpose of which is to bring all Christian [i.e. European] merchants that have contracted 
marriages here under the said haraç, and to gain a good sum of money from the new berats. 
For fear of new avanias, all public ministers have provided the aforementioned lists to the 
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said kadi, and undertaken to convey orders to their respective consuls and dragomans 
residing beyond this place [Istanbul] to comply with the notice given.338 
 
The ferman caused considerable distress among the European communities of 
the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman subjects that were under their 
protection. Not so much because of the measures it dictated, but because of 
their wider implications. The haraç tax was not a financial burden the 
Europeans and their protégés would not be able to bear.339 Similarly, 
obtaining new berats – though more costly – was also not an insurmountable 
financial drain on the embassies since they would be reimbursed by selling 
them to the recipients. 
The real problem was that the plans of the grand vizier, if carried 
through, would disrupt the entire system that enabled the European 
merchant communities to conduct their trade through their Ottoman 
connections. As we have seen, European merchants in the Ottoman Empire 
conducted their trade through Ottoman wholesalers and brokers with the 
assistance of Ottoman dragomans and warehousemen, all of them protected 
non-Muslims (zimmis). These Greek, Armenian and Jewish Ottoman 
middlemen were drawn to trade with the Europeans by virtue of those 
articles of the capitulations that offered to Ottoman personnel of European 
embassies and consulates the same exemption from Ottoman taxes it did to 
protected foreigners (müstemin). Although many of these Ottoman 
connections were not exactly personnel, they were extended this European 
protection through nomination to a “nominal” dragomanship or vice-
consulship by one of the European representatives in Istanbul, with 
conferral of their office being effected with a berat granted by the Ottoman 
central administration. In this context, the question of their having to pay 
haraç or not was not merely one of purchasing the protection of the Muslim 
ruler (here; the Ottoman sultan) for a few dollars, but encompassed further 
liability to a number of commercial dues and taxes (tekalif-i ‘örfiyye) which 
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could amount to much more. Liability to those taxes would effectively negate 
the competitive edge they had gained through European protection.340 
But as we have seen, the Ottoman “employees” of the Europeans were 
not the only ones the ferman was aimed at: European merchants that had 
taken zimmi wives were also to be subjected to haraç. Such a measure would 
effectively “naturalize” those merchants and their families to Ottoman 
subjects. This was not only of great consequence for the merchants 
themselves, but also for the European officials representing them, since they 
stood to lose some of their richest subjects. 
The articles of the capitulations which Colyer and his colleagues claimed 
the order was in contravention of (but to which the Ottoman government 
and its poll-tax collectors no doubt considered it a long overdue 
specification), ran as follows (in the Dutch capitulation in force at the time): 
 
[art. 32:] ve anlara tābi‘ olub memālik-i mahrūsemizde mütemekkin olanlar eger evlü 
olsun ve ergen olsun rencberlik edenler anlardan harāc taleb olunmaya [art. 33:] ve ėlçileri 
hidmetinde olan kūnsulūslar ve tercümānlar olageldügi üzere harācdan ve kassābiyyeden ve 
tekālīf-i ‘örfiyyeden mu‘āf olalar [art. 34:] ve Iskenderiyye ve Tarabulus-i Şām ve Cezā’ir 
ve Tunus ve Cezā’ir-i ġarb ve Mışr iskelelerine ve ġayrlara ta‘yīn ėtdükleri kūnsulūsların 
tebdīl ėdüb gönderdikde kimesne māni‘ olmaya / [art. 32:] From the subjects of the 
[Dutch Provinces] who have become residents in our well-guarded dominions, whether 
married or bachelor, and exercising trade, tribute (harāc) may not be demanded. [art. 33:] 
The consuls and dragomans who are employed by their ambassador are exempt from 
tribute, kassābiye-tax and extraordinary taxes (tekālīf-i ‘örfiyye), as has become usual. 
[art. 34:] Nobody may present obstacles when [the Dutch] appoint consuls to the scales 
of Alexandria, Tripoli of Syria, the Archipelago, Tunis, Algiers, Cairo and other places, 
change them, appoint men capable of such a task in those places and despatch them.341 
 
The first thing we must conclude from these articles, is that the order was 
not in direct contravention of them. The capitulations were susceptible to 
varying interpretations depending on many circumstances, such as the 
goodwill of local officials or the Porte, the conduct of the European 
merchants or nations in question, etc.. 
With regard to article 32, the Europeans claimed they could marry 
whomever they wished, whether they were subjects of the sultan or not. 
                                                     
 
340 On the protection system, see, generally, Maurits Hubrecht van den Boogert, 
“Ottoman Dragomans and European Consuls: The Protection System in Eigteenth-Century 
Aleppo” (PhD diss., Universiteit Leiden, 2001). Fot further reference to the protection system 
and haraç, see İnalcik, “Imtiyāzāt”; J. Schacht, “Amān”, EI2, i: 429a-30a; L. Fekete, “Berāt”, 
EI2, i: 1170a-71a; B. Lewis, “Berātlı”, EI2, i: 1171b; Cahen, “Dhimma”; Cahen and İnalcık, 
“Djizya”. 
341 Transliteration and translation: De Groot, Ottoman Empire, 241-42 and 255. 
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Although their assertion had legality beyond the capitulations (342), this had 
always remained a controversial matter and there had been many cases where 
a tax-collector, kadi, or governor had tested the proportionate strength of 
both principles by trying to levy haraç or other taxes reserved for Ottoman 
subjects such as inheritance-tax (kassamiye; resm-i kısmet).343 Such cases then 
had to be resolved by giving presents and bribes to the officials involved, or 
to various officials in the central administration to obtain an order 
confirming the applicability of the capitulary article in question. Since this 
had to be done with some regularity, the European trade organisations 
pressed the ambassadors and consuls to discourage and prevent as much as 
possible such “mixed” marriages.344 That this policy did not succeed we can 
infer from the frequent reiteration of orders to that effect. 
The ferman was also not in direct violation of articles 33 and 34, since it 
did not order all Ottoman dragomans and vice-consuls to be made liable to 
haraç. As indicated above, this would have meant completely lifting their 
protection, making it virtually impossible for them to exercise their duties. 
                                                     
 
342 Accord. Khadduri, War and peace, a summary of Islamic jurisprudence and Ottoman 
law on relations between Muslims and non-Muslims: “Once the harbī becomes a musta’min, 
he is allowed to bring with him his family and children; to visit any city of dār al-Islām except 
the holy cities of the Hijāz; to reside permanently in dār al-Islām, if he accepted the status of 
dhimmī and paid the jizya; and to marry a dhimmī woman and take her back with him to dār 
al-harb (conversely, if the harbī were a woman and married a dhimmī man, she had no right to 
take him with her to dār al-harb since this might constitute potential power for use against dār 
al-Islām).” (166) and “If the musta’min, after he returned to dār al-harb, leaving his property 
in the dār al-Islām, suddenly died; his property could not be taken out of dār al-Islām by his 
heirs; instead, it would be confiscated by the State. But if the musta’min died while he was in 
the dār al-Islām, the amān granted was still valid for his property; his heirs could therefore 
take it out of the dār al-Islām if they wanted to do so.” (168). 
343 See Cengiz Orhonlu, “Kassām”, EI2, iv: 735b-6a; and İnalcik, “Imtiyāzāt”. The articles 
in the Dutch capitulation of 1612 exempting the inheritances of Dutch subjects from kas-
samiye, or from seizure by the sultan if there were no known/recognized heirs, ran; “[art. 7:] If 
a subject of the Dutch Provinces dies, Treasury officials may not interfere with his goods 
contrary to the capitulation, saying that they are the property of unknown owners, or on any 
other pretext.”, “[art. 9:] The dividers of inheritances (kassām) and the cadis may not demand 
the duty on the division of inheritance.”, and “[art. 29:] If a person dies, his goods and posses-
sions must be given to whom he has bequeathed them. If a person dies intestate, they must be 
given to his local partner by way of his consul. Nobody may interfere”: De Groot, Ottoman 
Empire, 251 and 254, transliteration on 238 and 241. 
344 Two such cases are discussed extensively in my “Towards Classifying Avanias”. Dan-
iel-Jan de Hochepied tells us that consular protection was henceforth withdrawn from English 
and Dutch merchants who had taken local wives (The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 49a-50a). For 
instructions concerning such marriages and the actions to be taken against merchants con-
tracting them, see the States General’s draft regulation of 1673 and order of 1675 in W.E. van 
Dam van Isselt, “Het ontwerp-regeeringsreglement voor de Levant van 1673 en het Formulier 
van 1675”, Bĳdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 4/6 (1907), 407-28; and the 
Levant Company’s instructions to James Chandos (John Finch’s successor to the Istanbul 
embassy): Kew, NA SP 105 145, 82-92. 
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We can be absolutely certain that the Porte had no intention of dislocating 
the foreign trade of the empire by making it impossible for the Europeans to 
function within the Ottoman context. Therefore, we may safely discount 
Colyer’s assertion to the contrary as an exaggeration designed to alert the 
home front to the seriousness of the problem. 
As becomes clear from Colyer’s further correspondence on the matter 
(and as is corroborated by a number of other sources), the grand vizier’s 
order was aimed at curbing the practice of the European representatives of 
selling berats (for nominal positions), which was rightly perceived to erode 
the Ottoman tax-base. However modest the losses might have been when 
compared to the 19th-century protection system, the phenomenon clearly 
worried Kara Mustafa. On March 13nd, Colyer further informed the States 
General about the matter: 
 
More and more each day, they continue to treat the Christian nations here very badly, and 
to utterly destroy the capitulations with the sole purpose of eventually making not only all 
our merchants, be they married or bachelor, tributaries of this realm, but also of subjecting 
them to its laws, thereby extracting their masters’ subjects and goods from the jurisdiction of 
their respective Christian ministers to the total ruin of all commerce. Our and the other 
capitulations clearly state that married and single Franks [Western Europeans] should 
not be made to pay haraç, which is tribute. This, the grand vizier has now interpreted to 
the contrary with regard to those married, and has given strict order to collect the tribute 
from them. By this they are brought under the law of the land, outside our protection, and 
their goods in life as in death under the violence of the Turks. All complaints, arguments 
and remonstrances were rejected, and the requested audiences about this with the grand 
vizier were refused with threats. All ministers are stuck and stand with their hands tied, 
and the dragomans dare not raise the matter for fear of being treated very badly. I have 
several times addressed the Lords ambassadors of England, France, and Venice, and 
suggested it might be wise to jointly, but separately, submit our memorandums on this 
serious matter to the grand vizier. They showed willing to do so, but none of them has so far 
started. … We have three merchants here, who are married; De Brosses, Van Breen, and 
Croesen, whom I hope to liberate from the said tribute by giving each of them a title of 
consul of some small scale hereabouts. At the moment I am attempting this, but success is 
not assured. But the principle matter meriting your attention, is the consequence and 
outcome, for it is very clear to us that, if the interested kingdoms and republics of 
Christendom do not take joint action, all unmarried merchants will with certainty be 
treated in like manner, and they themselves as well as their effects will be placed beyond the 
authority of the ministers (as indicated above), which would make it inadvisable for anyone 
to send his effects here. For a tributary that dies here, whether he has children or not, the 
Turkish hand is immediately put on his home, and if there are children, it divides the 
inheritance and collects ten to a hundred for itself; and if there are no children or known 
heirs of the same blood, the inheritance is kept under the rule of Turkish justice until a 
legitimate heir appears.345 
                                                     
 
345 My italics. The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 1 March 
1678. 
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The grand vizier had left Istanbul to join the sultan’s hunt shortly after 
having issued the ferman. But since this was a matter of such consequence 
that it needed his constant support to be enforced (as we will see below), 
execution of the order was delayed until the signing of the Treaty of 
Zurawno with Poland and his return to Istanbul in the second week of 
March.346 Upon the court’s return to Istanbul, final preparations for the 
upcoming Ukrainian campaign immediately started, feeding assumptions of 
the European representatives that the sole purpose of the haraç order had 
been to raise money for the campaign. And indeed, with Kara Mustafa back 
in Istanbul, the voyvoda (district governor) of Galata rather half-heartedly 
started collecting the poll-tax from some European subjects. In order for us 
better to understand subsequent events, it is necessary to discuss them in 
light of their broader administrative and political context. 
 
Galata and Pera, across the Golden Horn from Istanbul proper, were the 
townships where the majority of Istanbul’s non-Muslims and all Europeans 
resided under the protection of their embassies. Together with the township 
of Üsküdar, on the other bank of the Bosporus, they constituted the district 
of hawass-ı refī‘ or haslar kazası, which was administratively separate from 
Istanbul proper and had its own civil and executive governors; a kadi and a 
voyvoda. The district belonged to the hawass-ı hümayun (private estates of the 
sultan; imperial lands) and its tax revenues were assigned to the imperial 
treasury. In the period under discussion, the treasury annually farmed out the 
tax revenues from the district as iltizam tax farms. The collection of haraç 
from the non-Muslims of Galata and Pera was one of these farms. In 1678, 
the tax farmer (mültezim) that had contracted to collect this haraç was Kara 
Mustafa’s client chief customs collector Hüseyin Ağa (I), who had also 
purchased the post in 1672. For the collection of his revenues, particularly in 
cases where payment was refused and duress or force was necessary, he 
depended on the voyvoda and his irregulars (sekban), who were specifically 
appointed to safeguard the treasury’s interests.347 
And so it happened that the voyvoda of Galata, when confronted with the 
refusal of the assessed Europeans to pay the desired haraç, decided to arrest a 
                                                     
 
346 A full contemporary Dutch translation of the treaty of Zurawno (or Zarnów as it was 
known in Europe at the time; Izvence in Turkish), dated 7 march 1678, can be found in ibid., 
13 March 1678. 
347 Hüseyin Ağa obtained the poll-tax farm in 1672 (Galland, Journal, i: 87) and also held it 
in 1678 (Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 123 and 126). In that last year, he travelled to Izmir with 
two galleys in his capacity of haraç-collector to collect from the English nation there 100,000 
Lion Dollars, which was the Ottoman administration’s claim on the inheritance of the de-
ceased English merchant (Samuel Pentlow), who had taken a zimmī-wife and residence: Van 
Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de Levant”, 547; and Olnon, “Towards Classifying Avanias”. On 
hass-lands and their administration, see Orhonlu, “Khāss”. On haslar kazası, also see Halil 
İnalcık, “Istanbul”, EI2, iv: 224a. 
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number of them – only to release them again without any payment having 
been made upon complaints of their representatives.348 At first sight, this 
sudden change of heart might seem strange. But it can be accounted for if 
one considers some of the changes in government that had resulted from 
Kara Mustafa’s departure. Antoine Galland, who had arrived in Izmir on 
March 8th and followed the matter from there, tells us that; 
 
… on avait déjà commencé de l’exiger [the haraç] de quelques Français à Constantinople. 
Mais on cessa de le demander depuis que le Grand Seigneur fut sorti et qu’il eut passé sous 
ses tentes, hors de la ville, pour se mettre ensuite en campagne. L’on a su que ce fut sur une 
forte contestation qui se forma sur ce sujet entre le mussahib [gentleman in waiting on 
the sultan/favourite], le grand vizir et le douanier, Hussein Aga, qui avait mis dans la 
tête du vizir de faire cette contravention aux privilèges accordés à tous les princes chrétiens 
comme une invention ingénieuse pour tirer une bonne somme d’argent.349 
 
This favorite of the sultan, who temporarily managed to suspend Kara 
Mustafa’s order as soon as the Ottoman court and army had left Istanbul (19 
to 21 March) was (Musahib) Mustafa Paşa. He had married the sultan’s 
daughter Hatice Sultan in 1675 and was now engaged in a struggle with the 
grand vizier for ascendancy at court.350 But this was not the only power 
struggle being fought out over Kara Mustafa’s control over the financially 
important customs and poll-tax farms. As we will see further along, another 
competitor of the grand vizier (who in the end would cost him his head), 
Kara Ibrahim Paşa, also got involved.351 
In the first days of April, with the army and court still encamped at an 
hour’s distance of Istanbul in preparation for the march to the front, the 
European representatives had sent their dragomans to congratulate Kara 
Mustafa’s newly appointed kaymmakam ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abdi Paşa on his 
high office.352 During these audiences, the new deputy grand vizier had 
refused to listen to any of their complaints concerning the imposition of 
haraç and had successfully insisted on an enlargement of the gifts usually 
presented on such occasions, adding “flatly; these are different times now, 
they should know that the grand vizier is present here, and they should be 
                                                     
 
348 Colyer mentions the arrest and release of his physician Henning Wolde (The Hague, 
NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 23 April 1678), and Galland that of sev-
eral unidentified Frenchmen (Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 123 and 126). 
349 Ibid., 123. 
350 †1686. Ibid., 272n4. 
351 Kara Ibrahim Paşa had started out as a protégé of Kara Mustafa Paşa, but gained such 
prominence that he became a threat to his patron’s position, and eventually managed to per-
suade the sultan to have him executed. See İ. Parmaksızoğlu, “Ibrāhīm Pasha, Kara”, EI2, iii: 
1001b; and Richard F. Kreutel, Kara Mustafa vor Wien: 1683 aus der Sicht türkischer Quellen, ed. 
Karl Teply (Graz: Styria, 1982), index and throughout). Also see note 355. 
352 On this official, see Fr. Babinger, “‘Abdī Pasha”, EI2, i: 97a. 
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careful that no complaints are made to him.”353 Then, on the 30th of April, 
the campaign was launched and the army and court left the environs of 
Istanbul. With the commanding presence of the grand vizier out of the way, 
Colyer immediately detected a change in atmosphere. He had pleaded his 
cause with Kara Mustafa’s interpreter and advisor Mavrocordato, who had 
undertaken to obtain the new berats for him during the campaign. Colyer had 
furnished him with the funds to effect the purchase and had good hopes of 
arranging the matter in the court’s absence by handing out bribes.354 
On 6 July, however, the matter was still unresolved and Mavrocordato’s 
berats had still not arrived. But Colyer had been able to make some progress 
by petitioning Kara Ibrahim Paşa, who had obtained the sadaret 
kaymmakamlığı while also keeping his post of kapudan (grand admiral). It 
appears he had deliberately cultivated this connection and was now reaping 
the benefits.355 Since the departure of the court the voyvoda had started 
apprehending some Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Venetians over the haraç. 
Their ambassadors had thought it too dangerous to resist publicly the 
execution of the grand vizier’s order and had arranged the matter privately 
by compensating the voyvoda, without openly acknowledging their merchants’ 
liability to the poll-tax. Colyer took a different course and asked Kara 
Ibrahim to hear him against the voyvoda. His request was accepted, but it took 
until 17 August until the hearing actually took place, the reason for the delay 
in all likelihood being haraç-collector Hüseyin Ağa’s preoccupation with the 
Pentlow-affair (see note 347). During the hearing of 17 August Colyer 
produced the Dutch capitulation and the voyvoda a hatt-ı şerif (an imperial 
decree written the sultan himself) to the effect that Europeans who had 
taken zimmi wives were liable to all imperial taxes, after which the 
kaymmakam promised to consider the matter. Over the next couple of days 
of sending Dutch chief dragoman Theijls to the divan to see where matters 
stood, it became clear to Colyer and his nation that they too would have to 
                                                     
 
353 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 23 April 1678. 
354 “Sir Mavrocordato has accepted to advance our cause in the army and has promised to 
send us the new berats and commands [fermans] for the consuls, dragomans and merchants. 
This, on the condition that we provided him beforehand with all the funds necessary to obtain 
them, which we have done today. Meanwhile, our merchants have in the matter of the haraç 
not been molested any further then with threats, but beyond execution. Every day we can now 
observe more clearly that it is solely about money.” Ibid., 1 May 1678. 
355 Ibid., 13 March 1678. The missive describes Colyer’s audience of 7 March 1678 with 
kapudan Kara Ibrahim Paşa; an audience which he, by his own admission, intentionally had 
during the court’s absence (when it was on hunting expedition). Colyer tells us that Kara 
Ibrahim “is a gentleman about fifty years of age, of good appearance, and one of the favour-
ites of the sultan.” The discussion mainly concerned the Western Europe’s navies, their 
movements and their ships’ technical specifications. Significantly, Kara Mustafa’s and Kara 
Ibrahim’s tenures as kapudan signalled the full adoption of sailing galleons as the basis of the 
Ottoman fleet: Uzunçarşılı, “Bahriyya”,  948a. 
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pay off the voyvoda if they wanted to keep him at bay. It seemed that even 
with Kara Ibrahim holding the second and third highest posts of the empire 
(that of sadaret kaymmakamı and kapudan-ı derya) and presiding over the 
proceedings, the divan could not bring itself to rule against the grand vizier 
on this matter and commit itself openly to Kara Ibrahim’s cause.356 
Until Kara Mustafa’s return to Istanbul on 20 April 1679 matters stayed 
as they had stood after all European nations had persuaded the voyvoda to 
stop arresting more merchants. But the grand vizier’s return to Istanbul 
immediately tipped the scales again. With his position very much 
strengthened after a year in the proximity of the sultan and a successful 
campaign (357), and after having Kara Ibrahim Paşa dismissed as kapudan and 
kaymakam and demoted to fifth vizier (25 November 1678358), he seemed as 
implacable as ever: 
 
Immediately after the said days of rejoicing [in honour of the victorious return of 
the sultan and grand vizier to Istanbul] all the Lords ambassadors and other 
ministers requested audiences with the grand vizier. Those of France and England have 
had theirs the 7th, and your honours’ minister, yours truly, the 14th of the previous 
[month; June], in the same manner as during the previous audience: namely, the grand 
vizier sitting above, and the said ministers below the sofa. The aforementioned Lords 
ambassadors of France and England among other discourses spoke of the haraç or tribute, 
which had been instituted against their merchants (that had been married here) the previous 
year, but they were at once repudiated in the most severe terms, which persuaded the Lord 
Venetian ambassador and myself not to bring up the subject to avoid further embitterment. 
… Consequently, nothing out of the ordinary happened during my visit, except for the 
grand vizier during the giving of the presents inquiring of me, whether it was certain that 
France had evacuated all the places it had previously conquered in our country.359 
 
The imposition of haraç on foreign merchants with local wives was to remain 
a contended issue until Kara Mustafa’s disgrace and execution in 1683. This 
is interesting in light of the constant exclamations by the European 
ambassadors and residents that Kara Mustafa had only issued the ferman 
                                                     
 
356 The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1060: Justinus Colyer, Jan van Breen, Gasparo Charelles, 
François de Brosses, Jan Croesen and Abraham de Vivier in the chancery of the Dutch em-
bassy of Istanbul, 20 August 1678. The voyvoda was presented with the relatively moderate 
bribe of 5 vests of Dutch cloth, 5 vests of silk and 30 Lion Dollars. 
357 Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 591b. 
358 Parmaksızoğlu, “Ibrāhīm Pasha, Kara”. By the time the Vienna campaign got under-
way in 1683, Kara Ibrahim had been promoted to third vizier and reappointed kaymmakam 
again through the sultan’s protection. It was in this capacity that he successfully intrigued 
against Kara Mustafa when the siege of Vienna failed. After Kara Mustafa’s execution (25 
December 1683) he succeeded him as grand vizier (December 1683; dismissed 17 December 
1685; exiled March 1686; executed June 1687). 
359 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 29 June 1679. The 
audience is also described extensively in The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 46b-47a. 
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because he wanted the Europeans to buy him off in the first place. This is 
the pot calling the kettle black. However convinced they were that the grand 
vizier was always in desperate need of money with which he could finance 
his immense household, his campaigns or keep up his standing at court; the 
fact of this case remains that no matter how much they offered, he never 
accepted any money to abrogate the order.360 One has to wonder whether 
this was in fact a matter of principle or part of a larger policy? In any case, 
with no further arrests being made over it, it appears that this ferman had 
served its original purpose and was now forgotten. But the issue which it had 
addressed was never definitively resolved; from time to time similar attempts 
to impose haraç on dragomans, vice-consuls, and foreign merchants that had 
taken local wives, would continue to occur.361 
After the troubles with the haraç, an increasing irritation with Kara 
Mustafa is discernible in Colyer’s correspondence, even if he managed to stay 
on relatively good terms with him for the remaining duration of his embassy. 
Things that would have amused him some years before (such as the stool-
incident), he now commented on with growing disgust, even if the Dutch 
ran no risk at all. This change in attitude is very clear in his correspondence 
on the problems the English ambassador, Finch, and the recently arrived 
new Venetian bailo, Civrano, ran into with Kara Mustafa Paşa and Hüseyin 
Ağa in October-November 1679 – the former over a large amount of cloth 
he had imported free of duty under the pretense that it was for personal use, 
but was now suspected of selling; the latter over a number of slaves that had 
fled their Ottoman masters and were hiding aboard the two Venetian men-
of-war that had carried the new bailo to Istanbul.362 
                                                     
 
360 The size and functioning of Kara Mustafa’s household, which numbered in the hun-
dreds and hundreds even when he was still kaymmakam, is minutely described in a memoir 
appended to Galland, Journal, ii: 186-207. 
361 The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088, for example, contains a number of Ottoman fermans is-
sued specifically in response to attempts to impose the tax on the Dutch and their protégés: 
one stating that the Dutch are exempt from haraç (1690); one stating that the dragomans, their 
sons and their servants are exempt from haraç (1692); one stating that five servants of the 
consul of Izmir are exempt from haraç (1701); one stating that the dragomans, their sons and 
their servants are exempt from haraç and other taxes (1705); and another one stating again that 
the Dutch are exempt from haraç (1709). Kew, NA SP 105 334, which is a register of Ottoman 
fermans concerning the English nation of Izmir during the consulship of William Raye (1677-
1703) contains a similar ferman “for freeing 5 of the consuls servants from haratch” (27). 
362 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 50a-b. The capitulations stipulated that ambassadors and 
consuls could import the furnishings, food and drink they needed for private use, free of 
customs. Although this meant that they were not permitted to sell the duty-free imports, this 
was of course very difficult for the Ottomans to monitor and transgressions abounded. In the 
case of the Venetian ships harbouring the runaway slaves, although there were witnesses to 
the contrary, the Venetians denied having them and refused to hand them over or to have 
their ships visitated by the Ottoman authorities. When things came to a head and they were 
visitated with force, all slaves were quickly rowed ashore or thrown overboard by their saviors. 
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Colyer's new-found sympathy for the misadventures of his colleagues, 
was not reciprocated. His old colleagues were all replaced within the space of 
a few months, and lacking the support and perhaps advice of his old friend 
Venetian bailo Morosini, he fell victim to the jealousy of the newcomers. In 
December 1679 an alliance of Genoese ambassador Levanto, Venetian bailo 
Civrano, French ambassador Guilleragues and English ambassador Finch 
(who would be recalled in 1681), out of frustration with the preferential 
treatment Colyer received from Kara Mustafa while at the same time being 
the lowest-ranking European envoy in Istanbul, decided to make it clear to 
the grand vizier that he was not a full-fledged ambassador but a mere 
resident envoy. They were so successful that the next petition Colyer sent 
Kara Mustafa was returned with the reply that he should stop refering to 
himself as elçi (ambassador/envoy) and use kapı kethüdası (representative of a 
provincial governor) instead, paired with the imputation that the States 
General were showing the Porte disrespect by sending an envoy of such low 
rank to represent them. The upshot was that the States General decided to 
promote Colyer to full-fledged ambassador (the first since Cornelis Haga had 
attained that rank in 1612). With the time it took for correspondence to 
travel back and forth between Istanbul and Amsterdam (approximately 1½ 
months each way) it was 10 April 1680 before the States General promoted 
Colyer, and May before he actually received his promotion. 
 
The last years of Colyer’s embassy (which ended with his death in Istanbul 
on 28 December 1682) and Kara Mustafa’s grand vizierate (which ended 
with his execution in Belgrade on 25 December 1683) relations between the 
two became slightly more troublesome, although never to the extent of 
becoming as discordial or disrupted as had previously been the case with 
Colyer’s colleagues. We should briefly mention two cases that touched upon 
the basic principles underlying the capitulations; the physical punishment 
with lethal consequences of Colyer’s secretary François de Brosses in the 
divan-ı hümayun, and the forced renewal of the Dutch capitulation. Despite 
the seriousness of these issues, they do not seem to have had a profound 
impact on the way in which Colyer regarded Kara Mustafa Paşa. And since 
both cases have received elaborate attention elsewhere, we will limit our 
discussion of them mainly to what they can tell us about Kara Mustafa Paşa 
and his interpretation of the capitulations.363 
                                                     
 
363 On the De Brosses case, see W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “De mishandeling van den 
legatie-scretaris De Brosses te Constantinopel”, Bĳdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en 
oudheidkunde, 7/8 (1937), which also comprises De Brosses’ own description of the event (91-
95). On the renewal of the Dutch capitulation, see Van Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de 
Levant”, 548-56. For a French translation of the Dutch capitulation of 7 November 1680, see 
Gabriel Efendi Noradounghian, Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman, vol. 1: 1300-
1789 (Paris: F. Pichon, 1897), 169-81. 
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On 17 May 1680 secretary De Brosses was tried and convicted in the 
divan in connection with a sum of 1,000 Lion Dollars he had loaned a Greek 
inhabitant of Istanbul several years earlier. When this original debtor, a 
woman named Safira, defaulted in August 1679, the debt was taken over by 
the metropolitan of Chios. However, he denied having incurred it and took 
his case to the Ottoman authorities. The case was heard by Chief Justice of 
Rumelia (Rumeli kadi-‘askeri) Hamid Efendi, who ruled in De Brosses’ favour 
and provided him with a hüccet (written proof) to the effect that the loan 
would expire after a further six months (i.e. in February 1679) and would 
then be settled by the kadi of Galata. The agreed date having arrived, De 
Brosses dispatched a dragoman to the kadi of Galata with the kadi-‘asker’s 
and several other hüccets and obligations (temessüks) supporting his case, as 
well as with a ferman by Kara Mustafa ordering the kadi of Chios to collect 
the loan by force if necessary. The kadi decided the claim should be taken to 
Chios, but the person deputised by De Brosses’ to collect the debt was 
surprised by four disguised Turks in the stairwell of the metropolitan’s 
house, severly beaten and robbed of all the documents supporting the case. 
After this, the metropolitan again denied the debt in front of the kadi of 
Chios, forcing De Brosses to obtain copies of his lost documents from the 
records of the Rumeli kadi-‘askeri. On De Brosses’ request Colyer now 
succesfully petitioned the grand vizier for a ferman ordering the kapudan paşa 
and the kadi of his fleet to examine the matter. But in the meantime the 
metropolitan had left Chios and committed himself to the protection of the 
patriarch of Istanbul, who now filed the case with the divan-ı hümayun. There, 
matters came to such a head that Kara Mustafa saw no other means of 
getting the truth out, than confronting De Brosses with an actual line-up of 
twenty possible debtors in the assembled divan. Between all the false beards – 
at least so he claimed in his defence – De Brosses failed to point out his 
debtor the metropolitan whom he had only met once eight months before, 
and was punished by being bastinadoed, receiving 200 blows under the feet, 
eventually resulting in his his death on 16 October 1682. 
It was unusual – even during Kara Mustafa’s grand vizierate – for 
European subjects who lost a lawsuit to be sentenced to physical 
punishment, and particularly one so stark. Nevertheless, neither the hearing 
of the case in the divan, nor the sentence handed down, was contrary to the 
letter of the capitulations – although they might be regarded as going against 
its spirit, i.e. the extending of protection (aman) to subjects of friendly 
nations.364 So why did De Brosses receive a punishment normally reserved 
                                                     
 
364 While lawsuits involving European and Ottoman Muslim subjects were outside their 
jurisdiction, the consular courts could hear cases (such as this one) between Europeans and 
zimmis. But if one or all of the parties involved decided to apply to the Ottoman kadi-courts, 
these could also hear them. So as to be better able to protect and represent their subjects in 
such cases, the European nations had obtained the capitulary privilege of having cases repre-
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for Ottoman subjects? The description of the case Colyer’s son-in-law 
Daniel-Jan de Hochepied has left us, provides us with a possible answer: 
 
About which [treatment] your honours’ said ambassador [Colyer] complained to the 
grand vizier, but never received satisfaction. But the grand vizier did send him answer that 
he had not known the said De Brosses to have been his Excellency’s secretary (although it 
is certain the vizier knew him full well), adding that he could not have imagined a secretary 
of an ambassador having a long beard and going about dressed a la turca [in the Turkish 
fashion], as the said De Brosses used to do, and even less that he could speak the Turkish 
language, in which he was proficient, and what’s more, that he would come and plea his 
own case in the full divan, that such was the responsibility of the dragomans, for it has to be 
noted that even though your honours’ ambassador’s chief dragoman Theyls had 
accompanied him, he insisted on defending his own cause against all practice customary 
there, which was rightly thought to have been the reason that this misfortune befell him, to 
which the haughty humour of the vizier then in power [Kara Mustafa Paşa], who had 
long before contemplated the means with which he could taunt and abuse the European 
nations, will have contributed to no small extent.365 
 
Apparently, Kara Mustafa had found De Brosses’ “Turkish manners” 
presumptuous and decided to teach him a lesson a la turca. We know from 
his correspondence on the matter, that Colyer for one agreed. Although it 
meant the end of his faithful right-hand man, he blamed the event entirely 
on him and took no further action.366 
The last significant run-in the Dutch had with Kara Mustafa Paşa, 
concerned their capitulation. Although the first Dutch capitulation (of 1612) 
had been confirmed in 1634, it had never been expanded, because the States 
General and the Board of Directors of Levant Trade baulked at the 
prohibitive costs involved in such a project. Instead of regularly seeking to 
have additional privileges inserted in new capitulations at huge costs and 
with relatively little effect, as the other capitulary powers were in the habit of 
doing, the Dutch practice had always been to depend on fermans confirming 
and specifying the articles of theirs. This policy of constantly renegotiating 
the application of the capitulation on the basis of individual cases and in 
response to specific needs, had proven to be relatively inexpensive and 
effective, but had left them with an outdated document and a large number 
of fermans to safeguard its validity and relevance. 
                                                                                                                        
 
senting a value of above 4,000 akçes (equivalent to 33,33 Lion Dollars) heard in the imperial 
divan and then only upon the condition that a European dragoman was present (İnalcik, 
“Imtiyāzāt”, 1180b-81a). On the jurisdictions of consular and kadi-courts (mahkemes) and on 
their actual functioning in day-to-day practice, see Gerber, State, Society; and the case studies in 
Boogert, “Ottoman Dragomans”, 91-174. 
365 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 80a-b. 
366 François, or Francesco, de Brosses had been secretary to the Dutch embassy since 
1664, vice-chancellor since 1665, provisional resident from 1665 to 1668, and secretary again 
since 1669, and simultaneously treasurer since 1675: Schutte, Repertorium, 307. 
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Then, on 16 August 1680, while hearing a dispute between the Dutch 
nation of Istanbul and chief customs collector Hüseyin Ağa (I), grand vizier 
Kara Mustafa Paşa decided he would have no more of this ancient bundle of 
paper with its “scraped out letters” and confiscated the Dutch capitulation.367 
With the capitulation held hostage by the grand vizier, who showed no 
intention whatsoever of returning it, Colyer was left no other choice then to 
apply for renewal. He dreaded the States General’s reaction and minutely 
described all his dealings with the grand vizier to convince them he had 
acquitted himself of his duties and had opposed as long as possible the 
forced renewal; in this, he naturally made much of Kara Mustafa’s 
intransigence. The States General decided in favour of renewal on the 
condition that the new capitulation should contain various clarifications with 
regard to articles (of the capitulation of 1612) which had given rise to 
disputes over the years. After extensive negotiations between Colyer and 
Kara Mustafa, it was decided that the Dutch were to receive their new 
capitulation upon payment of the enormous sum of 33,072 Lion Dollars. 
The new Dutch capitulation was eventually handed over 7 November 1680; 
it contained some minor additions to the articles concerning ambassadorial 
and consular duties, the shipping of goods for Muslim merchants, and the 
conversion of Dutch subjects to Islam.368 
 
Anyone investigating the European presence in Izmir during the grand 
vizierates of Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa 
Paşa, cannot but be puzzled by the seemingly contradicting references to the 
latter. Kara Mustafa Paşa has gone down in history as a blinded and ruthless 
xenophobe; yet, his dislike of foreigners did not keep him from having a 
large residence constructed for himself right next to the English consulate on 
the main street of Izmir’s bustling European quarter during the first years of 
his grand vizierate.369 He is credited with little understanding of the empire’s 
                                                     
 
367 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 81a: “… replied that our capitulation was very antiquated 
and that it contained several scraped out letters”. 
368 On the taking hostage of the capitulation and the subsequent negotiations for renewal, 
see ibid., 80b-86a. On the handing over of the new capitulation and the apportionment of the 
costs of renewal, see The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 255b-256b: Justinus Colyer and Dutch 
Nation of Istanbul to Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation of Izmir, 21 November 1680. The 
text of the articles of this new capitulation was almost identical to that of 1612; the above-
mentioned additions were made to articles 13, 47, 48 and 49. 
369 In the legend to his panorama of Izmir, Cornelis de Bruyn noted that the house he had 
drawn standing smack in the middle of Frank Street, between the Venetian and English con-
sulates, was “the house of the vizier Cara Mustafa Pasha, which is the largest and most stately 
of Frank Street”: De Bruyn, Reizen, 24. This residence is not mentioned in the list of “les 
maisons du pacha” in the memoir appended to Galland, Journal (ii: 203), which does include 
those in Istanbul, Edirne, Lárisa, Merzifon, and Galatasaray (Pera). Since this memoir was 
prepared between March 1675 and October 1676 (Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 589b), 
and since Kara Mustafa – as we have seen above – spent most of his time between 1670-1676 
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foreign trade and how to administer it; yet, he completed with his own funds 
his predecessors large-scale construction effort to facilitate that trade and 
was closely involved with its administration through his association with 
customs collector Hüseyin Ağa. His interest in the empire’s foreign trade is 
said to have gone no further than regarding it as supplier of ready cash for 
his own needs; yet, his administration’s handling of international mercantile 
and political affairs seems rather to betray efforts to impose a consistent and 
effective set of rules to come to grips with the elusive flow of European 
trade through Izmir and the assertiveness of its European partners. 
The same kind of contradictions are prevalent in the correspondences of 
the European envoys in Istanbul and in the broader literature dealing with 
his politics in general or his person in particular – although one has to look 
for them very carefully between a mass of unanimous condemnations. As 
Colin Heywood cautiously suggests in his article on Kara Mustafa in the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, the history of his rule, and by extension perhaps 
also his personal character, are susceptible to divergent interpretations.370 
The central question here is whether we should regard him as a grand vizier 
who managed to destroy in a mere seven years (1676-1683) a legacy it had 
taken Mehmed and Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü twenty years (1656-1676) to build, 
or as a faithful executor of Köprülü policy doing his utmost to conserve and 
consolidate that legacy of overextension and overdependence on unstable 
alliances against the odds. 
If we discard for a moment the judgments of his contemporaries and 
look at the bare facts, they overwhelmingly point in that latter direction: as 
an adoptive son of Mehmed Köprülü, educated alongside Fazıl Ahmed 
Köprülü, rising to power through the protection of his adopted father as well 
as his adopted brother, and successfully serving under both of them, he 
should certainly be considered a Köprülü grand vizier by pedigree. As for his 
administration: its make-up shows considerable continuity with that of Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa, to a large extent relying on the same men and political 
households (see Table 15). Related to this are his foreign policies: both his 
efforts to stabilise the empire’s northern frontier, and those to enhance the 
administration’s control over the international trade of the empire, were a 
direct consequence and continuation of Köprülü policy. Even his treatment 
of the European envoys to his government was not all that different from 
his predecessors, in fact only changing slightly in response to pressing issues 
and specific circumstances. In discussing someone as notorious as Kara 
Mustafa Paşa, we should mistrust the judgments and accounts of his 
                                                                                                                        
 
in Edirne and on campaign in the Balkans, he most probably had the Izmir residence con-
structed between his assumption of the grand vizierate in July/November 1676 and De 
Bruyn’s arrival in July 1678; perhaps to oversee the progress of the construction program he 
was now funding in Izmir. 
370 Ibid., 591a-b. 
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European contemporaries, particularly where his reputation as a destroyer of 
capitulatory rights is concerned. 
Previously, we have discussed Mehmed Köprülü’s stabilization of the 
capital and the central lands, and its continuation as a policy of stabilization 
and incorporation of the periphery by his son Fazıl Ahmed. In the course of 
his education in the Köprülü-household, and as he climbed through the 
ranks of palace and government administration, Kara Mustafa must have 
been imbued with the Köprülü view of the world, of the Ottomans’ place in 
it, of their own place within the empire, and of the policies which ambition, 
experience and prudence suggested would best serve to reinvigorate and 
sustain that view. He also inherited and continued (see further below) the 
Köprülü political household and its wider network, as he did the policy 
implications with which it grappled and the manner in which it did so. 
Figuring prominently among these were the Köprülüs’ strategically placed 
clients in the hierarchies making up the various components of Izmir’s 
administration, and the policies and controls they were to exert over Izmir’s 
international trade and diplomatic relations. After decades of Ottoman 
laissez-faire the Köprülüs had proven very attentive to the fact that Izmir was 
a place that could both mirror and propell Istanbul’s relations with Europe 
on a daily basis and a practical level. They had in fact recognized that it was 
not only a place where a lot of money could be collected, but that what went 
on in Izmir formed an integral part of the looming balance of power with 
Europe. 
Having inherited both the purpose and the apparatus that would allow 
the Ottomans (and the Köprülüs) to keep their footing in that balance, it fell 
to Kara Mustafa to put them to use and enforce and strenghten milltary, 
diplomatic and commercial boundaries and prerogatives with all the means at 
his disposal. Anything other than that would have meant carelesssly doing 
away with the immense investments his predeccesors had made to set up 
political, administrative and urban structures that would sustain their long-
term goals. 
How Kara Mustafa handled the first dimension of relations with Europe, 
the military one, is relatively straightforward: with great success, until the 
Vienna-debacle. His handling of the second, diplomatic, dimension has taken 
up most of this preceding section: we have seen how, in this arena, his 
reputation suffered heavily from a series of steps and measures that, taken 
collectively, may be viewed as a policy that reaffirmed the unliateral character 
of Ottoman relations with Europe and the pertinence of Ottoman laws and 
customs in this arena. Commandeering vessels, restoring disused tributes, 
and countering the creeping fiscal alienation of wealthy minority subjects; 
severely punishing smuggling, the illegal export of mixed inheritances, the 
harboring of fugitive slaves, and illegal selling by diplomats; guarding proper 
hierarchy and form when challenged by demanding strict adherence to 
diplomatic protocol (viz. the disputed audiences, Colyer’s diplomatic status, 
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De Brosses’ punishment, the sequestration of the 60-odd years old Dutch 
capitulations), and so on and on – these all meant to convey to the empire’s 
European relations that they were in no position to forestall the progression 
of Köprülü policy or even mitigate its consequences in any way. The 
diplomatic correspondence of the time makes it abundantly clear that the 
message was indeed received, which in turn greatly assisted Kara Mustafa in 
his efforts to bring Izmir back into the fold. 
The question as to what shape Kara Mustafa’s (re)assertion of Ottoman 
controls in this third, commercial, dimension of Ottoman-European 
relations took through the purposefully endowed Köprülü vakf will be 
discussed throughout the remainder of this text. But first we should consider 
what the Köprülüs’ succesful decades-long Ottoman reassertion vis-à-vis 
Europe and the making of an Ottoman-European balance of power mean 
for our various paradigms of Ottoman historical development, the world-
systems paradigm in particular. 
 
The Explanatory Value of the World-systems Approach 
Most observers have sought an explanation for Izmir’s relatively benign at-
mosphere in administrative neglect. Overlooking arguments of political cen-
trality, economic dependence, and socio-historical or political predisposition 
(such as suggested in the previous few pages), they have argued that the 
power (and, hence, freedom) foreigners enjoyed in Izmir was one wrested by 
them from a weakened Ottoman administration during a century of revolt 
and decentralization (1550-1650). It is argued that while Izmir’s highest offi-
cial was a mere kadi, and not even a high-ranking one at that, Aleppo was the 
seat of a full-fledged governor-general (beylerbeyi) of high military rank (paşa) 
and a high-ranking kadi. Consequently, Izmir’s European merchants could 
simply circumvent or overpower local Ottoman administration, while their 
counterparts in Aleppo were kept in check by the full force of paşa and kadi. 
From this – the administration of Izmir by lower-ranking officials – it is 
concluded that Istanbul must have been unaware of the importance of the 
economic developments taking place in western Asia Minor – and that, even 
if and when it became aware, it proved incapable to do much about the irre-
versible European undermining of the Ottoman economic system taking 
place there.371 
                                                     
 
371 See Daniel Goffman’s highly influential work on Izmir in the bibliography. Esp. 
Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 141-42: “Whatever economic and social permutations 
Izmir and western Anatolia underwent in successive centuries, however great the rise in the 
volume of trade during the Age of Enlightenment, however profoundly Europeans influenced 
western-Anatolian society during the Age of Imperialism, the transformation that determined 
the region as their hub occurred when the settlement developed from a regional port into an 
international entrepôt at the beginning of the seventeenth century. More can be asserted. 
Although the ethnicity of its directors varied and its direction fluctuated in the eighteenth and 
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Frankly, the line of reasoning sketched above is typical of attempts to fill 
in the Western Anatolian, Ottoman, or Middle Eastern details for a much 
wider theory – a theory which has developed into the paradigm of develop-
mental modernity par excellence; that of Immanuel Wallerstein’s “modern 
world-system”. Looking back from the 19th-century situation, it argues that 
an expanding Europe-centered economic world-system absorbed and inter-
nally reorganized for its own advantage a number of previously alternative 
world-systems (American, Chinese, Ottoman) at an increasing rate and inten-
sity from the Middle Ages onwards, and thus defined as well as motivated 
the evolution to the single Western-based world economy of our modern 
globalized age. In the language of the paradigm, the process of absorption 
and reorganization of previously alternative world-systems is designated as 
their “semi-peripheralization” (that is, into assembly points for raw materials 
from their own peripheries, providers of menial labor, and consumers of the 
center’s manufactured goods), their own semi-peripheries being converted 
into peripheries of the new system. 
The presence of increasing numbers of European merchants, combined 
with the growing volume of their – to a significant degree, contraband – 
trade and the uninhibited lifestyles they were able to cultivate, then, must 
signal that Europe’s 17th-century descent on that town was none other than 
the beginning of a relentless European drive towards economic (in the Arab 
provinces), political and cultural mastery over the Ottoman Empire, as fully 
realized in the second half of the 19th century. In a similar feat of history read 
backwards, the Ottomans’ ultimate failure to stop the peripheralization of 
their empire must signify that they were never up to the task in the first 
place: they were not able to formulate a commercial policy to successfully 
counter or mitigate the consequences of a European penetration that was 
not to manifest itself fully for a good two centuries: they merely managed 
conservative reflexes to the superficial manifestations of this deeper longer-
term economic reality. 
 
Obviously there are many objections to be raised against such a model-
driven application of world-systems-theory, principally that it tends to mis-
read or gloss over effective Ottoman responses as ultimately unsuccessful 
responses to the tide of history and therefore essentially repressive, which 
feeds into broader Orientalist prejudices. As a matter of fact, in our discus-
sion of the status of Izmir’s European quarter, of its relations with its Otto-
man context, and of the role of Ottoman society and administration in shap-
ing them, the main problem seems to be this particular application’s indebt-
                                                                                                                        
 
nineteenth centuries, the outlines of a western-inspired, and initially at least western-
controlled, commercial network emerged quickly after 1600 and, with it, the demographic, 
economic, and social alterations associated with such penetration.” 
 
 
224 
 
edness to another, cultural, paradigm; that of Orientalism (Edward Said’s 
version at least).372 
Any elaboration or application of the proposition that the Ottoman Em-
pire and its economy were completely overwhelmed by European mercan-
tilism and forever failed to formulate an adequate response to its challenges 
should preferably be based on analysis of economic data (but always in con-
junction with data from other fields!). However, if, as is the case for 16th and 
17th-century Izmir, such data is sketchy at best, there should be no objection 
to relying more fully on other types of data (social, political, legal, or even 
archaeological, architectural, etc.) for indications of corresponding economic 
realities. (Incidentally, the relatively abundant evidence for the 18th century 
does already dispel any illusions about Ottoman merchants and their gov-
ernment not managing a solid response by at least that time.373) After all, 
history-writing is much like assembling an incomplete jigsaw puzzle – and is 
the historian’s filling in the missing pieces not vastly preferable to his forgo-
ing the effort altogether? As Wallerstein himself has said: 
 
World-systems analysts insist that rather than reduce complex situations to simpler 
variables, the effort should be to complexify and contextualize all so-called simpler variables 
in order to understand real social situations. World-systems analysts are not against 
quantification per se (they would quantify what can usefully be quantified), but (as the old 
joke about the drunk teaches us) they feel that one should not look for the lost key only 
under the street lamp just because the light is better (where there are more quantifiable 
data). One searches for the most appropriate data in function of the intellectual problem; 
one doesn’t choose the problem because hard, quantitative data are available.374 
 
But how carefully we should tread! The more pieces are missing, the greater 
the danger that a preconceived idea of the findings gets the better of the 
scarce pieces at hand. One can easily imagine how 17th-century Izmir, with 
its lack of pertinent sources and its high potential relevance for world-
systems-theory as the floodgate Europe supposedly pried open to gain full 
access to the Ottoman world-system, might be a bit too tempting. 
The principal problem with world-systems-theory as it has been applied 
to study the variables of the complex equation it attempts to formulate is 
that the theory’s core evolutionary argument is considered established and 
unassailable. Research into specific centers, semi-peripheries and peripheries 
oftentimes seems often to want to rewrite the subjects’ history as part of the 
                                                     
 
372 See Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin 
Books, 1995). 
373 See Kadı, “Natives and Interlopers”. 
374 Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, 19. 
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elegant grand model and to fine-tune it, rather than earnestly to falsify it.375 
In Middle Eastern studies the world-systems approach has now been domi-
nant for at least two decades. It has in effect become the single most domi-
nant paradigm in the field, even strongly informing/determining the work of 
non-economic historians. This is why all modern studies on Izmir seem to 
start from the following inverse chain of assumptions: 
Firstly, that by the 19th century the Ottoman world-system had become 
semi-peripheralized through European mercantilist and capitalist penetra-
tion. Secondly, that shifts from Ottoman-controlled trade in luxury goods to 
European-controlled trade in bulky goods are sound indicators of this Euro-
pean economic penetration. Thirdly, that the boom occurring in 17th-century 
Izmir is the earliest manifestation of this process. And fourthly, that the 
Ottomans woke up to this reality too late to be able to counter the trend 
through administrative and economic adjustments. 
Although Wallerstein’s theory is neo-Marxian in origin, an indebtedness 
to Turner’s frontier thesis – in a way its ideological opposite – may be dis-
cerned. It relates of a less developed (or, “primitive”) landscape, society and 
economy opened up by energetic Westerners of enterprising spirit and culti-
vated for their own profit. In the process these Westerners not only trans-
formed that “other” landscape, society and economy, but also Western socie-
ty and economy itself with modernity as the end result. The Western Anato-
lian coastal area, and Izmir in particular, then, figure as an Ottoman version 
of the Wild West, and the role of the “native” Ottoman context is limited to 
being an passive and ineffectual object of Western penetration, at most re-
sponsible for the occasional burdensome delay to a linearly progressing mo-
dernity. This is overstating the case, but describing it in this vein does show 
how naturally Orientalist notions (as critiqued by Said in 1978) and the relat-
ed paradigm of (uninterrupted) Ottoman decline could get a second lease on 
life through this more refined paradigm of economic modernization.376  
                                                     
 
375 Cf. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy (Cambrdige: 
Cambrdige University Press, 1978; 2004), 24, where it is stressed that “The world-systems 
perspective also stresses the ‘historicity’ of regions prior to their confrontation with the Euro-
pean world economy. That is, it seeks to delineate their internal dynamic. In doing so, it dif-
fers from the Orientalist and modernizationist approaches in the choice of unit of analysis. 
Instead of the cultural unit of the Islamic civilization, İslamoğlu and Keyder and Wallerstein, 
Decdeli and Kasaba take as their object of study the social system of the ‘redistributive world 
empire’ defined in terms of its internal division of labour or its mode of integration. Hence, in 
contrast to ‘cellular’ conceptions of the Ottoman social structure in which discrete parts 
reproduce their own stagnation, the Ottoman world-empire describes an integrated whole.” 
(8-9). 
376 See John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 1-26 and throughout on the relation between Orientalism, Marxism, 
world systems theory, and their shared assumptions and fallacies. On world-systems analysis, 
he adds (in his conclusion): “This is not the place to rehearse all the arguments made against 
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We should hasten to add that this is not entirely to Wallerstein’s discredit. 
His The Modern World-system377) is extremely well-researched and very much 
concerned with varying modes, velocities and directions of development.378 
Nonetheless, along the road from (experimental and falsifiable) theory to 
(received and indubitable) paradigm much of Wallerstein’s detailed variance 
and qualified uncertainty has been lost. Just as happened with Marxian theo-
ry, the result has been world-systems-theory light, heavy on form and light on 
substance. 
 
The already noted scarcity of strictly economic data on 17th-century Izmir, 
the subject’s high relevance for world-systems analysis and the abrasive ef-
fect of that approach’s wide acceptance have resulted in much intuitive rea-
soning. Looking for early warning signs of the region’s peripheralization, 
research has started from the three available 16th-century tahrirs for Izmir (of 
1522/23, 1528/29 and 1575/76), which indeed suggest a shift from regional 
to international production and commerce. This relative wealth of Ottoman 
economic data is followed by a long silence – not even broken by the 
1693/94-tahrir (which is highly unreliable due to changes in taxation-units 
and the 1688-earthquake) or the partial defters from the Maliye’den müdevver 
(which are miscellaneous and offer totals instead of much-needed break-
downs). Only with the appearance of Ottoman yearbooks (salnames) from 
1847/48 does the kind of Ottoman statistical data needed become available 
again. By that time the Ottoman economy was fast losing what remained of 
its independence: from 1850 foreign capital became widely available, by 1875 
the empire reneged on its international debt-payments, and in 1881 a foreign 
(predominantly French-English-German) Ottoman Public Debt Administra-
tion took control of large sections of the economy to settle the debts. 
The three-century-gap between tahrirs and salnames is commonly filled 
with economic data from European sources instead of with truly circumstan-
tial evidence from local non-economic sectors. These sources – correspond-
ences, shipping manifests, account books and the like – offer fine samples of 
                                                                                                                        
 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory. The basic point to note here is that it is im-
portant to resist the functionalist logic of a global-structural approach.” (307).  
377 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974); id., The 
Modern World-System, vol. 2: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-
1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980); id., The Modern World-System, vol. 3: The Second Era of 
Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s (San Diego: Academic Press, 1989); 
id., The Modern World-System, vol. 4: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789-1914 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2011). 
378 “World-systems analysts began to be skeptical about the inevitability of progress. They 
saw progress as a possibility rather than a certainty. They wondered whether one could even 
describe the construction of a capitalist world-economy as progress”: Wallerstein, World-
Systems Analysis, 18. 
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early modern business practice, accounting and, not to forget, attitudes, but 
reveal little on the workings of the economy of the city of Izmir, its region, 
or the empire of which it was part. It matters little how much European 
trade narratives and figures are at our disposal; all they can really tell us is 
that at regular intervals a great many goods went into Izmir and a great many 
others came out again. Fluctuations in how many goods went in or out, in 
what goods went in or out and through whose agency they went in or out 
can of course reveal things about the economy in question, but does it lift 
the curtain pulled down over the inner workings of the city by the repeated 
loss of local Ottoman archives? The answer to this question must be “no”. 
Studying the Ottoman economy through European sources may reveal a 
declining Ottoman balance of trade and growing European influence within 
the Ottoman economy and the empire as a whole – but we should beware 
that it also completely obscures Ottoman agency.379 How convenient that 
three centuries of Ottoman economic and (conducive) administrative ad-
justment are not to be bothered with! Without taking it into account, a 
straight line can be drawn from 16th-century European penetration to late 
19th-century European penetration as if these were manifestations of one and 
the same process – a perfect illustration of the West’s historical hegemony 
and a fine playground for world-systems enthusiasts trying to substantiate its 
inevitability. One could say that, here, shortage of Ottoman data has been 
relieved by Orientalism, cultural bias providing what evidence could not. 
Following the logic of the Orientalist interpretation of world-systems 
analysis, the “fact” of the West’s uninterrupted and centuries-long rise to 
hegemony in the East feeds the assumption that Ottoman civilization was 
blind and/or powerless in face of the European onslaught: being recon-
structed as the passive object of Western self-realization, such a civilization’s 
manifestations and exertions (be they cultural, military, legal, economic, ad-
ministrative, etc.) are easily, if perhaps unwittingly, regarded first and fore-
most as impediments to the progression of Western history.380 This tendency 
towards historical polarization and partiality (“othering”) goes a long way in 
explaining the seductiveness of the interpretation that European power pried 
open Izmir in the late sixteenth century and from there proceeded to over-
whelm the entire Ottoman economy while the Ottomans stood by power-
                                                     
 
379 Compare Blair B. Kling and M. N. Pearson, The Age of Partnership: Europeans in Asia 
before Dominion (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979). 
380 Cf. İslamoğlu-İnan, Ottoman Empire, 18: what remains of Ottoman agency in the world 
systems approach is a “‘resistance space’ that the absence of direct colonization allowed the 
Ottoman central bureaucracy”. In this respect, incidentally, the very title of Goffman’s contri-
bution to the oft-praised volume of world-systems analysis on Istanbul, Izmir, and Aleppo 
(Goffman, “Izmir: from Village to Colonial Port City”) illustrates what is so problematic 
about Goffman’s work on Izmir; namely that, starting in the early sixteenth century, it reasons 
towards a (non-existent) 19th-century colonial situation. 
 
 
228 
 
lessly. The problem with this theory is that it has ignored too many challeng-
es. 
Never has it been adequately explained why the peripheralization of the 
Ottoman world-system would have taken well over three centuries if the 
territory’s administration presumably was so weak and out of touch with 
early modern realities. And this goes for Izmir and its so-called “weak” ad-
ministration even more. Should it not have given-in completely long before 
the 1870s, even with western prop-ups (because of the looming Eastern 
Question)? Nor has anyone ever successfully accounted for the favorable 
Ottoman balance of trade with Europe. The Ottomans’ making more from 
exports to Europe than the other way around (a situation that in all likeli-
hood continued into the 19th century), does not exactly signal overwhelming 
European dominance. Surely, if Europe was that more powerful than the 
Ottoman Empire, it would have decisively penetrated Ottoman markets to 
dump its industrial output there? Moving on from the economic to the polit-
ical and social spheres, how is it to be explained that the Ottomans managed 
to unilaterally dictate terms of trade to Europe through the capitulations 
during the 17th and 18th (and, to a lesser degree, even the 19th) centuries if it 
was simultaneously being overpowered by it? Finally, why was the social 
standing and power of European merchant communities resident in the Ot-
toman Empire so incongruous with their supposed economic power? Is this 
not a useful social reality to take note of in the absence of sound economic 
data? Furthermore, it is one thing for Armenians, Greeks and Jews (here cast 
as compradors381) to have low social standing, but to see the subjects of foreign 
states beg and grovel before Ottoman officials should make one wonder 
about the true weight and meaning of their power. 
 
Clearly, any theory that starts from the grand narrative of European domi-
nance – with Orientalism providing the negative and with Hobson’s “Euro-
centric myths of the West” providing the positive, is not equipped to really 
deal with these problems – or, more generally, to deal with Ottoman history 
on its own terms.382 It can only ignore them as long as nobody bothers to 
confront them for fear of moving beyond accepted academic discourse. And 
                                                     
 
381 On “fringe westernization” and compradors in general, see, e.g., Philip D. Curtin, Cross-
Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 247-51. Kadı, 
“Natives and Interlopers”, 1-17 provides a good overview of the comprador question in Otto-
man historiography, and – through the remainder of this doctoral dissertation – demonstrates 
its uselessness in that field. Accordingly, in the previous pages we have suggested that the 
Ottoman intermediaries employed by the European nations in 17th-century Izmir in many 
respects operated rather as their patrons than as their clients.  
382 Hobson, Eastern Origins, 283-93. These myths are those of “the centralized and rational 
Western state, 1500-1900”, “the liberal minimalist Western state, 1500-1900”, and “the demo-
cratic Western state., 1500-1900”. 
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as it is, accepted Western academic discourse concerning the progression of 
Ottoman history to a large degree is world-systems-theory. 
Nevertheless, I would venture to continue on the basic assumption that 
the balance of power between early modern Europe and the early modern 
Ottoman Empire was indeed very much a balance. That there existed a deli-
cate equilibrium during most of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries within which 
two separate systems – with their own distinct histories, realities, attitudes 
and policies – continuously and meticulously wrestled each other for influ-
ence in all spheres. And that in the end, but only in the end (say from 1850), it 
became most probable that the West would beat the rest. Just as one would 
expect to see European economic dominance refracted, resisted and trans-
formed in local social, political and administrative realities (with a truly dy-
namic interplay between world, center and peripheral developments as the 
result), the development of such an economic balance will have left traces in 
local society, politics and administration.383 Next, we will see what traces of 
Ottoman agency and policy may be found in late-17th-century Izmir. 
 
Developments in the Status of an Alien Quarter 
If we continue from the position that the Ottoman Empire was not only an 
économie-monde, but also a civilization, it follows naturally that that realm, 
economy and civilization operated according to an inner logic that was not 
strangely deviant from European modes, but rather alternative, and autono-
mous though overlapping, competitive though cooperating. This may sound 
abstract, but it is a proposition that has very real consequences for the study 
of such a civilization. For our infinitely smaller case, that of the significance 
of Izmir’s administrative status, it opens up the possibility that Izmir’s low 
administrative priority and Istanbul’s unwillingness to heighten it are not 
necessarily evidence for the Ottomans’ poor understanding of the systemic 
changes that were occurring in Western Asia Minor. Perhaps interpretations 
to that effect would have made sense for the Ottoman classical period (1300-
1600, or 1453-1566384), or for the modern period of recentralization (roughly 
from the 1839-proclamation of the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane), but it is not very 
helpful for the early modern period.385 
                                                     
 
383 Cf. Edhem Eldem, “Istanbul: From Imperial to Peripheralized Capital”, in: Ottoman 
City, 138-39, incl. n13. 
384 The first being the commonly used long classical age, from Ottoman beginnings 
shrouded in legend to the reign of Ahmed I and the Treaty of Zsitvatorok (1606); the second 
being the shorter (and in my view more apt), from the taking of Constantinople to the death 
of Süleyman I (the Great/the Lawgiver/the Magnificent). 
385 Virgiana Aksan has succinctly made this argument concerning the teleoscopic danger 
of analyzing the early modern empire on the basis of paradigms, or even of an understanding 
of the Ottoman polity that rests on expertise in earlier or later periods: “Decline theorists 
argue that the Ottomans lost control over their internal resources, manpower as well as taxa-
tion systems, as early as 1600, and never recovered it. The empire struggled on for three 
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In the late classical period the internal unity of the Ottoman system was 
such that changes in a region’s or town’s economic importance would have 
generally predictable consequences for its political importance and its admin-
istrative status. Changes in economic importance and value would be gauged 
through recurring tax surveys (tahrirs), with swift consequences for the ap-
portionment of fiefs (timars and ze‘amets) and the calculated value of lands, 
services and commodities and, hence, for taxation. In general, rising eco-
nomic value meant rising administrative status, military fiefs being upgraded 
and reserved for higher officers, judgeships and governorships being pro-
moted and awarded to higher officials, and provincial budgets and fiscal 
targets being increased. Furthermore, through the tahrir and ihtisab-systems 
unwanted economic developments, such as changes in a region’s output to 
satisfy foreign demand, could be signaled and countered effectively. In the 
modern period the keeping of more or less uniform budgets and the publish-
ing of salnames ensured administrative and political awareness of changes in 
regions’ economies.386 
In the early modern 17th and 18th centuries, however, the classical Otto-
man correlation between economic and political importance and military and 
administrative status had ceased to exist. By the end of the 16th century it had 
become undeniable that the semi-feudal timar-system through which most 
Ottoman lands were administered was breaking down under the pressures of 
the time. Most of these pressures on the timar-system were exerted by chang-
es in military organization, of which the system had always been the corner-
stone. 
The most direct pressures on the classical system were ongoing revolts 
within the empire (particularly in the Anatolian heartland387) and unrelenting 
competition with the Habsburg, Safavid and Muscovian empires without. 
The standoff on three fronts, combined with the deflection of Ottoman 
forces away from them to combat internal unrest, limited opportunities for 
conquest and, hence, for the allotment of new cavalry fiefs (timars). This in 
turn caused new revolts and fed into ongoing ones. The conflicts at home 
and abroad also accelerated an increase in the use of irregulars (instead of 
semi-feudal cavalry, or sipahi), as well as the need to maintain a growing army 
                                                                                                                        
 
hundred more years, motionless and unchanging. Whatever the validity of these assertions, 
they generally lacked hard evidence, such as an elemental understanding of the budgets of the empire after 
1650, or of the profound reordering of the agrarian tax systems that was underway, or of the relation between 
the military and society, and what the collapse of the military meant to the entire imperial project. … Otto-
manist debates, prompted by those in Europe around the global crisis of the seventeenth 
century, inaugurated a discussion about the incorporation of the Ottomans into the world 
economy, which initially tended to focus on challenging the Asiatic mode of production.” 
(Aksan, “Theoretical Ottomans”, 113, my italics). 
386 See K. Kreiser, “Sāl-nāme”, EI2, viii: 898b-99a. 
387 See W.J. Griswold, “Jalālī”, EI2, 0: 238b-40a. 
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of Janissaries and garrisons to secure Ottoman lands and fortify three active 
frontiers all year round. 
This combination of military-strategic necessities decisively limited the 
relevance of the timar-system and the sipahis it provided for: the number of 
available fiefs could no longer support the numbers of new soldiers needed; 
firearm production and training increased at the cost of traditional cavalry 
weapons and tactics; more and more infantry was raised to take the place of 
cavalry that, after all, could not be kept from its semi-feudal administrative 
obligations at home all year each year. All this meant that the mainstay of the 
army could no longer be kept up through fiefs and the exaction of taxes and 
services from tenants. Instead of services, the new army that was evolving 
needed more and more cash for pay, training and firearms.388 Mainly because 
of this historical dynamic the Ottoman economy transformed from one 
primarily organized around the exaction of services (service economy) to one 
primarily organized around the exaction and payment of cash money (mone-
tary economy). 
 
For the Ottomanist’s practice, one of the most important consequences of 
this economic transformation is the diminishing importance and frequency 
of tax surveys (tahrirs). The primary aim of the timar-system had been to 
support a hierarchically ordered military caste (the men of the sword, or 
seyfiyye) that could be called upon in wartime to join campaigns with groups 
of retainers and to govern the land in peacetime. Thus, there had existed a 
firm link between the military, administrative, political and economic do-
mains of the Ottoman polity. Now, the slow but certain demise of the timar-
system was tearing heavily at this link. As Ottoman government sought new 
ways to root new military realities in wider Ottoman administration, the old 
link, though not severed completely, was transformed deeply. 
With the direct tie between military service and administration of the 
lands increasingly ruptured through the reconfiguration from service to 
                                                     
 
388 In his outstanding work Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700 (London: UCL Press, 1999) 
Rhoads Murphey meticulously identifies and weighs the practical limitations, opportunities 
and relative strengths of the Ottoman military machine as it confronted these challenges – 
implicitly critiquing many such blanket statements as are commonly made about this process 
of fiscal-military adaptation. In the process he arrives at some interesting conclusions con-
cerning the social and fiscal background and impact of the Ottoman military complex, among 
others that it was relatively light, always kept significant reserves, moved about active troops 
prodigiously to save those reserves, and that recruitment targets for sipahi-cavalry, Janissary 
troops, garrison troops and irregulars were not set too far in advance as part of a policy to 
substitute one for the other, but frequently, as fiscal and military-strategic need required. 
Specifically see chapters one, two and three (“General political framework: the evolving con-
text”, 1-11; “Material constraints on Ottoman warfare: the immutable context”, 13-34; “Mili-
tary manpower and military spending: an attempt at realistic assessment”, 35-63), and chapter 
nine (“Conclusion – war and social transformation in the Ottoman empire”, 185-92). 
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monetary economy, the tasks of the military governors in the provinces were 
in large part reassigned to commissioners and private tax collectors. Local 
and provincial taxes originally levied for provincial treasuries (market dues, 
cattle dues, tolls, etc.) and taxes traditionally levied for the central treasury 
(cizye and various avarız-taxes) alike were more and more often collected by 
tax farmers (mukata’acıs and mültezims389) who had acquired their right to 
collect at (annual or biannual) auctions. In this manner, amounts of collect-
able taxes, estimated through continuous monitoring by expressly appointed 
commissioners (emins) and local kadis, flowed straight into the coffers of the 
central administration, which could then decide more freely where it was to 
be spent – though most of it inevitably went towards military conscription, 
training, equipment and pay – instead of being automatically assigned to a 
caste of military governors (and their dependents) on which military success 
depended less and less. 
The increasing use of tax farmers entailed the privatization of administra-
tive tasks that had previously been the state’s exclusively. This had a pro-
found impact on administrative practice. Not because it eroded the tax base, 
for taxes were remitted, be it in advance of collection. Nor because tax farm-
ers could and would play the system to lower the apparent value of their 
farm ahead of the next auction (“to beat down a farm”, in contemporary 
European parlance). Rather, the impact lay in the implications tax farming 
had for hierarchy. Where previously there had been beys and kadis, sent out 
from the imperial center and each with their own taxes to administer and 
remit, there now also existed a host of contracted collectors, often with 
strong local ties, some of whom might still have been answerable in theory 
to the beys and kadis (in security and legal issues respectively), but whose 
power could be so entrenched as to place them at considerable distance from 
these officials’ reach. The overriding importance placed on tax collection 
meant that the classical maxim of balancing a given town, city or region’s 
military-administrative and legal-administrative authority (again, the bey’s and 
kadi’s respectively) to limit opportunities for abuse, was subordinated to the 
acutely important rationale of fiscal maximization. If a locality’s circumstanc-
es permitted it or called for it, it became very conceivable that a kadi’s juris-
diction and power far outweighed a bey’s, or – if an area carried special fiscal 
importance – that both be eclipsed by those of its main tax farmer. Increas-
ingly, whatever setup generated the most income without causing too much 
unrest seems to have been preferred to classical form, fiscal efficiency win-
ning out from hierarchical authority. 
Most of the changes and shifts in administration that later occurred 
throughout the empire originated in crown lands (hawass-ı hümayun). The 
                                                     
 
389 See F. Müge Göçek, “Mültezim”, EI2, vii: 551a-b; and , H. Gerber, “Mukāta‘a”, EI2, 
vii: 508b-9a. 
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sultan could dispose of such lands with relative freedom from interference 
by classes and groups, who on other (miri/state, mülk/freehold or 
vakf/endowed) lands would have rightfully demanded specific regimes and 
claimed certain entitlements with regard to their uses and revenues.390 Thus, 
imperial hass lands could function as a kind of testing ground for new admin-
istrative practices and governing strategies that bypassed existing state struc-
tures to experiment with tax farming and, more generally, with government 
through commissioners (emins). In this system, the role of feudal administra-
tors like the sancak beyi was limited to purely military tasks like the upkeep 
and manning of defenses. Although clearly advantageous to court, such gov-
ernment necessarily lacked some of the legitimacy of the classical system; it 
was, after all, despotic in essence. 
Not only did the experimental attractiveness of the hass result in the ex-
tension of its administrative practices to miri-lands, the system was also ex-
tended more directly by converting more and more lands to hass proper.391 
Whereas the classical Ottoman state had reserved hass status primarily for 
royal hunting grounds, state monopolies and undercultivated stretches of 
farmlands suitable for cash cropping, the 17th century witnessed the conver-
sion of more and more lands that had (potentially) high fiscal yields but that 
did not necessarily fit those earlier categories. This was advantageous for the 
specific reason that it gave the court more direct access to fiscal yields. But 
there was also the added general advantage that hass administration bypassed 
the miri regime, giving the court much tighter administrative control over the 
lands involved than could ever be achieved otherwise. 
                                                     
 
390 See, e.g., the careful discussion on Ottoman land regimes in Kadı, “Natives and 
Interlopers”, 12-24. 
391 “The k̲h̲awāṣṣ-i humāyūn and the k̲h̲āṣṣ lands of high officials and administrators formed 
an important part of the revenues of every province; …, they formed 277,244,782 aḳčes, 51% 
of the total revenue; the other k ̲h̲āṣṣ lands and timārs comprised 200,186,394 aḳčes, 37% of 
the total revenue”; “The value and extent of k ̲h̲āṣṣ lands would vary according to the produc-
tivity of the provinces and sand ̲j ̲aḳs. Although the most productive lands were already included 
in the k ̲h̲āṣṣ estates at the beginning of the 10th/16th century, their boundaries and the reve-
nue accruing from them tended to increase by a considerable amount”; “As a result of this 
decrease in agricultural income, the k̲h̲āṣṣ lands of viziers, beglerbegs and sand ̲j̲aḳ begs began to 
be transferred to the k ̲h̲āṣṣ-i humāyūn”; “From the 10th/16th century onwards, the term 
k̲h̲awāṣṣ-i humāyūn started to be used as equivalent to that of mīrī muḳāṭaʿa. The officials super-
vising the k ̲h̲āṣṣ lands of sand ̲j ̲aḳ begs and beglerbegs could not therefore interfere with the reve-
nues of mīrī muḳāṭaʿa or k ̲h̲awāṣṣ-i humāyūn in any way … Ḵh ̲āṣṣ-i pādishāhī or k ̲h̲āwaṣṣ-i humāyūn 
and k̲h̲āṣṣ lands were managed by a voyvoda, who had under their command the sekbān soldiers 
in order to carry out their duties … In some places the voyvodas who were in charge of record-
ing the shares of state and of individuals from k̲h̲āṣṣ revenues … were called k̲h̲āṣṣ ḍābiṭi or 
“k̲h̲āṣṣ officers” … However, the taxes on the reʿāyā living and working on the k̲h ̲āṣṣ lands 
were collected by emīns, who had nothing to do with the voyvodas”; “In earlier times permission 
was not given for the k ̲h̲āṣṣa lands to be farmed out on iltizām …, but this was not adhered to 
in later applications”: Orhonlu, “Khāss”. 
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The foregoing already suggests that even if it is accepted that the modest 
rank of Izmir’s administrators in the classical system implied Istanbul’s indif-
ference to what went on there (and its reliance on local mechanisms of con-
trol), it would nevertheless be a great mistake to assume it implied the same 
in the rapidly changing 17th-century context. As will be illustrated in more 
detail below, Izmir’s conversion from hass (of the kapudan and his kethüda) to 
hass-ı hümayun (c. 1678) not only transmitted its rapidly increasing revenues 
from the military establishment (in the person of the tersane-i amire kethüdası, 
the second Lord of the Admiralty, the grand admiral’s second-in-command) 
to court (in the person of the valide sultan, the sultan-mother) – it also meant 
that the court was now fully qualified to administer the hass directly (all the 
better if this could be done over the head of a lower-level kadi not in any 
position to challenge the will of the center).392 Suraiya Faroqhi has asserted 
that “İzmir, the booming port town of this period [1590-1699], was inten-
tionally left a simple district center and not promoted to the rank of a sancak 
capital, so that involvement of high-level officials was avoided as far as pos-
sible.”393 Although the assertion is certainly valid for the position of Izmir’s 
kadi, and for the city’s wider administration prior to the 1670s, the argument 
should not be extended beyond those limits: with its conversion to hass-ı 
hümayun, the city proper was taken out of the military-executive hierarchy of 
the sancak system altogether (excluding its external defenses) and brought 
under direct court rule. When observed through the prism of the fading 
classical system, its administrative status might seem to have remained pe-
ripheral; but within the context of the specifically early modern form of Ot-
toman administration that was congealing, this was a significant upgrade in 
status that implied an assertion of power and control by the center.394 
Above the intact middle and lower tiers of Izmir’s administration consist-
ing of the imported kadi and local officeholders, the top tier of district and 
provincial governors effectively disappeared, leaving a vacuum that was to be 
filled by various agents deeply indebted to the households enjoying ascend-
ancy at court, committed to their politics and operating under their control. 
Special commissioners (emin) and tax farmers (who had subcontracted on 
empire-wide farms auctioned and based in Istanbul) were necessarily more 
dependent on the center than could ever have been the case with governors, 
who, though always tied to one or other court faction, might at least have 
retained some sense of their own legally defined claims to military-
administrative responsibility, independence and authority. 
                                                     
 
392 On clerical (ulema) hierarchy, and the lower-level rank (mahrec) of Izmir’s kadi, see Halil 
İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London: Phoenix, 1973; 1994), 170; 
F. Müge Göçek, “Mewlewiyyet or Mollalik”, EI2, vi: 1030a-b; Kreiser, Osmanische Staat, 221; 
and Madeline C. Zilfi, “The Ottoman ulema”, in: Cambridge History of Turkey 3, 216. 
393 Faroqhi, Economic and Social History 2, 481. 
394 Cf. note 385. 
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In Izmir, then, the realignment of offices so typical of the Ottoman 17th 
century came to mean that the jurisdiction of the bey (first of Sığla, then of 
Aydın) was limited to the inspection of coastal defenses while the jurisdiction 
of Izmir’s relatively low-ranking kadi far exceeded that usually associated 
with the office in localities of such importance.395 As the one in charge of 
day-to-day administration he was not only Izmir’s judge, notary, chief admin-
istrator and government agent, his duties also included overseeing and en-
forcing public safety and security in all its aspects, executive duties normally 
associated with the governorship. Formally within the kadi’s jurisdiction, but 
increasingly competing with him for the retreating competence of the bey 
were the officials operating Izmir’s tax collection system. 
Those most relevant to our subject are the gümrükçü and the voyvoda. 
While gümrükçüi simply means “customs inspector” (or, in the language of 
the time, “customer”), voyvoda translates much less readily. The title had its 
origin in the Ottoman Balkans, where it designated something like “viceroy”. 
Voyvodas had originally been local Balkan rulers enlisted into Ottoman ser-
vice and put in charge of the crown lands into which their previous domin-
ions had been converted. Since crown lands had no regular military admin-
istration it became their task to ensure smooth and adequate collection of the 
taxes that accrued directly to governors (hawass) or the crown (hawass-ı 
hümayun). As a corollary, they also assumed charge of the maintenance of 
public safety and security in the lands under their jurisdiction.396 This is why 
they are often called “bailiffs” by European observers. In the 17th century the 
Balkan-variant of the office was increasingly populated by non-Muslim court 
favorites, most often wealthy Phanariote Greek (and to a lesser extent Jew-
ish) dragoman-doctor-financiers. With the increased incidence of hass status 
in the Anatolian provinces the office became a regular fixture of Ottoman 
administration and – outside the Balkan lands – the preserve of Muslim oc-
cupants. 
In 1678, Izmir’s voyvoda collected a stipend for the palace (paşmalık), taxes 
on fruits and wine, on imported market goods (baç-ı pazar) and on intestate 
inheritances (beytülmal). The subaşı (police inspector) and gece naip (night 
judge) patrolled the streets day and night on his order to prevent, fine and 
arrest offenders of all sorts. This effectively made the voyvoda into a summary 
judge; the one who dispensed judgment and punishment as violations oc-
curred – the kadi figuring almost as a judge of appeal in such non-
administrative cases. Since the voyvoda was so deeply involved in so wide a 
variety of taxes and matters of public order, he was the first Ottoman official 
non-Muslims in general and Europeans in particular had to come to terms 
                                                     
 
395 See Gy. Káldy Nagy, “Ḳāḍī”, EI2, iv: 375b. 
396 See F. Adanir, “Woywoda”, EI2, xi: 215b-16a. Cf. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devletinin … 
teşkilātı, 321n3. 
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with when wanting to make wine, to bring goods to market or to secure the 
inheritance of a fellow merchant – or, less innocuously, when making or 
drinking wine, roaming the streets at night without a lantern, engaging in 
prostitution, and like varieties of lewd or questionable behavior. This most 
often meant obtaining some dispensation from him, so Europeans were 
well-advised to stay on this officials right side.397 
 
By 1678, the Izmir-Chios foreign customs farm (uc gümrük mukata’ası or 
“outer” – foreign – customs farm, as distinct from that of the iç gümrük or 
inner – internal – customs) had been under tight control of the empire’s 
leading political family, the Köprülüs. Reflecting the hierarchy common in 
other areas of the empire’s administration, most regular customs posts in the 
empire’s core provinces were operated as subcontracts under one central 
contract served in Istanbul by the chief customer. Smaller posts were leased 
out as further subcontracts to those. Thus, the Chios customs was operated 
under the Izmir customs which was in turn operated under the Istanbul cus-
toms (not coincidentally this pattern was repeated in foreign representation: 
ambassador in Istanbul, consul in Izmir, vice-consul in Chios). Through 
careful household politics the three consecutive Köprülü grand viziers ruling 
from 1656 to 1683 managed to patronize and finance the four tax farm-
ers (mukata’acıs) that dominated the Istanbul and Izmir offices during this 
period (see Table 15 below). 
 
                                                     
 
397 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 165-68. One of the voyvoda’s several country houses and cot-
tages was in fact a köşk (pavilion) at the far end of Frank Street, as shown under number 4 – 
“het Tjoske, of speelhuys van Hagmet Aga” – in De Bruyn’s 1678-panorama of Izmir (repro-
duced here as Appendix 1, Plate 1). This Ahmed Ağa – to whose person and functions we will 
return – held the office of voyvoda from at least 1665 to at least 1679. He competed with the 
kadi for the position of Izmir’s main power-broker and was also the single most accessible 
Ottoman in local administration to Europeans, even letting out his country house in the 
nearby village of Seydiköy to Dutch merchants. For the year 1665 and this voyvoda’s control 
over the kadi, see S.C. Lomas and Francis Lawrence Bickley, Report on the Manuscripts of Allan 
George Finch, Esq., of Burley-on-the-Hill, Rutland (London: H.M.S.O., 1913-57), ii: 375. For the 
year 1668 and his involvement with European merchants and their Ottoman protégés, see 
The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a: Privileges obtained by Dutch ambassador Justinus 
Colyer during his audience with grand vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, 6 August 1668. 
For the year 1671, his charitable endowments, and his general pre-eminence, as well as for the 
information obtained from the muhtesib, see Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 89-99. For the year 1674 
and his letting out his country house to the Dutch, see note 238 and Appendix 2, Document 
4. For the years 1676-1677 and the gift presented to this voyvoda by the Dutch nation on the 
occasion of his son’s circumcision, see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to 
DLH, October 1677. For the years 1678-1679 and his köşk, see De Bruyn, Reizen, 23-25. 
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TABLE 15: THE KÖPRÜLÜ HOLD ON CUSTOMS AND POLL-TAX COLLECTION (1668) 
 Name Relevant Offices Chief Household Rela-
tions 
1 Köprülü Mehmed Paşa former grand vizier father of 2 and 3 
2 Köprülüzāde Fazıl Ahmed 
Paşa 
former governor-general of Aleppo
former deputy grand vizier 
grand vizier 
son of 1
brother of 3 
father (in-law) of 4 
3 Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa 
Paşa 
former grand admiral
deputy grand vizier 
future grand vizier 
(adopted) son of 1 
brother of 2 
uncle (in-law) of 4 
4 Kaplan Mustafa Paşa grand admiral
future governor-general of Aleppo 
son (in-law) of 2
nephew (in-law) of 3 
5 Mustafa Ağa former customs farmer of Iz-
mir/Chios 
former customs farmer of Istanbul
former steward of 1 
father of 6
father (in-law) of 7 
client of sultana-mother 
6 Mahmud Ağa customs farmer of Istanbul
steward of 1 
son of 5
brother (in-law) of 7 
7 Hüseyin Ağa (I) customs farmer of Izmir/Chios
poll-tax farmer of Izmir/Chios 
future poll-tax farmer of Istanbul 
future customs farmer of Istanbul 
son (in-law) of 5
brother (in-law) of 6 
client of sultana-mother 
client of 3 
8 Hüseyin Ağa (II) future customs collector of Iz-
mir/Chios 
future poll-tax collector of Iz-
mir/Chios 
client of 3
client of 7 
Based on Galland, Journal, i: 87 and throughout; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 123, 170-
71, and throughout; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123: Jacob van Dam and Justinus Colyer to 
DLH, 5 May 1688; and Kreutel, Kara Mustafa vor Wien, throughout. 
 
The enduring grand vizieral grip on the empire’s foreign customs implied a 
high measure of control over its conditions, tariffs, collection and proceeds. 
It has already been noted that both the theoretical height of customs duties 
and the actual amount paid were decisive for the competitiveness of a na-
tion’s trade. Since trade was the raison d’être of the nations assembled in Iz-
mir’s European quarter, and since the Köprülüs had a special interest in that 
trade, it would be no exaggeration to claim that for a period of some twenty-
five years ending in 1683 that leading family possessed an unparalleled po-
tential to dominate European life in Izmir. Yet the Köprülüs managed to 
enhance this potential further still, since sometime before 
1672 they extended their patronage to the poll-tax farm (cizye iltizamı). Dur-
ing their remaining eleven years in power the chief customer was also the 
collector of the poll-tax in Galata, Pera and Üsküdar – the non-Muslim dis-
tricts across Istanbul’s Golden Horne where most of the city’s non-Muslims 
and all its Europeans lived. Just as was the case with the customs farms, the 
poll-tax iltizams were organized hierarchically with Istanbul at the top, Izmir 
and other important centers of non-Muslim presence just below and smaller 
and more peripheral ones like Chios appended to those. Although this did 
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not necessarily mean that the offices of customs and poll-tax collector were 
always united in one person, this was the case in Izmir as in Istanbul. 
 
In terms of power on the ground, patronizing the poll-tax farms in prime 
locations of international trade like Galata, Pera and Izmir was of major 
consequence. From their positions as grand vizier and substitute grand vizier 
the Köprülüs could already wield an impressive array of formal administra-
tive and diplomatic instruments. Their control and reform of the customs 
farms added to this the means to gain precise information on, and interfere 
in, all commercial transactions involving foreigners – most often by invoking 
suspicions of illicit trading. This pervasiveness allowed them to pursue 
broader economic policy and to serve their private financial interests through 
day-to-day micro-management on the local level.398 
Now, patronage and reform of the poll-tax added another instrument to 
the Köprülüs’ policy arsenal (399) and expanded opportunities for micro-
managing Ottoman-European trade and relations, providing the means to 
intervene in the Ottoman side of business transactions as well. Shifting poll-
tax burdens and manipulating relevant legal procedures in favor of some or 
other non-Muslim nation (Greek, Jewish, Armenian) or specific non-Muslim 
merchant (wholesaler, dragoman, warehouseman, etc.) at the cost of another 
                                                     
 
398 As is apparent in Kara Mustafa’s haraç order, in the Pentlow avania and the resulting 
precautions by the other nations, in the controversy with Venetian ambassador Civrano over 
diplomatic smuggling, in the forced renewal of the Dutch capitulations (upon complaints by 
the chief customer), as in the many arrests of European goods in the Izmir customs over the 
years 1675-1688: see, supra and, e.g., Appendix 2. The process began in earnest under Fazıl 
Ahmed Paşa, when the new Izmir customs was taken into operation and maintained by Kara 
Mustafa Paşa. Cf. The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Justinus Colyer to Jacob van Dam and the 
Dutch Nation of Izmir, 4 October 1675, where it is recounted how Colyer read Van Dam and 
the nation’s letter of 14 September 1675 on the troubles made by Izmir’s customer, who was 
refusing to expedite the cargo of Dutch national Schregels, upon which Colyer had sent his 
first dragoman to Hüseyn Ağa (I) to try to hold him to his earlier promise that the new 
customs regulation would not be enforced – to which the customer had replied that he could 
no longer guarantee this because the grand vizier had sent a general command to establish and 
maintain the new customs, and that all nations trading in Izmir now had to regulate 
themselves according to it. Upon taking his complaint higher up to substitute grand vizier 
Kara Mustafa, he was (of course!) again politely told that the order had come straight from the 
grand vizier and was ironclad. The subsequent memorandum to Fazıl Ahmed drafted by the 
French ambassador and cosigned by all European representatives was also to no avail, so the 
representatives advised their nations in Izmir to attempt to mitigate the effects of the new 
regulations through local arrangements with Hüseyin Ağa (II), giving up formal resistance for 
fear of commercial and diplomatic repercussions. 
399 The cizye-reform of 1691, which officially replaced all maktu’-arrangements and previ-
ous rates with three fixed rates of liability, was introduced by Köprülüzade Mustafa Paşa 
(1689-1691) but had in fact been prepared by Fazıl Ahmed and Kara Mustafa Paşas. They first 
tested various incarnations of the system in Crete, the Aegean, and Izmir after the conquest of 
Crete (see notes 110 and 112). 
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could after all impact these merchants’ competitive edge significantly.400 Po-
tentially, the leverage created by control over the poll-tax could also be ex-
tended to directly or indirectly include European merchants who were felt to 
have retreated from consular protection, to have crossed communal lines, or 
to have simply resided in Ottoman lands for too many consecutive years not 
to be liable to taxation.401 
Beside the Köprülüs’ hold on customs and the poll-tax through patron-
age of its farmers, another line of power led down to Izmir’s voyvoda. Because 
of the fluidity of the office, it has proved difficult to uniformly define 
the voyvodalık. Contemporary accounts invariably give many descriptions of 
his functions and modern scholars have followed in their footsteps styling 
him “prince”, “governor”, “bailiff”, “chief of police”, “tax collector”, “mar-
ket inspector”, “head intendant”, and so on. The most learned dragomans’ 
dictionary of the time gives “wajwoda: (LA.) palatinus, princeps, praefectus, 
major pagi, quaestor, tribunus, maleficiorum judex, praetor, nomarcha; (FR.) 
palatin, prince, gouverneur, baillif, maire, prevost, receveur.402 
Although voyvodas could certainly fulfill these and other tasks, we have al-
ready seen they can all be traced back to one central duty; that of collecting 
income from hass estates, whether imperial (hawass-ı hümayun, destined for the 
treasury) or otherwise (hawass of sultans, royal consorts, viziers, governors-
general, governors, etc.). This was the defining responsibility of the of-
fice, but to enable it to be carried out effectively some of the means and 
agents of force and control normally associated with the governorship had to 
be brought under the voyvoda’s competence. As a consequence, within the 
districts (kazas) he was appointed to the voyvoda could take on many tasks 
that were necessary to ensure the generation and collection of the revenue in 
his charge. Most important among these auxiliary duties were maintaining 
discipline and public order through the services of a number of lower tier 
officials like the police and market inspectors (resp. subaşı and muhtesib) and 
with the assistance of local Janissary regiments or irregular units. 
                                                     
 
400 The best illustration of this capability and the Köprülüs’ determination to use it to 
break European commercial power in their own and their subjects’ favor, is their deciding in 
the Portuguese Jews’ favor the controversy surrounding the balance between the formal status 
of Izmir’s Portuguese Jews as Ottoman subjects, Dutch protégés, and/or Dutch subjects, and 
the commercial privileges and courtesies that were to be accorded to them – a policy decision 
that was rapidly reversed after their fall. See pages 147-55, and Appendix 2, documents 8 and 
9. 
401 See my “Towards Classifying Avanias” on two Köprülü interventions (in the Dutch 
and the English nations) on poll-tax related questions of subject status and inheritance divi-
sion. On the haraç controversy – Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa’s more concentrated effort to push 
the Europeans and their commerce back in their appointed legal-commercial space, see pages 
206-16 and Appendix 2, document 12. 
402 Meniński, Thesaurus, 5423. 
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Considering the extraordinary amount of commerce taking place in Izmir 
it is not surprising that Izmir’s voyvoda, Uzun Ahmed Ağa (see note 397), cast 
a particularly large shadow – all the larger for the fact that he derived his 
salary as a percentage of the farmed and unfarmed taxes he collected. What’s 
more, the voyvoda’s local pedigree seems to have made him a power broker 
with close ties to the city’s elite and deep roots in local politics.403 As the 
strongman behind the customer/poll-tax collector and several more collec-
tors of market taxes and other commercial duties, but also – more directly –
 behind the guards along Izmir’s quays, streets and markets, he was obviously 
of supreme importance to any Ottoman or European conducting business in 
the city. The Köprülüs’ ties to this personage of significant wealth and local 
power were twofold: firstly, they were officially charged with overseeing the 
affairs of the valide sultan (the beneficiary of the Izmir hass) and in that capaci-
ty were the voyvoda’s direct superiors; and, secondly, they had a more private 
stake in smooth and effective operation of the office because it was the sec-
ond leg under their customs and poll-tax interests. 
The situation outlined above once more draws our attention to the single 
most distinguishing feature of Ottoman elite social and political life in the 
early modern period; the political household (kapı), and the politics through 
which it was supported, expanded and utilized.404 The cultivation of large 
and influential households was not unique to the Ottoman case: it was com-
mon throughout the Middle East and Asia, as well as in Europe (though 
there on a more modest scale). The longevity, size and political relevance of 
the Ottoman institution were remarkable nonetheless. It was so pervasive 
because it developed as an integral part of the equally long-lived, large and 
politically relevant Ottoman Empire where the patrimonial household of the 
Ottoman dynasty was almost synonymous with the state and commanded 
emulation throughout elite society. As Ottoman vezir-paşa-households, with 
the Osmanlıs and the Köprülüs’ as shining examples, started to fill the vacu-
ums left by the early modern multiform reorganization of the military, the 
land regimes, and provincial administrations, they acquired so much power 
and expertise that they ended up becoming indispensable to the operation of 
the Ottoman state and its territories. These miniature states would employ 
many hundreds of people with further client-patron relations branching out 
far and wide into Ottoman administration, institutions and society. Although 
their importance for early modern Ottoman history is established, their fluid-
                                                     
 
403 Cf. Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 89-99; and Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 165-68. 
404 On the importance of political households for (the historiography of) the Ottoman 
early modern period, see Aksan, “Theoretical Ottomans”; Neumann, “Political and diplomatic 
developments”; Carter Vaughn Findley, “Political culture and the great households”, in: 
Cambridge History of Turkey 3, 65-80; and Dina Rizk Khoury, “The Ottoman centre versus 
provincial power-holders: An analysis of the historiography”, in: ibid., 135-56. 
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ity and informality (though not perceived as such by the Ottomans them-
selves) have hindered consistent scholarly investigation.405 
While being aware of the limitations of our current understanding of the 
phenomenon, it should be possible to appreciate its importance and illustrate 
its impacted on Ottoman affairs. We are fortunate to have relatively many 
references to the household connections of the three consecutive Köprülü 
viziers of the second half of the 17th century, and one remarkably detailed 
description of the household of the third.406 The general impression they 
provide of the Köprülü network is that it was tight yet wide, that it 
was carried over from generation to generation, and that it tended to mirror 
administrative hierarchy within its household and wider patron-client rela-
tionships. That last addition may seem like a complicated way of saying that 
this and other such networks purposely and necessarily followed administra-
tive organization. After all, a client only gets appointed to an office precisely 
because his patron is in a position to procure appointment for him. In this 
fashion the patron not only dominates his subordinates professionally and 
formally as a superior within formal hierarchy, but also privately and infor-
mally as a patron through his network. But besides reminding us of the fact 
that there existed many other (e.g. more horizontal, less political) types of 
households and other networks, stressing this particular one’s stability, size, 
longevity and coincidence with formal hierarchy also serves another purpose: 
it signals a renewed Ottoman capability for policy-making. 
 
Until now, we have primarily discussed the court’s direct involvement in the 
hass of Izmir (and, fleetingly, the hawass of Galata, Pera and Üsküdar) and 
Köprülü dominance in customs and poll-tax affairs in terms of the accumu-
lation of raw power and financial control. We have argued that the light 
presence and even retreat of classical state structures from these places is not 
a sound indicator of their real or perceived importance to the Ottomans 
because from the end of the 16th century onwards the roles and functions of 
classical Ottoman administration were partly taken over by more effective, if 
more arbitrary, forms of management. The takeover happened first and 
foremost in lands reserved for the crown (hawass-ı hümayun) and members of 
                                                     
 
405 Although a number of biographic studies on Ottoman statesmen have gone some way 
towards mapping the unknown terrain opened up by Abou-el-Haj’s landmark study on the 
vezir-paşa-household (id., “The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households”), his rudimentary study 
of the Köprülü-household, and those monographs, have yet to prompt a consistent effort to 
arrive at a (prosopographical) description of the empire’s most important households and 
their relations to each other and the state in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries. 
406 See, e.g., supra under “The Köprülüs, Their Endowment and Its Impact” and “Kara 
Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman Control”. Also see Dankoff, The Intimate Life; 
id., An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Çelebi; Galland, Journal, throughout (the 
description of Kara Mustafa’s household at ii: 186-207); and North, Life. 
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the royal household, court favorites and high officials (hawass proper). The 
fact that such lands were either partly or fully administered for the benefit of 
private persons implied that their government was also to a certain degree 
privatized. Considering that most Ottomans invested whatever social and 
political capital they possessed in their households and that management of 
the extended family’s resources was the primary task of the public (birun; as 
opposed to enderun or privy) section of any household, it is to be expected 
that the administration of hass lands was dominated by members of their 
patriarchs’ households. If, then, a patron’s household was powerful enough 
to effectively and consistently develop linkages with the lands un-
der consideration and keep out rival households, we would expect to see the 
pattern repeated lower down, displaying a hierarchical sequence of house-
hold loyalties instead of a tangle of competing ones. 
This indeed was how the Izmir hass was administered; locally by members 
of the Köprülü household and centrally by its patrons, the Köprülü grand 
viziers, who in turn administered it for their own patron, the valide sultan. It 
seems the bonds of power connecting court, central government and local 
administration in Izmir were at once strong and deep because of the way 
“formal” and “informal” power coincided throughout hierarchy. The setup 
not only enhanced the Köprülüs’ political and financial position by function-
ing as a power base, it also served as a political and financial insurance whose 
formal and informal legs kept each other up if either threatened to fal-
ter. Deliberate household policies thus served to unite political, financial and 
social power in the family’s hands and to make sure it stayed there beyond 
one patron’s term in office and for as long as possible. The measure of con-
tinuity thus achieved, apart from serving private interests, had great signifi-
cance for general government. The longevity and depth of Köprülü pow-
er made possible a level of coordination in state affairs which the eroding 
classical state structures were no longer able to deliver. After decades of 
intense turmoil and rudderlessness it provided the means to engage in the 
development and implementation of unified and sustained government poli-
cies. 
The Köprülüs directed most of this renewed capability towards “foreign” 
affairs. It could hardly have been otherwise, seeing their empire’s uncomfort-
able position amidst the encroaching Muscovians, Safavids and Habsburgs 
and the rapidly increasing volume of Ottoman-European trade. But as our 
discussion of the capitulations has shown, the distinction between foreign 
and home affairs would have appeared artificial to the Ottomans to begin 
with. Short of special Ottoman embassies or outright war, all Ottoman-
European relations took place in Ottoman lands and could be considered 
home affairs – a natural outcome of the absence of reciprocity. Throughout 
Ottoman history European representatives were confronted with the conse-
quences of this position, namely that their hosts assumed sovereignty under 
Ottoman law over persons the Europeans considered to be protected and 
 
 
243 
 
immune under international law. Nevertheless, the resulting conflicts were 
rarely more than minor if recurring inconveniences to be smoothed over by 
diplomacy and money. That is, in the absence of major international crises 
and so long as the Ottomans did not embark upon any consistent effort 
to utilize the full potential of this controversy for larger purposes. 
In extremis, though, consistent Ottoman utilization of the legal duplicity of 
capitulatory status for long-term political ends could result in the devaluation 
of the status of resident European diplomats and their merchant communi-
ties. Although it would never declare so unequivocally for the understanda-
ble reason that this would catastrophically harm the empire’s international 
relations, a sufficiently ruthless Ottoman logic could dictate that ambassa-
dors, residents and consuls henceforth be treated – de facto – as heads (millet 
başıs) of Ottoman minority communities (millets; taifes) that lived under their 
own legal and fiscal regimes just like the empire’s other non-Muslim com-
munities. The previously described changes in Ottoman attitude towards 
foreign representatives, trade and merchants that occurred under the Kö-
prülüs could certainly be construed as shifts in that direction. The fundamen-
tal reaction to this apparent policy-based shift was an intensified European 
struggle to safeguard the additional privileges and exemptions that separated 
its merchant communities from the subjected Armenian, Jewish, and Greek 
ones. Most visibly, this involved suspending Ottoman imposition of the 
most eye-catching mark of the zimmi, the cizye poll-tax, on protected Europe-
ans (müstemin). 
The extension of Ottoman sovereignty achieved through Köprülü land, 
household and fiscal politics was crowned by their privately funded 1678 
urban development project. In Izmir, its primary function was to bring Eu-
ropean trade under Ottoman control, in the process cordoning it off more 
tightly from the Ottoman economy so as to limit its impact. As such, it was 
the physical equivalent of the Köprülüs’ efforts to legally and administrative-
ly separate the Europeans more clearly from their Ottoman context in the 
social and economic arenas and force them back in their assigned legal, social 
and commercial space – a policy that simultaneously aimed to integrate these 
discrete communities’ more absolutely in the Ottoman system and to control 
their cultural impact. This it did through legal, commercial and other admin-
istrative measures, but now also physically through the creation of an Otto-
man-controlled middle ground in Kasap Hazır. 
Relocating entrance, storage and sale to Ottoman institutions in the Ot-
toman part of town served the practical purpose of drastically limit-
ing possibilities for smuggling and other types of tax evasion (407), thereby 
raising the value of the hass and the income and value derived from it. Politi-
cally, patronizing and facilitating Izmir’s administrative and mercantile elites 
                                                     
 
407 See pages 136-37 and note 195. 
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– whether Ottoman or European – served to correct a main irritant in Ot-
toman foreign affairs, viz. the disproportionate amount of influence individ-
ual local Ottoman officials and European merchants could wield in the em-
pire’s affairs against Istanbul’s (or for that matter; home governments’) ex-
plicit wishes. Indeed, if one takes a step back and surveys Ottoman-
European affairs in Izmir from its beginnings up to 1688, a subtle change 
becomes visible: one notices how ripples and disruptions in local relations 
(let’s call them “avanias”) at first tend to be more frequent and modest, and 
to originate with demands made by local Ottoman officials in contravention of 
Istanbul’s will, and later on become scarcer, while appearing as expressions of 
Köprülü will to be countered only through petitioning other court factions and 
households in moments of Köprülü weakness or absence. 
With the wide and deep foundation they were laying in the economic 
heart of Ottoman-European affairs, the Köprülüs gained enough power to 
have all concerned toe their line. To the Ottomans, politics and trade 
had always been two sides of the same coin, but the politicization of mercan-
tile affairs that was the result of the Köprülüs’ interest in foreign affairs and 
their decades-long reassertion of central power was such that any and all 
chances of counterbalancing it through local alliances were lost from the 
outset. In a system that was increasingly adept and determined at manipulat-
ing their affairs through administrators, middlemen and competitors, Izmir’s 
European communities did well to recognize that they now operated as an 
integral part in an increasingly unified Ottoman power structure and to make 
the most of this given. 
 
The affairs of the Dutch nation of the period afford an unusual degree of 
insight into this process. I have asserted above (and elsewhere408) that the 
manipulation of factions within Ottoman society and administration to se-
cure optimal commercial conditions and mitigate avanias was regular Euro-
pean practice – a regular practice, however, that was to be concealed as 
much as possible from the home authorities. By not allowing their control-
lers and supervisors too good a view on how the sausage of commercial 
success was made, European merchants and representatives preserved deni-
ability for when their dealings unraveled and invited Ottoman interference: 
they could play on European prejudices, blame Ottoman (or Jewish) un-
trustworthiness, intransigence and despotism, be bailed-out, and still come 
away with their reputations and prospects intact. Although the Dutch were 
no exception to this, and although the full extent of their illicit trades and 
relations will therefore also forever remain hidden, the intense and uninter-
                                                     
 
408 See also my “Towards Classifying Avanias”. Cf. North, Life, throughout, but esp. Dud-
ley North’s own contemporary critical account of “diverse Turkish avanias, since the Govern-
ment of Cara Mustapha Basha, Vizier Azem”, 71-100. 
 
 
245 
 
rupted crisis of authority that plagued their nation from 1668 until 1687 
(mainly over arrears in consular and ambassadorial duties409) does afford us 
some added perspective on how the Dutch dealt with the realignment of 
Ottoman power in Izmir. 
Together with the realignment of Ottoman power in Izmir, the rift in the 
Dutch nation that persisted throughout the first Köprülü-period (as specified 
in Appendix 3), ensured that the Dutch merchants and combined nation 
were no longer positioned to utilize national and factional divergences and 
oppositions within the city’s wider administration and society to locally 
counter or undermine the wishes of an Ottoman center that was in disar-
ray.410 Instead, Dutch (and other European nations’) attempts to conduct 
factional politics in Izmir against the Ottoman center, although often initially 
appearing promising at the local level, invariably foundered later on because 
whatever national and factional divergences and oppositions existed within 
local society and administration were resolved higher up in the unified 
household and government hierarchy set up by the Köprülüs – its energies 
being redirected back down to Izmir to ensure compliance. 
This change did not end factional politics in Izmir, but the fact that local 
factions could no longer be played to counterbalance Köprülü orders 
through local co-optation did limit its relevance for the city’s Europeans. 
Such European involvement in local politics as did occur, now served the 
purpose of winning temporary and incidental advantages over European 
competitors, or – as in the Dutch case – within the nation. In their struggle 
to gain the upper hand over one another, the factions within Izmir’s Dutch 
nation sought and obtained the support of competing institutions back 
home, and of competing European nations and Ottoman officials in Izmir. 
The prism of Dutch factional relations therefore affords us some interesting 
insights into concrete political alignments in Izmir during this time. 
The rift in the Dutch nation of Izmir formed and persisted in resistance 
to attempts by the States General to reassert consular jurisdiction and con-
trols. After decades of underrepresentation, liberty and anarchy (reminiscent 
of the Wild West) this was regarded by a substantial number of Dutch mer-
chants as an unwarranted and costly infringement in their personal and pro-
fessional affairs. Although it did not take the form of formal dissent with the 
States General, the Dutch correspondence to and from Izmir of this period 
does show that this tendency toward liberty was often viewed more sympa-
thetically by the directors of the chambers of the Board of Levant Trade 
(DLH), themselves after all not officials but representatives and coordinators 
                                                     
 
409 The crisis figures prominently in all primary and secondary sources on the Dutch na-
tion of Izmir in the 17th century, but see the contributions by Van Dam van Isselt in the 
bibliography in particular. 
410 Cf., generally, Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World. 
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chosen from among merchant/burgher communities wary of centralized 
authority. Overall, the interests of the consul and the obedient faction coin-
cided with those of the resident/ambassador and the States General, while 
those of the disobedient often found a more understanding audience in the 
DLH, the cities, and occasionally the provinces.411 
The two Dutch factions also sought and obtained support among Izmir’s 
other Europeans. Although that support did not follow national lines com-
pletely, the consul’s faction often garnered the support of the English consul 
and nation, while the disobedient faction frequently managed to muster that 
of the French.412 Here, it is interesting to note that this alignment had almost 
nothing to do with world political developments (one will recall that an An-
glo-French alliance attacked the United Provinces in 1672, for example), and 
everything with the organizational, mercantile and cultural style and makeup 
of these nations (as discussed a few pages further down): within the diverse 
European cultures of Izmir the French and disobedient Dutch faction repre-
sented an older more chaotic and diversified Levantinized mercantile culture 
than the one represented by the English nation and the obedient Dutch fac-
tion. 
 
Completing the triangle of relations supporting European life and trade in 
Izmir was that of Ottoman administration. For any nation, faction or mer-
chant to survive beyond one trade season, and certainly for as long as the 
Dutch disobedient faction did, it required not just the support of some home 
authorities and other European nations, but also that of one or more Otto-
                                                     
 
411 See all The Hague-archives listed in the bibliography. Also see Heeringa, Bronnen 2; and 
the articles by Van Dam van Isselt. 
412 Cf., e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Adriano Groenincx, Frans de Hartigh, Nicolas 
Legouche and Philips van de Sande in Jacob van Dam’s chancery, 28 December 1671; ibid.: 
Nicolas Legouche to DLH, 2 July 1674; ibid.: “discrepant” Dutch merchants of Izmir to DLH, 
14 August 1674; and ibid.: Nicolas Legouche in Louis Chambon’s chancery, 14 August 1674 – 
where we read that the complainants against consul Van Dam were vacationing in Seydiköy 
with members of the French nation, and that one of the consul’s supporters (Cornelis van 
Persijn, also a lodger of Van Dam’s) violently mistreated French merchant Auguste Rubin in 
that same village, leading his brother-in-law Joseph Clement Fauré to lodge a complaint with 
Jacob van Dam, who refused to do anything about it but did consequently had Fauré beaten 
up by Van Persijn and his domestics, occasioning a lawsuit resulting in depositions with 
French consul Louis Chambon and with a notary in Rotterdam. As for the advice and support 
the English lent the Dutch consul and his faction, that is in evidence throughout Dutch corre-
spondence, esp. in The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 21 Sep-
tember 1671; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 6 December 1674; ibid.: 
Jacob van Dam to States General and DLH, 18 March 1675;  
The Hague, NA 1.03.01 98: Jacob van Dam to Colyer, 13 February 1676; The Hague, NA 
1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to States General, 2 March 1676; and ibid.: Jacobus van der Merct 
to DLH, 24 November 1678. It is also apparent in the joint Anglo-Dutch excursion to Ephe-
sus of 1678 (The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23a-b; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 28-34). Additional 
texts in Appendix 2, documents 1, 3, 4, and 5. 
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man power brokers. It appears that the consul and his faction managed to 
retain the support of Izmir’s kadi (and his subordinates), while the disobedi-
ent faction garnered that of the voyvoda (and his).413 Surely, it is no coinci-
dence that on this side of the triangle too, the consul and his party aligned 
with the Ottoman official that most represented the imported authority of 
the center and its formal procedures, while his opponents could apparently 
count on the support of a more embedded power broker with whom deals 
could be struck to mutual benefit. European expense accounts show that the 
kadi ranked above the voyvoda, also in the eyes of the European consuls. In 
their official correspondence, what’s more, the latter is non-existent. At the 
same time, Galland and other travelers tell us that he was a person of great 
power and importance to the Europeans. The resulting image is that of a 
local power broker who made good his formal position below the kadi by 
using the contacts and means of enforcement at his disposal to become the 
well-rewarded enabler of the shadier sides of European and inter-national 
life in Izmir, in a way balancing out the kadi’s and the consuls’ authority.414 
                                                     
 
413 See note 397 and Appendix 2, document 4 on the disobedient faction’s leasing the 
voyvoda’s house in Seydiköy. Van Dam, on the other side, fully depended on the kadi for lodg-
ing complaints and enforcing his consular authority – cf., e.g., Appendix 2, document 1, which 
was used as a widely attested and very public demonstration of the disobedient faction’s 
disrespect for the kadi and all but the French consul’s authority. The kadi’s support was also 
of crucial importance in the controversy surrounding Van Dam’s appointment of Johan 
Calckoen as vice-consul, that is, against the express and rightful will of the disobedient fac-
tion: see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Discrepant Thirteen of the Dutch Nation of Izmir to 
DLH, 13 December 1677; and ibid.: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 29 December 1677; and The 
Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 23 December 1677.  
414 See Appendix 2, documents 2, 4 and 11 and notes 238, 356, 397 and 413 (and sur-
rounding text) on Dutch relations with voyvoda Ahmet Ağa (also in relation to the kadi). Ac-
cord. Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 224n48 on English presents to the kadi and voyvoda. And Dumont, 
Nouveau voyage, 284-93 on Ahmet Ağa’s accessibility, his formal relation to the kadi, and his 
actual power over him. Idem Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 162-68, where (166-67) it is also explai-
ned how the voyvoda issued permission slips enabling Europeans to visit prostitutes: “Il profite 
aussi des amendes auxquelles le cadi condamne les malfaiteurs et ceux qui font des désordres. 
Mais un des beaux droits qu’il ait est sur ceux qui se trouvent en débauche avec les femmes, 
parce que l’amende n’est pas limitée et qu’il peut exiger le plus qu’il peut suivant les richesses 
de ceux qu’il surprend. Mais il y en a plusieurs, et particulièrement des Francs, qui lui donnent 
qui 10, qui 20 écus par an pour avoir un billet de lui qui leur donne la liberté de fréquenter 
celles qu’ils veulent, et pour se mettre à couvert de l’affront d’être menés en prison ou de 
recevoir quelque autre mauvais traitement. Néanmoins, afin que le cadi ne trouve rien à redire 
à une telle permission qu’il pourrait trouver de mauvais exemple et contraire aux lois, il met 
simplement qu’il donne la permission à un tel Franc d’aller à la maison ou au jardin d’une telle 
pour faire blanchir son linge. Cela ne les met pas beaucoup plus en sûreté, parce que comme 
ils sont connus et que l’on sait les lieux qu’ils fréquentent, il ne manque pas de les importuner 
souvent et de leur en faire débourser davantage. Il y a des filles qui obtiennent aussi de ces 
billets afin d’être visitées par les Francs avec liberté, et l’on en a déjà vu qui par ce moyen sont 
arrivées à en épouser de bien riches, quoiqu’elles n’eussent aucun bien.” Accord. note 235; 
Dumont, Nouveau voyage, 315 and 334; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 127. 
 
 
248 
 
Rather than pointing towards a European overpowering of an incompe-
tent and derelict Ottoman administrative structure ushering in an era of sus-
tained Ottoman commercial incorporation into the European world system, 
the aforementioned changes in Ottoman administrative practice and the 
subtle ways in which the European communities adjusted to them, suggest 
movement in an opposite direction – that of an increasing European incor-
poration into a reconfiguring and reascending Ottoman system (at least until 
the Orlov revolt of 1769 and the Battle of Çeşme of 1770). This is not to say 
that no Ottoman (semi-)peripheralization took place, but it does challenge us 
to reconsider time and again that process’ relative timing and strength, and, 
therefore, also its inevitability. However hard it might be for the modern 
observer to recognize and appreciate policies and measures that were formu-
lated through sovereign Ottoman knowledge, experience and practice (espe-
cially when they do not correspond to our perceptions of what was ideally, 
classically, Ottoman), it would be wise to imagine that they might have con-
stituted a viable alternative to European commercial prowess instead of a 
rearguard action against it. 
 
Size and Composition of the non-Ottoman Communities 
After our necessarily somewhat philosophical examinations of the causes, 
perceptions, manifestations and ramifications of the European communities’ 
changing legal, administrative and social status, the following sections will 
address a number of more practical questions concerning their size, compo-
sition, organization and taxation. 
Our first two questions, as to size and composition, do however require 
some further qualification before we can attempt to answer them. For 
what did a “nation” constitute? As is to be expected in a time when concepts 
such as nationality and citizenship were still very much in development, there 
existed precious little agreement on what constituted national membership. 
And even if some form of agreement existed, a far from egalitarian 
worldview would guarantee that insiders and observers often shared a sense 
that not all members really mattered or counted evenly. Comparison of con-
temporary accounts confirms this: some observers count only the principal 
merchants (trading for their own accounts or “factors”), others include 
clerks and other staff, still others shop- and tavern keepers and the like. And 
then there is the question of whether female family members and protégés 
were included in estimates of a given nation’s size. So, although tables of 
contemporary estimates have been produced and reproduced countless 
times, the question as to what sections of Izmir’s European population are 
included or omitted in the figures given for any nation still need to be grap-
pled with. In the end, just as was the case with our figures for Izmir’s non-
European population, it comes down to whom to trust most as a source. 
Contemporary accounts speak of significant disparities between the vari-
ous nations. Everywhere, the French nation is listed as the largest by far, 
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followed at some distance by the English, the Dutch, the Venetian and the 
Genoese. Though they are not to be taken at face value, the overall picture 
that emerges from them is confirmed by all contemporary accounts, both 
narrative and otherwise. It is that of three consecutive waves of foreign mer-
chants washing one over the other, each virtually crushing its predecessors 
(with the French forming the exception). After centuries of competition 
among themselves, the merchants of Venice and Genoa were swamped by 
an inpour of French, particularly Provençals, who started arriving in full 
force in the second half of the 16th century. Around the turn of the century 
they were joined by the English, followed on their heels by the Dutch. Far 
from being haphazard, this sequence of arrivals perfectly illustrates the over-
riding themes of Braudel’s La Méditerranee, viz. the capturing of Mediterrane-
an trade by the Atlantic Seaboard states (a theme which would go on to 
prompt and inform much of Wallerstein’s world-system theory) and the 
ruining of Mediterranean socioeconomic unity.415 
Just like the arrival of Islam and the Turks had an enormous (though not 
disruptive) impact on the organization and substance of Mediterranean trade 
(and obviously also on participation in it), the Atlantic seaboard’s intrusion in 
the status quo under Ottoman rule again ushered in many new develop-
ments. Neither the arrival of Islam and the Turks, nor that of France, Eng-
land and the Netherlands, were negative developments commercially speak-
ing (a belief nevertheless still widely held in the case of Islam and, even more 
so, the Turks).416 Rather, each new arrival signaled yet another rise in the 
total volume and value of trade. But in the early modern period the distinc-
tively tolerant Mediterranean way of life so closely intertwined with a highly 
pragmatic and crosscultural Mediterranean commercial practice developed 
over ages, was time and again besieged by clericalism, mercantilism, absolut-
ism, nationalism, and a host of other “isms” that eventually altered it beyond 
recognition. Such medium-term changes in Mediterranean commerce and 
society were not only expressed through the sequence in which new trading 
nations arrived in commercial centers, but also of course through who traded 
what goods under what form of internal administration once they got there. 
A relatively open and commercially integrated city like Izmir – benign-
ly administered and ideally positioned at the crossroads of the North-South 
and East-West axes of Mediterranean trade, offering access to the old luxu-
ry trade from the Far and Near East and to increasingly popular bulk goods 
(cotton, grain, soap, ore etc.) from Anatolia and Egypt – offers an excellent 
example of how systemic developments played out locally. 
 
                                                     
 
415 See notes 139 and 373-76. 
416 Cf. Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and Plenty, throughout, esp. 71-73 on the Pirenne-
thesis. 
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Venice, Genoa and the Greek islands dominated by them had the oldest 
claims to trade in Ottoman lands. The city republics themselves obviously lay 
outside Ottoman borders and were therefore foreign to the Ottomans. Yet, 
the existence of Genoese and Venetian communities in Thrace, Asia Minor 
and the Archipelago predated the arrival of the Ottomans, implying they 
could be considered more domestic to those regions than their overlords. 
The integral parts of the pre-Ottoman configuration that these communities 
were, they were complete societies in the truest sense. In Izmir as in Istanbul 
they once consisted of significant numbers of families occupied in as full an 
array of trades as might be found in any town, guided by their own clergy-
men, led and represented by chosen headmen, and under the ultimate juris-
diction of noble families tied to the home city.417 
As the demand for luxury goods from the East was superseded by Eu-
rope’s increasing demand for Egyptian and Anatolian bulky foodstuffs and 
raw materials, however, the French managed to supplant them as leading 
merchants and by 1678 the number of their companies in Izmir had dwin-
dled to insignificance. The city states’ networks, honed as they were to the 
long-distance far-eastern connections of the Silk Road and the Red Sea, and 
of diminishing political relevance in the Mediterranean arena, had managed 
only slight resistance against the Marseille merchants, who had an old pres-
ence in Mamluk and Ottoman Egypt and whose affairs were increasingly 
taken in hand by (and absorbed into) a steadily ascending Kingdom of 
France. 
Just like the history of the Italian city states’ Levantine communities, that 
of the French goes back to the Crusades, the primary difference being that 
the Venetians and Genoese managed to hold on a bit longer to some of their 
territories in Anatolia and the Archipelago through the 1202-1204 crusade 
against Byzantium, while further to the South the French relinquished all 
territory from earlier crusades to the Seljuks and Mamluks. French presence 
in the Levant, then, was equally old but had ceased to be territorial at a much 
earlier date. These circumstances, accompanied by the uncoordinated nature 
of the multiple trade connections between the Provence and Izmir, created a 
French nation in Izmir that by 1678 was fairly large, but constituted much 
less of a complete society. It boasted a number of larger companies, or “rag-
gions” of several merchants, and a mass of petty merchants, skippers 
and sailors; a rough and predominantly male society herded by its own 
priests and monks and supported by its own tavern- and innkeepers, carpen-
ters, rope-makers, barbers, doctors, apothecaries and so on.418 
                                                     
 
417 See, generally, e.g., Lane, Venice; Slot, Archipelagus turbatus; and Fleet, European and Islamic 
Trade. 
418 See note 234. 
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These nations were joined, at the close of the 16th century and the be-
ginning of the 17th century respectively, by the English and the Dutch. We 
have already discussed the scramble for sovereignty and the uniformity of 
capitulatory practice that accompanied these nations’ arrival on the scene. 
There were corresponding developments with regard to national size, com-
position, organization and taxation. The feature that most distinguished the 
newly formed English and Dutch nations from the older and more firmly 
embedded Italian and French ones, was their leanness. These were small and 
tight-knit communities comprised almost exclusively of factors and clerks 
who ran a monopolized trade (fully so in the English case, and de facto so in 
the case of the 17th-century Dutch) between themselves and their principals 
and trade organizations back home. The result was an exclusively male purely 
professional business community with narrowly defined interests and mini-
mal ties to the larger population of the city. But as is confirmed by many 
sources (Colbert and Winchilsea chief among them) these comparatively 
small communities did represent a trade of such value that it soon eclipsed 
that of a large nation like the French.419 
In retrospect, there seems to have taken place in the trade of 17th-
century Izmir (as in European trade at large) a shift in mercantile power 
from the large, open and loosely organized commercial communities of the 
Middle Ages to the smaller tighter professional merchant communities of 
our capitalist age. The French, part of the old Mediterranean system as much 
as of the up-and-coming Atlantic one, occupied a promising yet cumbersome 
middle position. Ideally, France could muster its old, wide and populous 
Mediterranean base to procure the materials needed to advance its industrial 
output at home and go on to use that to dominate the Atlantic arena. In 
implementing the centralized mercantilist state policy that would enable it to 
achieve this, however, it had to deal with much resistance from the city of 
Marseilles at home and from its merchant communities abroad. Neverthe-
less, by the end of the century France had regained its lost ground. It man-
aged to keep up with England and (at least for some time still) the United 
Provinces, while these nations’ combined mercantile power briskly shoved 
the Italian city states out of the market. 
 
Notwithstanding the insights to be gained through a relative, developmental, 
perspective, it cannot quite make up for the absence of uniform and reliable 
data on the composition, size and economic value of Izmir’s various Euro-
pean communities. Overall estimates should be attempted nevertheless, be-
                                                     
 
419 Anderson, English Consul, 54-55: “… in 1661 Winchilsea had to report that for every 
English ship in Turkey there were four Dutch.” and “In that year Colbert valued the annual 
Levant trade of the Dutch at ten to twelve million livres, roughly equivalent to their East India 
trade.” 
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cause rough approximations can at least provide indications of the relative 
numerical strength (in size and commercial value) of the city’s European 
presence. However tentative the resulting ratio might be, it is instrumental if 
we want to consider Frank Street as part of a larger Ottoman complex (i.e. 
the city of Izmir and, beyond that, wider Ottoman society and administra-
tion) and in establishing its potential for and against the Ottoman context. 
Apart from what it can reveal about the relative size of Frank Street, ab-
solute size could also shed additional light on the question whether Izmir’s 
Europeans might indeed have constituted the isolated and self-sufficient 
community that emerges from European sources, or must have depended 
much more on their Ottoman context than they cared to admit openly. Oth-
er (social, economic and political) factors did influence Frank Street’s capaci-
ty to fend for itself, but the first condition for self-sufficiency is mass. Only a 
community large enough to fulfill all functions its members habitually de-
pend upon can even attempt to fend for itself.420 It would be frivolous to 
construe our early modern community of merchants as pursuing absolute 
self-sufficiency as a policy, but the fact that the trade of its members de-
pended heavily on their privileges as foreigners, as well as their repeated 
claims to such a status aparte does indicate that they perceived it to be in their 
best interest not only to be well-connected to Ottoman society as merchants, 
but also to maintain considerable distance from it as Europeans. 
The questions before us therefore are the following: what would be 
a reasonable estimate of Izmir’s European population and commerce; of 
what order of magnitude is the ratio between its European and Ottoman 
populations and economies; and, can we draw any conclusions from this 
with regard to relative power and the measure of self-sufficiency? 
To arrive at a reasonable estimate of Izmir’s European population we 
have to weigh the estimates of several reporters from various nations against 
each other. This can best be done by first obtaining an impression of the 
reporters’ reliability in other fields, followed by an assessment of the particu-
lar politics and idiosyncrasies underlying and coloring their narratives. If, by 
1678, the Genoese and the Venetian nations increasingly functioned as con-
sular extended families, the French as a town or miniature state complete 
with hierarchically ordered estates, and the Dutch and English as a number 
of competing yet coordinating companies of factors of solid burgher stock, it 
is to be expected that such differences were not only of consequence for the 
nations’ real size and functioning, but also for their perceived size and func-
tioning. 
                                                     
 
420 The inherent contradiction of course being that the larger the scale, the more unattain-
able the ideal of autarky actually becomes – because of the increasing difficulty in maintaining 
a territory, providing enough consumable goods and enforcing the requisite strict conformity 
without outside assistance. This is why states that have pursued the ideal have invariably either 
become oppressive and totalitarian, or have quickly abandoned it altogether. 
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That is to say, structural as much as political differences between the na-
tions naturally also bore upon the way they perceived and represented them-
selves and upon the way they were perceived and represented by others. For 
instance, the account a staunch French observer might give of a sizeable and 
lively French nation will have differed significantly from the Englishman’s, 
who, proud of his own nation’s order, thriftiness and effectiveness, most 
likely considered this rival nation impractically bloated and overly arrogant 
while not all that savvy commercially. Furthermore, their accounts of the 
Dutch nation will again have differed – the French typically stressing its 
small size, humble origins and lack of social hierarchy; the English its anti-
authoritarianism, its extreme frugality and the commercial prowess that ena-
bled so small a nation to claim such a large share of the trade. 
What, then, are our preferred sources for the year 1678 and the years 
immediately preceding and following it? Table 1 has shown that precious 
few travelers who commented on the size of Izmir’s Turkish, Greek, Jewish 
and Armenian population provided similar information for the European 
population. Although a good number of relatively open-minded and inquisi-
tive men from all nations visited Izmir in the 1670s and left us fairly accurate 
narrative accounts of the city, its surroundings and – above all – its Europe-
an life, few bothered to disentangle and breakdown the multitude of Euro-
pean nationals they encountered on and around Frank Street. Between Jean 
Chardin (present in 1672) and Antoine Galland (pr. 1672 and 1678) for the 
French; De Bruyn (pr. 1678) and De Hochepied (pr. 1678) for the 
Dutch; Rycaut (pr. 1667-1678) and North (pr. 1667) for the English; and, 
lastly, the Anglo-French collaboration of Spon and Wheler (pr. 1675-1676), 
Galland, again the best informed and most informative, provides the most 
detailed breakdown (see Table 16).421 
Galland’s figures may seem rather low when juxtaposed with the many 
enthusiastic accounts of European life in 17th-century Izmir. Yet, they are 
consistent with the more fragmentary statements given by the overwhelming 
majority of his contemporaries. Compare his information, for instance, with 
the – clearly less thoroughly informed – information provided by Jean Char-
din for 1672 (that is, before the English had captured most of the Dutch 
trade during the war of 1672-1678), or with that provided in 1678 by a young 
Daniël-Jan de Hochepied, fresh off the boat from Holland and preparing for 
a long and successful career in Levantine diplomacy (see Table 17). 
 
                                                     
 
421 Jean Chardin, Voyages du chevalier Chardin en Perse et autres lieux de l'Orient (Paris: Le 
Normant, 1811); Galland, Voyage à Smyrne; Bruyn, Reizen; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684; Rycaut, 
History of the Turkish Empire; North, Life; and Jacob Spon and George Wheler, Voyage d'Italie, de 
Dalmatie, de Grece, et du Levant: fait aux années 1675 & 1676 (Amsterdam: H. & T. Boom, 1679). 
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TABLE 16: ESTIMATED EUROPEAN POPULATION OF IZMIR (GALLAND, 1678) 
Nation Description Subtotal 
French 1 consul, 30 merchants, 40-50 other families constituting more than 160 
persons (inn-keepers, doctors, apothecaries, surgeons, barbers, tailors, 
shoemakers), 2 bachelor doctors, more than 20 further bachelors (doctors, 
shoemakers, tailors and cooks working mostly for the Dutch and English), 3 
Capuchin friars, 1 lay friar 
217 
English 1 consul, 70 merchants, 15 clerks, 1 minister, 1 doctor, 1 apothecary, 1 
surgeon, 3 tavern-keepers 
93 
Dutch 1 consul, 23 merchants (3 of whom are married to local women), 8 clerks, 2 
ministers (one of whom is French) 
34 
Venetian 1 consul, 4 merchants 5 
Genoese 1 consul, 4 merchants and 1 clerk 6 
Others 1 merchant and 1 clerk from Florence, 1 merchant from Sienna (all under 
Dutch protection), 1 clerk from Leghorn (under English protection), 1 
tavern-keeper from Sienna (under French protection) 
5 
EST. TOTAL 360 
Based on Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 113-27. 
 
TABLE 17: IDEM (CHARDIN, 1672; DE HOCHEPIED, 1678) 
Nation Chardin’s description 
(1672) 
Subtotal De Hochepied’s description (1678) 
French trade of approx. 400.000 
livres a year, 1 consul, 
more than 100 mer-
chants, most petty 
≥101 small trade, largest number of mer-
chants and artisans 
English trade of 6-700.000 livres a 
year, 1 consul, more than 
20 houses [a trading 
house usually consisted 
of 2-3 partners plus 2-3 
clerks] 
±101 large trade, approx. 20 houses
Dutch trade greater than that of 
the English, 1 consul, 
few houses (lacking 
connections in the 
Anatolian interior) [10 
houses plus clerks?] 
[±50?] previously large trade (recently inter-
rupted by war of 1672-1678, but back 
on a par with the East Indies trade of 
the VOC within months of the 
cessation of hostilities), 13-14 houses 
Venetian 1 merchant-consul [plus 
clerks] 
±3 of little consequence, not many
Genoese 1 consul, 2/3 merchants 
[plus clerks] 
±5 of little consequence, 1 vice-consul, 1 
house 
EST. TOTAL ≥262 plus a couple of tens for French 
growth between 1672-1678 and 
subsequent Dutch recovery 
Based on Chardin, Voyages, 6-21; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b-38b. 
 
Sonia Anderson, author of an exceptional biography of Paul Rycaut (the 
highly skilled English consul in Izmir from 1667-1678, better known as the 
foremost English writer on the Ottoman Empire of his day) largely corrobo-
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rates these figures through her subject’s correspondence and numerous other 
primary and secondary sources.422 She also draws attention to two French 
censuses conducted in June and November 1670, and provides the totals 
given in the former as being “101 heads of household, 28 wives, 56 children, 
and 84 servants or slaves, in all 269 persons”.423 
The results of the French census would increase the grand total to about 
425 persons. The same census, however, also raises the question whether this 
would not be too conservative an estimate still. It suggests that certain cate-
gories of “voiceless” subjects (wives, offspring, servants, slaves) may have 
been heavily underrepresented in contemporary accounts of other nations. It 
seems that on top of the more obvious underrepresentation of anyone who 
was not a private merchant or factor (i.e. clerks, clergy and craftsmen with 
little to no vote or voice in their nation), there was a second form of un-
derrepresentation at work in the counting of higher-class, or burgher, heads 
of household only. In this respect, the problems we come up against resem-
ble those we encountered in “The Ottoman City”. 
Yet, although it is certain that merchants of all nations made good use of 
the services of craftsmen, servants and the like, these appear to have been 
either French or Ottoman non-Muslim and not fellow-nationals.424 Similarly, 
some English, Dutch, Venetian and Genoese merchants of Izmir indeed also 
kept families, but their number appears to have been modest and the nation-
al status of its members disputed.425 All considered, application of a multipli-
er such as the one introduced previously or an alternative comparable to the 
ratio between France’s 30 merchants or 101 heads of household and the total 
of 269 French nationals (multipliers of 9 and 2.66 respectively) is not war-
ranted. Particularly because the exceptionalism of the French case is stressed 
repeatedly in all sources, their own included. 
Rather, all available evidence on the 1670s indicates that only the French 
nation comprised significant numbers of imported French families and serv-
ants, forcing us to conclude that only in that nation the number of nationals 
differed so considerably from the number of merchants or heads of house-
hold. In view of the conspicuous undercounting (in all but the French case) 
of a nevertheless modest number of imported clerks, clergy, servants and 
family members, a rough estimate of up to 500 inhabitants fully belonging 
under European jurisdiction (henceforth “European nationals” will be used 
by way of historically inaccurate shorthand) seems reasonable – but it could 
have been a good 100 less. This brings the ratio between the estimated total 
number of European nationals and our previously estimated Ottoman popu-
                                                     
 
422 Anderson, English Consul, 49-76. 
423 Ibid., 59. 
424 See note 234 and appendix 2, documents 2, 3 and 12. 
425 See supra for the discussion of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s haraç order, and see Appendix 2, 
documents 2, 12 and 14.  
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lation of Izmir in the year 1678 to a maximum of (500 / 70,000 =) 0.0071, 
i.e. 0.7 % or less. 
The above calculations are useful for several purposes. First of all, they 
serve to provide an appraisal of the number of residents the European con-
sular system was maintained to protect, regulate and govern. In the absence 
of clearly defined and uniform principles of nationality and citizenship this 
number should be construed as including only those whose nationality was 
generally undisputed, i.e. structurally agreed upon by the Ottoman state and 
their own, as well as by themselves. Secondly, our calculations invite compar-
ison between the size of the overall community and its hard core. We have 
seen that contemporary accounts are usually – and unsurprisingly – strongly 
biased in favor of political, social and economic elites (noblemen and other 
officials, factors and wealthier private merchants). Their number appears to 
have been about 135, slightly above a quarter of the community’s total size. 
This we should take to be the size of Izmir’s European political community, 
for its members held exclusive right to active participation in community 
affairs and decision-making. Needless to say, this elite also formed the eco-
nomic backbone of Frank Street and might therefore be considered the con-
sular systems true raison d’être. 
 
It would be a mistake to think of Frank Street as a community of 500, how-
ever. That number reflects an official reality rather than an actual one. With-
out challenging the accuracy of the estimation that some 400 to 500 Europe-
an nationals occupied Frank Street, we should take the size of Frank Street as 
a socio-economic complex (and therefore its direct influence as well) to be 
much larger. Imagine, if you will, a pebble thrown into a pond, a number of 
concentric circles rippling out across its surface; if the pebble is consular 
authority and the first ripple marks the boundary of our core community of 
around 135, the next ripple would represent the entire community of 400 to 
500 European “nationals”. Not strictly part of the community, yet part of its 
communal space just as much, is the next ripple, that of non-European resi-
dents of dubious legal status; Greek wives to European merchants, their 
offspring, slaves, concubines, and native servants. Visiting European travel-
ers and the officers and crews of several hundred European ships calling 
port twice a year form yet another ripple, this one of visitors. Higher Otto-
man personnel spending much of their time in Frank Street could be regard-
ed as constituting the next ripple, this one heavily overlapping with similar 
circles rippling out from Izmir’s Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Turkish peb-
bles. Within this last category fall the Janissary guards appointed to protect 
each consul and secure the consulates, the customer’s guards along Frank 
Street’s quays, and the Europeans’ dragomans, warehousemen (with their 
porters) and moneylenders. 
Even when omitting the many servants employed in the dozens of Euro-
pean country residences in Izmir’s vicinity, or those called upon to provide 
 
 
257 
 
food and other essentials in recurring times of contagious fever or plague 
(426), it is obvious that our estimate of 400 to 500 European Frank Street 
residents to a large degree obscures that we are discussing a quarter teeming 
with additional Frankish, Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Turkish residents, 
personnel and visitors alike.427 Putting a sensible number to that conclusion 
is both impossible and impractical. Impossible because these different 
groupings represent too many constantly fluctuating variables, impractical 
because they consist of temporary visitors as well as residents already repre-
sented in our previous estimate of the Ottoman population (of 70,000). Still, 
the discussion above suggests some preliminary conclusions with regard to 
the European quarter’s relative importance and its measure of self-
sufficiency. 
Izmir’s foreign commerce-driven demographic explosion, the size of its 
European quarter, the number and comparative wealth of its inhabitants, 
visitors and dependents, and the hundreds of European ships calling port 
(428), show it to have been one of the city’s major economic hubs. If we take 
into account the (previously discussed) outdated infrastructure of the older 
commercial quarters of Han Bey/Pazar and Limon (Liman) and the major 
1678-effort to relocate the city’s European trade to the rebuilt and newly 
constituted neighboring Ottoman quarter of Kasap Hazır (429), there can be 
little doubt that in 1678 Frenk Mahallesi had become the commercial center 
of the city insofar as volume and value were concerned. In the absence of 
precise statistical data on the relative size of Izmir’s outer (uc, “international”) 
and inner (iç, “national”) economies, Evliya offers some interesting figures to 
work with (see Table 18). 
Official incomes will have represented half to a third the actual income of 
these officials (which is probably still a high estimate). Similarly, customs 
income for goods actually declared (i.e. the official value of the customs tax 
farm) will have had a comparable ratio to actual imports and exports.430 If we 
                                                     
 
426 See, e.g., De Bruyn, Reizen, 23; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22a-b. Galland, whom 
the French nation refused to lodge for his and their own safety, took refuge in the Greek han: 
Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 86. 
427 See Map 13 and the surrounding paragraphs. 
428 Cf., e.g., Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 96-97; Alfred C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company 
(London: Frank Cass, 1964), 46-47 and 54-55; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 204b-209b: DLH 
to States of Holland and West-Friesland, 1676. Also cf. K. Heeringa, Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis 
van den Levantschen Handel, vol. 1: 1590-1660 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1910), 14-17 and 
486-87; and Heeringa, Bronnen 2, 30, 109-15 and 387-92. 
429 In 1677, De Hochieped could already report that many Europeans had warehouses in 
the newly constructed Vezirhan: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 42b. 
430 We have previously mentioned that contemporary and modern estimates are that half 
to two-thirds of the foreign commerce of Izmir was smuggled (with and without knowledge 
of its officials). Consider, by way of corroboration, the following calculations concerning 
Dutch consular and ambassadorial (C&A) duties (which were collected as percentages from 
the value of goods declared at Ottoman customs) between 1668 and 1671, i.e. in the peak 
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accept these ratios, we might go on to conclude that Izmir’s European econ-
omy must have represented about a quarter to a fifth of Izmir’s overall 
economy. It follows that Izmir’s European population (of less than 1%) 
enjoyed influence far beyond its number, although the political and social 
aspects of that power will have lagged significantly behind the economic 
aspect due to the lowly place generally reserved for non-Muslims in the Ot-
toman system, and (more to the point) because of the care the Köprülüs 
took to keep the Europeans in check. 
 
TABLE 18: OFFICIAL INCOMES OF IZMIR’S PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS (EVLIYA, 1671) 
Yearly income Given Value In LD Per office 
Paşalık 50 purses 25,000 125,000 Paşa’s hass 100.000 kuruş 100,000
Mevleviyyet (500*365=)182,500 akçe 2,500
302,500 Kadi’s hass 200 purses 100,000
Kadilik 200.000 kuruş 200,000
(uc) Gümrük 200.000 kuruş 200,000 200,000 
Voyvoda [similar to kadi’s?] [c.300,000?] [c.300,000?] 
Based on Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 88-100. 
 
With regard to the question of self-sufficiency, it is safe to conclude that 
though a community that size could have probably fended for itself, it did so 
less and less. This was due to a number of factors, both internal and external. 
Firstly, the development from a full-blown minority community fulfilling 
most functions required to sustain it, to a lean merchant community focused 
almost exclusively on long distance trade, brought with it an increasing reli-
ance on structural labor and assistance from without. Secondly, the whole 
principle of competition, though here somewhat softened through the limits 
imposed by Ottoman controls and oversights, is not at all conducive to isola-
tion. Contrary to, for instance, the monopolistic Dutch factory in Japanese 
                                                                                                                        
 
years of Dutch trade with Izmir: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 204b-9b: DLH to States of 
Holland and West-Friesland, 1676 lists the duties collected by Dutch representatives from 
convoys and ships that arrived in Izmir under Dutch protection between 1668 and 1671. 
These amounted to LD 82,000. There were 32 Dutch ships in convoys in approx. 3 years, or 8 
Dutch convoys of 4 ships on average p/a. C&A-duties stood at an average 1,5% at the time of 
Van Dam’s appointment, so the equivalent value of the declared trade imported on 8 Dutch 
convoys of an average 4 ships to and from Izmir from 1668-1671 was LD 5,466,667, or LD 
1,822,222 p/a. The actual value (accounting for smuggling, miscellaneous Dutch shipping, and 
protected foreign shipping) must have been much higher – cf. Colbert’s contemporary esti-
mate of 10-12 million livres (equiv. LD 5-6,000,000) p/a for overall Dutch Levant trade. If 
three quarters of that passed through Izmir (LD 4,125,000 p/a), this would mean that de-
clared imports represented only about 44% of the actual value of the Dutch Izmir trade, the 
Dutch and Ottoman states and its representatives being defrauded of more than half their due 
proceeds from it. 
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Deshima, Europeans in Izmir could hardly limit outside contact to a couple 
of officials and wholesalers. To do so would have cost them their trade in 
the face of any competitor that proved more aggressive in his reconnaissance 
of the hinterland and actively courted and patronized less obvious local mer-
chants and power brokers, especially in the context of the generally limited 
Ottoman enforcement of Ottoman-European social segregation.431 
As to the external factors, these all go back to Köprülü policy. That poli-
cy was determinedly not aimed at separating the European quarter from the 
Ottoman city anymore than its Greek, Armenian or Jewish quarters. If any-
thing, the opposite (controlled integration into the Ottoman context) seems 
to have been the agenda. Consequently, the quarter was managed as a se-
cured but open one and, like all Ottoman city quarters, had its main (south-
western) entrance chained off and guarded at night, although traffic within 
the quarter and across its closure was possible at night.432 Further proof of 
active Ottoman commitment to Frank Street as an Ottoman-European thor-
oughfare and trade center is the fact that up until the destruction of much of 
Izmir in the 1688-earthquake, all real estate along it was the property of Ot-
toman vakfs and notables, its European inhabitants occupying it on the merit 
of their lease alone.433 
 
Organization and Taxation 
Throughout the 1670s there were present in Izmir five officially recognized 
European communities, or nations: the French, the English, the Dutch, the 
Venetian and the Genoese. These differed significantly in size, composition, 
favored merchandise, commercial acumen and, consequently, success. As the 
mainstay of the Levant trade shifted from luxury items to bulky goods in the 
course of the 17th century and as the margins on the merchandise conse-
quently decreased, it became organization and taxation that determined these 
nations’ competitiveness more than anything else. After all, a well-
functioning community with lower shipping, handling and tax rates could 
                                                     
 
431 It is no coincidence that those merchants that are often disapprovingly mentioned in 
consular correspondence because of having invited costly Ottoman interventions through 
over-familiarity with the non-European quarters and their inhabitants were also almost invari-
ably the most successful. Cf. notes 236, 238, 244, 347, 348, and 397. 
432 Cf. D’Arvieux, Mémoires, 125-27; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to 
States General, 11 July 1676; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 133-34 and 149; De Bruyn, Reizen, 138-
39; Anderson, English Consul, 5, 10 and 13; Dumont, Nouveau voyage, 352-53; and other con-
temporary accounts listed in the bibliography. 
433 See the Köprülü-vakf’s merchants’ apartments and hans in Table 12, the leases cited in 
note 181, two similar leases (the second of which by Dutch factor Dionis Houset from the 
Ottoman officials Hasan Çavuş and Subaşı Mehmed Bey) in Alexander H. de Groot, “An 
Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Turkish-Dutch Letterbook and Some of its Implications”, in: 
The Netherlands and Turkey: Four hundred years of political, economical, social and cultural relations: 
selected essays (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2007), 64-65; and Kadı, “Natives and Interlopers”, 149. 
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capture trade more swiftly, decisively and profitably when opportunities 
presented themselves. Furthermore, in a commercial setting where Ottoman 
controls limited opportunities for all-too assertive competition in buying and 
selling, success depended all the more on a smoothly run organization with 
the lowest possible overhead. 
The key competitive areas of organization and taxation both have local 
and general components. Since they are also closely intertwined (in that lean 
and efficient organizations generally incur less costs than bloated and ineffi-
cient ones, leading to sharper rates) this complex of factors is perhaps most 
readily identified and understood by following an imaginary piece of mer-
chandise from the principal merchant in, say, Amsterdam to the receiving 
and reselling merchant factor in Izmir (i.e. the “factor”; a merchant who 
buys or sells for another in exchange for a commission). The costs that 
needed to be recuperated through the sale of the original merchandise in 
Izmir and that of the return cargo in Amsterdam included the purchasing 
prize of the goods, local tariffs, the operational costs (incl. salaries) of the 
principal, export duties, insurance costs, the operational costs of ship and 
crew, import duties, presents and bribes to officials, and last but not least the 
operational costs of the factor(s), of diplomatic protection and representa-
tion, and of the Ottoman staff. On the return trip a similar chain of costs 
would be incurred.434 
The chain of costs above aptly illustrates the importance to trade of 
trustworthy yet minimal and therefore cheap government, frugal mercantile 
management, secure yet affordable passage through sailing in large protected 
convoys, ships with large hulls and an abundance of guns, small and well-fed 
yet badly paid crews, optimal contacts with Ottoman officials, modest and 
hardworking factors and clerks, relatively cheap and low-rank missions, and 
well-cultivated and formally protected dragomans and warehousemen. It also 
suggests why “alternative” commercial practices like (legal) carrying for third 
parties and (illegal) smuggling and under-declaring were so endemic. The 
former meant additional trade and cargo without round trips and additional 
income from duties with minimal risk, the latter relatively cheap uninsured 
cargo and the evasion of customs and diplomatic duties. Since both were 
relatively easy means of minimizing costs, thereby enhancing merchants’ 
competitive edge, such practices proved ineradicable. 
 
As we have seen, each of the five European nations of Izmir was predeter-
mined historically, economically, politically and socially to deal with the chal-
                                                     
 
434 See also Kadı, “Natives and Interlopers”, 132-33, 157-59 and 193-205, a comparison of 
the chain of added (handling, insurance and other) costs incurred as merchandise travelled 
between 18th-ct. Holland and Ankara (through Izmir) in the hands of Ottoman and Dutch 
merchants. 
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lenges of the trade in its own way. Since a nation’s operational costs were 
central to its competitiveness, its willingness and ability to adjust its opera-
tion when circumstances required was instrumental to its survival and suc-
cess. In this area the city states of Venice and Genoa were at a disadvantage. 
Their organizations, both at home and in the factories, proved unable to 
adjust to a number of structural changes governing the Levant trade: firstly, 
the loss of sovereignty along the western and northern Anatolian coasts and 
in the Greek archipelago (which definitively reconfigured the political basis 
of their relations with the Ottomans); secondly, the shift from luxury trade 
and fine fabrics to bulk trade and coarser fabrics (as epitomized by the sud-
den success of the English and the Dutch); and, thirdly, changes in Ottoman 
administration and foreign policy (chiefly felt as a drive for greater Ottoman 
administrative and commercial control in the trading ports, or scales). 
As mentioned earlier, both Genoa’s and Venice’s history in the Levant 
predated that of the Ottoman Turks. Holding a number of sovereign territo-
ries across the Eastern Mediterranean put them in the difficult position of 
not just being commercial partners with the Ottoman Turks, but at the same 
time also territorial competitors. For Genoa, whose power had been waning 
since the mid-15th century, this was less of a problem than for Venice. Re-
treating before the advancing Ottomans, the Genoese managed to mostly 
keep on friendly terms with them, repeatedly gaining Ottoman privileges in 
return for their support against sworn rival Venice (yet, incidentally, joining 
Venice in the Holy Leagues against the Ottomans when it suited them). Still, 
the loss of its territorial bases in the East, and that of Chios (1566) in par-
ticular, exacerbated the Republic’s decline. Faced with fierce competition 
from the much stronger Venetians and French it opted for a subordinate 
role in Levantine politics and commerce, sending the occasional envoy and 
conducting business under French protection. 
When fortuitous circumstances finally did conspire to furnish the Geno-
ese with their own Ottoman capitulation, Istanbul embassy and Izmir consu-
late in 1666, it soon became apparent why they had not systematically pur-
sued these previously. Even a favorable Ottoman customs rate of 3% (their 
previous French protectors would continue to pay 5% until 1673) could not 
make up for their lack of urgency, resources and merchandise. Genoese 
ships sailed without escorts or under Venetian ones, unnecessarily raising 
either insurance or hiring costs. The cargoes they returned for the luxury 
silks they exported from Izmir consisted mainly in debased and false coinage, 
which invited complaints, lawsuits and demands for compensation from the 
other nations and Ottoman officials alike, thereby increasing the nation’s 
overhead even further. When the Ottomans expressly prohibited the import 
of such moneys in 1669 it became apparent that Genoese cloth and shipping 
was too expensive to compete with the English and Dutch nations, forcing 
them to trade out of the Tuscan port of Leghorn/Livorno. 
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Worse still, neither the consul nor the one Genoese company (of Vincen-
zo and Francesco Spinola; close relatives of Augostino Spinola, Genoese 
resident in Istanbul from 1675 to 1679) could muster the force required to 
deal effectively with French refusals to recognize their independence, or with 
Ottoman officials’ taking advantage of their lack of leverage and power to 
exact substantial lump sum restitutions (avanias) for their import abuses. 
Unable to settle these matters locally themselves, they all-too often fled to 
English or Dutch protection, or referred disputes to their resident in Istan-
bul, both emergency measures further raising the costs of their resolution. 
Faced with a dwindling trade, heavy financial demands, and deprived of his 
income and security, the (by that time, third) Genoese resident (Francisco 
Maria Levanto) decided to slip out of Istanbul in 1683, disguised as a friar 
and without the necessary Ottoman discharge and permission. Thereupon, 
Genoese trade reverted to French protection.435 
During the short time the position existed, the Genoese consuls in Izmir 
(Ottavio Doria, 1666-1671; Gian Luigi Gentile, 1671-1674; Langetti, 1675-
…) reportedly received a fixed annual income of 600 rix-dollars; a mere pit-
tance when compared to Izmir’s other consuls and far too little to advance 
regular expenses, let alone extraordinary ones.436 The organization of Geno-
ese representation appears to have followed established Venetian practice 
(see below) in theory, but in reality was largely informal in Izmir, where the 
number of Genoese merchants and the value of Genoese trade after all re-
mained so negligible as to forbid all too cumbersome and costly an arrange-
ment. 
 
Although Venice’s troubles were very similar to Genoa’s, it did manage to 
hold on to a sliver of the trade that it had formerly dominated. The defining 
difference between the rivals was one of scale. Culminating in the sack of 
Constantinople in 1204 and continuing with the installation of a series of 
Latin puppet emperors (ruling until 1261), Venice’s heavy involvement in 
Byzantine affairs provided it with every opportunity to entrench itself com-
mercially. Its commercial communities and networks even successfully sur-
vived the resurrection of an independent Byzantine empire from Nicaea and 
the arrival of the Ottoman Turks. 
Still, Venice proved particularly receptive to the temptation of continuing 
(and perhaps even increasing) territorial sovereignty in the Levant. When 
Ottoman advances forced it to choose between trade and sovereignty in the 
Levant, it almost consistently preferred the latter in the hope of eventually 
                                                     
 
435 Cf. The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to States General, 18 June 1675; The 
Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 9 December 1677; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 
126-27; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b, 49a, 51b-52a and 77a. Also, see Anderson, English 
Consul, 52-54. 
436 See The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b. 
 
 
263 
 
gaining the former on its own terms. Although it did so with the necessary 
encouragement and assistance from others (the papal state and France pri-
marily), repeated failures to halt the Turkish tide disrupted the trade of Ven-
ice in particular. Between 1453 (the fall of Constantinople) and 1699 (the 
Treaty of Carlowitz) Venetian representation in Ottoman lands was sus-
pended due to war for a total 65 years (in 1463-1479, 1499-1503, 1537-1540, 
1570-1573, 1645-1669, 1684-1699).437 
Especially the 24-year-long Cretan war (1645-1669) proved very hard for 
Venetian commerce to make a comeback from. Naturally Venetian trade in 
Ottoman lands did not cease altogether during this period. It continued un-
der Dutch protection, but this meant that Venetian factors, principals, pro-
ducers and government had very limited control over the conditions of trade 
and could not shape them to sustain the political and commercial power of 
the Republic in a coordinated manner. It was no coincidence that when Ven-
ice reentered the trade on its own account, it found that its cloth manufac-
tures could no longer compete against advances in English and particularly 
Dutch industry. Similarly, the shorter and safer distance from the Levant to 
Venice (although Venice’s merchants successfully resisted sailing under 
mandatory convoy, the route was constantly patrolled by the Venetian fleet 
and largely bypassed North Africa’s Barbary coast, the Straits of Gibraltar 
and the Atlantic coast), could not make up for its less effectual merchant 
fleet and its Ottoman customs rate of 5%. Ironically, Venice had not only 
supported Dutch Levant trade at its own (future) cost by taking itself out of 
the diplomatic equation, it had also done so by continuing the trade under 
the Dutch flag. Logically so, because Venetian-Dutch mutual assistance went 
all the way back to the arrival of Dutch trade in the Levant and since Dutch 
terms of trade (capitulatory privileges as well as shipping security and costs) 
were now the most advantageous in existence. But in this manner Venice did 
contribute to the undisputed Dutch primacy of the 1660s and early 70s, in 
the event hampering its own return to the trade in 1669. 
Not only Venice’s trade in general suffered from the Cretan war. The 
Venetian community of Izmir sustained a particularly heavy loss of size and 
influence. As the main naval relay between the Dardanelles and Crete, Izmir 
was crucial for supplying the Ottoman besiegers. Consequently, the Otto-
mans seized every opportunity to minimize the liability of Venetian presence 
and influence in the city, diplomatically and commercially as well as culturally 
and numerically. By the end of the war, after 24 years without a Venetian 
consul, there was barely any trade or nation left (see above). Furthermore, 
the most marked representative of Venetian cultural influence in Izmir – the 
                                                     
 
437 See De Groot, “Historical Development”, 587-95. 
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Franciscan church under its protection – had been pillaged and sold to Iz-
mir’s Greeks.438 
When a new Venetian consul was finally appointed, the position went to 
one of the very few in Venetian service that had stayed on in Izmir, Frances-
co Luppazzoli. The new consul, though not from the senatorial order (nor-
mally a strict requirement for admission into Venetian diplomatic service) 
received the appointment nonetheless – a reward for “recommendable dip-
lomatic activity” (read; espionage) during the war, which also earned him a 
state pension. His appointment was not a particularly far-sighted move by 
the Republic, since the Cretan War and Luppazzoli’s contribution to it had 
earned Izmir’s resident Venetians the lasting hostility of the ruling Köprülü 
dynasty (and notably that of Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa). In hindsight it 
would almost seem as if the Venetians were allowed back into Köprülü-
controlled Izmir for the sole purpose of being all the more easily picked 
clean by them as belated punishment. Still, it had been common knowledge 
in 1660s Frank Street that Luppazzoli – as chancellor of the Dutch consulate 
from 1654 until his promotion to consul in 1669 – had not pursued Dutch 
interests exclusively.439 Interestingly, among Izmir’s Europeans such appar-
ent conflicts of interest formed precious little impediment to diplomatic 
functioning and Luppazzoli was allowed to continue as Venetian consul until 
1702, though with an extended interruption due to renewed Ottoman-
Venetian hostilities from 1684 to 1699. 
In fact, behavior such as Luppazzoli’s was far more common than most 
official correspondences of the period would have us believe. However 
much at odds with the largely fictitious national unity and loyalty home gov-
ernments wishfully expected from their “nations” in the Levant (and which 
future generations projected onto them), theirs was in fact a society replete 
with the tangle of identities and loyalties so apparent in the biography of 
Luppazzoli. Amidst our account of national differences in organization, the 
Venetian consul’s Mantuan youth, short-lived papal service, heavily Grae-
cized scholarly and family life (first on Chios, then in Izmir), and lastly Dutch 
chancellorship cum Venetian secret and consular service are a useful reminder 
of this easily understated historical reality.440 
                                                     
 
438 It was subsequently purchased by Catholic Dutch factor Eduard Blijdenbergh. He 
reendowed it to the Franciscans, who promptly became Dutch protégés, though they eventu-
ally returned to Venetian protection in 1671: Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 126; The Hague, NA 
1.02.22 684, 39a-b; and Johan van Droffelaar, ““Flemish Fathers” in the Levant: Dutch 
Protection of Three Fransiscan Missions in the 17th and 18th Centuries”, in: Eastward Bound: 
Dutch Ventures and Adventures in the Middle East, eds. Geert Jan van Gelder and Ed de Moor 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), 81-113. 
439 Cf. Schutte, Repertorium, 341; and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123: Dutch Nation of Izmir 
to Jacob van Dam, 25 May 1668. 
440 Cf. Anderson, English Consul, 50-52; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 122-26; and The Hague, 
NA 1.02.22 684, 38b. 
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What did initially become an impediment to the freshly minted consul’s 
functioning, however, was his insistence on being awarded precedence over 
Izmir’s other consuls. Questions of precedence were deemed far more con-
sequential than strict national loyalty and the French in particular did not 
take his unrealistic claim kindly, the more so since Louis XIV repeatedly 
ordered his diplomats in the Ottoman Empire to pursue unequivocal French 
primacy as a matter of principle. Eventually Luppazzoli (much like Venice in 
general) was forced to acknowledge the new realities of the trade and, by 
1672, the recognized order was French, English, Venetian, Dutch, Genoese 
– a diplomatic hierarchy reflecting, firstly, constitutional seniority (of the 
kingdoms of France and England over the Republics of Venice, Holland and 
Genoa); secondly, the consuls’ descent (noble as opposed to burgher); and, 
thirdly, the significance of their nation’s trade (where the upstart, burgher, 
Dutch, for the moment, ruled).441 
As it was, appointing a representative of non-noble lineage and accepting 
lower diplomatic rank were not the only deviations from regular Venetian 
procedure and organization. According to Steensgaard’s comparative analysis 
of the organization of the European nations in the Levant (442), it dictated 
that consuls were to belong to the aristocracy, were appointed for three 
years, were to have no business ties with their station, were appointed by the 
senate in consultation with the Cinque Savii (the Board of Commerce), en-
joyed a fixed salary, could only dispose of consular duties (the cottimo for 
ordinary expenses and the tanza for payoffs and avanias) in cooperation with 
the nation’s representatives, enjoyed no legal sources of extra income, should 
have their consular expenditures approved by a Council of XII from the 
nation pending final approval by the home authorities (the Cinque Savii, 
nominally the Provveditori ai Cottimi (Commissioners of the cottimo) and 
finally the Council of XII), and enjoyed no formal right to regulate trade. 
In a simplified diagram Venetian consular organization might be repre-
sented as shown in Figure 1. 
Note especially the absence of a structural administrative relation in Ven-
ice itself between the principals and the institutions governing the consulates. 
This absence seems to have contributed greatly to Venice’s inability to regu-
late the trade and come up with viable alternative strategies to cope with 
mounting English and Dutch competition. 
 
 
                                                     
 
441 Cf. Anderson, English Consul, 50n4. On the importance of protocol, esp. to the French, 
see pages 199-203. 
442 Niels Steensgaard, “Consuls and Nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650”, in: 
Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World, ed. Sanjay Subrahmanyam (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
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FIGURE 1: VENETIAN CONSULAR ORGANIZATION (17TH CENTURY) 
 
Steensgaard, “Consuls and Nations”, 50. 
 
Just as was the case with the Genoese consulate, the operation of the Vene-
tian consulate of Izmir was far less formal than would have been the case in 
a more significant factory. Although the diagram still applies, the relative 
insignificance (and, hence, low income) of the consulate meant that many 
otherwise standard restrictions within it were relaxed. This accounts not only 
for the consul’s non-noble lineage and low diplomatic rank, but also for his 
exceptionally long tenure (instead of for three-year periods), his dependence 
on consular duties (instead of a fixed consular salary), and his enjoying a state 
pension and several other sources of income (instead of having no extra-
consular income).443 All considered, it would be remarkable if he did not 
hold extraordinary sway over his tiny nation, in effect regulating what little 
remained of Venetian trade in Izmir, being very much at liberty to dispose of 
the consulate’s dwindling funds, and enthusiastically pursuing additional 
sources of income.444 
 
If Venice’s consul and nation in Izmir had considerable leeway, its measure 
pales in comparison to that of the French, though for entirely different rea-
sons. In their case it was not small size that was conducive to relaxed organi-
zational behavior, but a dysfunctional organization that made an already 
unwieldy French nation virtually ungovernable. Here was a large community 
of Frenchmen, only about half of whom were merchants and therefore could 
be counted on to let the trade’s and home city’s best interests – not to be 
confused with the Crown’s interests – prevail. The other half consisted of 
trades- and craftsmen and, it was suspected, of the dregs of French society 
(bankrupts, deserters, thieves and the like). Representing and governing them 
was a consul whose administrative authority derived from a more or less 
regular administrative hierarchy leading down from the Crown to the com-
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mercial deputies of the Marseille government, but whose financial responsi-
bility was first and foremost to a private person: the proprietor of the tax 
farm that was the consulship (see Figure 2). 
 
FIGURE 2: FRENCH CONSULAR ORGANIZATION (17TH CENTURY) 
 
Steensgaard, “Consuls and Nations”, 53. 
 
A French consulate was first established in Izmir during the reign of Henry 
IV (1553-1610; r. as Henry III king of Navarra, 1572-1610; as king of 
France, 1589-1610). In 1623, the consulship was fiscalized, a result of the 
transfer of authority from the cities to the Crown. Predictably (because it was 
necessary for noblesse de robe to guard and secure their position at court by 
being physically present there), the result was increasing absenteeism. Some-
times those acting as consuls were the actual proprietors of the consulship, 
but more often these tax farmer-consuls had their positions filled by associ-
ates fulfilling its duties as their salaried employees or as the deputies of those 
salaried employees. After several failed attempts to curb this absenteeist 
practice, it was definitively abolished in 1675.445 
The French consular system had a number of inherent problems, most 
importantly a less than clear-cut relation between the embassy and the con-
sulate (since the competence of its two main occupiers belonged to such 
different spheres), overly slow communication on matters of urgency and 
importance (Izmir to Istanbul by way of Paris and vice-versa), contestable 
diplomatic precedence and accreditation, and, last but not least, extensive 
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borrowing, smuggling and overtaxation by deputies whose salaries (their own 
as well as the ones they paid to consular personnel) were insufficient since 
they were only a fraction of the actual consular duties accruing to the consul 
proper (the permitted 2% on French goods would have barely covered the 
consul’s and the ambassador’s expenses, yet 0.5% was regularly waived so as 
not to overburden an already fragile trade).446 
During the personal rule of Louis XIV (from 1661), the problems of hi-
erarchy, authority and finance typically caused by tax farming were exacer-
bated by pervasive royal meddling. The result of the Crown’s efforts to max-
imize its influence over civic institutions, its behavior of micromanaging the 
fiscal administration of the realm over the heads of competent lower institu-
tions and officials made the Izmir nation all the more unmanageable. Consu-
lar authority became increasingly dependent on the Crown (it reserved the 
right to assess special duties for instance), yet at the same time it proved 
reluctant to truly administer the consulate. As a consequence, the consul’s 
hands were tied by the fiscal requirements of the tax farm, by the two consu-
lar auditors or “assessors” chosen from among the nation doing their most 
to represent its own wishes and needs, by underpaid dragomans and watch-
men, by royal ambassadors who tried to recoup the excessive expenses of 
their unrealistic diplomacy from the Izmir nation, by the policies of Mar-
seilles’ Chamber of Commerce, and by the Crown’s political interests. 
It is hardly surprising that amidst this jumble of policies and jurisdictions 
no one knew exactly who did or did not belong to the French nation of Iz-
mir or what their precise identities were, that conflict was rife between all 
parties involved, and that the French were hardly in a position to challenge 
Anglo-Dutch commercial primacy in a concerted fashion.447 To remedy this 
detrimental state of affairs, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (minister of finance from 
1665 to 1683) in 1670 launched a policy with the stated ambition to capture 
the entire Levant trade for France. Notwithstanding very grave and recent 
ruptures with the Ottomans over French military and logistical assistance to 
the defenders of Crete, a new ambassador (De Nointel, 1670-1679) was sent 
to the Porte with instructions to obtain from the sultan a capitulation giving 
the French a full monopoly over Levant trade. Despite spending vast 
amounts, the less than brilliant ambassador merely managed (through the 
capitulation of 1673) to have affirmed and slightly enhanced French protec-
tion of Roman Catholic clergy (in Izmir; a Capuchin church with three friars 
and one lay brother, and a Jesuit one with three friars) and pilgrims in Otto-
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man lands and to obtain the long-sought reduction of customs from 5% to 
3% (already acquired by the English in 1601 and by the Dutch in 1612).448 
The envisioned monopoly was to be operated by a newly created French 
Levant Company. Instead of being awarded a full monopoly on French trade 
comparable to that of its English namesake and example (or a de facto one like 
the much-admired Dutch variant discussed below), this company was set up 
to lure merchants into government-controlled joint stock by offering export 
bounties and free loans for exporters of Languedoc cloth and high tariffs 
and embargoes for foreign trade (a mercantilist import-substituting policy 
called “Colbertism”). Until French cloth industry and Levant trade really 
took off in the early eighteenth century most merchants continued to prefer 
the freedom of their old trade however, especially since French cloth and 
shipping was still so easily undercut by the English and the Dutch. French 
Levant merchants must have seen little purpose in giving up their lucrative 
Greek and Armenian carrying trade and attacking foreign supremacy with 
their own products for the common good of France (or, rather, of the 
Crown’s finances), but at the price of personal bankruptcy. Struggling since 
its inception and having proven itself unable even to profit from the reduc-
tion in Ottoman customs or from the Dutch War laying waste to Dutch 
trade (1672-1678), Colbert’s Levant Company was liquidated in 1678. 
The master plan also included changes in the administration of Izmir’s 
French. To enhance the Crown’s jurisdiction over the nation, the national 
assemblies which had sprung up (in response to mismanagement or out of 
sheer independence) were suppressed in 1670. At the same time Colbert 
instructed biannual censuses (see note 423) of the nation to be conducted by 
the consul and forwarded to the ambassador in Istanbul and himself in Paris. 
But even had he wanted to, Colbert himself could not have the all-pervasive 
and lucrative Ancien Régime-practice of tax farming discontinued. (In fact, 
discontent about its injustices would go on to become one of the driving 
forces behind the French Revolution.) So instead of doing away with the 
problematic split administration, his efforts in this area were necessarily lim-
ited to imposing a forbidding 10,000-livre fine on absenteeism in 1675. Being 
more than three times the sum he paid to acting consul Chambon annually 
(his 3,000 livres equaled about 1,000 dollars), this duly prompted consul Henri 
Dupuy (whose family had held the post since 1624) to return to his post. He 
would stay on there until his death in 1683.449 
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In the end, Colbert’s measures (though laying the groundwork for the 
18th-century boom in French cloth production and trade) produced precious 
little initial effects. In Izmir they merely succeeded in replacing a perfectly 
good deputy consul, Louis Chambon, with a rather feeble tax farmer. In-
deed, the French nation lost little of its unruliness, trade continued to be 
conducted in a haphazard manner, and France’s merchant fleet remained 
overly light, heavily overmanned and largely unescorted. More fundamental-
ly, French Levant merchants continued to place little trust in French cloth 
(instead resorting to importing felt caps and currency of often doubtful qual-
ity), Armenian merchants continued to load French hulls with Armenian 
silks, and the trade consequently continued to be outmaneuvered by the 
Atlantic competitors. In diplomacy, the haughty manners and imperious 
demands of Louis XIV’s ambassadors continued to make them impossible in 
the eyes of Ottoman officials and French merchants alike. French commerce 
was far from done suffering for the magnificence of the most Christian king. 
 
The English of course had their own eventful royal history to contend with. 
Between the commencement of permanent Anglo-Ottoman relations (sealed 
by the capitulation of 1580) and our year 1678 the English Levant merchant 
had to navigate a change of dynasty (Tudor to Stuart in 1603), a civil war 
(1642-1651), a republican period (1649-1660), and a restoration (1660). Alt-
hough especially the civil war and the republican period had their repercus-
sions in the Levant – rival ambassadors being dispatched to Istanbul, Eng-
lishmen attacking each other in Frank Street, insurance rates soaring (450) – 
the English generally attempted to receive news of important events with 
protest or merriment (as with the Treaties of Nijmegen/Nimégue in 1678-
1679451) only to move on quickly to the more pressing business of making 
money. In fact, the English maintained the primacy of trade over politics 
whenever circumstances permitted it. 
Instrumental in implementing and guarding this primacy was the English 
Levant Company. Founded as a chartered joint-stock company in 1581, it 
became a regulated monopoly in 1588 and continued as a regulated company 
from around 1595. The Company is regarded by both contemporary and 
modern observers to be the secret behind English success in the Levant. A 
glance at Figure 3 will easily reveal the most obvious advantage of organizing 
the trade through a single company. 
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FIGURE 3: ENGLISH CONSULAR ORGANIZATION (17TH CENTURY) 
 
Steensgaard, “Consuls and Nations”, 51. 
Because government stepped back and left a sufficiently chartered company 
of professional merchants with private interest in the trade to its own devic-
es, the Levant trade could be run in a comparatively rational and professional 
manner. The Company’s operation was fully funded through impositions on 
imports and exports in London, consular duties (“consulage”) in the scales, 
and fines (“brokes”) for violations of its statutes. Government interference 
was limited to the regulatory framework and general trade policy within 
which the Company was allowed to conduct its affairs. In the question of 
safe passage through the waters of the North Sea, the Eastern Atlantic and 
the Mediterranean – infested with the navies and corsairs of the Dutch Re-
public, France, Italy and Barbary (Ottoman North Africa and Morocco) – 
national and private interests and responsibilities converged at their fullest. 
The merchants of Genoa, Venice and France had successfully opposed 
the introduction of sailing in regular fleets because of the costs involved. 
Apart from the costs of organizing, maintaining and enforcing it, they fore-
saw significant commercial losses. Rightly so, for in their non-regulated 
trades it would have been impossible to control buying and selling to such a 
degree that their factors in Izmir would not try to outbid and underbid each 
other. The wholly foreseeable drop in prices that would result from factors 
outdoing each other in rushing an entire convoy’s cargo to the market and 
the buying frenzy they would unleash in their competitive quest for return 
cargo would have annihilated their already weak trades. In the English case, 
however, the Company monopoly ensured that the organizational costs of 
organizing, maintaining and enforcing a convoy system remained moderate, 
while its policy of encouraging cartel formation by the English nations in the 
Levant avoided uncoordinated flooding of its markets and explosive price 
rises due to undue competition in buying. English “Smyrna fleets” consisting 
of fully loaded, lightly manned, well-fitted and large-hulled merchant ships 
were dispatched under government-paid naval escort twice a year. Any addi-
tional costs were generally more than compensated by the resulting drop in 
English insurance rates and the consequent increase in English and third-
party (strangers’) trade. 
The English nations receiving and returning cargoes in the Levant mean-
while consisted entirely of Company members and candidate-members; fac-
tors trading on commission-basis and principals trading on their own ac-
count making up the first category, apprentices to either of the previous 
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making up the second. All had investments in stock or premiums considera-
ble enough to guarantee their abiding by the Company’s laws and regula-
tions. And if they did not, the Company was fully authorized to impose 
damaging fines or boycotts that would quickly return them to the fold.452 
With regard to the appointment and instruction of ambassadors and con-
suls the English followed the practice established by other states; i.e. the 
right to the former belonged to the highest political body of the central gov-
ernment (here; the Crown in conjunction with the Secretary of State), that to 
the latter to the highest available body representing mercantile interests 
(here; the Company). Nor was it unique to have the ambassador receive his 
salary of 10,000 dollars a year from the Company whose interests he primari-
ly represented, instead of from the government that appointed and instruct-
ed him. Although paying for the appointment of an unfit ambassador could 
cause unrest among Levant merchants, the system did have the advantage of 
an embassy that was necessarily inclined to balance very carefully the inter-
ests of the Crown against those of the mighty Company.453 
But it was in the administration of the consulates that the advantages of 
the Company monopoly were most apparent. The affairs of other nations 
were often severely hampered by internal strife. For the most part, this was 
due to their consuls’ dependence on consular duties (“consulage”). Consular 
officials (usually the treasurers) estimated these duties on incoming and out-
going goods of the nation by inspecting the manifests and bills of lading after 
they had passed customs (or, in case of suspected evasion, through physical 
inspection of the goods loaded and unloaded), and collected them from their 
nations. The merchants of the other nations generally proved reluctant to 
give honest accounts of their transactions or downright refused to pay the 
estimated duties, declaring with or without reason that consul and treasurer 
had colluded to unjustly increase them. Precisely because of the temptations 
for abuse that the consulship would otherwise offer, consuls were universally 
withheld the near-dictatorial power that would be required to compel full 
payment of duties. 
The Levant Company solved this dilemma by disentangling the financial 
interests of the consulates (of Aleppo-Alexandretta, Izmir and Alexandria) 
firmly from the private interests of its occupants. English consuls as well as 
their treasurers, secretaries and chaplains were all full Company employees. 
As such, they were prohibited from enjoying any trade-related secondary 
sources of income and were dissuaded from pursuing them anyway by 
uniquely adequate salaries: the English consul in Izmir received 2,000 dollars 
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a year with a 1,000-dollar gratuity (roughly equaling the consulate’s total 
income from consulage), the treasurer 600 dollars with a 100-dollar gratuity, 
the chancellor 200 dollars plus a 5 dollar bonus at the New Year, and the 
chaplain 200 dollars with another 200-dollar as gratuity. Because English 
consular staff did not depend on consulage for its personal livelihood and 
was rewarded for duties properly fulfilled (that is, irrespective of private or 
professional conflicts with the consul), English consular administration could 
function with all internal checks and balances in working order and in rela-
tive harmony with the factors it administered.454 
The professionalism of English consular organization in Izmir extended 
to the employment of its relatively well-paid native staff of translators and 
guards. Like other consuls, the English were accorded a two-man guard from 
the local Janissary regiment to protect the consulate and its officials when 
they ventured beyond Frank Street. Their basic salary of 136 dollars was 
augmented with 15 dollars at the New Year, 10 dollars (plus 8 dollars from 
each of the other consuls) at the Islamic Festival of Sacrifice (T. Kurban Bay-
ramı; A. ‘Id ul-’Adha), 2 dollars in port charges from every English ship, and a 
horse each maintained at the consul’s expense. 
Notwithstanding being provided with an adequate guard, European dip-
lomats were expected to minimize direct contact with Ottoman officials. To 
prevent any unnecessary devaluation of their office they left as much of the 
daily business of representation to their dragomans. These not only served as 
translators pure and simple but were interpreters in the fullest sense of the 
word, also acting as attachés and political advisors. The English employed 
three to five at regular salaries of 400, 300 and 200 dollars with New Years’ 
bonuses of 25 dollars (and 15 dollars from the other consuls), 12 dollars in 
port charges, and additional gratuities for various commercial services ren-
dered. 
Ottoman Greeks from the Homero family invariably served as chief dra-
gomans of the English, with Ottoman Armenians from time to time filling 
junior dragomanships. The choice naturally fell on these minorities since 
Jews – banned wholesale from England until 1654 and overly implicated in 
Izmir’s Turkish affairs – were considered unlikely candidates for positions 
requiring such a degree of confidentiality and loyalty. As for non-Ottomans, 
the Levant Company expressly precluded Izmir’s Genoese and Venetians 
from entering English consular service, while experiments with bringing up 
young boys as interpreters failed due to lack of interest or funding. 
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Even if Ottoman subjects’ handling daily diplomatic affairs caused some 
apprehension, employing local Christians did have important advantages too. 
Although they might have been more amenable to pressure from Ottoman 
officials and would prudently water down their masters’ more abrasive 
communications or even give up sensitive information under threat, they 
were certainly less expensive than specially trained European counterparts 
could ever be and had a far more intimate knowledge of the local political, 
economic and social configuration. For these cheaper as well as better inter-
preters, the 3% customs rate from which they profited as English protégés 
commanded its own loyalty. Senior dragomans regularly became the wealthi-
est merchants of their communities and facilitated or handled consignments 
for many of their coreligionists on the vessels of the nation employing them. 
In fact, in the years leading up to 1678 English shipping was so successful 
that it came to hold a near-monopoly on third-party carrying. Granted by the 
sultan as the privilege to protect the merchants and goods of nations that 
held no capitulations, in Dutch and English hands it came to apply equally to 
the goods of protégés and members of other capitulatory nations that wished 
to consign by their companies and/or carriers. As more and more merchants 
from the Ottoman minorities as well as from protected and unprotected 
European nations chose Dutch and English factors and ships for their low 
customs, freight and insurance rates, the consulage collected from these 
“strangers” became an increasingly important source of income. Strangers’ 
consulage also provided them with the means to regulate other nations’ Le-
vant trades to their own advantage. Because of this double advantage it be-
came the weapon of choice in the fiscal battle that was waged within the 
wider Anglo-Dutch war for commercial supremacy (of which the English 
Navigation Acts of 1651, 1660, 1663 and the Anglo-Dutch wars of 1652-
1654, 1665-1667, 1672-1674 were the most conspicuous manifestations). 
The fiscal policies the Company adopted in its quest to fully supplant the 
Dutch followed a typically monopolistic pattern. With the dispatching of 
Paul Rycaut on the heels of the English defeat in the second Anglo-Dutch 
War (1665-1667) to take up the position of English consul in Izmir, the 
Company embarked on a consistent if somewhat fitful adjustment of its 
fiscal regime to capture and incorporate as much shipping as possible. The 
Izmir consulate over which Rycaut was to preside until 1678 was central to 
the operation since that scale was the undisputed center of Dutch Levant 
trade. First, in 1668, Rycaut was instructed to lower strangers’ consulage on 
exports from Izmir from 4% to 2% at his discretion, in effect bringing it to 
the same level as regular “national” consulage. Then, in 1670, instructions 
followed to extend protection not only to English ships and any foreign 
goods they might carry, but to any ship that chose to sail into port flying 
English colors – but with the proviso that its actions or cargo would not 
provoke an Ottoman avania, which left foreign captains and merchants to 
choose between the indisputably low costs of English protection and the 
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theoretically fuller security of another consul’s. Next, in 1671, the Company 
did away with the penalizing double consulage for private shipping (i.e. Eng-
lish merchants consigning Company goods by private ships instead of by 
Company, or “general” ships), lowering that to 2% as well, thereby encour-
aging an overall growth in the volume of English shipping. In 1673, consul-
age on general ships was lowered even further, to 1% – a record low with 
which even the Dutch could not compete. And finally, in 1674, the lowering 
of strangers’ consulage from 4% to 2% was extended to include not only 
strangers’ exports from Izmir (since 1668), but also strangers’ imports. 
In tandem with the very real Third Anglo-Dutch War the English waged 
against the Republic from 1672 to 1674 (as part of the larger Allied-Dutch 
War of 1672-1678), these commercial policies succeeded in hindering Dutch 
shipping to such a degree that Izmir’s Dutch factors were compelled to use 
English carriers to save their trade. By the time of the Treaty of Westminster 
(ending the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1674) English trade in the Mediterra-
nean had become larger than that of all other nations combined. At that 
point, having laid waste to the shipping of all other nations and consequently 
holding what amounted to a monopoly over the entire Levant trade, the 
Levant Company could no longer resist its monopolistic impulses and re-
versed its fiscal policy to extract maximum profit from its advantage in the 
face of the resurgent Dutch. In 1677 the Company determined that Izmir’s 
foreign merchants, still heavily dependent on English shipping and protec-
tion, would henceforth pay consulage at double the rate reserved for English 
merchants. An additional increase (to 4%) on cargoes shipped to destinations 
north of Cape Finisterre (on the far northwestern coast of Spain) other than 
London, also aimed at once to make more money from the carrying trade, to 
promote English trade and to reduce the commerce of other nations. Both 
measures appear to have contributed significantly to the strong comeback of 
Dutch trade from 1677/78 onwards. 
The coping stone of a professional English management of consular af-
fairs was the way in which sudden financial shortfalls were met. Even though 
a shortage of consular funds was dangerous because it hindered or suspend-
ed the meeting of Ottoman financial demands, empty consular coffers were 
never an excuse to levy additional taxes from English shipping, even if the 
addition concerned came in the form of an advance. Where other nations 
would all-too-often take recourse to such measures, or borrow the necessary 
funds from Ottoman (Jewish) financiers against Turkish rates of interest (of 
18% and upwards), the Levant Company successfully prohibited both. In-
stead, it organized a fixed procedure for raising money that was both volun-
tary, inexpensive and relatively quick. The key was that both the debt and its 
fulfillment against interest were moved from the Ottoman Empire to Eng-
land, where it would not unnecessarily impair diplomatic relations: extraordi-
nary expenses were advanced by the factory members (i.e. factors) and notice 
thereof sent to general court of the Levant Company in London, whereupon 
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the London merchants (i.e. principals) subscribed to the accumulated debt at 
a moderate 5-6% rate of interest which was fulfilled by the Company, in 
effect making it a Company debt. 
 
If there is one aspect to their trade where the Dutch failed miserably, it was 
this. For all their disinterest in ideology, status or rank, Dutch merchants 
were interested above all in the one form of competition that truly mattered 
to them; that for commerce. In their uphill struggle to achieve it against the 
more legitimate, powerful and centralized states of France and England, 
loyalty to their nation and deference to their appointed superiors suffered 
more systematically than in any other nation. Although its trade’s loose or-
ganization (and the abundant room for individual initiative it afforded) con-
tributed significantly to Dutch success, it also made it exceedingly difficult to 
organize the trade and respond to challenges against it in a structurally sus-
tainable manner. Most of the time though, some balance between personal 
and state interests was attained, be it at often great personal cost of the offi-
cials caught in-between. It was on them that both sides implicitly counted to 
unite conflicting interests through mediation and the slight manipulation of 
rules and laws.455 
Particularly during the 17th-century heyday of Dutch trade, the pressure 
put on Dutch consular officials was enormous. In contrast to that of the 
Dutch East Indies trade or the English Levant trade, the organizational un-
derpinnings of Dutch Levant trade did not predate or coincide with the full 
establishment of trade. Dutch Levant trade had started in the 1580s under 
foreign (English and French) protection and had already become considera-
ble enough by the early years of the Twelve Years’ Truce with Spain (1609-
1621) to merit the States-General’s pursuing and acquiring its first Ottoman 
capitulation in 1612 to the dismay of the English and French. Although the 
capitulation formalized Ottoman-Dutch relations and called for a proper 
hierarchy of representation to be established, having a representative in Is-
tanbul and consuls and deputies in the factories did not amount to organiz-
ing the trade. 
For the duration of the truce Dutch Levant trade was predominantly left 
to the merchants of Holland and Zeeland, with Dutch diplomatic officials 
functioning in a supporting capacity rather than in a regulatory one. The 
resumption of Spanish-Dutch hostilities made this relatively cheap and 
loosely organized regime untenable, however. The passage along the French 
and Spanish coasts, the Strait of Gibraltar and through the corsair-infested 
Mediterranean had been wrought with difficulties even during the truce, but 
to make it through Spanish waters now required a whole other level of pro-
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tection. Simultaneously, even the States General’s practice of sending naval 
squadrons to patrol the Atlantic and the Mediterranean for corsairs and oth-
er enemy ships preying on Dutch merchantmen was no longer tenable, since 
the Dutch navy was pinned down defending Dutch waters.456 
A solution for the merchants’ increased need for protection and the na-
vy’s decreased availability was sought in convoying. In 1623 the States Gen-
eral obliged shipping companies to equip their vessels according to fixed 
standards checked and maintained by the Admiralty.457 Though they had to 
do so at their own cost, the Admiralty consequently assigned contingents of 
sailors free of charge. It soon became apparent however that the convoying 
regulations could hardly be enforced through the Admiralty’s power alone. 
Because a sizeable percentage of companies and ship masters took their 
chances and evaded the costs of submitting to regulation, they could carry 
against unfairly reduced rates but at undue risk for consigning merchants and 
insurers. The dangers posed by rogue traders prompted the Dutch ambassa-
dor in Istanbul to request the States General to consider establishing a regu-
latory body of senior merchants to organize and represent Dutch Mediterra-
nean trade.458 Within two months, the resident’s missive from April 1625 was 
followed up with a similar request from the principal merchants of Amster-
dam. Though addressed to the States General, the government of Amster-
dam’s underwriting it preemptively established a central Amsterdam leg, or 
“chamber”, for the projected organization: 
 
Burgomaster and governors of the city of Amsterdam authorize and commission Albert 
Schuyt, Hillebrand den Otter, Elias Trip, Gerrit Hudden, Marcus Vogelaer, Philippo 
Calandrini and Jan Bicker, to oversee the equipage of all ships bound for the Mediterrane-
an and the Archipelago, to vsistate and examine their patents and consignments, to corre-
spond with the resident and consuls in the Levant and Barbaray, and to procure everything 
they consider necessary to maintain the bashas and principals of Algiers and Tunis. 
(Signed 25 June 1625.)459 
                                                     
 
456 On the organization of the Dutch Levant trade and diplomacy, see, generally, 
Heeringa, Bronnen 1 and 2. The summary supra and infra is largely based on these sources. 
457 See Heeringa, Bronnen 1, 838. 
458 “… eenige van de ervaerenste ende prcinpaelste coopluydens tot Ambstelredam, op 
Italia ende Levant handelende, t’aucthoriseren, om behoorlijk regard te nemen op de uuytrus-
tinge van alle schepen, die nae de Straet vaeren, sorge te draegen voor haere verseeckeringhe 
met het visiteren ende examineren van de patenten ende cognossementen, correspondentie te 
houden met den orateur ende consuls van Levante ende Barbarije …”: Heeringa, Bronnen 1, 
963: Cornelis Haga to States General, 5 April 1625. 
459 “Burgermeesters ende regeerders der stede Amsterdam authoriseren ende commiteren 
Albert Schuyt, Hillebrand den Otter, Elias Trip, Gerrit Hudden, Marcus Vogelaer, Philippo 
Calandrini ende Jan Bicker, om behoorlijck regard te nemen op de uytrustinge van alle de 
schepen, die in de Middelandse see ende Archipellago varen, hare patenten ende cognosce-
menten te visiteren ende examineren, mitten heere orateur ende consuls van Levanten ende 
Barbarijen correspondentiën te houden ende voorts alles anders te procureren, dat sijluyden 
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Set up as a municipal board, the “Directie van de Levantse Handel en de 
Navigatie op de Middellandse Zee” (“Board of Levant Trade and Navigation 
in the Mediterranean Sea”, commonly abbreviated to DLH in Dutch) in fact 
acquired national authority upon ratification by the States General. Reim-
bursed for their efforts and expenses through surcharges on vessels bound 
for and from the Mediterranean, its directors were to oversee their proper 
mustering, equipage, insurance and taxation. As its advisory and coordinating 
role in relations between the States General, the Admiralty, provinces, cities, 
and other municipal and port authorities on the one hand, and principals, 
factors and consuls in the Mediterranean on the other, developed in the 
course of the century, the DLH’s authority evolved into a political and semi-
legislative one. 
Originally set up primarily to coordinate Levant trade-related affairs in 
Holland, by the 1670s and 80s the DLH’s involvement with the factories had 
become so intensive that it was in regular correspondence with consular 
officials and actively designed, promoted and supervised the standardization 
of the factories’ commercial, fiscal and administrative practices, the States 
General increasingly merely signing off on decisions previously made by the 
directors in Amsterdam city hall. Far from being coincidental, this develop-
ment (which we would nowadays call “mission creep”) was condoned by the 
States General. They now had at their disposal a commission that managed 
Ottoman-Dutch trade, free of charge, yet bound to take full account of The 
Hague’s diplomatic considerations and needs. At the same time the Levant 
merchants and their cities and provinces were not unduly provoked by per-
ceived authoritarianism because – officially – the directors were not in the 
States General’s service and had no authority beyond that which they them-
selves accorded them. 
The resulting organization of Dutch Levant trade is represented in the di-
agram below. Most conspicuous is the absence of a link between the direc-
torate and the nations. This can be attributed to the fact that the DLH’s 
jurisdiction over them was indirect at best. The majority of Dutch factors in 
the scales were deputies of the principal merchants in the Republic and were 
primarily answerable to those. The DLH’s legal authority over them was 
limited to commercial practice and regulation (through the consul), and – as 
we have seen above – even that authority was often very much in dispute. 
That the relatively low-powered DLH came to be the central authority in 
Dutch Levant trade, having to establish itself over, and coordinate form the 
midst of, a web of institutions and persons over which it could claim little 
seniority or authority had advantages as well as, obviously, disadvantages. 
 
                                                                                                                        
 
tot onderhoudinghe van bassas ende principaelen van Algiers ende Tunis nodigh achten 
sullen. … Actum den 25 Junij 1625”: Heeringa, Bronnen 1, 968-69. 
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FIGURE 4: DUTCH CONSULAR ORGANIZATION (17TH CENTURY) 
 
Steensgaard, “Consuls and Nations”, 48. 
 
On the positive side its establishment as a committee or board (and not a 
full-fledged government agency or independent company) made its operation 
far less expensive and cumbersome. At no cost to the States General and the 
provinces, at minimal cost to the cities housing DLH-chambers, and at fairly 
modest cost to the trade that provided the DLH with funds, Holland and 
Zeeland gained a well-organized, secured and insured operation with lobby-
ing and policymaking capacity that was nevertheless still freely accessible to 
merchants and investors. Beyond the immediate advantages of heightened 
controls on mustering, equipage, insurance and taxation, these measures also 
had another (longer term) advantage: to reduce the costs of mandatory mus-
tering and equipage per unit of cargo Levant merchants quickly switched to 
ships with bigger holds and more guns. These could barely outrun threats, 
but made up for this defect with relatively small crews that could neverthe-
less wield enormous firepower. This inadvertent advantage in the develop-
ment of Dutch Mediterranean shipping would go on to make it so cost-
effective and competitive as to form a severe threat to Italian, French and 
English shipping well into the 18th century. 
All consequences on the negative side of the equation were a direct con-
sequence of the almost organic evolution of the DLH as the central authority 
in Dutch Levant trade. As this fledgling organization tried to assert itself 
over a trade that predated and outstripped it, its ambassador and merchants 
can be forgiven for primarily regarding it as a vehicle for their specific wishes 
and demands, as in turn might the burgomasters of cities housing chambers, 
the States of Holland and Zeeland, and the States General. In any case, 
whatever the directors’ intentions or the institutional, political and diplomatic 
merits of their policies, their limited mandate would continue to haunt them 
for the duration of the 17th century. 
But no one felt the very real consequences of the theoretical gap between 
authority and ambition, loyalty to the trade and subservience to the state 
quite as keenly as the consul of the largest Dutch Levantine factory; Izmir. 
He was initially appointed through an overly elaborate procedure: candidacy 
by the directors, approval by the burgomasters of Amsterdam, final selection 
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by the States of Holland, confirmation by the States General (460) – and all 
this in contravention of the capitulatory stipulation that the appointment of 
consuls was in fact the ambassador’s prerogative. Plagued with a structural 
lack of legal jurisdiction, of political authority, of means for enforcement and 
– most importantly – of personal as well as consular funds (for both of 
which he was entirely dependent on consulage, which was collectible only 
with explicit consent from the consulate’s three independently elected asses-
sors) his position was the one where Dutch administrative decentralization 
came into full contact with the reality of a strong and independent communi-
ty of expatriates. The nation seemed determined to systematically defraud its 
consul of his income through chronic under-declaring and endless bickering 
over consular and national expenses. At the same time the directors ada-
mantly refused to take sole fiscal responsibility for consular affairs (for ex-
ample, through awarding fixed salaries and reserving funds for extraordinary, 
emergency, expenses). Yet, he was counted on by both parties to act in their 
best interests, which made fulfillment of the office a high-wire act that re-
quired very loyal, skillful, diplomatic yet forceful occupants. As it was, the 
skills of those found were often insufficient. 
After the establishment of the directorate in 1625, the growing im-
portance of the Dutch Izmir trade, coupled with the increasing requirement 
for its consul to function as a governor abroad rather than as a purely local 
representative of his merchants’ interests, conspired to make hiring foreign 
locals (from 1618 to 1633 the Venetian Nicolo Orlando and from 1635 to 
1657 the Greek Duca di Giovanni) less desirable.461 From 1656 onward, the 
consulship would no longer go to foreign incumbents who were highly 
versed in mercantile matters and well-connected to Ottoman officials, but to 
patricians, burghers and lawyers brought over from the Netherlands (while 
members of the Dutch nation from time to time observed it ad interim). With 
little to no connections to the trade or to the Izmir nation, and expected to 
be all the more faithful to the directors and resident to which they owed their 
office, Dutch consuls would now be better positioned to gradually establish 
the home authorities’ prerogatives and objectively implement stricter and 
more uniform rules and principles. Or so it was thought. 
After two less successful consulships (that of Michiel du Mortier form 
1657 to 1661 and of Gerard Smits from 1662 to 1668) the unlucky task 
would fall to Utrecht lawyer Jacob van Dam, consul from 1668 to 1687. As 
he set about attempting to impose consecutive layers of administrative con-
trols on a community that baulked at seeing its former liberties diminished 
by the merchants and governments back home, his long-drawn consulship 
                                                     
 
460 See J.W. Samberg, De hollandsche gereformeerde gemeente te Smirna: de geschiedenis eener 
handelskerk (Leiden: Eduard IJdo, 1928), 29. 
461 Cf. Schutte, Repertorium, 331-34. 
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became entirely marred by the unceasing and oftentimes extreme enmity 
between his nation and himself.462 The way the organization of Dutch trade 
was made up along the way of its greatest successes had borne a peculiar 
mixture of mandatory participation and official organization on the one 
hand, and private initiative and informal organization on the other. It was 
this failure of the decentralized and heavily factionalized governing institu-
tions of the Dutch Republic to clearly delimit and communicate the jurisdic-
tions and administrative forms involved, to which Dutch commercial and 
community life in Izmir owed its peculiarly quarrelsome and anarchical char-
acter. 
 
This organizational overview of Izmir’s European communities concludes 
our survey of what we have (somewhat misleadingly) called the ‘demography’ 
of European Izmir, that is to say; a survey of the various communities (and 
individuals) of which it was made up, of the specific ways in which these 
were confronted with, and reacted to, the increasing pressures brought to 
bear on them from the countries under which they resorted, from their Ot-
toman context, and from the specific segments of the mutual trade they 
sought to dominate. It should by now be very clear that this was actually a 
nationally, culturally, socially and economically diverse collective, whose 
shrinking yet professionalizing parts were feeling their way through systemic 
changes – with very different responses to their Ottoman surroundings as a 
result. Let us next see what we can say about their geographic distribution, 
along Frank Street, but also in relation to the adjacent Ottoman quarters. 
 
Geography 
Despite the abundance of European sources from and on Izmir it is equally 
challenging to attempt a rudimentary topography of the city’s 17th-century 
European quarter as it has been for the Ottoman quarter. As is to be ex-
pected of an Ottoman administration that had a decidedly laissez-faire attitude 
towards the inner workings of its non-Ottoman quarters, it left precious little 
relevant documents for us to peruse. Nevertheless, European sources do not 
yield significantly more detailed or accurate information. Delighting in gen-
eral references to Frank Street’s landmarks and cosmopolitan character, it 
appears Europeans’ interest in their neighborhood’s Greek-Armenian urban 
hinterland was not significantly greater than that displayed by Ottoman con-
temporaries. In fact, European observers remain tantalizingly vague even on 
the more modest and common aspects of life in Frank Street itself. 
Our discussion of the geography of European Izmir will therefore neces-
sarily be very limited and highly inferred. Even so, it will yield a topography 
of the quarter’s main structures, as well as roughly delineate the distribution 
                                                     
 
462 See Appendix 2, Documents 4 and 7 and supra. 
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of class, nationality and power among them. In the process, it will also sug-
gest an answer to the double question as to what separated the European 
quarter from the Ottoman quarters behind it and why all contemporary 
sources avoid it altogether. 
 
A Topography of Frank Street 
Just like our discussion of the geography of 17th-century Ottoman Izmir, that 
of 17th-century European Izmir must take De Bruyn’s panorama as a starting 
point. The panorama is the only pre-19th century source that identifies with a 
measure of accuracy a number of buildings along the cities northern coast-
line. On the large six-folio foldout illustration, De Bruyn enumerates a total 
of twenty-one landmark structures and locations which he further identifies 
in the text. (Since the original numerals are undistinguishable on our scaled 
down Plate 1 I have added Map 14 for clarification.) 
 
MAP 14: PANORAMA WITH CLARIFIED LANDMARKS (DE BRUYN, 1678) 
 
De Bruyn, Reizen, plate 2 and 23-25. 
 
The corresponding descriptions (by De Bruyn) may be summarized thus: 
 
1. Kadifekale (upper castle) 12. Gümrükhane or uc gümrük (outer customs house) 
2. Chapel of Saint Polycarp 13. Bezestan (covered market)
3. Ancient theatre 14. Vezirhan (great warehouse)
4. Köşk (pavilion) of Ahmed Ağa 15. Liman Kalesi (harbor castle/Castle of St. Peter) 
5. Greek han (inn) 16. Inner, or galley, harbor (iç or kadırga liman)
6. Genoese consulate 17. İç gümrük (inner customs)
7. Dutch consulate 18. Church of Saint Veneranda
8. Venetian consulate 19. Greek and Armenian burial grounds
9. Residence of Kara Mustafa Paşa 20. English, French and Dutch cemeteries
10. English consulate 21. Jewish burial ground
11. French consulate
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When we insert De Bruyn’s numerals in our edited version of Graves’ map 
of Izmir to more readily understand the relative locations of the identified 
landmarks, the result is Map 15 below. 
 
MAP 15: MAP OF STRUCTURES AND LOCATIONS IDENTIFIED BY DE BRUYN (1678) 
 
Based on Maps 5, 11 and 12. 
 
Galland, our other most instructive 17th-century visitor, has left us no such 
panorama. Still, the unusual detail of his description of the city, and of its 
seaside in particular, complements De Bruyn’s quite well by also moving 
beyond the immediate shore, as well as by giving some more general insights 
into the workings of the European quarter. From his description (465) we 
may add that; 
- the vezirhan (no. 14) was reserved for Armenian merchants (106); 
- the governor’s mansion was located on the shore of the inner harbor 
on a square right behind the lower castle, which also boasted a mod-
                                                     
 
465 Galland, Voyage à Smyrne. 
 
 
284 
 
est mosque, an elegant fountain and Izmir’s wood market (wood be-
ing of particular importance to the fleet building governor, or derya 
bey) (110); 
- the Capuchin French parochial church was just across the street 
from the French consulate (to which it was connected by a traverse) 
and had its own cemetery (114-116); 
- there was also a French Jesuit “church” (housed in a large house) 
with garden somewhere along Frank Street’s quayside, with ground 
floor shop- and storerooms being leased out (116); 
- on the landward side of Frank Street there was also a Franciscan 
Venetian church with cemetery (126); 
- Frank Street counted three officially sanctioned ovens: one in the 
Greek khan, an older English one and a French one established only 
after the Candian war had ended (the Ottoman authorities had pre-
viously refused the French their own oven for fear of its products 
being employed to sustain the Venetian defenders of Candia) (145); 
- there were a number of bars (“cabarets”) on Frank Street, the popu-
larity of which among European as well as Barbary corsairs caused 
trouble with some regularity (133), and 
- the houses along Frank Street were all on lease from Ottoman own-
ers (since non-Muslim foreigners were not allowed to hold real es-
tate in Ottoman lands) and thus constituted a major source of in-
come for the well-to-do Turks of Izmir (144).466 
 
The topographical detail provided by De Bruyn and Galland represent the 
limits of a feasible topography of Frank Street as it existed in 1678 (as well as 
adding some interesting details to that of adjoining quarters). A good many 
other sources provide further information on the street and its inhabitants, 
but theirs is invariably topographically or generally imprecise and is best 
employed for added context only. 
Our rudimentary topography of Frank Street begs a number of questions; 
most importantly, what does the distribution of the fully identified structures 
on the seaward side of the street tell us and, secondly, what, then, was the 
situation on the landward side of the street? 
 
Distribution 
In all descriptions of European Izmir – be they practical or literary – the 
consulates along Frank Street invariably receive the most attention. This is 
for a number of rather straightforward reasons: because their size and flag-
ging made them the most visible and recognizable European buildings when 
approaching the city from the sea; because arriving travelers were expected 
                                                     
 
466 Cf. notes 181 and 433. 
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and required to seek lodging, patronage and protection at their consulate (i.e. 
to matriculate); and because the consulates were (or were supposed to be) 
the main focus of their stay as well as of their national loyalty and pride. 
Together with the churches (second only in the attention bestowed on them) 
the consulates constituted the backbone of the respective European com-
munities or nations and as a result are at the center of our understanding of 
Frank Street. 
Being national symbols though, an awful lot of the consulates’ (and the 
churches’) more mundane goings on have remained hidden from sight. We 
have at our disposal many reports of consular and national meetings, a cou-
ple of anecdotal references to meals at the consular table, to festivities and to 
religious services and precious few hints (mostly in descriptions of the ex-
traordinary measures taken to avoid plague infection) at what went on in the 
consulates’ storage and private rooms, in their gardens and on their jetties. 
One can only guess at the reasons for this, but most likely what went on 
there concerned the private lives of consular staff and was (alas!) deemed too 
prosaic to deserve mention, or was indelicate, illicit or plain illegal. What is 
revealed to us, then, is mostly the public outer shell of the consular institu-
tion. 
Still, even that outer shell can serve an analytical purpose. Granted, we 
have no information on the exact lineup of buildings along (sections of) 
Frank Street. Yet our awareness of the relative prominence and location of 
the consulates, as well as of what Ottoman quarters with what functions and 
institutions bordered which section of Frank Street, may be combined to 
provide a degree of topographical context for otherwise tantalizingly vague 
references to the clustering of nationalities and professions and to the loca-
tions of minor chapels, merchants’ houses, shops and bars. The question of 
centrality is of key importance in attempting this. 
 
Like any city Izmir had parts that were deemed to be more desirable to work 
or live in than others – i.e. that best suited the specific wishes and purposes 
of certain groups of inhabitants (and visitors). And like any neighborhood 
the European quarter had streets and stretches of streets more desirable than 
others. European sources are very clear on the fact that the most desirable 
(and, only?) street of the European quarter was Frank Street and that the 
seaside of the street was more desirable than the landward side. The man-
sions along the shore had direct, private, access to the outer harbor and their 
ground level warehouses, gardens and jetties were therefore ideally posi-
tioned to move goods from and to ships quickly, easily and – more interest-
ingly – at any hour and under the cloak of darkness. At the same time, the 
seaward side of the street offered some distance from the stresses of ethno-
religious cohabitation and the real and imagined dangers of plague, fire and 
Ottoman “violence” (read; jurisdiction!) that roamed the indigenous city 
beyond Frank Street. 
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Undesirable as we might expect some to have found too close a proximi-
ty to the non-Frankish and particularly the non-Christian quarters, not being 
too far removed from them certainly had its advantages. This not only ap-
plied to vicinity to the Greek and Armenian quarters, but certainly also to the 
Jewish and the Turkish. As the Europeans depended on the former for per-
sonal services, industrial production and mercantile mediation, they did on 
the latter for luxury imports (through the caravan trade) and for financial, 
administrative, legal and diplomatic services. Their dependence only in-
creased when, between 1675 and 1678 the Köprülüs decisively moved to 
gain administrative and even physical control over European trade by having 
it flow through the administrative and commercial institutions of its endow-
ment (see above, and esp. De Bruyn’s nos. 12, 13 and 14). 
Weighing the various advantages and disadvantages of certain locations 
along Frank Street against each other, consuls and well-to-do merchants 
generally preferred to set up house on the southernmost end of Frank 
Street’s seaside. The advantages were several: a private garden and quay, 
proximity to the Greek center (east and northeast of the Saint George and 
the Saint Photina), easy access to the rue des Arméniens (467), and thereby to the 
Armenian center east of the St. Stephen, as well as to the caravan bridge and 
the countryside beyond. More crucially, the southern end of Frank Street 
opened unto the newly renovated Ottoman commercial quarter of Kasap 
Hazır and lay within carting distance of its customs house, warehouses and 
markets. How successful the Köprülüs’ regrafting of Izmir’s international 
economy, away from the European quarter and onto this Ottoman quarter, 
was, can be gleaned not just from the rapid establishment, enforcement and 
acceptance of the new customs house and its procedures in 1675, but also 
more convincingly from the fact that, in 1678, a freshly arrived De 
Hochepied could already innocently remark that… 
 
near the customs house two large fireproof hans (being closed living and commercial quarters 
with many rooms) have been contracted for the convenience of the merchants; the first being 
called the bedestan and the second the vezirhan, the latter containing two floors, where many 
European merchants have their warehouses, the rest being inhabited by Armenians, Per-
sians and other foreign nations, who use it to keep the goods they direct to Izmir by cara-
vans from Persia and other places.468 
 
Located at the far southern end of Frank Street’s seaside, the French and 
English consulates occupied superior if somewhat exposed positions. Both 
suffered repeatedly at the hands of drunken and rowdy bands of European 
and North-African sailors and corsairs, but apparently that was not felt to 
                                                     
 
467 See Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 88. 
468 My italics. The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 42b. 
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outweigh the advantages offered by simultaneous proximity to the Greek, 
Armenian, Jewish and Turkish sections of town. 
How then, did the French and English manage to occupy such prime lo-
cations? Was it because their presence went furthest back, or because they 
were the mightier or wealthier nations, or because of any combination of 
these possible reasons? Not necessarily, or even likely. An explanation 
should rather be sought in the importance they accorded to the projection of 
their wealth, status and power vis-à-vis their European competitors and their 
Ottoman hosts, i.e. in consuming conspicuously.469 It is no coincidence that 
precisely the monarchical states went for the most prestigious locations, 
while those of the merchant republics of Venice, Genoa and the United 
Provinces were content with real estate on the street’s less prestigious north-
ern end. Although the republics were by no means insensitive to matters of 
precedence, the status it implied and the beneficial social, economic and 
political effects it could produce, they were equally apprehensive of diverting 
the best of their efforts away from their commercial raison d’être, and of the 
unwanted attention from corrupt officials and commercial swindlers that too 
much visibility and pomp could generate.470 
With the locations of the consulates accounted for it would be consistent 
to proceed with those of their nations. Unfortunately no contemporary doc-
ument I know of more than hints at the distribution of communities (or 
even their senior merchants) along Frank Street – with the exception of the 
testimony of Christoffel Capoen (see Appendix 2, document 3), from which 
we learn that the Dutch company of Van Goor & Smout was located next to 
the French consulate (which, together with apparent French complicity in 
the hostage-taking, again suggests a certain affinity between the Dutch diso-
bedient faction and the French). In any case, with the protective function of 
the consular institution in mind, we may accept those hints and assume that 
the majority of (loyal) nationals will indeed have settled in the vicinity of its 
consular seat. On the other hand, it is to be expected that a number of mer-
chants did do its utmost to distance itself from consular authority and, espe-
cially, fiscal jurisdiction.471 But their number will have been too small to in-
validate the proposition that most well-to-do merchants resided on the sea-
side in the close vicinity of their consulate, while the less well-off joined the 
tradesmen and shopkeepers on the other side of the street. 
                                                     
 
469 On “conspicuous consumption”, see Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class 
(Charleston: Forgotten Books, 1899; 1965; 2008), 42-61 and throughout. Also see Burke, 
History and Social Theory, 67-69. 
470 Cf. supra on Kara Mustafa Paşa’s stalled audiences, and the practicality with which the 
non-monarchical representatives (Venetian, Genoese and Dutch) efficiently dealt with Otto-
man adjustments of protocol that the French and English found unacceptable and halted 
relations over. 
471 See supra, esp. notes 230, 236, 238, 244 and 347. 
 
 
288 
 
Boundaries 
With the relative lack of sound topographical data for even Frank Street’s 
seaside and its near complete absence for the street’s landward side, we are 
left very much in the dark about the Frank quarter beyond Frank Street 
proper. Was there such a thing to begin with? Or did all Europeans (except 
for a few peculiar cases nearly “turned Turk”) actually live on that one street? 
And, if not, did a significant number actually reside in the Greek quarter and 
under Greek communal organization and authority? 
Although the extent to which the Frank quarter can truly be equated with 
Frank Street is beyond retrieval, the suspicion lingers that the separation 
between European and Ottoman that most contemporary accounts insist on, 
is disingenuous. For how are they to be reconciled with the candor displayed 
throughout Galland’s description, and many other contemporary descriptions 
of the generally pleasant European life in Izmir, as they dryly refer to the 
unhindered social intercourse between Europeans and Ottoman Christians 
(the stigmatized Greeks, Armenians and Jews) and even Muslims in Europe-
an and Ottoman bars, theatres, churches, markets, shops, warehouses, courts 
of justice, lodgings and households? Though formally regarded as somewhat 
distasteful conduct, which many considered it imprudent to advertise to 
widely or openly, it could never be covered up entirely. 
Particularly in conflict situations the self-preservationist instinct to point a 
finger would often override prudence, leaving us interesting snippets of the 
otherwise hidden information discussed in the preceding pages and foot-
notes. As a result we now have at our disposal the letters of stiff-headed and 
self-righteous men like Dutch minister Thomas Coenen and Dutch consul 
Jacob van Dam. In stressing their own good faith and exemplary conduct 
and pressing the resolution of conflicts over their remuneration and oft-
flouted authority, both extensively lamented their flock’s wayward manners 
and in the process described them in informative detail.472 It is because of 
predicaments such as Coenen’s en Van Dam’s that we can now know about 
the less than exemplary ways of a number of well-to-do merchants that took 
up Oriental lifestyles complete with Turkish dress, concubines and slave 
girls, and with houses beyond Frank Street. Had it been up to more diplo-
matic men in less desperate circumstances such information would have 
remained hidden. 
For all concerned it was generally more expedient to promote an image 
of wholesome, obedient and self-sufficient expatriate communities then to 
soil it with tales of cultural fluidity, opaque jurisdictions and messy interde-
                                                     
 
472 See supra, and Appendix 2; Amsterdam, Stadsarchief 379 (Classis Amsterdam) / 235 
(Ingekomen stukken betreffende kerkelijke zaken in Smyrna): throughout, Thomas Coenen to 
Classis Amsterdam; Samberg, Hollandsche gereformeerde gemeente, 1-84; and Joos Vermeulen, 
Sultans, slaven en renegaten: de verborgen geschiedenis van het Ottomaanse rijk (Leuven: Acco, 2001), 
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pendence. And this strategy of silencing not only applied to the Ottoman 
other, those lower on the social ladder commonly received similar treatment. 
Apart from the fact that the crosscultural and transcultural messiness in-
creased as one traversed the non-Muslim part of town from the shore to the 
quarters beyond, most early modern literates will also have found it distaste-
ful to dwell on the lives and livelihoods of “rabble”, be they coreligionists, 
compatriots, or – worst of all – neither. For over-acknowledging such ele-
ments of lesser class, profession and/or religion would implicitly taint and 
thereby diminish the authority that diplomats and gentlemen-travelers were 
attempting to establish and project with their narratives. 
The boundary between the European and Ottoman city, then, is not just 
obscured by differences of race and religion, but doubly so by their confla-
tion with class. Consequently, as the “quality” of inhabitants decreased in all 
respects when one travelled from Frank Street’s seaside toward the city’s 
interior, the light of our sources also grows ever more faint and we stumble 
to feel our way forward there. Nonetheless, all of the above strongly suggests 
that there was no firm boundary between Frank Street and the Greek quarter 
beyond it, and that particularly Europeans of lesser station freely mingled 
with the latter’s population, a good number of them in all likelihood residing 
there as well.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Over the preceding argument, we have attempted to impose on the historical 
“double city” of Izmir a framework for inquiry that divides that city into its 
two ideal constituent parts – Eastern/Islamic/Ottoman on the one hand, 
and Western/Christian/European on the other – only to demonstrate how 
unworkable this division, tirelessly (though not necessarily consciously) 
maintained by contemporary and modern observers alike, really is. Not only 
because the sources for both parts are so disparate that comparison is im-
possible without major reinterpretation, but even more so because the real 
lives and activities of their denizens, over the centuries imagined and willed 
into their presumed identities and proper places from the outside, for a long 
time managed to challenge such neat divisions, until at last (in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries) international aspirations and power politics managed 
to subdue and destroy their robust heritage of everyday crossculturalism. 
If we are to attempt a genuine understanding of Izmir during its early 
modern boom, at the very time that the Ottoman world system is thought to 
have been pulled into the European world system through precisely that city 
and society, we should be acutely aware of the Ottoman and European dis-
courses of segregation and opposition to which the vast majority of sources 
at our disposal were playing, the differences between them and the purposes 
they served. To be able to do this, it is not enough to take stock of economic 
indicators from a variety of disjointed sources. What is needed is a compara-
tive analysis of the cultural, social and political-administrative context of 
these Ottoman and European sources and an exploration of cultural, social 
political and administrative realities on the ground, to see whether they in-
deed correspond to world systemic developments. 
In working out the specifics and timing of Izmir’s role in the (semi)peri-
pheralization of the Ottoman world system, world systems analysis has not 
lived up to its promise. For the most part, its proponents have dealt with the 
considerable problems arising from the crucial 17th-century’s repeated ad-
ministrative reorganizations and the scattering of already inconsistent sources 
by throwing a tightrope across the disconcerting ravine the era can be, and 
edging across it from the “classical” 16th century to the transformed 18th 
century without looking down. The balancing act has forced them to glance 
over the haphazardly documented and purposefully hidden messiness of 
crosscultural relations as they were lived along 17th-century Izmir’s quays and 
streets, and in its markets, inns, and houses. In the process, they have ne-
glected the agency of a resilient urban culture averse to ideological purity and 
always prone to opt for mutual benefit, such as had been formed by centu-
ries of reaching across ethno-religious divisions in search of livelihoods. 
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We have sought to address this historiographical negligence by taking our 
eyes off economy for a moment, instead focusing on such other indicators of 
power in crosscultural relations as the sources will permit us to discern, i.e. 
legal-fiscal-administrative developments, changes in the distribution of the 
city’s populations (urban demography) and changes in the city’s built envi-
ronment (urban geography). Let us retrace the long and winding argument 
that has been the result: 
 
In the first chapter (“The Ottoman City – History”) we noted that Izmir’s 
history was one of oscillation between East and West, in response to which 
Izmir’s communities and overlords, invested in the continued flow of trade 
through the city as they were, developed an urban culture and infrastructure 
that downplayed and contained crosscultural antagonisms in favor of prag-
matism. The civic culture that was the result was typical of the frontier: het-
erodox, tenaciously tolerant and sustained by dogged cultural resistance to 
the principles and designs of outside powers – all in the quest for riches. 
This unceasing tug between independence and incorporation left its marks 
on the city (as it did on the polities that attempted to subdue it), and inces-
santly played out among a peculiar urban economy, geography, demography 
and culture, shaped by centuries of reaching across religious, ethnic, linguis-
tic, political, and economic frontiers. 
 
The second chapter (“The Ottoman City – Demography”) focused on popu-
lation and the divisions within it. We confirmed that the common practice of 
regarding early modern Ottoman communities as relatively isolated and self-
sufficient is the result of unwarranted back projection from the late-
nineteenth century millet-system. In reality, we argued, the universality and 
uniformity of that system was theoretical (as zimmet) before the 19th century 
(and perhaps even then?): the internal organization and external relations of 
zimmi-communities were determined first and foremost by local circum-
stances, and for purposes of everyday administration early modern Ottoman 
administrators did not regard the status of the empire’s minorities as funda-
mentally different from that of the other communities (taifes) under their 
jurisdiction. As a consequence, seemingly uniform legal and administrative 
principles, when confronted with reality on the ground, generated widely 
divergent outcomes; as categorical a refutation of the paradigm of “the Is-
lamic city” as is possible. 
Izmir’s history as a frontier, combined with the city’s meteoric early mod-
ern rise, particularly precludes the existence there of a fixed and non-
negotiable order to govern all relations between Muslim, non-Muslim and 
the state. Far from causing an interpretative chaos or void, this recognition 
of administrative and social diversity (i.e. of local and personal agency) – not 
only where non-Muslims are concerned, but throughout Ottoman society – 
allows us to reinterpret the seemingly desperate archival predicament. This 
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predicament, which has kept historians away from the Ottoman 17th century, 
turns out to be a consequence of our limited understanding (sustained by a 
somewhat mechanical interpretation of world systems history) of the count-
less localized adjustments through which Ottoman administration absorbed 
the shocks of early modernity (instead of the Ottomans’ peculiarly limited un-
derstanding of the challenges of early modernity). If this history and its dis-
jointed sources are approached on their own terms, from their own logic, 
and are made to relate to each other in a heavily contextualized historical 
interpretative environment, much more information might be gleaned from 
them than is often thought. 
An important case in point is the notoriously difficult problem of family 
size, and the derived estimate of population size. Creative new use of sources 
and measured comparison across time, place and social setting indicate that 
the size of the average 17th-century Ottoman heartland family unit was far 
smaller than previously assumed: 3.65 in cities and 4.9 in rural environs. The 
evidence suggests that Izmir’s Turkish, Greek, Armenian and Jewish families 
were no exception. This brings the population of 1650s Izmir to c. 40,000, 
and of 1678 to c. 70,000 (from a mere 2,500 in 1575!), with immigration of 
non-Muslims (Jews especially) disproportionally contributing to the growth 
of the city and its economy. 
The simultaneous boom in population and trade, both moving through 
the antiquated infrastructure of the city in increasing numbers and volumes, 
meant that crosscultural contact was pervasive – although well-hidden under 
a triple layer of ethno-religious, class and fiscal silencing. Because of this 
silencing, extra care should be taken to include the society’s full width and 
depth in examining the web of crosscultural relations at work in 17th-century 
Izmir. Yet, in the historiography of Ottoman absorption into the European 
world system through Izmir, the complicating and moderating agency of 
Izmir’s Europeans and Ottoman Turks, Christians and Jews, of servants, 
slaves, merchants, representatives and officials, has all too often been ne-
glected. All the same, the historical narrative is predicated on many assump-
tions about their desires and daily interactions. These might well fit the tele-
ology, but not Ottoman history, especially not Izmir’s. This teleological nar-
rative of segregation has led to significant misunderstanding of the Ottoman 
social order as it existed on the ground in the preceding centuries (most par-
ticularly in Izmir, as the arguments in Chapter 1 underline) – and as a result, 
of the social and infrastructural structures and mechanisms (urban, regional, 
imperial and international) that, through their daily crosscultural goings-on, 
are thought to have more or less consistently facilitated the 16th-century be-
ginnings and 17th-century consolidation of the process of Ottoman (semi)pe-
ripheralization. 
 
The third chapter (“The Ottoman City – Geography”) traced the physical 
evolution of the city as it exploded onto the international stage, as well as the 
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development of Ottoman policies attempting to control and utilize the con-
comitant economic, social and fiscal challenges through infrastructural in-
vestment and fiscal-administrative regulation. It argued that the divided or 
double city of Izmir integrated under the pax Ottomanica, and that its primary 
urban features (commercial, political-religious and military) were redistribut-
ed over the unified city. The direction of growth and certain areas’ functional 
concentration, then, were the consequence of interaction between urban and 
regional geography (the three axes at the city’s heart) and the triple trends of 
Turkification, internationalization and the growth of the non-Muslim econ-
omy and population. 
1660s Izmir was a focal point of rapid economic expansion and social 
change. Already underadministered and underfunded, its cultural pragmatism 
and commercial opportunities would surely end up eroding and challenging 
the Ottoman social and economic order if left to its own devices and Euro-
pean designs. Into this breach stepped Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and 
Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa. Second and third scions of the Köprülü-line 
of grand-viziers, they followed their father’s policies of severe pacification 
and consolidation with incorporation and modernization. The upgrade they 
gave Izmir was at once classical and modernizing: they upgraded the city’s 
infrastructure through a major privately endowed program of public con-
struction, but in so doing focused exclusively on bringing the city’s runaway 
economy under Ottoman control (incorporation), in the process trying to 
make sure that the booming city’s challenges to their updated version of the 
Ottoman social and fiscal order (i.e. its crossculturality and extraterritoriality) 
could be decisively dealt with. Their endowment act and the orders and con-
flicts accompanying its implementation, contain a wealth of information on 
the (otherwise unknown) 17th-century city’s spatial organization and ethno-
religious composition. 
From it emerges an Ottoman city that was rapidly losing its ethno-
religious homogeneity under the strains of growth. In demographic, social 
and economic terms the center of the city had shifted downhill toward the 
seaside, degrading the southernmost parts of the city to a parochial Turkish 
backwater. The lower-lying other two-thirds of the city now had a profes-
sionally, ethnically and religiously diverse population. Socio-historical ortho-
doxy claimed that the pluralism of “the Ottoman city”, and of Izmir in par-
ticular, was superficial. In this view, its inhabitants led such deeply segregated 
lives that there could be no joint representation or responsibility, no civic 
spirit, and therefore no real city; only a group of centrally administered obe-
dient etnno-religious communities. Even on the off-chance that this para-
digm (of “the Islamic city”) might have been useful for framing the history 
of the 15th or 16th-century town, it is impossible to fit it around late-17th-
century Izmir. This is precisely why the Köprülüs invested so much in bring-
ing it back under Ottoman, and (not to forget) their own, control. 
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Through their major investment the Köprülüs, by 1680, had managed to 
transform Izmir from a regional port and smugglers’ paradise, into a major 
Ottoman commercial center and a true focus of empire. The upgrade herald-
ed a drive for increased Ottoman control which, if it was consistently fol-
lowed up with matching legislation and administrative practices, would sig-
nificantly curtail the uncommon liberty the European merchant communities 
of Izmir had become accustomed to, and ultimately even absorb them into 
the Ottoman order completely (as Ottoman taifes). Stabilization and incorpo-
ration on updated Ottoman terms were the Köprülüs’ answers to the chal-
lenges posed by the increasing pull of the emerging economic world-system. 
They were very successful, until their ambitions were thwarted by the triple 
blow of the failed siege of Vienna in 1683 (and the consequent execution of 
Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa and the loss of Hungary), the deposition of 
sultan Mehmed IV (in 1678, after a reign of 39 years), and the 1688-
earthquake (which destroyed significant portions of the Izmir endowment). 
From 1687, however, a restored line of Köprülüs would take up their cause 
in Izmir. 
 
The fourth chapter (“The European City – History”) discussed the history of 
the northern, originally non-Muslim, part of the city – with particular atten-
tion to the interplay between religious differences and cultural prejudices on 
the one hand, and the developing capitulatory regime and its varying degrees 
of fiscal and legal exceptionalism on the other. Undeniably, it argued, many 
of “European Izmir’s” inhabitants and dependents set themselves apart from 
wider society and administration (and threatened to do the same with the 
region’s economy), but in the unified Ottoman 17th-century city the division 
was far less hard and far more mediated than they themselves, their neigh-
bors, their overlords and their visitors insisted. This deliberately maintained 
zone of mediation, which we have here called the middle ground, is where the 
pressures of the European world system were transformed so they could be 
managed and absorbed to create a specifically Ottoman early modernity. And 
it was this middle ground and its economy that the Köprülüs worked to 
relocate and incorporate. 
On the middle ground itself, meanwhile, the individual “subjects” (or 
“partners”) in question remained adept at slipping through any national or 
monopolistic nets European or Ottoman authorities imagined to tie them in. 
They avoided full incorporation and made sure they were maximally posi-
tioned to opt in or out of European or Ottoman legal and fiscal regimes 
whenever it suited them best – although they always did so as Ottoman sub-
jects first and foremost. The mediation these Ottoman Greeks, Armenians 
and Jews provided relied heavily on the practice of strategic dissimulation (or, 
the managing of different parties’ prejudices and expectations of both the 
mediator and other parties) to navigate between the demands of the individ-
uals, cultures and states they were bringing together. This independently-
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minded dissimulative stance (White’s “creative misunderstanding”) is typical 
for frontier societies, for the early modern individual seeking a way from 
medieval obligations to modernity’s freedoms, and for the practice of inter-
national trade. In Izmir, its relevance made understanding and living up to its 
requirements instrumental for anyone wanting to achieve success, whether 
he or she be European, Ottoman non-Muslim, or Muslim (and failure to do 
so must have been the root cause of many a merchants’ bankruptcy and 
official’s or diplomat’s disgraceful recall). 
After Europe’s Thirty Years’ War and the Ottoman “Time of Troubles”, 
both arguably reactions to the shocks of early modernity, the second half of 
the 17th century saw European and Ottoman drives to expand and intensify 
sovereignty and to enlarge the economic and fiscal basis of sovereign princes 
and states. Izmir’s once so helpful crosscultural freewheeling became a direct 
threat to their authority and a liability for their mercantilist policies of protec-
tionism and expansion. The marshaling of assets, populations and religions 
in the service of monetary and territorial expansion not only required further 
fiscalization and centralization, but also a measure of allegiance and obei-
sance (a nationalization avant-la-lettre) that went against every grain of Izmir’s 
society, putting a heavy strain on its nations and nationals, and forcing them 
to hide their mediation from view even further. The only communities to 
keep their footing amidst these shifts and rifts were those of Izmir’s Jews 
(Portuguese and Middle Eastern), who had no desire to overly rely on fickle 
European protection and unequivocally preferred the status aparte the Otto-
mans granted them, and whose independence promptly made them the best, 
though often reviled, intermediary and buffer between European and Turk. 
Meanwhile, the Köprülü viziers and their sultan (Mehmed IV) worked to 
reassert, codify and institutionalize their new-found stability and might, both 
internally and externally. In their relations with Europe they did so by reas-
serting the unilateral character of the capitulations, and by repeatedly enforc-
ing it in diplomatic and mercantile traffic. The concretization of the tributary 
fiction in Ottoman relations with Europe for a while had the desired effect 
between 1666 and 1683, as practical relations were reconfigured and Euro-
pean merchants, diplomats, trade organizations and even states and sover-
eigns became increasingly circumspect in their dealings with Ottoman ad-
ministration and in mercantile practice. 
 
The fifth chapter (“The European City – Demography”) explored Izmir’s 
European communities, individually and as an group, the increasing pres-
sures brought to bear on them by their home authorities and the Ottoman 
context, and how they responded to these. In the process, we argued that 
Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa’s long series of interventions in Izmir’s and 
wider crosscultural relations (although increasingly represented in Europe as 
the actions of a crazed madman) was in fact part of a consistent dynastic 
policy to intensify control and to rebuild Ottoman-European relations from 
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the ground up by having formal and informal hierarchies coincide under 
their family’s control. A policy nevertheless, whose initial and, especially, 
ultimate success has gone unnoticed by many historians, blinded perhaps by 
the brilliant elegance of world systems theory (and sometimes also by their 
prejudices) amidst the darkness of the disjointed sources left us by all man-
ners of decaying and newly-forming Ottoman bureaucracies. 
We began by asking what it meant for Europeans to be living under the 
capitulations. Almost immediately, we concluded that the capitulations were 
not uniform, did not govern everyday life, and that the relations they in-
formed must have varied greatly from place to place, from nation to nation, 
and from person to person – depending on the historical, social, economic, 
legal (and so on) dynamics steering the parties engaged in crosscultural rela-
tions, and on the specific dynamic that resulted from their relations. Among 
these crosscultural dynamics, we should note that of collusion in particular: 
transgressions against the capitulations were most often the result of agree-
ments between the parties involved in a transaction (agreements for the mak-
ing of which Izmir was uniquely suited, as we have seen), and only when they 
failed to maintain their agreement, did dealing in contravention of the capitu-
lations become relevant and punishable. 
We should take care to distinguish the reality of Izmir’s Ottoman-
European affairs from the capitulatory fiction all parties relied upon in their 
relations with outsiders. The hidden space afforded by Izmir’s benignly ad-
ministered middle ground, made the city all the more attractive to libertarian 
(or simply unscrupulous) Europeans, who could create a life of far greater 
freedom than back home, under full protection of the Ottoman state, but 
with few obligations for them to fulfill in return – as long as they managed to 
keep shipping and tax expenses to a minimum. 
Izmir’s mediative capability had always held great economic promise and 
would continue to do so, but the degree of collusion it invited as the city’s 
economy and population ballooned, was threatening to undermine the em-
pire’s international affairs and to erode its fiscal basis. This threat was regis-
tered by the Köprülüs, who responded by seizing control of the entire chain 
of authorities involved in the administration of Izmir and its international 
commerce, by constructing a new physical middle ground under their con-
trol, and by retracing and policing the divide between European and Otto-
man Greek, Jew and Armenian. In their Izmir, there would still be a middle 
ground, but it was to be physically, fiscally, legally, socially and politically 
internal to the Ottoman system. From the understanding that Izmir was a 
place that could both mirror and propell Istanbul’s relations with Europe on 
a practical and daily basis, the Köprülüs worked to include it in their 
international politics. All the while, they unfailingly asserted the unilateral 
character of Ottoman relations with Europe and the pertinence of Ottoman 
laws and customs in this arena. 
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The Köprülüs’ decades-long policies and their success in dictating the 
terms on which Izmir’s international commerce, society and politics would 
proceed, begs the question how they were able to do so after a prolonged 
existential crisis, against staunch resistance by European states and merchant 
communities alike, with an economy that had allegedly been attuning to 
European demand since the mid-16th century (i.e. that had a century of 
peripheralization behind it)? Our answer has been that, even if the process of 
peripheralization was indeed at work in 16th-century Izmir, it should not 
follow on the basis of a clearly limited understanding of the problematic 17th-
century context and sources that the 18th or 19th-century process was the 
direct incarnation of that discerned in the 16th century. If this would have 
been the case, the power relations implied in prolonged and intensifying 
peripheralization would have dominated not only 17th-century Izmir’s 
economy, but would have permeated its entire administration, politics, 
culture, and society. In fact, we see the opposite happening, if we forget the 
model for a moment and start from an Ottoman perspective. 
The Ottoman 17th century saw a shift from hierarchical authority to fiscal 
efficiency and maximization. Many of the roles and functions of classical 
Ottoman administration were taken over by more effective, if more arbitrary, 
forms of management. This happened first and foremost in lands reserved 
for the crown and high officials (hawass), which already had a tradition of 
government delegated (i.e. farmed-out) to clients of the patron and his 
household. Izmir might appear to have been left to its own and Europe’s 
devices because it did not receive an administrative or infrastructural upgrade 
in the classical sense. But as hass-land, within the context of the specifically 
early modern form of Ottoman administration that was congealing, its new 
exclusively commercial facilities and the attention lavished on it by emissaries 
from the Köprülü household were assertions of new Ottoman interests and 
powers. Indeed, its being under both formal and informal control of the 
empire’s most powerful political household meant that the bonds of pow-
er connecting court, central government and Izmir’s local administration and 
middlemen were exceptionally enduring, strong and deep. If anything, there 
was now so much Ottoman political and economic coordination and pres-
sure in Izmir that European diplomats and their merchant communities were 
worried that they themselves would one day wake up to find themselves 
Ottoman subjects. 
The economic and political changes in Europe, in the Ottoman Empire, 
and in the relations between the two, naturally also had its effects upon the 
make-up of Izmir’s European communities; effects that shed still more light 
on how systemic developments played out locally. What becomes clear from 
the development and correspondence of Izmir’s Genoese, Venetian, French, 
English and Dutch communities is that there was a historical tendency to-
wards professionalization. Broad village-like communities of individual mer-
chants, artisans and their families creating a livelihood (Genoese, Venetian 
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and French) were replaced by, or morphed into, much smaller predominantly 
male communities of merchants and assistants making careers and seeking 
fortunes (and pleasures) before moving back home (French, Dutch and Eng-
lish). These communities of merchants depended heavily on their privileges 
as foreigners, and perceived it to be in their best interest not only to be well-
connected to Ottoman society as merchants, but also to maintain considera-
ble distance from it as Europeans. 
Before thinking too much of this group’s economic, political and social 
power, it would be wise to remember that they served as factors to principals 
back home, worked on commission, and were heavily dependent on the 
goodwill and acumen of a small group of Ottoman wholesalers and financi-
ers. But still more sobering is the fact that these 400 to 500 European na-
tionals (about a 135 of whom were diplomatic staff, factors or merchants for 
their own accounts) made up less than one percent of Izmir’s 1678 popula-
tion. Although this is not a precise reflection of their influence, and Izmir’s 
European population enjoyed influence far beyond its number, the political 
and social aspects of that power did lag significantly behind the economic 
aspect. In short, it was impossible for this community to dictate the terms of 
any Ottoman-European transaction or case. 
 
The sixth and last chapter (“The European City – Geography”) explored 
what can be known about the physical presence and distribution of Izmir’s 
European communities in the Köprülü period. Contrary to what one would 
expect considering the wealth of European consular correspondence from 
Izmir, all these archival meters actually reveal curiously little about daily life 
there, about the physical layout of the European quarter, and about its rela-
tions with the adjoining Ottoman quarters and its inhabitants. What is re-
vealed to us is mostly the public outer shell of the consular institutions – in 
much the same manner as these dominated the view of the city from the 
harbor. 
At the same time, we know how dependent Izmir’s Europeans were on 
the resources, services and contacts of their Ottoman connections in these 
quarters. A dependency that only increased when, between 1675 and 1678 
the Köprülüs decisively moved to gain administrative and even physical con-
trol over European trade by having it flow through the administrative and 
commercial institutions of their endowment. The city’s French, English and 
Dutch nevertheless continued, and even intensified their displays of wealth, 
status and power vis-à-vis their competitors and their Ottoman hosts, con-
suming conspicuously along the upscale seafront to mark the honors of their 
offices, their princes, their states, their religion and their culture. The suspi-
cion lingers that these and other displays and affirmations of boisterous in-
dependence and moral uprightness, were mostly disingenuous – that, be-
yond, on the modest side of Frank Street and in the even lowlier Ottoman 
quarters beyond, these same Europeans were firmly ensconced in Oriental 
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lives. The occasional violent crack in the hard narrative façade of European 
independence (caused by commercial or private conflicts spinning out of 
consular or national control), after all offers many a glimpse of merchants 
taking up alaturca lifestyles complete with Turkish dress, concubines and 
slave girls, and houses beyond Frank Street. 
Accepted as such transcultural freedoms might have been within Izmir 
society, it counted as a double degradation in the Ottoman and European 
capitals. The boundary between European and Ottoman Izmir is obscured 
by the politics of race and religion, further amplified by the politics of class. 
Given all the circumstantial evidence, however, there appears to have been 
no firm boundary between Frank Street and the Greek quarter beyond it, 
meaning that Europeans could and would freely mingle and reside there, 
especially if considerations of class mattered little to them. 
 
It has been my aim to attain a better understanding than was until now af-
forded of how 17th-century Izmir’s several parts related to each other, how 
they depended on each other for their mutual survival and progress, what 
kind of specific urban history and culture produced that interdependence 
and was reproduced through their actions, how Ottoman administration in 
turn sought to control and shape this culture of interdependence, and to 
what purpose and with what results it did so. I have attempted to identify the 
mechanisms that are responsible for our sources’ overwhelming silence on 
crosscultural contact, to demonstrate their politics, and to counter the (often 
nationalist or eurocentrist) historiography that has sprung from them. 
The strategy used for this involved the bringing together a number of ac-
cidental references to European crosscultural contact with an analysis of 
wider early modern and late-17th-century European and Ottoman historical 
developments, and showing how they interacted and resulted in concrete 
developments in Izmir. In this way, I hope to have demonstrated that the 
narrative of segregation and guarded animosity that still dominates descrip-
tions of 17th-century Izmir and its various communities is unrealistic, and to 
have put in its stead the foundations of a narrative that more realistically 
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of an urban culture of interdepend-
ence typical to Izmir, and the ways in which its resident Ottoman and Euro-
pean participants and individual, as well as institutional, Ottoman and Euro-
pean stakeholders on the outside consciously and methodically attempted to 
change it to their advantage in the 1670s, in the process severely testing the 
very urban culture that had brought them the wealth and power to do so. 
I hope that the resulting survey has managed to pioneer a fresh and chal-
lenging historiographical path that will bring us closer to the lived cross- and 
even transcultural civic realities of this key city during this crucial period. 
One that, if taken up by researchers with different strengths and insights, 
may significantly adjust the received wisdom about Ottoman peripheraliza-
tion and Izmir’s role in it. 
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Appendix 1: Plates 
 
 
 
PLATE 1: SMYRNA (CORNELIS DE BRUYN, 1678) 
Cornelis de Bruyn, Reizen van … (Delft: Hendrik van Kroonevelt, 1698), plate 2. 
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PLATE 2: SMYRNE (JOSEPH PITTON DE TOURNEFORT, 1700) 
 
Joseph Pitton de Tournefort, Relation d'un voyage du Levant … (Amsterdam: n.p., 
1718), 2:195. 
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PLATE 3: CITY OF ISMIR (THOMAS GRAVES, BEFORE 1844) 
 
The Hague: NA 4.MCAL 1824 (Hydrographic Office: London, 1844). 
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PLATE 4: SMYRNA HARBOUR (RICHARD COPELAND, 1834) 
 
The Hague: NA 4.MCAL 1825 (Hydrographic Office: London, 1844). 
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PLATE 5: GOLFO DI SMIRLI (ANTONIO BORG, 1760S) 
 
Historic Cities-website (http://historic-cities.huji.ac.il/historic_cities.html). 
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PLATE 6: IZMIR (RV VERLAG, C1990) 
 
Detail from Türkei, West 1 (Ostfildern: RV Verlag, n.d.). 
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PLATE 7: IZMIR CITY PLAN (TR MINISTRY OF TOURISM, 1992) 
 
Detail from Izmir and environs (Ankara: n.p., 1992). 
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PLATE 8: SMYRNE (KARL BAEDEKER, 1914) 
 
Karl Baedeker, Konstantinopel, Balkanstaaten, Kleinasien, Archipel, Cypern: Hand-
buch für Reisende, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1905; 1914), between 332-333. 
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PLATE 9: KÖPRÜLÜ ENDOWMENT DEED (8 APRIL 1678) 
 
Istanbul: SLK MF 4027, 2v-3r. 
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PLATE 10: SUMMARY POLL-TAX REGISTER OF IZMIR (15 JANUARY 1688) 
 
Istanbul, BBA MAD 14888: İcmāl-ı defter-i cizye-’i gebrān-ı vilāyet-i İzmir, 
‘eşr ve eḥed sene 1099 (AH 11 Rebi’ I 1099 / AD 15 January 1688)
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Appendix 2: The Crosscultural Mess, from the Dutch Archives 
 
 
 
DOCUMENT 1: VAN GOOR’S MISCONDUCT IN THE KADI’S COURT 
(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Dragomans of assorted European nations in 
the chancery of the English consulate of Izmir, 16 October 1671) 
 
Copia richiaratoria fatta nella Cancelleria Inglese in Smirna 
 
Laus Deo in Smirna adi 16 d.le ottob.re 1671 
 
Comparsero in cancellaria dell’ J.U.mo Sig.r Paolo Ricaut console per la maesta della Gran Bretagna et b.re 
in Smirna il sig. Constantino Amira drog.no Hollandese dichiarando qualm.te havesido hieri stato eol. cadi di 
Smirne ine.a’l Alba dl giorno il naip del d.o cadi li disse come il Sig.r Van Goor haveva assai pergireriato al 
suo residente et al suo console, con parole scandalose dicendo anche che voleva spender seisanta piastre per far 
monstrar al monde che Asini sono loro in q.to paese et anco al med.mo tempo comparsero similm.te nella 
pred.na cancelleria li ss.ri Isaac Barbinanni, Constantino Amira et Giacomo Sandernara drog.ni Hollandesi 
et il sig.r Michael Attalas drogomano Venetiano, et il sig.r Spiro di Niccolo drog.no Genovese, et il Porlo 
Homero drogom.no giovane della Nat.ne Inglese, i quali con commune testimonianza dichiararono, come 
havendo stati hieri adi 15 d.i ottob.re 1671 in casa del cadi p.r certi negotij delli loro consoli li fudato d’ 
intendere dagli officiali del d.to cadi cioe il naip et il caia come il sig.r Van Goor disse avanti di loro, che ben 
che lui non poteva resistere al commando del rezid.te per andar in Constant.li non dimeno sapersa bene che cosa 
si doverda fare contra il suo console & di piu il caia del d.to cadi, disse come i d.ti ss.ri Van Goor & Lespaul 
havevano ingiurriato al loro J.U.mo Sig.r. rezidente et al sig.r console in testimonianza della verita 
e’sottoscritto la punta con le proprie mani il giorno et anno soprascritto; Era sottoscritto Isaac Barbinanni, le 
ferma del s.r Isaac Constantino Amira, Giacomo Sandernara, Spiri di Niccolo, Michael Attalas, Paolo 
Homero, sottoscritto in presenza di me Giacomo Ricaut cancelliere, noi Paolo Ricaut console per la maesta 
della Gran Bretagna et b.re in Smirne, faciamo ampla et in dubitata fede et attestiamo per la verita achi 
s’aspetta come l’oltra scritta … 
 
Geextraheert uijt de pnate berus- 
tende in de Engelsche cancellarie, 
en nae collatie bevonden daer- 
mede te accorderen, ende was onder- 
teekent Laurens Rigo clercq 
 
DOCUMENT 2: PRIVILEGES OBTAINED FROM MERZIFONLU KARA MUSTAFA PAŞA 
(The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a: from the journal of Daniël-Jan de 
Hochepied) 
 
No. 1. Den Resident versocht Baratten voor vier Drogemans. Is toegestaen. 
 
No. 2. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den Cadij ofte oppertsen tollenaer tot Smirna. daer by 
haer gelast werdt geen Capo over de Makelaers van de Natie te stellen. Is toegestaen. 
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No. 3. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op de Waivoodens ofte Soubassies tot Smirna. waer by haer 
gelast wert. die van de Natie. en die haer aengaen. in cas sy op deselve yetwes te seggen sullen hebben. nergens 
anders daerover als voor haren Consul sullen hebben te betrecken. Is toegestaen. 
No. 4. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den tollenaer tot Smirna. dat hy van de Valonien. ende 
cattoenen. nu voortaen. niet meer voor tol sal nemen. als van alle andre goederen die volgens de Capitulatie 
betalen dry van hondert. Is toegestaen. 
 
No. 5. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den oppersten tollenaer tot Constantinopolen. dat hy van 
de Natie van alle incomende ende uytgaende goederen. t sy van wat plaetsen. die soude mogen comen. niet meer 
voor tol sal afvorderen als dry van het hondert. ende soo hy de goederen te hoog waerdeert. dat de Natie hem met 
goederen volgens syn Estimatie vermach te betalen. volgens de Capitulatie. Is toegestaen. 
 
No. 6. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den oppersten tollenaer tot Constantinopolen. dat hy de 
goederen. comende van Smirna ende andere plaetsen van dit ryck. daervan den toll is betaelt. niet op nieus sal 
vermogen t estimeren. en de daervan meerder toll doen betalen. gelyck hy nu eenige tyt herwaerts heeft gedaen. Is 
toegestaen. 
 
No. 7. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den oppersten tollenaer van Constantinopolen. dat hy in 
het ontfangen ende uyt rekenen van den toll. de spetie van het gelt. niet sal vermogen minder t estimeren. als de 
waerde van dien. ende gelyck hij die selfs aent hoff weder uyt geeft te weeten de Leoni tot 70. asp. ende de 
wichtige stucken van agten. tot 100. asp. ende niet niet de Leoni tot 70. ende de reale di peso tot 80. gelyck hy 
nu tegens billickheyt is doende. Is toegestaen. 
 
No. 8. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den voors: opper tollenaer.daer by hem gelast wert. den 
tol van de Natie t ontfangen. in alle soorten van munt van den Coninck. als in aspers de tura pana. en de 
paraas. ende dat hy die mede niet minder sal estimeren. als hy die weder aen het hof uytgeeft. Is toegestaen. 
 
No. 9. Den Resident versocht een Commandement. daer by de Natie eens van hare goederen. en de Coopman-
schappen. tol hebbende betaelt. vry gekent werden van eenige andere oncosten. t sy aen. Seraflyck. Momsij. 
Capusys. ende Janissari te betalen. Is toegestaen. 
 
No. 10. Den Resident versocht een Commandement. daer by gelast wert. geen Mustery van de Natie af te 
nemen. gelyck het selve aen de duytschen. ende genouesen is geconcedeert. Is toegestaen. 
 
No. 11. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den voors: tollenaer ende Cadij tot Smyrna. daer by 
haer gelast wert. geene scheepen van de Natie. die hare gerechtigheden hebben betaelt in dienst van den Coninck 
aen te nemen. als specialyck strydende tegens de Capitulatie. Is toegestaen. 
 
No. 12. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den Capiteyn Bassa. ende op den Bassa van Scio. 
waerby haer gelast wert het schip Den ouden Tobias. door ordre van den Coninck inde maent van April 
laestleden. in dienst genomen. omme koren naar Canea te voeren. ende rechtevoort met het voors: koorn noch 
leggende tot Scio te doen ontlossen. ende toe te laten. dat het selve syn reys naer Nederlant vervorderen sonder 
resisitentie van de vracht. Is toegestaen mits betalende de halve vragt. 
 
No. 13. Den Resident versocht een Commandement op den Bassa ende tollenaer van Aleppo. waer by hem 
gelast wert geen ankeragie gelt af te doen vorderen. van onse Oorlogscheepen. dewelcke tot Scandroen ende 
alexandrette onse Coopvaardij scheepen comen convoyeeren. het welcke hij tegens het oude gebruick nu in den 
voorledene maent van May ende Junnij heeft getracht in te voeren. Is toegestaen. 
 
No. 14. Den Resident versocht een commandement waerby Agmet Aga, Voyvoda van Smirna, ende desselfs 
luytenant Ibrahim Cillebij gelast werden haer te comen verantwoorden voor het hof alhier over de kracht, gewelt, 
ende force nu eenige tyt geleden aen de natie gedaen. Is toegestaen. 
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No. 15. Den Resident versocht een commandement waerby de Armeenders wort belast het consulaetregt tot 
Smirna volgens het oude gebruyck van alle hare goederen, stammen ende contanten te betalen, naer advenant 
twee van het hondert. Is toegestaen. 
No. 16. Den Resident versocht een commandement daerby een yder ende allen den genen die in de schulden in 
vorige tijden by de Consuls reggio ende teyls tot Cairo gemaeckt syn geintresseert, werden gelast den Resident ofte 
de schale van Smirna daerover niet aen te spreeken, ofte lastich te vallen, maer dat die gelden moeten werden 
betaelt bij diegene, dewelcke die schulden hebben gemaackt volgens de capitulatie. Is toegestaen. 
 
DOCUMENT 3: CHRISTOFFEL CAPOEN TAKEN HOSTAGE BY FELLOW NATIONALS 
(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Christoffel Capoen in the chancery of the 
Dutch consulate of Izmir, 5 October 1672) 
 
… ben ick Christoffel Capoen coomen gaen langs de francke straat omtrent ten vijf uren naer de middagh bij 
het huijs van de mess:s Cornelio Rugiero van Goor & Pietro Smout … daerop ter sijnen huijse binnengegaen, 
ende boven coomende quam s:r van Goor neffens sijn comp:n s:r Smout, mij te gemoet gaende, s:r Smout naer 
achteren ende ick met s:r van Goor in de voorsael aende straet versoeckende d:tto s:r van Goor om neffens hem 
te gaen sitten hetgeen ddede, waer op mijn doen vraegen, hoe dat het was geleegen omtrent de LD: 500:- die in 
mijn handen waeren en wat remedie daer wasd om deselve te connen becoomen, en ick gaf tot antwoort, den H: 
Luppazzolo Venetiaenschen consul mijn deselve hadt gesonden met een sijner dragemans enden Joot genaemt 
Bayram, neffens een order dat detto: LD: 500:- soo onder hem waeren gearresteert door den ed:e H:r Consul 
Jacob van Dam door mij souden bewaert & behouden werden tot dat detto: ss:s van Goor & Smout hem borge 
hadden gestelt voor alle naemaeninge, die den Ed:e H:r Consul Van Dam weegens gesijde toegestaene arrest, 
soude connen coomen te doen, bracht mij een glasien wijn van vrintschap toe waer op hem bescheijt dede ende ick 
seijde doen … twelcke gedaen, ginck needer sitten op sij versoeck in een twee leunde stoel, hij commandeerde 
doen an sij knecht Jusuf om wijn en waeter te brengen hetgeen achtervolght wiert, en detto s:r Van Goor dronck 
weeder op mijn gesontheijt ‘t geen weeder beschijt hebbe gedaen, onder weijlen s:r Van Goor sich door gesijde 
knecht Jusuf sig:r Fran:co de Hartigh roepen dewelcke aenstonts quam, en naer wijnigh woorden eijschte s:r 
Van Goor in presentie van d:to s:r de Hartigh LD: 500:- die hij sijde - ick van sijn Joot genoomen hadde, 
op’t welcke ick verclaerde geen penninge van sijn Joot ontfangen nocht veel min enoomen te hebben & indien 
sijn Joot sulcks sijde dat het valsche leugens waeren & dat het anders con doen blijcken met testimonie en 
schrift, waer op hij sijde ghij sult mij het gelt geeven dat ghij van mijn Joot ontnoomen hebt, ofte ghij sult hier 
niet vandaen gaen, ende ick sal u hier houden, ende ick antwoorde ende sijde sig:r Van Goor ick en hadde 
sulx van U:E: niet vertrout, hebbende U:E: mij geroepen, ende ick uijt vrientschap ben bij U:E: gecoomen, 
ende ghij hout mij hier als gevangen, waer op hij s:r Van Goor antwoordende en seijde, en dat sal ick doen tot 
dat je mijn gelt geeft. Ick versocht daer op aen s:r Fran:o de Hartigh daer van getuijgen te neemen, en met mijn 
antwoort aen sig:r Van Goor bleef bij mijn voorige dat geen gelt van hem noch van sijn maeckelaer hadt, ende 
dat het gelt dat den H:r Venetiaensen consul aen mijn in disposito hadde gegeven weeder op sijn ordre soude 
over leeveren & verder versoeck ick pen en papier om aen mijn contracter te schrijven, dat mijn toegestaen wiert 
waer op ick een briefie schreef in:a van deesen inhout, contracter s:r Dionisio Houset U:E: gelieft soo aenstonts 
hier te coomen t’huijse van ss: Van goor & Smout terwijl detti ss: mij in haer huijs houden, … sach ick door 
een gebroocken ruijt een persoon op den H:r Fransche consuls schael die ick sachies riep en versochte hij geliefde 
ten huijse van Capoen te gaen en te seggen aen mijn contracker Dionisio Houset, dat hij hem daer geliefde te 
doen coomen en alsoo mij den persoon onbekent was dorst het briefien dat aen mijn contracter hadde geschreeven 
niet vertrouwen, … en naer gedaene soeckinge bevonden dat een venster dat op de H:r Fransche consuls schael 
uijt compt, te openen was, welcke geopent hebbende niet aensiende de hooghte soo van de aerde was door den 
pressanten noot ben daer ten eersten uijt gesprongen, ende drijginge van s:r Van Goor, ende het vervolgende van 
dien door die middel te ontcoomen beseerde mij wat de heupen ende aen een been ,‘t geene met de hulpe des 
Almoogenden wel over sal gaen, ‘t huijs gecoomen sijnde verhaelde aen mijn compag:n het gepasseerde, de welcke 
mijn verclaerde, op de indictie hem door een persoon, hem onbecent, gegeven dat ijmant geroepen hadde, hij naest 
de Fransche consuls huijs most coomen, waer op hij persoonlijck is gegaen met onse cock, draegende de lantarne 
ten huijse van de ss:ri Van Goor & Smout voorn:e comende de knecht Jusuf aen de trap dewelcke gegedracht 
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of sig:r Capoen daer was, waer op ditto knecht int Italiaens antwoorde de patroon eeten in de tuijn daer sijn 
geen vreemde hier, en - weeder ‘t huijs coomende hij mij niet vindende sont de knecht weeder naer het huijs van 
de ss:ri Van Goor & Smout onderwijle was ick ‘thuis gecoomen, ende bracht tot antwoort, dat op de vragh die 
hij daer gedaen hadde ofte ick daer was, de slaef antwoorden dooreen der vensteren van de voorsael int Italiaens 
hier is niemant vreemts in huijs, … 
 
DOCUMENT 4: NICOLAS LEGOUCHE ACCUSES HIS CONSUL OF THEFT 
(The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Nicolas Legouche to DLH, 2 July 1674) 
 
Nu het schijnt dat den Consul costy noch veel vrienden heeft onder de Heeren Directeuren, die hem met kraght 
hier soecken te prolongeren, sullen wij van dien reghter niet weynigh gequelt en getyrannisseert worden als in 
diverse occasien al is gebleecken. En soo daer niet nader in voorsien wert, sullen der geen cleyne disordres en 
ongelucken uytspruyten, gelijck aen volgende occasie cunt bespeuren wat onreghtvaerdigh pouvoir hij over de 
onderdanen van den staet gebruyckt. Eerstelijck heeft hij verleden jaer van mijn, door een van sijn domestiquen 
een schoonen winthont die ontrent 25 Rijcxdaelders waerdigh was, doen steelen. Naer ick daervan kennis 
hadde bekomen en den hont selver in des consuls huys vont, en, ick mijn reden daerover doende aen den genen 
die suspecteerde mijn den selven ontdrayt hadde, maer geen satisfactie konnende bekomen, soodat genootsaect 
was ander middel te gebruycken. Op een tijdt als den consul met sijn suite naer het dorp Sedequi gingh, den 
hont daerbij sijnde, dat ick se vervolgende den hont mij wert kennende en met mijn int huys raeckte dat ick 
voor de somer ‘t onser vermaeck met s.r Broen gehuurt hadde. Maer den consul soodrae hij den hont vermiste 
quaem den gemelden Persyn met niet weynigh furie en dreygementen om die weder te hebben, doch hij kreegh 
(als niet meer als reden is) daerop geen gehoor. Op sulcx den h.r Consul sigh geaffronteert achtende geboot een 
van sijn Janitsers ons huys te bestormen en den hont daer per force uyt te halen. Dat int werck stellende, bestont 
den geseyden Janitser, welgewapent sijnde met een sabel, halve pieck en pistolen, de muur van ons huys te 
beklimmen mits de deur geslooten was. Daerop sijnde gecomen begon sijn ordres te demonstreeren, vervattende 
dat soo wij den hont niet goetwilligh wilden overgeven, hij dan andre middelen soude genootsaeckt sijn te ge-
bruycken, waerop hem geantwoort wiert, en daer beneffens eenige pistolen welgeladen vertoont, dat hij op sijn 
propositie maer soude afcomen, en dat men hem soude tracteren als een diergelijcken schelm meriteert. Maer hij 
was voorsigtiger en ritireerde sigh van de muur, gevende aen sijn meester relaes vant gepasseerde, die daer scheen 
te bersten van spijt dat sijn goddeloos desseyn soo schandelijck gebroocken was. Eghter om sijn dulle rasernije, 
die tot noch toe maer scheen gesmoockt te hebben in lichte brant, te blasen, liet hij den Aga of Gouverneur vant 
dorp met 15 of 20 Turcken voor den dagh haelen om a toute force sijn desseyn uyt te voeren. Welcke luyden 
door groote beloften haer daertoe gewilligh laten dienen en quamen met bijlen, stocken en andre gereetschappen 
op ons huys aen aloffer een starck casteel waer te bestormen geweest, maer wij quamen haer dullen ijver int 
gemoet, en openden soodrae wij haer hoorden de deur, soodat sij daer sonder moyten binnen quamen. Haer 
vragende wat sij op sulcke wijse begeerden? t Was om een winthont seyden sij, dat den consul haer daer geson-
den hadt en dat sij die in aller manieren wilden hebben. Men gaf haer te kennen dat sij het huys van een 
considerabel Turcq, gelijck de patroon daervan was, die nu tegenwoordigh Wayvode van Smirna was, wel 
souden wagten te violeren en als sij dat conden goetmaken maer met haer saecken souden voorvaeren. Welcke 
reden sij beter als onsen consul ter harten namen, mits haer voornemen lieten steecken, en vertrocken met goet 
fatsoen. Ook ten andren, dat sij eenighsints bevreest waren dat wij met een half dosijn pistolen die in haer ogen 
bloncken, ons mochten defenderen. Eyndelijck wiert er niet uyt gereght op den selven tijt, dogh den Aga met de 
gemelde Turcken ons huys weder quamen overvallen, is S.r Broen aenstonts bij den Consul gegaen om of hij 
sulcx ordre gegeven hadt en wat daermeede voorhadt? Antwoorde dat hij den hont a viva force wilde hebben. 
Den anderen, te weten S.r Broen, seyde wederom, niet tegenstaende ick kon bewijsen dat den hont mij toebe-
hoorde, of hij die dan nogh pretenderen, dan hij bleef bij sijn stuck van den selven met reght of onreght te willen 
hebben. Ick laet U.E. en anderen die dit sullen hooren eene oordelen, of een Consul die hier van den staet 
gestelt om ons tegens de Turcken of anderen die ons souden mogen verdrucken, te protegeren, toch staet op 
sulcke wijsen ons te handelen, en als hij continueert, of wij daervan geen groote swarigheyt te waghten hebben. 
Te meer, nu wij sien dat in de vergaderinge en andere bijeencomsten die van sijn creaturen niet sijn, met woor-
den soeckt te capteren, om occasie te hebben van tegen ymant een schelmstuck uyt te vinden en sijn opgecropt 
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vergift uyt te braecken. Ick wil U.E. gebeden hebbe dese saeck aen de vrienden bekent te maekcen en mijnent-
halve klaghtigh te weesen of het ‘teeniger tijt operatie dede dat hier uytraeckte, alsoo hier niet te harden is bij 
een Consul die die van sijn complice niet en sijn, soeckt te ruineren. Ick soude U.E. voor desen als over dese 
saeck ges. hebbe ten ware ick niet gehoopt hadde dit werck soude geaccommodeert worden, en den Consul 
sulcken ongeneeslijcken haet niet souw behouden, maer sien nu dat geen remedie is. Waerover degene die van 
sijn complice niet en sijn, hebben goetgevonden met dese passage yder van sijn vrienden daerover te schrijven ten 
eynde datter redres in magh comen. 
 
DOCUMENT 5: AN ENGLISH DRAGOMAN DISCOVERS FRENCH COINER 
(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 9 January 
1675) 
 
Mijn Heer 
 
Gisteren is alhier voor den dagh gecomen, dat seker Fransman, genaemt … Imbert, in sijn huys een persoon 
heeft, die valsch gelt maeckt, en’t selve iegenwoordich doet in stucken van achten, sijnde daer door ontdeckt door 
den selven Imbert aenden jongen Dragoman vanden heer Engelsz Ambass:r, die als nu hier is, seker somme 
gelts in die munte heeft betaalt, welke penngen bij den heer Engelsz Consul sijnde gesien, en voor vals erkent, 
heeft die aenstonts aenden Fransz Consul gesonden, en versocht, dat ondersoeck op dat werck mogt worden 
ge:daen, deie daer op aenstonts den voorn: Imbert heeft ontboden, en inde gevangenis geset, naderhant sijn huys 
selver onvoorsiens besogt, enden valschen munter op sijn werck betrapt, met alle sijne instrumenten, daer onder, 
soo ik bericht ben, alderhande stem: pels sijn, namentlijk van Leeuwendaalders, Iselotten, Sechinen, Ongers, 
Quarten die hij alle in sijn eygen huis heeft laten brengen, enden munter inde boeyen doen setten, dan den 
Fransz Consul gisteren tegens den avont den voorsz Imbert, weder hebbende gerelaxeert, soodat weder doorde 
straat ginck, en den heere Engelsz Consul ’t selve hebbende vernomen, heeft daer op desen morgen met den 
Fransz Consul geabboucheert, en hem aengeseyt, dat, soo wanneer hij meende dit werck soo stil te laten gaen, 
en den voorn: Imbert op vrije voeten te setten, hij selfs aenstonts aan den Kadi soude gaen, en aenwijsinge vant 
werck en personen doen, waer op den Fransz Consul den selven Imbert aenstonts weder inde gevangenis heeft 
geset, alwaar hij, op’t aenhouden vanden Engelsz Consul, sal blijven ter tijdt en wijle den heere Fransz Am-
bassadeur alhier sal wesen gecomen, aemdem welcken den voorsz Engelsz Consul justitie sal versoecken, soo 
sijn Ed: nu desen morgen heeft laten weten door eene mijner dragomans, die ick expresselijck dese morgen aen 
hem hadde gesonden, om hem te versoec:ken, dat deze de goede en stercke handt beliefde te houden ontrent den 
Fransz Consul, ten eynde dese saake nauw mogt worden naagevorscht, alsoo mij meent en het daer voor houdt, 
dat de principaelste vande Fransz coopluyden, alhier handtdadigh of participanten daer aan sijn, en wordt ook 
geseyt, dat dit munten al ontrent de drie jaren soude hebben geduert, den gemelte heere Engelsz Consul sent over 
dit subieict een expressen aanden heere haren Ambassadeur, vande welcksz U:Ed: des gelievenden, apparent 
naarder informatie desen aengaende sal connen hebben, middelerwijlen hebb’ ick van mijn devoir geacht U:Ed: 
dit ten eersten voor af met de gelegenheyt van dese messe te adviseren, en daer bij te senden een monster van een 
heel en en helf stuck van achten van dat slagh, omme sich vant een en ander te dienen, daer ende soo U:Ed: sal 
weten nodich te wesen, en hebbe met dese occasie hier ook willen bijvoegen twee vandat slagh van Leeuwendaal-
ders, als den bewuste Armenier seyde te hebben ontfangen van Charles Amon, waar van voordesen aan U:Ed: 
hebbe geschreven, onderweyle hebb’ick mijne dragomans mede aanden Fransz Consul gesonden, en hem mede 
ernstel: te doen versoec:ken, dat dese sake wel soude mogen worden naagevorscht, en daer over justitie gedaen, 
als sijne een seer hooch en important point, waer op mij heeft laten antwoorden, dat ick verseeckert moge sijn, 
dat hij daar inne strenger justitie sal doen, als men licht wel sou:de dencken, alsoo het een sake was, soo sijn 
Ed: syde, die hem raackte, t’gene hier:inne verder komt te passeeren, sal ik niet na laten U:Ed: te adviseren, 
sullende voorts blijven, Ick hebbe de prouve vande voorsz: stucken van achten laten nemen, en door een mijner 
dragomans een silver smit sijnde, doen smelten en rafineren, en bevonden datse met 8gtich ten hondert of wat 
meer sijn geaugmenteert  
 
Smirna den 9 ja: 1675 
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DOCUMENT 6: PIETER SMOUT ACCOUNTS A DUTCH PROTÉGÉ’S DEBT 
(The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Pieter Smout in the chancery of the Dutch 
consulate of Izmir, 11 April 1675) 
SS.ri Van Goor & Smout      
 Galata di Const.pln 
 
Mag:ri SS:ri siamo a 14 Septem.re 1674, het voorstaende os copia van onse jonghste, ‘t sedert soo bevinde ons 
met UE seer aengen: van den 15 passato, en neffens de reck: courant van Abram Meijer particulier, beneffens 
de procuratie tegen hem perticulier ende extract van UE comp: mer S:r van Goor zali: in antwoordt confirmere 
de copije vonden hebben ‘t zeedert met Meijer afgereekent ende sijne maakelaers, neffens hem aen t’werck 
gehadt, ende bevonden dat van de LD 6830: soo bij UE aenwijsen in haere reck. cour:t van ult:mo Agosto 
voor UE reck. uijtstaen, niet meer sijn te ontfangen als ine a LD 1568: te weten 
 
Aen Samuel & Juda Levy dat nu met haere falissem.t een quaede schult geworden is LD 850: 
Van Joseppo Ventura & Ab:m Valencin ,, 66: 
Van Haggi Aly Samoza ,, 352: 
Van Haggi Aly Et:a ,, 300: 
 ,, 1568: 
Soo dat compt en manqueren ,, 5262: 
 LD 6830: 
  
Welcke gelden door Ab:m Meijer los voor, als naer het opmaecken van de reck: hierboven gemelt, door Ab:m 
Meijer bevinden ontfangen te sijn, sijnde daer onder begrepen het 1/3 van de 24/2 laekenen daar UE menti 
van maeckt in presentie van S:r Eus vercoght te sijn, die door Meijer neffens meerder somme sijn getrocken 
Et:a 
 
was geteekent     De Brosses, De Bois & Van Breen 
 
Copie geextraheert door een derde en gecolliationeert door mij ondergesz. met de originele berustende onder S:r 
Pieter Smout, Smirna den 11 April 1675   Laurens Rigo Vice Cancell:r 
 
DOCUMENT 7: JACOB VAN DAM’S MEMORANDUM ON (HIS) LIFE IN IZMIR 
(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 12 July 
1676) 
 
Hoogh Mogende Heeren, Mijne Heeren 
 
Den 5 des voorleden maents Juny hebb ick, ter sake tot Constantinopolen, een barck op Marseille gereet lagh, 
over dien wegh aen Uw Ho:Mo: onderdanigl gesz, den brief, waer van de nevengaende duplicata is, oft mocht 
wesen dat den eersten niet terecht ware gecomen, daer aen al wat te twijfelen is. Ick sal mij dan, met UW 
Ho:Mo: permissie, tot denselven brief met alle schuldigh respect gedragen, en haer favorabele resolutie daer op 
(in’t reguarde van mijn ootmoedich versoeck, rakende het genot der consulaet rechten, van ons vertrocken convoy 
onder d’heer Schout bij Nacht De Ruyter) met de vereyschte onderdanige gelatenheyt, afwachten, waer toe ick 
reverentel vertrouwe, dat mede veel of het sijne sal hebben gecontribueert, of, bij ontstentenisse vandien, noch veel 
of het sijne sal contribueren, dat Uw Ho:Mo: goedertierentl, en nae hare gewoonlijcke clementie, sullen hebben 
gelieven, of noch sullen gelieven te considereren, het landt, daer wij hier in wonen namentl bij de Turcken, een 
violent, wreedt, en hardt volck, alsse beginnen, of iets bij de handt nemen, voorts de vele en verscheyde schric-
kelijcke, periculeuse, en moeylijcke accidenten, die wij daerinne onderworpen sijn, als namentl de aertbevingen, 
pest, hete koortsen, brandt, en haveryen, of beurs en hooft brekeryen, breder bij mij opgestelt inde nevengaende 
memorye of notitie, omme UW Ho:Mo: in hare vergaderinge door de lancheyt van dien, niet te diens te vallen, 
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waer toe mij derhalven mede onderdanigl gedrage, en vertrouwe ick oock reverentel, dat de consideratien van dese 
voorverhaelde, en in mijne memorye geannotteerde accidenten, en dreygende of nakende periculen, die in dese 
Turcksche landen dagelijcx connen voorvallen, en oock inderdaet voorvallen, de oorsake is geweest, dat Uw 
Ho:Mo:, voor desen de goetheyt en consideratie hebben gelieven te gebruycken, ende consuls in dese gewesten 
meer toe te leggen als in andere quartieren, en gevolgel deselve te laten genieten de rechten, bij deselve Uw 
Ho:Mo: gestelt op de goederen, en coopmanschappen, die met de schepen harer onderdanen, te deser plaetse 
gebragt en weder van hier vervoert worden, waer mede den gemelten consul sich wat rijckelijcker heeft connen 
onderhouden, als hij nu wel sal connen doen met dit sijn toegeleyde tractement soo wanneer Uw Ho:Mo: daer 
bij sullen gelieven te persisteren, dan tsij soo ‘tsij. Ick dorve mij selfs, met hare gunstige permissie, van derselver 
gewoonlijcke clementie en equiteyt beloven, dat Uw Ho:Mo: haer tot die favorabele resolutie sullen hebben 
gedaen of noch wel sullen doen permoveren, met welck eerbiedich vertrouwen eyndigende, en voorts Godt de heere 
dagelijcks voor Uw Ho:Mo: hooghwijse regeringe en personen biddende blijve altijt, 
 
Hoogh Mogende Heeren, Mijne Heeren   Smirna den 12 July 1676 
 
      Uw Ho:Mo: onderdanigsten en 
     gehoorsaemsten dienaer 
 
     J. van Dam 
     1676 
 
Memorie of notitie opgestelt bij den jegenwoordigen en ondergesz consul van de Nederlantsz Natie tot Smirna, 
vervattende de schrickelijcke, periculeuse, en moeylijcke accidenten, die de consuls te dier plaetse, soo met ende 
neffens de gemene inwoonders aldaer, als ten reguarde van hare functie, onderworpen sijn, mitsgaders desselfs 
consideratien, ontrent het jugieren van sijn persooon, als consul, alles dienende tot onderdanige informatie, vande 
Hoogh Mogende Heeren, sjine gebiedende heeren, de Staten G:rael der Verenigde Nederlanden, bestaende inde 
volgende te weten: 
 
Eerstel: de aertbevingen, die een mensch de hayren te bergen doen rijsen, en voornamel als men overdenckt, dat 
dese stadt 3 of 4 malen daer door is versoncken, of te gronde gegaen en datter hier noch een prophetie is, dat 
deselve stadt noch twee malen door aertbevinge sal of moet vergaen, welcke aertbevingen alle jaren drie of vier 
reysen, niet en manqueren, en wel degel bij hem met grote schrick en ontsteltenisse gevoelt sijn en worden, mitsgs 
hem alsdan, noch meer met beven doen gedencken aen die overschrickelijcke, en schier noyt gehoorde aertbevinge 
tot Ragousa in den jare 1667, dewelcke hij consul alsdoen mede heeft bij gewoont en geproeft op sijne penible 
reyse herwaerts, inde welcke hij al het sijne heeft verloren, en ter contrarye met over grote moeyten, iae selfs met 
peryckel van sijn leven, vele ende verscheyden goederen heeft gebergt die de h=ren Directeuren vanden Levantsz 
Handel, door haer Ho:Mo: ordre aen wijlen den heer Resident Croock hadden mede gegeven tot presenten voor 
den Turckschen Keyser, en desselfs ministers, en welcke gebergde presenten, door desselfs vifilantie, en onver-
moeyden erbeyt, oock tot nut en voordeel van ‘t gemeen gecomen en besteet sijn. 
 
Ten tweeden: de pest, die meest het gansche jaer door regneert, nu jegenwoordich noch hier, niet meer als twee 
huysen van hem consul is, alle vier of vijf jaren seer vehement domineert en ettlijcke duysenden van menschen 
weghsleept, gel noch over twee jaren te deser plaetse is gebeurt. 
 
Ten derden: de heete koortsen, die precys en sonder fout alle jaren inde maenden van septemb en octob grasseren, 
en al immers soo quadt iae quader worden geoordeelt als de pest, alsoo aen de eerste sieckte al meer, immers al 
soo veel van de cristen of franckennatien sterven als aen de leste, gel aen onse eygen natie wel te degen gebleken 
is, alsoo bij sijnen tijt meer als de helft vandien en onder deselve mede onsen predicant aen deselve is overleden en 
hij consul oock selfs twee verscheyden reysen swaerl en dodel daer aen vast is geweest. 
 
Ten vierden: den brandt, die wij hier 20 of 25 dagen geleden, noch hebben gehadt, inde straet waer alle of de 
meeste van onse coopl wonen, en oock niet verre van sijn consuls huys, welcken brandt soo schrickel en vreesel 
was, dat men niet anders dachte of gansch Smirna immers althans het quartier, daer alle de cristene coopl 
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wonen soude inde assche geraeckt hebben, sijnde daerenboven het accident van den brandt noch onderworpen, of 
met sich slepende, dat die gene in wiens huys deselve eerst ontstaet, door de Turcken wordende geattrappeert int 
vuyr wort geworpen, behalven noch de schade die men van het vuyr selfs heeft, alsmede van de selve Turcken, die 
onder een schijn, van te comen helpen, de ommestaende huysen met gewelt comen opslaen, en alles roven en 
stelen, sonder dat men sulcx, immers seer beswaerl en met grote moeyten en peryckel can voorcomen. 
Ten vijfden: de havanyen of beurs en hooft brekerijen, die ick in mijn functie dagelijcks hebbe te verwachten, en 
mij overcomen, soo vande ministers, als van het gemene volck, alsmede vande Turcksche corsaren die van 
Algiers, Tunis en Tripoli met hare schepen en voort vande leventen, die met de gallijen van alle quartieren 
comen, en seer grote moetwil bedrijven alsmede seer dickwils valsche of opgeraepte avanien of gelt pretensien 
maken diemen dan met grote schade en veel moeyten moet afcopen of men lijdt peryckel van bij de cop gevadt en 
int gevangen huys gesmeten te worden, gel hij consul daer van een levendigh exempel heeft gehadt, ruym twee 
jaren geleden van seker Algeriens cap:n, dewelcke hier met een groot schip leggende en een sijner slaven sijnde 
van geboorte een brabander of een vlamingh door de vlucht quijt rakende, denselven slaef met kracht ende gewelt 
begeerde te hebben, dat ick hem soude betalen, om dat hij quansuys nae sijn sustenue of voorgeven, van onse 
natie soude wesen, hoewel het echter oock niet waer was of anders wilde hij met sijn schip aende waterkant 
vlack voor sijn huys comen leggen, en tselve met sijn geschut pladtschieten, sonder dat den cadi of regeringe alhier 
(voor dewelcke hij die sake noch quansuys in rechten ventileerde of urgeerde hem consul daerinne conde of wilde 
maintineren, niettegenstaende hij door sijne dragomans alle bedenckelijcke redenen die voor hem militeerden 
hadde gedaen allegeren eysch (selfs volgens het seggen en de bekentenisse van den voorsz cadi) onrechtmatigh, en 
tegens de capitulatie was, en hij cadi hem consul geen andere hulpe toebragt als sijn raedt daerinne bestaende 
dat hij den voorsz slaef most betalen, en dat hij most denkcen dat hij inde handen van rovers was, en dat die 
hem niet uyt haer gewelt wilde laten gaen, of sij wilden hem dwingen sodanigen somme gelts aen haer te geven, 
voegende denselven cadi noch daerbij dat hij geen voocht over dat volck was, en geen justitie over haer conde 
doen, also se in dienst vanden groten heer hier waren sulcx dat hij consul wel genootsaeckt was, bon gne mal gne 
ordre te stellen dat den voorsz slaef aen den cap:n wierde betaelt, belopende te samen vier hondert Rijcxdaeld:rs 
of duysent Gls: wilde hij anders niet afwachten, dat men hem in sijn huys hadde commen dootschieten, immers 
althans dat se tselve met geschut hadden connen ruyneren, en meer schade gadaen hebben. 
 
Noch is het ontrent denselven tijt geschiet, dat hier eenige Tripolische schepen ter rede leggende, het volck daer op 
varende soo veel moetwil en gewelt aende Cristen Natien bedreef, dat alle de consuls haere huysen mosten 
fortificeren, met alderhande schiet geweer voorsien en bij nacht en bij dagh wacht laten houden, om niet onvoor-
siens van hetselve volck overvallen te worden, waer mede sij haer gestadigh dreygden, en sijl oock door den cadi 
wierden gewaerschouwt op hare hoede te wesen, met bijvoeginge, dat de regeringe selfs geen meester was, of tselve 
volck niet conde dwingen. 
 
Jegenwoordigh leggen hier ter rede weder seventien gallijen met leventen of Turcksche matrosen, die mede geen 
cleyne vrese en moeylijckheyt, veroorsaecken soo datmen schier niet als met groten schroom dorft uytgaen, alsoo 
het seer dickwils gebeurt is, dat se die van onse natie op de straeten hebben aengerandt. 
 
Ten tijde van des ondergesz consuls voorsaet is mede voorgevallen die over grote, doch in ons regardt ongefon-
deerde, en onrechtmattige avanie, van ‘t schip de Ceyser Octavianus, dewelcke met in circa achtentseventich 
duysent realen of leeuwendaeld.rs inden beginne heeft moeten worden afgemaeckt, in welcken tijt den consul oock 
geen cleyn peryckel liep, van aengetast en gebonden en naer Constantp:en gevoert te worden, daer mede hij sterck 
wierdt gedreygt. 
 
Den Engelschen consul tot Aleppo is jegenwoordich deselve of diergelijcke avanie of pretensie, mede te beurt 
gevallen, die derhalve aldaer genoegsaem wordt gevangen gehouden. 
 
De gemelte en andere avanien connen nogh dagelijcks voorvallen die dan alle op de schouderen vanden consul 
moeten afstuyten. 
 
Hier bij compt, sijns nedrigen gevoelens, mede in grote consideratie dat inden jare 1670 den heere resid:t Colyer 
hem consul hebbende gelieven te ontbieden tot Constantinp:n om met hem over gnale en particuliere saken te 
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abboucheren, en hij om dien heer als sijn super intendent in dese gewesten te gehoorsamen en om de saken van 
het gemene best of het publicq te bevorderen, de reyse derwaerts hebbende aengevangen, onder wegen een goet 
getal rovers hem hebben besprongen, genoegsaem naecht uytgetrocken, alles mij ontnomen, en wel degel met 
slagen, van piecken, lanssen is onthaelt, mitsg op drie plaetsen swaerl gequetst hebben, mitsgs noch daerenboven, 
sijn broeders soon die hem op die tocht accompagneerde, mede sodanigh hebben gewont dat hij vijf of ses dagen 
daer nae noch op de wech en eer sijl tot Constantp:n waren is gecomen te overlijden. 
 
Buyten en behalven alle ‘tgene voor verhaelt staet, is het kennel hoe haer Ho:Mo: den 9 janry 1671 hebbende 
gelieven te nemen een resolutie, waer bji den heer Resident Colyer en den ondergesz Consul van Dam onder 
anderen expressel worden belast en geauthoriseert, omme met onderlinge communicatie en correspondentie over 
de fraudatie van de ambassaet en consulaetrechten, ten tijde van ‘t overlijden van den heer resid:t Warnerus 
voorgevallen, een exacte recherche te doen, en ’t verswegene te doen betalen, en, den lesten dien hem opgeleyden 
last en ordre van sijne heeren en meesters, volgens sijn schuldigen plicht, getrouwel en gehoorsaemel hebbende 
willen uytvoeren, en ter executie leggen, is daeruyt voor hem gesproten een seer gevaerlijcke dissentie hooftbreec-
ken en moeylijckheyt (blijckende uyt vele en verscheyde brieven, bij hem aen haer Ho:Mo:, en aende H:rn 
Directeuren van den Levantsz Handel is gesz) alsoo die geene der natie die aen die defraudatie, mede schuldigh 
waren, een uytermaten groten haet en picq, ter oorsake vande selve sijne getoonde gehoorsaemheyt, en vigilantie 
op hem consul hebben genomen, dewelcke ruym vier jaren heeft geduyrt, en waer uyt mede allenl en eerstel is 
voortgecomen, dat de bewuste elf klaegh poincten tegen hem consul aenden staet sijn overgegeven, bij denselven 
staet aen hem consul sijn gesonden en waer tegen hij oock sijn provisioneel debath of verabtwoordinge den 15 
septemb: des voorleden jaers 1675 ingevolge van haer Ho:Mo: last met alle schuldige onderdanigheyt albereyts 
heeft opgestelt, en aen haer gemelte Ho:Mo: gedaen afgaen, onderdanigl vertrouwende dat daermede contente-
men:t sullen hebben, en uyt het selve desselfs onschult en oprechten wandel blijcken. 
 
Dewijle nu dese vorenstaende poincten bij den gemelten consul van Dam sijn opgestelt, met eerbiedich vertrou-
wen dat daer door den meergemelten staet te meer gepermoveert sal worden ten eynde die goetheyt en equiteyt 
believen te hebben, om hem noch toe te leggen, de consulaet rechten verschenen of vervallen met of in het laest van 
hier vertrocken convoy, onder den heer Schout bij Nacht J:r Engel de Ruyter, soo sal hij sich vorder met alle 
onderdanigheyt gedragen aen de xxxxxxxx redenen vervat in sijne brieven over dat subject aen haer Ho:Mo: 
gesz sub datis 15 novemb, 14 janry 5 feb: en 5 junij alle lestleden cortel inde naervolgende bestaende: 
 
Eerstel: dat hij consul, geduyrende den tijt van over de drie jaren dat hier geen convoyen sijn geweest, weynich of 
geen profijten of revenues hebbende gehadt, echter deselve grote oncosten van paerden, dienaers en huyshoudingh, 
als Janitzars, dienende tot bescherminge en wacht van sijn persoon en huys, dragomans of tolcken, cancelier, 
onder cancelier, clercquen en huysdienaers gesamentl het getal van twintich uytmackende, voorts presenten en 
vere: ringen aen den cadi en andere hoge ministers alhier, alle om het respect van den staet en natie te mainc-
tineren, en twelck alhier soo moet wesen, wil men anders crediet en respect bij de Turcken hebben en van haer 
geacht sijn, alsoo sijl op die uyterlijcke pompe seer sien, belopende de voorsz oncosten, tesamen in dien tijt al 
ontrent of over de vijftien duysent Realen van Achten en sulcx achtendertich duysent Gls:. 
 
Ten tweeden: dat haer Ho:Mo: resolutie vanden 4 octob des voorleden jaers 1675, op ‘t stuck van’t provisioneel 
salarieren vanden selven consul eerst is genomen, soo veel maenden nae ‘t uytlopen van ons convoy onder d’heer 
Schout bij Nacht de Ruyter, en oock alhier eerst gecomen is langh nae ‘t vertreck van ‘t selve convoy van dese 
plaetse en sulcx nae ‘t eerbiedich gevoelen van hem consul, soo langh nae de tijden respectivel, dat de rechten 
vandien albereyts aen hem waren vervallen. 
 
Ten derden: dat bij de H:rn Directeuren vanden Levantsz Handel, ingevolge van haer Ho:Mo: authorisatie, 
tot noch toe de behoorlijcke ordre, op den ontfangh der ambass:t en consulaet rechten niet en is gestelt, immers 
althans noch niet in handen of ter ooren van hem consul gecomen. 
 
Ten vierden dat hij consul met den ontfangen vandien, om die reden albereyts alle de moeyten en hooftbreken 
heeft gehadt. 
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En ten vijfden dat noch het landt, noch het gemeen eenige de minste schade of beswaernisse hier bij sal comen te 
lijden, dat hij consul met de rechten van ‘t voorsz convoy sijne excessive gedane oncosten en geleden schade, een 
weynych come te soulageren, of goet te maken, willende hij consul onderdanigl verwachten, dat de voorsz redenen 
een favorabele ingressie sullen vinden, te meer alsoo hij in goeden conscientie niet beter en weet, of hij heeft sich 
in alles geduyrende, of rakende sijne functie gequeten, als een getrouw genereus en neerstigh minister schuldigh is 
te doen, daer ter contrarye soo dese sake tegen sijn verwachten mocht comen uyt te vallen, hij meent reden te 
sullen hebben, om sich hoogl te bedrouven, of hij den staet aen d eene sijde geen behoorl genougen hadde gegeven, 
en aende andere sijde, dat sijne getrouwigheyt en genereusheyt hem soo costel soude vallen, mitsgs sult hem last 
en ongelegentheyt veroorsaken, en voorts mede dat bij ontstentenisse van dit sijn versoeck hem benomen worden 
de middelen, van de Cristelijcke liefde te bewijsen, int verlossen van Cristenslaven, en meest van onse eygen 
natie, die alhier in seer groten getale, swaer geboeyt te coop worden gebragt, en waer door men seer qualijck can 
naerlaten commiseratie met die ellendige geketende menschen te hebben, waer van den ondergesz consul (sonder 
roem gesproken) bij sijnen tijt al een goet gedeelte heeft gelost, en het hem seer veel gelt heeft laten costen, ‘twelck 
opgerekent sijnde, lichtel duysent Rijxdaelders, of meer voor sijn hooft soude comen te monteren. 
 
Tot een besluyt van dese memorye sal den meergemelten consul met haer Ho:Mo: gunstige licentie, hier nogh 
eerbiedighl bij vougen en deselve onderdanigl berichten, dat hij, op de expresse last en aenscvhrijvens, van haer 
gemelte Ho:Mo: vanden 1 septemb: 1670 in sijne consideratie, die hij in meert 1671 desselve met alle onder-
danigheyt heeft toegesonden, heeft laten influeren, dat sijns oordeels het gagieren van sijn persoon seer dienstigh 
soude wesen, eens deels om dat hij alsdoen meende, dat het ‘tselve veel soude contribueren tot meerdere rust van 
haer Ho:Mo: en van de H:rn Directeuren vanden Levantsz Handel (dewelcke andersints met brieven en 
klachten, door den resident, consul en natie alhier gestadigh moeyl gevallen souden worden) als oock tot meer 
vrede en enigheyt tusschen den gemelten resid:t, consul en natie alhier; en andersdeels om dat hij alsdoen niet 
anders conde sien, of het gemeen soude daer bij proviteren, en door dat middel voorgecomen en uyt de wegh geleyt 
connen worden, eenige havanyen en andere nootsackelijcke oncosten, die veeltijts ten besten vande navigatie en 
negotie in dese landen moeten worden gedaen, want als des gemelten consuls oogmerck, en sentiment niet der-
waerts heen hadde gelopen, soude hij noyt het voorsz gagieren hebben geinclineert en geadviseert alsoo het niet 
anders conde uytvallen, en strecken, als tot sijn over grote schade, die hij echter (als een getrouw minister toe-
comt, en altijt moet doen) liever in sijne prive heeft willen lijden, en het voordeel voor het gemeen laten, dan alsoo 
de saken deser werelt, en voornemel ontrent de navigatie en negotie, haere veranderingen dagelijcx onderworpen 
sijn, soo heeft ondergesz consul sedert het opstellen van deselve sijne consideratien, mede bevonden, dat ontrent 
dit werck al mede eenige veranderingen en andere speculatien sijn voorgevallen, en siet hij alsnu uyt de dagelijck-
se discoursen en contenances van de coopl sijner natie gevolgel te gemoet, dat het selve werck sijns oordeels niet 
sal strecken, tot meer rust van Uw Ho:Mo: en vande H:rn Directeuren noch tot meerder vrede en enicheyt, 
onder den resident, consul en natie alhier, maer vreest ter contrarye, dat meer moeyelheden en dissentien respecti-
vel sal causeren, alsoo die van sijne natie gewoon sijnde, voor desen altijt een goede courtoisie of quijtscheldinge 
in’t betalen harer rechten van hem consul te genieten, en alsnu bevindende datse naer alle apparentie, daer van 
niet alleen niet meer sullen hebben te verwachten maer dat se daeren boven lichtel de manifesten noch sullen 
moeten beedigen, heeft sulcx in haer een seer grote misnoegen en degonst gebaert, pretenderende alsnu voor af, 
dat de tariffe of estimatie der waren en coopmanschappen, wel een derde te hoogh is gestelt, diese begeren ver-
laeght te hebben, en alsdan volgens die verlagingh te betalen, om soo doende, en door dat middel, de voorsz 
courtoisie uyt te vinden, en te genieten, en belangende den eedt datse daer toe geensins gehouden sijn sulcx dat hij 
consul al vrij becommert is, dat uyt het een en ‘t ander nogh grote verwarringen, onenicheden en disputen sullen 
spruyten, en dat het gemeen daerenboven occk wel sijne reeck:e daer bij niet soude connen vinden, wandt bij 
aldien hij consul door Godts genade, en haer Ho:Mo: gunst in de goede jaren niet wat hadde overgegadert, waer 
mede soude hij inde quade jaren hebben connen subsisteren, en sijne dienaers soo ten dienste vant publicq, als 
int prive betalen, mitsgs: de Turcksche ministers haere presenten geven? Wandt de dagelijcksche ondervindinge 
leert datter altijt is een vicissitudo rerum, sulcx datmen de tijden niet in sijne handen heeft, en ondertusschen 
moet het gemeen of de directie alle de te doene oncosten en vervallen tractementen, volgens haer Ho:Mo: resolutie 
betalen, daerenboven heeft hij consul altijt selfs in loco geweest, en heeft sijn oogh over sijn eygen interesse connen 
laten gaen, en echter hebben eenige noch soo veel van sijne rechten geweten achter om te halen, waer uyt licht is 
af te meten, hoe het sal gaen als die rechten bij een derden ongeinteresserden of gegagieerden sullen worden 
ontfangen soude derhalven, onder het gunstigh welnemen van haer Ho:Mo: volgens sijns consuls nedrigh oordeel, 
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om die redenen wel sijne consideratien meriteren, of deselve niet soude connen goet vinden het subject vant 
ontfangen, der ambassaet en consulaet rechten te laten of weder te brengen op den ouden voet 
 
Tgene voorsz is heeft den meergemelten consul gemeent van sijne onderdanigen plicht te wesen, haer Ho:Mo: met 
alle eerbiedige schuldige termen, voor te dragen, met ootmoedich versoeck van excuse soo hij daerinne te im-
portuyn is geweest, en niet te min sijn geringh oordeel gehoorsamel onderwerpende het hoogh wijs verstant en goet 
vinden van haer Ho:Mo: derwelcker hooghwijse regeringe en personen Godt de heere meer en meer ten dienste 
vanden lande wil segenenen voorspoedigh maken. 
 
Aldus opgestelt int consulaire huys tot Smirna     J: van Dam 
den 11 July 1676       1676 
 
DOCUMENT 8: THE DUTCH NATION’S JEWISH CREDITORS DEMAND PAYMENT 
(The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Haim Algranate, Jehuda Amatto and Nisim 
Amatto to Jacob van Dam, 1677) 
 
Avante di Ss-a Ill-ma Sig-re Jacomo van Dam Console dela Natione Hollandesa 
 
Compariscanno, 
 
Abraham Leon et Efraim Arditte, Nisim e Jeuda Amatto, et Haim Algranatte figliolo dil.q.m Ishac Algra-
natte, Hebrei negoziantti in questa piaza, e con ogni devotione li naranno qual m.fe, erendo che sotto il giorno 
di -30- genaro de 1671-, li comparente diedero a cambio alli sig-ri mercanti di la natione holandesa, li nome di 
qualle, saranno in piedo notatti, una somma di Leone efetive, numero nove mille sette cento settanta et peze 
quatro centto di pesso di mess.co e sevig.a, con obligo di detti sig-ri, che p.r interese di ogni messe, li pagare 
benno a ragione di uno e mezo p.r.centto, et che ogni tre messe doveva seguive il pagamentto del cambi scadutti 
et non facendolo, si obligorno detti sig-ri a capo sei mesi di pagare il principalle e cambi scadutti, sensa litte 
 cezione, ne contraditione alcuna, come il tutto aparisce dala scritta de obligo originale, la copia dela 
qualle, sara inclusa, alaqualle ha  et avendo detti sig-ri mercanti obligatti, fatto pagamentto alli comparentte, 
sotto li -30-marzo-1672-, di peze quatro centto di pesso, con piu il interesse di dette peze quarto centto, et sotto 
li -31- detto, di Leone cinque mille otto centto settantta, con piu il interese cadutte fino al detto giorno di tutta 
la somma di Leone nove mille sette centto settantta  et sotto il di p-mo di settembre de 1673 -, fecero 
pagamentto detti sig-ri alli comparentti di Leone cinque centto sette mezo, a contto del interesse tra corsi, fino 
dal giorno -31-marzo-1672- delli Leone tre mille nove centto restorno di principale devittori, come dila recevtta 
apare; et sendo, che li comparentte piu volte, ano fatto instanza p.r ottenere il pagamento di loro principale, e 
cambi in vertude ne dila obligatione di detti sig-ri, ala qualle ha, p.r ilche, non erendoli si no al presentte 
sodisfatto cosa alcuna di prin cipalle e cambi; et sendo che questo interese, apartiene a pupille, ve dove, e pobere 
gente asistentte in Jerusalem, dale qualli li comparentte sono molestatti p.r otenere  loro avere p.r loro somini-
trations, et non potendo li comparente piu resistere al o covere ali detti di loro propio, come anno fatto sin o al 
presentte; sono forzatti a ricorrere ala clemenza e benignitta di ss-mo ill-ma, acio, covectta giustatia, facia ali 
comparente restar imborsatte di loro avere, che alere m-fe facendo, sara no costretti a ricorrere ad altre giustitie, 
e cercare diversi modi p.r ottenere il suo, pregandola, inquesto negotio operare dala sua solitta rectitudine; et la 
somma, che li comparenti, sono credittore dalli sig-ri mercanti holandesi, sono di principalle, Leone efettive tre 
mille nove centto proximo a venire, che importtano Leone tre mille cinque centto e dieci, di cambia, sieme con il 
principalle, sono in tutto Leone sette mille quatro centto e dieci, a contto deli qualle  ano solo recevtto Leone 
cinque centto, e sette e mezo, con che restanno li comparentti credittore 6902 1/2 di Leone sei mille nove centto 
e dua e mezo, lequalle, con ogni devotione, preganno a Ss-a Ill-ma afarli imborsare, che ditt al favore, tantto li 
comparentte, quanto le pobere vedove, e pupilli, restaranno pregando al sig-re Dio p.r sua felicitta et enri al 
sam.do ha 
      ./_/. 
Nisim e Jeuda Amatto 
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Nisim Amatto & Haim Algranate 
[Hebrew signatures] 
 
DOCUMENT 9: JACOB VAN DAM’S DEFENSE AGAINST HIS JEWISH CREDITORS 
(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 
1677) 
 
dat. 20. Apr.      Extract in 
/ 1677      brieven uit Sm: 
rec. 23. Jug.      aan D.L.H. 
 
Hoogh.Mogende.Heeren, Mijne heeren    … foly 532. 
 
Door die van de Joodsche natie alhier is mij wel geworden Uw:Ho:Mo: missive en resolutie, beyde respectivelijck 
geschreven en genomen den 21 decemb. des voorleden jaers, opt gene de heeren gedep-den van de Provincie van 
Hollant & Westvrieslant ten selven dage in Uw:Ho:Mo: vergaderinge hebben believen te representeren en voor 
te dragen, wegens ‘t gunt de onderlingen van de Portugesche Joodsche natie, wonende tot Amsterdam, mitsgaders 
Jacob de Pinto aen de heeren Staten van Hollant en Westvrieslant bij req:e hadden te kennen gegeven, behel-
sende de voorsz: resolutie in effecte dat, wij de goederen coopmanschappen, ende effecten, die bij, vanwegen, ofte 
voor reeckeninge van de voorsz: Joodtsche coopluyden, ingesetenen onser landen, naer Smirna souden mogen 
werden gesonden, ofte die oock van daer voor, vanwegen, ofte ten behoeven van de Joodtsche coopluyden, ingeste-
nen onser landen, souden mogen werden versonden, niet anders sullen hebben te considereren, aen te sien, te 
handelen, ofte te tracteren, directelijck of indirectelijck, meenigerley wijse, ende sulcx soowel ontrent het tauxeren 
van de voorsz: goederen, als de betalinge van de ambassaet ende consulaetrechten, als de waeren, goederen, 
coopmanschappen ende effecten van de andere ingesetenen onser landen, professie van de Christelijcke Religie 
doende, t sij dan dat de voorsz: goederen soowel in’t gaen, als in’t komen, aen ofte van de Christenen, Turcken, 
Joden, of andere natien alhier souden mogen sijn geaddresseert ofte geconsigneert. En dewijle het Uw:Ho:Mo: 
wille en goede geliefte is, mij bij haren voorsz: brief expresselijck te gelasten en ernstigh te bevelen, dat ick mij 
naer den inhouden van de voorsz: resolutie precise sal hebben te reguleren ende te gedragen, sonder daerontrent 
eenigsins in gebrecke te blijven, soo sal ick ‘t selve, nae mijnen onderdanigsten plicht gehoorsamelijck nacomen 
en achtervolgen, als deselve daerbij sullen believen te blijven persisteren. Ondertusschen versoecke en bidde ick 
onderdaniglijck, dat Uw:Ho:Mo: ten besten believen te duyden, dat ick, met derselver gunstige licentie, mij de 
vrijmoedigheyt sal aenmatigen, van aen de ene sijde te seggen, dat ick eerbiedelijck vertrouwe, dat Uw:Ho:Mo: 
lichtelijck over dat subiect hare gedachten en deliberatie naerder souden hebben laten gaen, of hare mesures 
anders genomen, als deselve hadden geweten hoe en wat eygentlijck van die saecke is, en in welcke maniere het 
gepasseerde en de proceduren tusschen mij en de Joodsche natie alhier van tijt tot tijdt sich hebben toegedragen en 
aen de andere sijde, om mijn debat of defensie een weynigh int brede, op en tot refutatie in eeniger wijse van het 
voorsz: req:e der Joden met ten aenkleven van dien, te doen en op te stellen, sullende Uw:Ho:Mo:, des believen-
de, het een en het ander ten merendele vinden vervat in de copie missive, bij mij op hetselve subiect den 10 feb: 
lestleden geschreven aen de heeren Directeuren van den Levantsche handel & die ick ten dien eynde, tot 
Uw:Ho:Mo: speculatie en eerbiedige informatie, hierbij hebbe gevoegt, mij daertoe met alle vereyschte onderdani-
cheyt gedragende, met ootmoedigh versoeck, dat op den inhoude van dien soodanigen reguard moge worden 
genomen als Uw:Ho:Mo: volgens hare gewoonlijcke hoge equiteyt, altijt gewoon sijn te doen, alsmede opt gene 
ick, met derselver permissie, int corte noch hierbij sal voegen, daerinne bestaende: eerstelijck, dat ick verscheyde 
waren van de Joden minder hebbe geestimeert, als onse Tariffa of waerdeernotitie medebrengt, waernae onse 
natie selfs betaelt, en onder anderen mede de stammen of Turksche garens, die ick haer maer hebbe doen 
betalen tegen twee Leeuwend:rs. de ocke, sijnde twee en een half pont hollants, en ’t welck wel het voornaemste 
is, en het meest importeert, daer onse natie die moet betalen tegen drie Leeuwend:rs. sulcx dat het in die waer 
alleen een heel derden deel scheelt, en andere waren naer advenant, breder blijckenende bij het nevensgaende 
memoricken, daertoe mij reverentelijck gedrage. Ten tweeden dat ick die estimatie of Tariffe niet hebben ge-
maeckt, maer gevonden, en gevolgt, soo als se bij mijne predecesseurs altijt is gepractiseert geweest. En ten 
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derden, dat het, omder reverentie, versiert is, dat ick de coopmanschappen met een half pc:to meer hebbe belast, 
sullende Uw:Ho:Mo: het vordere, des believende, connen sien uyt de voorsz: mijne copie missive, aen de voorn- 
heeren Directeuren geschreven, en onder anderen daeruyt mede, dat onse natie niet anders wenschte, als dat die 
van de Joodtsche natie, om de daerbij gevoegde redenen, niet een stuck op onse schepen int comen en gaen moch-
ten laden, mitsgaders dat ick de Joden niet hebbe laten betalen nae het Concept-Tariffa bij de heeren Directeu-
ren herwaerts gesonden (soo als bij de voorsz: Joden is gepretendeert) eens deels omdat deselve Tariffe niet bij 
Uw:Ho:Mo: was geappobeert, en gearresteert (gelijck se lichtel. noch niet sal wesen geapprobeert en gearresteert) 
en anderdeels omdat in volle vergaderinge van consul en natie is goetgevonden, dat de voorsz: Joden noch na de 
oude Tariffe sullen betalen, blijckende bij de copie authentycq Resolutie, daerover genomen, en, tot derselver 
contemplatie, hiernevens gaende. Daerenboven sal uyt deselve missive, mijns geringen erachtens, oock evidentelijk 
blijcken, hoe ondancksbaerlijck, stoutelijck, en informelijck de voorsz: Joodsche natie haer tegens mij hebben 
gedragen, onaengesien de grote courtoisie en afslagh, hiervoren gemelt, die ick aen dat volck hebbe bewesen, 
twelck, in’t generael gesproocken, voorwaer gene de minste beleeftheyt of goet onthael meriteert, als vooreerst haer 
uyterste best doende, om de Christenen allenthalven te duperen en te misleyden, waer se maer connen of mogen, 
en voornamelijck in dese landen, daer se in sulcken menichte sijn, en al vrij eenigh pouvoir omtrent de regeringh 
alhier hebben, en, om die reden, oock in velen bij deselve regeringh al vrij ontsien worden. Ten tweeden omdat se 
seer onbeschaemt sijn, in hare eijsschen en voorstellen, onversettelijck in hare concepten, en insupportabel in hare 
maeniere van gouverneren onder haer tegen de Cristen-natien, en voornamelijck mede tegen Uw:Ho:Mo: Consul 
en Coopluyden te deser plaetse, die se alle seer geern soo subiect en dependent van haer soecken te maecken, als 
se haer eygen volvk, doen, waervan ick Uw:Ho:Mo: vervolgens eenige notabile exempelen sal verhalen tot 
welcken eynde Uw:Ho:Mo: onderdaglijck believen bericht te wesen, dat alle den handel, die hier ter plaetse, 
door onse coopluyden en van outs is, en iegenwoordigh noch wort gedreven, altijt is geschiet, en alsnoch geschiet, 
door Joden die deselve onse coopluyden voor makelaers dienen, sonder dewelcke men niet van importantie can 
verrichten, of eenige basaren, dat is coop en vercoopshuysen, alsoo die luyden seer ervaren sijn in de waren, 
maximes, en manieren van tracteren met de inwoonders deser landen, t welck hierop een gansch andere wijse 
geschiet als in ons landt. De voorsz: Joden nu wel wetende, dat den Francken of Christen coopluyden aen haer 
volck, voor sooveel die haer als makelaers dienen, merckelijck is gelegen, en, sonder haer, in’t stuck van de 
negotie niet connen uytrichten, soecken en weten haer daervan seer wel te dienen, en door dat middel hare 
personage te spelen, en sich te doen valeren, alsoo sij Joden in de minste saecke of gelegenheyt, die der maer 
voorvalt tegen de Christenen, en waerinne sij sustineren, dat haer van deselve ongelijck geschiet, doch, om beter 
te seggen, als sijluyden maer sien, dat se met hare pretensien tegen de Christenen, nae haer welgevallen, tot haer 
oogmerck niet connen geraecken, soo laten se aenstonts een exco-icatie in hare sinagoge afcondigen, dat niemant 
van haer volck sich sal hebben te verstouten, om eenige negotie of handel te doen voor, met, of in dienst van 
soodanigen Christen coopman, waertegen iemant van haer eenige pretensie of questie moveert, al hebben se 
alschoon met malcanderen tevoren in negotie gestaen, of besigh geweest eenige parthije tesamen te sluyten, jae selfs 
niet om met hem te mogen spreecken, waerdoor dan soodanige coopluyden in seer grote verlegenheyt worden 
gestelt en deselve merckelijcke schade can toe gebracht worden, alsoo haren ganschen handel alsdan ledigh moet 
staen, ‘t welck een onlijdelijcke saecke voor een coopman is, en voornamel: in dese verre Turxe landen, alwaer 
de commissionaris met sooveel periculen en oncosten moeten comen, om harer meesters interesse waer te nemen, 
en derselver costelijcke effecten te verhandelem. Vier diergelijcke excommuniatien of battelatien soo men se hier 
noemt, hebben de voorsz: Joden, geduyrende mijn aenwesen alhier, tegen Uw:Ho:Mo: onderdanen, coopluyden te 
deser plaetse, op de wijse als voren gedaen en laten vercondigen, alleenl: maer, om, gelijck ick hiervoren mede 
hebbe geseyt, dat se sustineerden dat haer ongelijck was geschiet, of omdat se niet sagen anders, als doordat 
middel, so se meenden, tot haer oogmerck te geraecken, hoewel se echter haer seer in hare opinie hebben bedrogen 
gevonden, geconsidereert ick mij altijt met force en vigeur tegen dese hare schadelicke en verderffelijcke maxime 
en maniere van procederen hebbe moeten stellen, en oock effectivelijck gestelt hebbe, alsoock weder contrarie 
middelen uytgevonden, waerdoor ick haer tot reden en tot het desisteren of revoceren van de voorsz: exco-icatie of 
batellatien hebbe gedwongen, en voornamelijck noch in de laetste, die nu, niet meer als 8 a 10 dagen gelden, is 
voorgevallen, tegens seker Florentijns coopman, die alhier onder Uw:Ho:Mo: protectie is, op’t versoeck, t welck 
den heer Groot Hartogh van Toscanen, bij een expressen brief aen mij heeft believen te doen, in welcke saeck de 
voorsz: Joden in’t eerst soo hartneckigh sijn gebleven (onaengesien ick haer vele notoire onwaerheden en in-
formailteyten daerinne hebbe aenwesen) dat met gene redenen, persuasien, of inductien conden worden verset, soo 
dat ick eyndelijck genootsaeckt soude sijn geweest, ‘t sij dan haer, met weten en toestaen van onse natie, mede te 
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doen batelleren, en te verbieden hare voeten in eenige huysen van onse coopluyden te setten, of wel den tollenaer 
alhier in handen te geven de manifesten der goederen, die deselve natie met onse schepen heeft ontfangen en 
versonden, om te sien of se hem sijn tol daervan hebben betaelt, die se ordinaris of t’enemael sluycken, of op de 
naem van Christenen doen lossen, om in plaets van 5: 6: en 7 ten hondert, die de voorsz: Joodsche natie wegen 
deselve hare goederen aen tol moet betalen, vrij te wesen met 3 ten hondert, soo als de Christenen betalen, welcke 
laetste saecke bij aldien bij mij ware geschiet, soude haer sulx geen kleyne schade hebben toegebracht, alsoo den 
tollenaer haer ‘t selve wel rijckelijck soude hebben doen betalen, en daer en boven noch wel seer qualijck laten 
tracteren. De voorsz: Joden nu horende, dat ick haer sulx hadde laten aenseggen, en daermede dede dreygen (om 
dat se andersins doch ganschelijck niet tot eenige gevoeglijckheyt of reckelijckheyt wilden verstaen) sijn daerdoor 
soodanigh geintimideert en verstelt geworden, dat se aenstonts de voorsz: batellatie hebben te niet gedaen, en 
daerenboven bij mij sijn gecomen om pardon en vergiffenis vant gepasseerde te versoecken, met bijbrenginge van 
eenige telle quelle excusen, die vrij wat blauw waren om haer vorige geprocedeerde quansuys soo wat te verscho-
nen of te vergoelijcken, welcke excusen ick oock so danigh hebbe laten passeren, omdat ick in desen doch tot 
mijn oogmerck was geraeckt, en de voorsz: batellatie gerevoceert of te niet gedaen was, waertoe ick mene wel 
versekert te wesen, dat sijl. geensins souden hebben verstaen, soo wanneer ick haer met dien capesson niet hadde 
bereden en adiube gebracht, onder tusschen heeft het de voorsz: Joden seer verset en is het haer seer buyten hare 
gissinge gegaen, dat sijlieden hebben bevonden dat Uw:Ho:Mo: resolutie geensins in faveur van die joden is, die 
hier wonen (omme namentlijck deselve, in’t stuck van de estimatie en consulaetrechten, te tracteren, als 
Uw:Ho:Mo: andere ingesetenen professie van de Christelijcke religie doende) maer alleen ten voordele van die 
Joden die ingestenen onser landen sijn also se niet anders hadden verwacht, als dat sijlieden mede, in’t reguarde 
van de goederen en coopmanschappen, die se voor haer eygen reeck:e ontfangen en versenden soodanigh souden 
worden aengesien en getracteert, en om die reden en alleenl: so se mij selfs hebben geseyt, aen de Joden in ons 
vaderlant hebben geklaegt of geschreven, ‘t welck sij seggen dat anders niet souden hebben gedaen, als se hadden 
geweten dat hare brieven van geen andere operatie of effecten souden sijn geweest, also se haer hier seer weynigh 
laten gelegen leggen aen het voordeel van de Joden in ons vaderlant, als sijlieden alhier geen profijt daerbij 
hebben soo als se mij mede opentlijck hebben te kennen gegeven, soo dat die arglistige menschen soo doende haer 
salfs met hare eygen arglisticheyt hebben gevangen. Nu geve ick Uw:Ho:Mo: met alle onderdanicheyt in be-
dencken en te considererem, of de voorsz: Joodsche natie ter saecke van de vorige hare informele comportementen 
tegen Uw:Ho:Mo: onderdanen alhier, wel eenige de minste courtoisie hebben gemeriteert, en deselve courtoisie 
echter effectivel: in velen, meer als onse eygen natie, hebbende genoten, soo als hier voren hebbe aengwesen, of se 
niet van de grootste ondanckbaerheyt, dat se deselve niet en erkennen, te beschuldigen sijn, en noch meer van 
onbeschaemtheyt en stoutheyt, dat se haer niet hebben ontsien Uw:Ho:Mo:, mitsgaders de Ed Groot Mog: 
heeren Staten van hollant en Westvrieslant in hare req:e importante besoignes met hare onware en arglistiglijck 
geinventeerde voorgevingen te importuneren; en, waert mogelijck geweest, te seduceren, dat se daer en boven noch 
in hare req:e hebben dorven laten influeren die hatelijcke en onverdragelijcke termen, namentlijck, van exactien, 
extravagantien en enorme taxatien, die bij mij souden sijn gedaen, dat se wijders, om dat werck noch quansuys 
te schoonder schijn en glimpte te geven, in’t selve hare req:e seggen, dat se, naer genomen behoorlijcke informa-
tien, onder vonden hadden, dat de voorsz: klachten berustende waren op de puyre en suyvere waerheyt, daer het, 
onder reverentie, pure leugenen of veroraeysselen sijn, en tot een besluyt dat de ouderlingen van deselve natie, 
geassisteert met Jacob de Pinto, ‘tselve re’:e hebben overgegegeven, of haer daer mede hebben bemoeyt, om haer 
voor stel en versoeck, door de veelheyt en achtbaerheyt harer personen en, quansuys mede soo veel te meer geloof 
te doen geven, en door te dringen, sijnde nu desem, bij de voorsz: Joden ten naesten bij even eens geprocedeert 
(doch, onder Uw:Ho:Mo: welnemen, sij het met de vereyschte eerbiedige termen en sonder comparatie gesprooc-
ken) gelijck de schriftgeleerde en onderlingen van’t selve volck onsen salighmaker voor den wereltlijcken rechter 
hebben getracteert en beschuldigt, seggende mede met deselve smieriteyt quansuys, dat het de waerheyt was, dat 
hij Godts lasteringe hadde gesproocken, daer het nochtans soo verre vandaen was, sulcx ick, voor soverre, bij 
provisie daerinne oock beter patientie can en moet hebben, alsoo het een volck is, welckers wet toelaet, dat se op 
soodanige arglistigen wijse tegen de Christenen mogen aengaen, als se maer haer voordeel bij sien: Maer ‘tgene 
mij het vreemste daerontrent voorcomt, en waerover ick niet can laten mij ten hoogsten te verwonderen, en oock 
seer te beklagen, bestaet daerinne, dat de heeren Directeuren van den Lavntsz: handel en navigatie in de 
middelantsche zee, mede soo lichtelijck en aenstonts hebben gelieven geloof te geven en te favoriseren het stout en 
onwaer voorgeven van dat hartneckigh volck, dat deselve heeren voorts van sich hebben connen en believen te 
verkrijgen, tot dien eynde in hare naerdere consideratien (rakende het subiect van de Ambassaet & Consulaet-
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rechten van het convoy onder den heer Schout bij Nacht Joncker Engel de Ruyter geprocedeert) aen de Ed’ 
Groot Mog: heeren Staten van Hollant en Westvrieslandt overgegeven als een poinct van beschulding: en tot 
onsen laste te laten influeren de volgende gesublimeerde woorden: maer uyt de grote begeerlijckheyt die sij (waer-
mede den heer resid:t Colyer en mij denoteren) in desen betonen en de exactien NB die sij plegen ontkent niet 
alleen de Duytsche maer oock de Joodsche natie NB (waerover sij hare klachten particulier sullen aen U.E. 
Groot Mog: doen) confirmeren sij hun ooghwit te sijn haer in corten quovis modo per fas et nefas NB te willen 
verrijcken, ende tot laste en ruine van anderen NB haer opproppen sijnde voorwaer termen, die mijns oordeels, 
doch onder reverentie, geen eerlijcke luyden, ick swijge den enen Christem van den anderen, behoorde te dencken 
of te seggen, ick late verstaen op’t papier te setten, en noch aen sulcken Illusteren vergaderingh, als die van de 
Ed’ Groot Mog: heeren Staten van Hollant en Westvrieslant is, over te geven, j’ae dat meer is, soo als ick 
bericht ben, deselve boven dien noch te doen drucken, alle ‘twelcke, mij onder reverentie, al te hard’en onsmake-
lijck dunckt, en dat soodanigen oordeel al te voorbarigh bij haer is gevelt, en dat noch in faveur van Joden, tegen 
haren mede Christen, die publicque professie van de Gereformeerde religie is doende, en op dat poinct alvoren 
niet eens is gehoort, en sulcx parte mandita gecondemneert is, alsmede tegen den genen, die d’eer heeft gehadt 
van de voorn- heeren Directeuren als Secret-s den tijt van ontrent ses jaren te dienen, en als doen en namaels 
oock altijt het geluck heeft genoten, dat hem de reputatie hebben nagegeven te wesen een eerlijck en reckelijck 
persoon, en eyndel: tegen een van Uw:Ho:Mo; ministers, hoewel van de minste, tegen welcke termen, alsmede 
tegen andere diergelijcke, die haer Ed’ Ed’ mede in deselve have nadere consideratien hebben believen te laten 
influeren, mij wel geen stoffe soude ontbrecken om met deselve of noch wel met harder termen, hoewel echter met 
en nae de waerheyt, aen te gaen, dan aen de ene sijde wederhout mij daervan, dat ick Uw:Ho:Mo; niet geern 
met diergelijcke stoffe of materie in hare hoogwichtige affaires soude interrumperen, aen de andere sijde de 
besadichtheyt en bescheydenheyt, en ten derden het respect, ‘twelck ick noch voor deselve heeren hebbe, onaenge-
sien haer Ed. Ed mij soo smadelijck en onsmakelijck in de meergemelte hare nadere consideratien believen te 
tracteren, en daerom soo sal ick oock alles met onderdanige gelateneyt vooraf gedefereert laten aen Uw:Ho:Mo;, 
als mijne vaders in desen, hoedanigh sij sullen goetvinden over dese saecke te oordelen, en deselve te redresseren, 
mitsgaders haren Minster te maintineren, want Uw:Ho:Mo: gelieven onderdaniglijck bericht te wesen, dat die 
termen mij seer hard’en sensibel vallen, mitsgaders niet weynigh raken, alsso ick niet anders can sien, of deselve 
krencken mijne reputatie, immers althans dat men deselve daermede tracht te krencken, en mijn persoon bij 
Uw:Ho:mo:, soo men maer conde, als oock bij de heeren Staten van hollant en Westvrieslant, en voort, daer 
men meent voordeel te sullen connen doen, verdacht en odieus te maecken, mitsgaders een preoccupatie te cause-
ren en aen te brengen, en om die reden hebb’ick oock met en onder Uw:Ho:Mo: welnemen en permissie, aen de 
eene sijde gemeent, niet te connen stille staen, om’t gene voorsz: eenigsins met rede te deduceren, en Uw:Ho:Mo: 
onderdaniglijck voor oogen te stellen, hoewel ick aen de andere sijde mij oock soo veel te meer verplicht vinde 
Uw:Ho:Mo: vooraf met de vereyschte submissie te bedancken, dat het deselve heeft belieft, dat werck, nae haere 
gewoonlijcke hooge wijsheyt en equiteyt, in soodaniger voegen te termineren en af te doen, soo als de voorsz: hare 
resolutie is meldende, sonder in de conclusie van dien eenige reflexie te nemen op, of mentie te maecken van de 
voorsz: hatelijcke en onbehoorlijcke termen bij deselve Joden, buyten twijffel, tot geen goet eynde en oogmerck 
gebruyckt, ‘twelck mij oock soo veel te meer moet en hope geeft, dat, als Uw:Ho:Mo: bij dese mijne eerbiedige 
informatie sullen sien, dat het met dit werck in geenen delen soodanigh is gelegen, alsser wel wort of is voorgege-
ven, maer dat het genoegsaem contrarie is, en dat ick gevolgelijck in desen t’enemael ten onrechte worde geinsi-
muleert en beschuldigt van saecken, die mij worden te laste geleyt (gelijck mede met de vorige l;achten is gschiet, 
die het Uw:Ho:Mo: heeft belieft mij voor desen toe te senden, en die echter naderhant, of versiert of ongefondeert, 
of arglistelijck geinterpreteert sullen wesen bevonden deselve daerdoor te eer en en meer sullen worden gepermo-
veert, omme haer te laten welgevallen en te embrasseren, mitsgaders te arresteren het rapport van de Ed: Mo: 
heeren hare Gedep-s den 18 Augusti des voorleden jaers aen Uw:Ho:Mo: gedaen, bestaende daerinne, nament-
lijck: Dat sij heeren Uw:Ho:Mo: gedep:den, onder’t welnemen van Uw:Ho:Mo:, meynden, dat Uw:Ho:Mo: 
souden konnen verclaren, dat de tarctementen van den voorn- Resid:t en Consul, in derselver Resolutie van de 7 
Octob: 1675 breder vermelt, sullen ingaen a tempore mora, dat is van die tijt af, dat daer geen convoyen in 
Smirna sijn geweest, twelck is van de maent Juny 1672, ten minste sonder d’interesten van de onbetaelde Jaren, 
oftewel simpelijck dat d’Ambassaet en Consulaetrechten van het voorsz: eerste Convoy onder de Schout by 
Nacht de Ruyter, noch als voor desen voor den Resid:t en Consul sullen blijven, ende dat de voorsz: tractemen-
ten sullen ingaen met het vertreck van tselve convoy, waerover ick aen Uw:Ho:Mo: voor desen verscheyde 
brieven met alle onderdanigheyt hebbe geschreven, en tselve bij desen weder met deselve onderdanigheyt bidde en 
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supplicere, opdat ick, nae soo veel bittere en vuyle calummen, traductien, en wederwaerdicheden te onrechte te 
hebben moeten verdragen en uytstaen, van diegene, die het niet ten besten met mij schijnen te willen, en voor te 
hebben, door Uw:Ho:Mo: clementie en benevolentie eenmael moge worden geconsoleert, en op die bijtende wonde 
soodanichen versachpleyster geleyt, en die verquickinge moge genieten als Uw:Ho:Mo: nae ondersoeck en 
waerheyt van saecken, sullen bevinden in billickheyt en equiteyt te bestaen, die ick vastelijck vertrouwe, en oock 
bidde, dat Godt de heer deselve sal en wil inspireren, alsmede dat den tijdt meer en meer sal doen sien, dat alle 
‘t gene succesivelijck ten mijnen laste of beswarenisse is geleyt, of bijgebracht, of ‘t enemael onwaer en ongefon-
deert is, of verkeerdelijck en oock wel malicieuselijck is geinterpreteert, dat oock ‘t selve nergens anders uyt is 
voortgecomen, als uyt passie en geinteresseerde animositeyt, alsoo ick in desen can seggen, recht mij heere nae 
mijne gerechticheyt, ende nae mijne oprechticheyt, die bij mij is, twelck den kenner aller herten bekent is, 
dewelcken daer over tot getuyge aenroept, en oock dagelijcx voor Uw:Ho:Mo: hooghwijse Regeringe en personen 
bidt. 
 
Hoogh Mogende Heeren, Mijn Heeren,   Uw:Ho:Mo: gehoorsaemsten 
Smirna den 20 April     en onderdanigsten Dienaer 
1677      J. van Dam 
1677 
  
PS Specialijk als men met waerheyt daerbij sal voegen (daervan ick hier goede exempelen hebbe, dat de Joden 
hier te lande en special. de principaelste, ende die aen de poorten van de Turksche hoven dienen in alle gelegen-
heden onse natie dagelijx daer sij maer connen met valsche schriftuyren, hogietten ende getuygen soeken te 
strapazzeren, te verkotten ende havanien aen te doen ende dat de voornaemste selfs die onder onse protectie sijn) 
daeraen de hant helpen houden, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, ende special. dat 
ministers (als wij sijn) afgesonden van een staet, die het ware Christengeloof openbaer doet lesen sullen onder-
werpen sijn met effect de calumnien van diegene, die met alle abominatien van Godt verstoten sijn, ende dat men 
aen hare onwaerachtige klachten soo veel sal defereren, dat daerdoor een minister aen de vuyle opsprake van 
soodanige ongelovige caluminateurs wort overgegeven, seker als den staet van dese sake nae behoren sal wesen 
onderricht, die resolutie sal wel worden verandert. 
 
DOCUMENT 10: DUTIES AND EXPENSES FROM THE DE RUYTER-CONVOY OF 1675 
(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Justinus Colyer to States General, 7 October 
1677) 
 
dat: 7. October 
 1677. 
rec: 26. Novemb 
 
Hooch Mogende heeren, Mijne heeren 
 
… 
 
Copie   26 9ber1677 
Reeckeninge van de Gelden die bij Den Resident Colyer (Zedert het 
arrivement van het Convoy onder den heer Schout bij Nacht Engel de 
Ruyter in Smirna) op de heeren Consul ende Coopluyden vande Neder: 
lantsche natie aldaer, getrocken, ende van haer ontfangen sijn. 
 
1676   
den 8 Jan. Voor Een wisselbrief te betalen aen Abraham de Leon et Efraim 
Arditi 
LD 1000:– 
15 Maert Voor Een wisselbrief te betalen aende ss:ri Charelles et Vander Sande ,, 1020: – 
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3 April Voor Een wisselbrief te betalen aen s:r Abraham de Mons ,, 500: – 
4 May Voor Een wisselb: te betalen aen Nissim et Juda Amatos ,, 1600: – 
- detto Voor Een wisselb: te betalen aen Haim Peyno ,, 200: – 
- detto Voor Een wisselb: te betalen aen Belmonte ,, 150: – 
- detto Voor Een wisselb: te betalen aen Isac Attias ,, 50: – 
7 Juny Voor Een wisselb: te betalen aende ss:ri Groenincx et Broen ,, 320: – 
- detto Voor Een wisselb: te betalen aen ss:ri Charelles et Vande Sanden ,, 500: – 
- detto Voor Een wisselb: te betalen aen ss:ri Van Laer et Vande Poel ,, 589:40 
26 detto Voor Een wisselb: te betalen aen ss:ri Charelles et Vande Sanden ,, 590:60 
 Voor Een assegnatie te betalen aende s:r Schregels ,, 2500: – 
1 Septeb Voor Eene wisselb: te betalen aen Nissim et Juda Amatos ,, 500: – 
 P:r Aggio bij den heer Consul betaelt op Leoni 2000:- ,, 5:50 
 P:r Contanten bij den heer Consul
getelt, ende 
aen Een onser Janitzaren een Post ,, 11: – 
 Noch Daer nae aen Een post bij den heer Consul verschoten ,, 6: – 
 Voor Eene Rimesse bij sig:r Calcoen gedaen ,, 71:63 
22 X-ber Voor Eene assegnatie op de ss:ri Capoen et Houset ,, 151:42 
6 Maert 
1677 
Door ordre vande ss:r Cosson alhier ontfangen ,, 451: 40 
  Salvo Errore LD 9719:59 
 
Pera di Constant:pli  Justinus Colyer 
den 28 May 1677  1677 
 
Copie 
De heeren Directeuren vanden Levantschen handel Ende navigatie 
Inde Middellantsche Zee, ende voor haer Ed:e der selver Thesaurier 
Jacobus vander Merct in Smirne 
 
Debit Credit
Voor 18 Maenden ofte drie halve Jaren 
tractament beginnende met den 21 
augusti 1675, als wanneer het Convoy 
onder den heer Schout bij Nacht Engel 
de Ruyter in Smirna is gecomen, tot den 
21 february 1677. Volgens den Inhou-
den van haer hooch mog: Resolutien in 
dato den 24 Juny ende 7 octob: 1675. 
Mitsgaders 4 feb: 1677 tegens Realen 
van achten 2500: voor yder half Jaer Rs: 7500:–
Voor so veel volgens de nevens 
gaende reeckeninge bij ons op de 
heeren Consul ende Coopluyden 
vande Nederlantsche Natie in 
Smirne, zedert het arrivement van 
het convoy onder den heer Schout 
bij Nacht Engel de Ruyter, 
aldaer, getrocken, ende bij haer 
betaelt is 
Compt Per slot deses 
LD 9719:19 
,, 3828:19 
Noch voor Guldens 8000 bij hare ho:mo: 
ons toegeleyt in gevolge van der selver 
Resolutie in date den 4 feb: voorsz: 
maecken ,, 3200:–
Salve Errore
F 13547:38 
Reali 10700:–   
Voor aggio vande voorsz: 10700: tegens 
7 1/2 p:r cento omme de selve In Leoni 
te Reduceren ,, 802:50
 
 
 LD 11502:50   
Voor een reeckeninge van Presenten hier 
nevens gaende ,, 2044:58
 
 
 LD 13547:38   
 
Pera di Constant:pli 
den 28 May 1677 
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Justinus Colyer 
      1677 
 
Reeckeninge Van Verschot Bij den Reisdent Colyer zedert d’aemcompste van het convoy onder den heer Schout 
bij Nacht Engel de Ruyter in Smirna, gedaen, over ordinaris Ende Extraordinaris presenten, beginnende den 
19 Decemb: 1678 Ende Eyndiegende den 27 Septemb: 1676, opgestelt den 28 May 1677, ende aen den 
Thesaurier ende Sijne assessores den 31 dito P:r Smirna toegesonden 
 
1675    
19 xber  Voor Bairamlyck aen Ibrahim Pascia Caymacam van Constan-
tinopolen  
 3 Vesten hollants laecken piecken 15 @ LD 3 de pieck LD 45:–  
 3 Vesten satijn piecken 30 a Leoni 1 5/8 de pieck LD 48:75  
  Aen sijn Kiahaia  
 1 Vest hollants laecken piecken 5 @ LD 3 LD 15:–  
 1 Vest satijn piecken is a LD 1 5/8 de p:e ,, 16:25 ,, 31:25 
  Aen den Rais Effendi van Constant:pln  
 2 Vesten als boven ,, 31:25 
  Aen den Ciaus bassi  
 2 Vesten als boven ,, 31:25 
  Aen den Grooten Teskeregi  
 2 Vesten als boven ,, 31:25 
  Aen den Cleyne Teskeregi  
 1 Vest hollants laecken ,, 15:– 
  Aen den Capigiler Kiaiasi  
 1 Vest hollants laecken ,, 15:– 
  Aen den Salam Ciaus  
 Een brouck van 2 piecken holl: laken ,, 6:– 
  Aen den Kiahaia van Ciaus bassi  
 Een brouck als boven ,, 6:– 
  Aen den Buluckbassi  
 Een brouck als boven ,, 6:– 
  Aen den Beilickzi  
 Een Brouck p:r Gratia ,, 6:– 
  Per spese minute aende Dienaers vant hof, Janitzars vande 
Respective heeren Representanten, als andere Turcken ,, 32:25 305:– 
detto  Aen Osman Aga Bostangi bassi op sijn versouck p:r Bairamlyck  
 1 Vest hollants laecken  
 1 Vest satijn LD 31:25 
  Aenden Kiusckbexzi volgens usanse  
 1 Vest laecken ,, 15:– ,, 46:25 
detto  Aen den Rais Effendi ofte Groote Cancellier vant Rijck, in 
Adrianopolen wesende, Voor sjin Bairamlyck, Volgens usanse  
 2 Vesten als boven LD 31:25 
  Aende Schrijver van Commandam:ten  
 1 Vest hollants Laecken ,, 15:– ,, 46:25 
  Aende Turcxe Meester ende Schrijver vant hof p:r Bairamlyck  
 1 Vest Engels Laecken ,, 10:– 
   LD 407:50 
27 xber  Voor Presenten aenden Nieuwen Cayemacam van Constantino-
polen genaemt alman Pascia gewesen Bostangi bassi, ende voor-
namen vrient van onse Natie:  
 3 Vesten hollants Laecken @ LD 3 1/2 de Pieck LD 52:50 
 2 Vesten Gout Laecken a LD 3 de pieck ,, 60:– 
 3 Vesten Satijn ,, 48:75 
  Aen sijn kiahaia  
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 1 Vest hollants Laecken LD 17:50  
 1 Vest Satijn ,, 16:25 ,, 33:75 
  Aen den Rais Effende van Constant:pln  
 2 Vesten als boven ,, 33:75 
  Aenden Ciaus bassi  
 2 Vesten als boven ,, 33:75 
  Aenden Grooten Teskeregi  
 2 Vesten als boven ,, 33:75 
  Aenden Cleyne Teskeregi  
 1 Vest hollants Laecken ,, 17:25 
  Aenden Capigiler kiahaia  
 1 Vest hollants Laecken ,, 17:25 
  Aenden Caftaengi  
 1 Vest Laecken als boven ,, 17:25 
  Aenden kiaia van Ciaus bassi  
 1 Brouck van 2 piecken hollants Laken ,, 7:– 
  Aenden Buluckbassi  
 Een brouck als boven ,, 7:– 
  Aenden Salam Ciaus  
 Een brouck als boven ,, 7:– 
 Per Spese Minute aen sijn Volck ende barck gelt ,, 24:50 ,, 393:50 
  Aende Chiausen ende hassakies gegeven, die dagelijcx vande 
Poort, aen ons hof werden gesonden ,, 25:60 
28 d:to  Per Presenten Gegeven aenden Nieuwen Bostangi bassi Veli 
Aga, die Inde Plaets van alman Pascia gecomen is  
 3 Vesten hollants Laecken LD 52:50  
 3 Vesten Satijn LD 48:75  
  Aenden kioskbeczi  
 1 Vest hollants Laecken ,, 17:50 
 Per Spese Minute aende Dienaers Ende barcqgelt ,, 16:25 ,, 135:– 
1676    
1 January Per buona mane op Nieuw Jaersdach aende Janitzars vande Respecti-
ve h:en Representanten, waivoda ende wachters van Pera, mitsgaders 
Portiers ende and:ere turcken volgens usanse ,, 19:75 
27 d:to  Voor Een Present aenden tweeden Dragoman Jan battista op 
sijn bruyloft Volgens usanse  
 2 Vesten hollants Laecken LD 35:–  
 2 Vesten Satijn ,, 32:50 ,, 67:50 
26 feb: Per minute Speses aende turcxe onder officieren vande Poort, ende 
Janitzaren etc: gegeven op den Cleynen Bairam Volgens usanse ,, 32:– 
7 Maert  Aenden nieuwen Waivoda van Galata volgens usanse  
 1 Vest hollants Laken a LD 3 1/4 de p:e LD 16:25  
 1 Vest Satijn ,, 16:25  
  Aen sijn kiahaia  
 Een brouck van 2 piecken holl: Laken ,, 6:50  
  Aen sijn dienaers ,, 2:10 ,, 41:10 
   1121:95 
15 april Per buona mane aende turcken als vooren op onsen Paeschdach 
Volgens usanse gegeven ,, 20:25 
10 d:to Aen Een aga vanden Caymacam, ende Vrient vande natie, Een 
brouck Laecken ,, 6:66 
- d:to Aenden kiahaia vanden Ciaus bassi als boven ,, 6:66 
14 d:to  Aenden Bostangibassi op sijn Versouck vereert  
 2 Vesten van Laken ende Satijn ,, 32:50 
19 d:to  Voor Een Present aenden Eersten Dragoman Theijls op sijn 
bruiloft gegeven  
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 1 Vest Gout Laecken LD 40:–  
 2 Vesten hollants Laecken ,, 35:–  
 1 Vest Satijn ,, 16:25 ,, 91:25 
22 Maert  Voor Presenten Gegeven aenden Nieuwen Capiteyn Pascia, Cyd 
Oglu, die gecomen is Inde Plaets vanden overleden kiusse ali 
Pascia  
 2 Vesten hollants Laecken LD 33:32  
 2 Vesten Gout Laecken ,, 80:–  
 2 Vesten Satijn ,, 32:50  
  Aen sijn kiahaia  
 1 Vest Laecken  
 1 Vest Satijn ,, 32:50  
  Aen den Tershanna kiaiasi  
 2 Vesten als boven ,, 32:50  
  Aen den Capigiler kiaiasi  
 1 Vest Laecken ,, 16:25  
 Per minute Spese aen sijn volck ende barcq gelt ,, 24:25 ,, 251:32 
1 Juny  Op d’aen Compste van het hof buyten Constantinopolen in 
Dawat Pascia aen den kiaia vanden Vesier  
 2 Vesten van Laken ende Satijn ,, 32:50 
 Voor Een Groote Verrekijcker door den Grooten heer gedaen 
vorderen van yder Representant ,, 10:– 
8 d:to  Aenden Segel bewaerder vanden p:mo Vesier  
 1 Vest laecken op sijn versouck ,, 16:25 
 Voor 8 andere verrekijckers aende Ministers gegeven ,, 20:80 
25 d:to Voor Confitueren ende verscheydene Curieusiteyten aenden Grooten 
favoryt, ende schoonsoon van den G: heer gesonden ,, 53:80 
8 july Aenden Bostangibassi op sijn Versouck in verruw Vereert; gelijck 
d’andere Representanten mede gedaen hebben ,, 49:30 
3 Augusti op het Versouck vanden Cayemacam Osman Pascia, aen sijne 
Excellentie, voor sijne nieuwe fabrica in verruw Vereert, gelijck 
d’andere Representanten mede gedaen hebben ,, 33:50 
10 d:to  Inde Visite aenden kiahaia vanden Vesier Gegeven  
 2 Vesten hollants Laecken LD 32:50  
 2 Vesten Satijn ,, 32:50  
 p:r spese minute aen sijn volck ende barcq gelt ,, 15:40 ,, 80:40 
16 7ber Voor spese ende oncosten gedaen met Goet Vinden vande Natei 
alhier, wegens seecker Rumoer In Galata gepasseert, mitsgaders het 
afsetten van den kiaia ofte Luytenant Gouverneur van Galata volgens 
Reeckeningh ,, 170:70 
27 d:to Voor diverse minute speses als anders aen Ciausen ende Agaas die 
dagelijcx vande Poort aen ons hof werden gesonden, tot nu toe ,, 47:40 
   LD 2044:88 
       
        
 Justinus Colyer 
        
 1677 
 
DOCUMENT 11: DISPUTED ‘GENERAL’ EXPENSES BY JACOB VAN DAM 
(The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, October 
1677) 
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Copye     Speses door den Heer Consul van Dam ge- 
     daan, die niet behoorden het gemeijn ten 
     laste gebragt te worden. 
 
1677: 12 October voor een hogietto van de zijde LD 100:– 
1676: p:mo febr: voord dry vesten die niet konnen voor’t geneyn gebragt werden, alsoo 
deselve maar draegluyden van den heer consul sijn ,, 37:50 
 10 may voor een vest aan den cady als rakende den heer consul in’t particulier ,, 13:75 
 16 ditto voor een vest als den naip trouwde ,, 13:75 
 21 ditto voor de schaal ,, 70:– 
 12 ditto voor een prsent aan Dervis Aga meede niet voor’t gemeen ,, 18:– 
 17 ditto voor presenten aan de soons van Mostaffa Bassa ,, 12:– 
 2 9ber voor speses gedaan voor een levent die doot gevonden is, omtrent de deur 
van den consul, ‘t welck men seekerlijk seght door de dienaars van den 
heer consul gedaan te sijn ,, 270:– 
1677: p:mo Janua:ri voor dry vesten aan de draagluyden die maar sijn om den heer consuls 
statie te helpen vergrooten ,, 37:50 
 12 Juny voor een vest aan den weywoda over’t besnijden van sijn soon ,, 13:50 
  voor presenten den 22 April 1668, met co-icatie en goetvinden, van de 
natie gegeven aan den techtiche of examinateur baschie, ‘t welk de selve 
natie moet betalen, aghtervolgens de  acte daar van gegeven bij den heer 
resident Colyer den 3 may 1668 volgens reekeningh ,, 384:– 
  Voor presenten, als boven gegeven volgens reekeningh ,, 384:– 
  Het tractement van den cancellier, dewijl den heer consul haar E. 
formulier niet heeft connen aproberen, en soo trekt daar alleene uyt ‘t 
geene tot sijn E. voordeel strekt, dat niet behoorden goetgevonden te 
worden ,, 430:– 
  Voor Agio van Leeuwendaalders 9600: a 1/2 p.c.to soo te 
veel -telt ,, 48:– 
  LD 1832:– 
 
Mits den heer consul de reekeninge aan haar E. gesonden heeft, soo oordele onnodigh de copye te senden, bij 
aldien maght hadden of geauthoriseert waren om de reekeninge van den heer consul naar te sien soude veel beter 
geweest sijn, haar E. sullen uyt de reekeninge van de presenten wel konnen sien datter parten in sijn, die van 
selfs spreeken dat het niet tot het gemeen kan gebragt werden. 
 
Notitie van de posten die 
den Consul van Dam in 
reeck. brengt, en door den 
Thesaurier van de Marct 
wordem gedisputeert a. 1677 
Bo 1832- 
 
DOCUMENT 12: JUSTINUS COLYER ON THE EXECUTION OF THE HARAÇ ORDER 
(The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 18 January 
1678) 
 
Date 18 januarij 
Recept 11 maert 1678 
 
Hoogh Mogende Heeren, Mijne Heeren 
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De maxime van dese jegenwoordiege regeringe siet men dagelijcx meer ende meer tenderen tot extreme prejuditie 
van alle de christennatien; den heer Engelschen Ambassadeur heeft, niet tegenstaende de gepresenteerde ses 
duijsent Leeuwendaelders in den mijne vanden 9 passato gementioneert, sijne visite bij den Primo Vesier niet 
cunnen optineren, als noch daer en boven gevende de gewonelijcke ordinarisse presenten recht tegens het gemaeck-
te accoort aen. 
Omdat de Resident van Genova de beloofde acht duysent Leeuwendaelders op den tijt, volgens d’obligatie, niet 
heeft betaelt, so wert nu van hem geeijst Leeuwendaelders vijftien duijsent, ende een Genovees schip alhier 
volladen, ende op sijn vertreck sijnde, daer voor in arrest gehouden. 
 
Den Primo Vesier de heeren Ambassadeurs van Ragusa gedreycht hebbende (so sij de Poort over de genoten 
toll geen satisfactie en gaven) den adel aldaer te sullen extirperen, ende alle de ingestenen tot slaven te maecken; 
heeft eyndelijck verclaert, dat den Grooten heer voor alle pretentien contentement sal nemen, met drie hondert en 
vijftigh beursen, sijnde hondert, en vijf en t’seventich duysent Leeuwendaelders, te betalen tot Ragusa voorn: in 
dertigh daegen, ende bij faulte van dien, dat den Kayser weet wat hem te doen staet; men seydt voor vast, datter 
albereyts aen alle de Pasciaas van Bossina, ende de quartieren dicht aen Ragusa gelegen, ordres sijn uytgegaen, 
omme in cas de voorsz: gelden op haer tijt niet werden betaelt, de voorsz plaets terstont onder het gebiet van den 
Grooten heer te brengen. 
 
Den Primo Vesier heeft nu mede in het begin van dese maent alle de publycque christen ministers doen aenseg-
gen, dat yder vande selve, aen een Caddi, daer toe gecommitteert, op eene lijste soude doen overleveren de namen 
van hare coopluyden, die hier te lande getrouwt sijn, de namen ende het getall van hare drogeluyden, ende de 
namen ende het getall van hare dienaren de welcke van dit lant sijn, mitsgaders dat alle de consuls ende dro-
geluyden het geheele rijck door binnen den tijt van drie maenden nieuwe Baratten van de Poort sullen hebben te 
versoucken op peijne van geconsidereert te sullen worden als particuliere personen, ende ten reguarde van de 
drogeluyden van dit Lant, dat die het Garaz, op het welcke alle ingeborenen vant rijck, geen Turcken sijnde, 
sijn getaxeert, sullen moeten betalen, strijdende recht tegens alle capitulatien aen; ende van alle welcke saecken 
geene andere reden te geven is, als dat het is de wille van die geene, de welcke de macht in handen heeft, om de 
selve saecken uyt te voeren; de welcke specialijck tenderen omme de christen coopluiyen, die hier huwelijcken 
hebben gecontracteert onder het voorsz Garaz te brengen, ende van de nieuwe Baratten een goede somme gelts te 
consequeren; uijt vreese van nieuwe havanien, so hebben alle de publicque ministers de voorsz lijste aen den 
voorn Caddi over doen leveren, ende aengenomen aen hare respective consuls, ende drogeluyden, buyten dese 
plaets residerende in conformité van de voorsz: aenseyginge hare ordres te sullen laten afgaen. 
 
… 
 
DOCUMENT 13: INVENTORY OF JAN VAN BREEN’S HOUSE AND FURNISHINGS 
(The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1060: Willem Theijls in Justinus Colyer’s Chancery, 
18 November 1681) 
 
Staet ende inventaris van de meubele, goederen, ende boucken van negotie, dewelcke bij mij 
onderget.de Gug.mo Theijls Cancell.r van den wel Ed.en Achtb. heere Justinus Colyer 
Ambassad.r van den Staat der Verenichde Nederlanden aen het Ottomanische hoff, uijt 
crachte van eene appostille van sijne Ex.tie in date den 17 deses, op heden sijnde den 18 
novemb. 1681 ten huijse van Jan van Breen, Nederlants coopman alhier, staende in het eijnde 
van Pera di Constantinopoli, vermits d’absentie van dito Van Breen, in het bijwesen van sijn 
huijsvrouw genaemt Elisabeth Violier, ter presentie van signori Gio. van Ris ende Gio. 
Croesen, insgelijcx coopluijden onser natie in dese plaetse, gemaeckt ende aengeteijckent is, als 
te weten; 
 
In de groote camer op de straet; 
14 ordinarij Turcxe kussens met wol gevult; 
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5 menderen met wol gevult, en met root Engels laecken overdeckt; 
1 groote tapijt op de soffa, van Salonica; 
2 spiegels; 
1 groote porcelainen schotel; 
1 tafel met 3 uijttreckladen; 
2 ordinarij turcxe pestachtaas; 
1 ijseren ladekant van Venetien, behangen met gestreept sijden stof, op dewelcke 
lagen twee bedden, een hooftpeul, en 2 ordinarij deeckens; 
2 glasen fenalen van Venetien; 
3 schilderijien, sijnde 2 portretties, ende het derde dien van nichtie Maria; 
1 cipressen kist met gesneden figuren, met goet van gem.te Juff.r Elisabet Violier; 
 
In de bedsteede van deselve camer; 
3 stromatten; 
2 hooftpeulen; 
4 overdeeckens; 
1 hooftkussen; 
 
In een dolap ofte cas beneffens de voorsz. bedsteede; 
1 silveren schenkbord; 
1 silveren serbetcom; 
2 kokers met 12 messen; 
3 silveren matten ofte heften; 
1 silveren lepel; 
1 silveren tafel vurchuen; 
 
In een andere dolap; 
40 witte aerde schotelties en tafelborden; 
1 Haerlems aerden commetien; 
1 detto canetien; 
1 porcelainen schoteldrielingh; 
 
In de zijdelcamer op de straet; 
10 roode fluwelen kussens met woll; 
4 menderen met wol, ende met groen Hollants laken in 5 lappen overdeckt; 
1 gebroocken spiegeltien; 
1 portret ofte controfeijtsel van detto Van Breen, sijn huijsvrouw en 6 kinderen; 
1 detto controfeijtsel van d.o Van Breen int cleijn 
1 cabinettien van peerenhout met sijn voet; 
1 out Turcx coffer daerin was het naervolgende goet; 
1 gebloemde zijden deecken met sijn slaeplaken; 
2 roode fluwelen kussens sonder woll; 
13 linnen overtrecksels tot kussens met sijd gestickt; 
1 gestreept behangsel tot een bed; 
5 witte cottoenen ondervesten; 
3 oude vesten van root satijn, geel damast en groen dimit; 
1 regenrock; 
1 kierekie of spahijsrock van Holl.s laken caneelcoleur met sijd gevoert; 
2 hemden; 
2 linnen broucken; 
1 messineesche borsrock; 
1 feregie van camelot; 
1 oude lakense brouck; 
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2 paer oude cottoenen ondercousen en drie paer voetsocken; 
1 oude lakense rock muscuscoleur; 
1 witte borsrock; 
 
In de wintercamer; 
9 ordinarij cottoenen kussens met woll; 
4 menderen met woll, overdeckt met Salonicxe kietsees; 
2 spiegeltjes; 
8 porcelainen fingiannen; 
1 tandoer met 2 oude deeckens; 
1 oude houten kist daerin waren; 
14 slaeplaeckens; 
2 cleijne linnen overtreckselties van menderen; 
10 servetten vant lant en drie tafellakens; 
1 kist met kinderegoet; 
1 kissien, en een cleijn coffertien met goet van het dochtertien; 
1 vloertapijt; 
 
In de slavinnekamer; 
1 groot bed met sijn deeckens ende hooftkussens voor deselve; 
… kisten met het goet van de slavinnen; 
 
In het gewesen cantoir; 
… menderen, ende een hooftkussen met woll gevult sonder overtrecksels; 
1 oudt coffer, leegh; 
1 weeftou, met garen tot linnen daerop; 
 
In de camer op de tuijn; 
1 groote ijseren geltkist toegesloten, waervan de sleutel niet te vinden was; 
1 houten tandoer; 
1 lijst, van een grote spiegel; 
5 houten stoelen; 
2 carpetten; 
3 oude sepetten; 
1 grootbouck beginnende met mercantie in monte an.o 1665 @t junij, eijndiegende 
f.o 170 an.o 1670 @ 20 augusti; 
1 detto, begginende an.o 1670 @t 1 april Ab. de Leon, Ali Cohen, Ab. Rosales et 
Samuel Eskenagi, eijndiegende f.o 199 an.o 1675 @ 4 julij; 
4 copijboucken van brieven, beginnende an.o 1670, p.mo maert, eijndiegende an.o 
1674 @ 20 augusti; 
1 facteurbouckien, beginnende an.o 1665 p.mo maij, eijndiegende an.o 1675 adi 9 
novemb.; 
1 memoriael van alles, beginnende an.o 1669 @ 7 maij, eijndiegende @ 1670 @ 23 
maert; 
1 casbouck beginnende an.o 1665 @ - junij, eijndiegende an.o 1676 @ 15 n.ber; 
3 particuliere copijboucxkens van brieven beginnende an.o 1667 @ 7 feb. eijndiegen-
de an.o 1675 @ 7 octob.; 
2 notitieboucxkens van de jaren 1665 tot den jare 1675 @ 18 novemb. toe; 
1 boucxken van coopmanschappen tot Adrianp.len an.o 1674; 
2 musijckboucken; 
1 sepet vol oude brieven; 
1 bondel met schrifturen dienende tot het proces tegens Sologne, ofte Justo van 
Eijck; 
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1 quintern italiaensche cognoscementen; 
1 clavesimbal; 
3 vlasharken; 
2 matten; 
2 canowetties ijder met 9 flessies; 
1 coperen bedpan; 
1 zeekaert; 
verscheijde gedruckte boucxkens; 
 
Op de gelderij; 
1 Rustbed met oud root laken overtrocken; 
3 tafels; 
2 tafeltapijties; 
5 houten stoelen; 
2 Venetiaensche g;asekisten, daerin; 
1 tapijt van Salonica; 
1 vloertapijt; 
4 hooftkussens met veeren; 
eeniege oude canefassen tot menderen; 
1 cleet van engels laken voor een knecht; 
4 hooftpeulen met wol, oudt; 
2 kilimen; 
1 oude portier; 
4 schilderijen sonder lijsten, van vruchten; 
1 Venetiaensche scheepskist, met brieven en boucken; 
 
In een cas op de voorsz. gelderij; 
18 florentijnsche leege flessen; 
1 silveren soutvatien sonder voetien; 
7 Engelsche bottelties; 
1 tinnen mostertpot; 
1 seijn en ibruk van caser; 
1 een Venetiaensche kist met oude klederen van de vrouw en de kinderen; 
1 coperen lanteren; 
1 tafellaecken; 
2 servetten; 
 
In het comptoir; 
26 diversche gedruckte boucken met Franse banden; 
1 bijbeltien in quarto met silveren sloties; 
1 bouck in quarto Corn.o Tacitus; 
2 wandelstocken, met tinnen knoppen; 
1 canowettien met 4 flessies; 
2 laties met gewicht; 
2 oude houten lessenaers; 
1 groot ront Duijts slot; 
1 friscadoor; 
1 rotte val; 
1 handspiesien; 
1 signet van coper; 
1 stoel; 
1 brievepersien; 
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In het tuijnhuijsien; 
3 stoelen en een tafeltien; 
 
In de keucken; 
6 coperen ketels, en 2 ijseren pannen; 
8 tinnen schotels, en 34 tafelborden; 
5 coperen schotelties; 
1 tinnen com, met een gate ofte vergietschotel; 
1 oude kiste met clederen van de kockinne; 
4 coperen candelaers; 
2 braedijsers; 
1 rooster en tangh; 
1 cinijceijn van coper; 
4 aerden schotels; 
1 houten moud, en 1 stenen mortier; 
 
Aldus geinventariseert in het bijwesen, ende ter presentie als boven; 
bij mij Gug.mo Theijls Cancell.r 
 
Den 21 maij 1682 is dese voorstaende inventaris geaugmenteert met 2 tafellakens ende 24 
servetten Hollants linnen, dewelcke den 21 octob. 1681 door de s.ri Roots et Van de Cruijs 
uijt Marseille, herwaerts, aen Gio. van Breen sijn gesonden; Ende vermits sig. Jean Croesen, 
Nederlants coopman alhier, voor de goederen in de voorsz. inventaris gespecificeert borgh 
gebleven is, ten eijnde deselve niet souden werden vervreemt, so sijn de voorsz. tafellakens 
ende servetten onder hem gelaten; 
Qoud attestor; 
Gug.mo Theijls Cancell.r 
 
DOCUMENT 14: LIST OF ORDERS REGARDING THE DUTCH NATION, 1690-1709 
(The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088) 
 
1690: 
- dat de Hollanders vrij van Haratz sijn 
- dat de Tollenaer geen Toll kan eijschen van de Ambassadeurs, Consuls en Draaglieden, 
etc. 
- dat alle de Privilegies aen de Fransen, Engelsen etc. toegestaan ook aen de Hollanders 
toe komt 
 
1692: 
- dat van de Holl. laekens niet meer als LD 125,- per stuk Toll mag gevraagd werden soo 
als de Franse en Engelsen 
- dat de Zeijlscheepen die in Const. haer Tol eens betaeld hebben en met Teskerée ver-
trekkende aen de Dardanelle niet moogen gevisiteert worden 
- tot permissie der opbouw vant consulaire huijs tot Smirna 
- tot het huijs der heeren van Laar &c. 
- dat de Draaglieden en hare kinderen en knegts geen haraz hoeven te betaelen 
- dat de goederen welke in de aerdbeving op scheepen gelaeden zijn en reets te vooren 
Toll hadden betaeld, verder geene te betaelen hebben 
- dat Hollandse Scheepen hier eens haer regt betaelt hebben en Teskerée genome, niet 
kunnne verhindert worden elders te gaan en een ander regt gepretendeert worden 
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- dat de Hollanders goederen van Const., Alep, Aleppo en elders konnen laeten koomen 
en dat de Tollenaer die niet booven haer waerde Estimeeren mag 
 
1693: 
- dat de Franken de Wagters van den Tol niet konnen wijgeren &c. 
- dat de Hollanders niet konnen g’incommod.t worden, met valsche pretentie contrarij de 
Capiyulatie &c. 
- dat de Venezianen de Hollanders niet konnen verbieden goederen koomen te laeten, 
welk na venetiaense Contrabande gelijken 
 
1694: 
- dat geen dubb. Toll sal mogen gevordert nog bet. Worden 
- dat den Tollenaer de goederen niet booven haare Tariffa mag estimeeren 
- dat de Portugeese Jooden nadat een Jaer zijn hier geweest, regt en tol moeten betaelen, 
als onderdaans vant land 
- dat alle de priviliegies der Fransen ook de Hollanders moogen gelden 
- dat de Sloepen van oorlogscheepen niet geforzeert mogen werden aen den Toll te gaan 
- dat de Tavernes bij de Hollandse huijsen sullen geslooten werden 
- dat de Hollandse scheepen haere provisie sonder obstacelen mogen maeken 
- dat de Differenzies meer als 4000,- aspers, in Const. moeten aftgedaan worden 
 
1700: 
… 
 
1701: 
… 
- dat 5 knegts van den Consul vrij sijn van de Charatz 
… 
 
1705: 
… 
- dat de Draaglieden, haere kinderen en bedienden vrij sijn van de haraz en andere belas-
tingen 
… 
- dat de Consuls in Scio en Ciprus I.la geen Raijaas moogen zijn 
… 
 
1709: 
… 
- dat de Hollanders van Haraz vrij zijn 
…  
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Appendix 3: The Dutch Nation Divided (1668-1677) 
 
 
 
TABLE 19: DUTCH RAGGIONS (TRADING HOUSES) IN IZMIR, 1668 
 large medium-large medium-small small
1 Blydenberg &c. 
2 Delespaul & Eijghels
3 Van Goor 
4   Van Aelst
5   Charelles & Vroombrouck 
6   Gubert &c.
7   Laurens
8   Popta
9   De Hartog & De Weert
10   Van der Sande
11   Schreygels & Davids
12   Groenincks
13   Kloppenburch
14   Capoen
15   Meeuwels
16   Persyn & Rigo 
17   Heusch
Based on The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 73a. 
 
TABLE 20: THE RIFT IN THE DUTCH NATION OF IZMIR (1671) 
 Disobedient Obedient
1 Broen, Marco Pietersz Capoen, Christoffel
2 Delespaul, Anton Dam, Jacob van (consul)
3 Delespaul, Gaspar Mesteecker, Hendrik
4 Eijghels, Johan Persijn, Cornelis van
5 Goor, Cornelis Rogier van Rigo, Johan
6 Groeninks, Adriaan Rigo, Laurens (chancellor)
7 Hartigh, Frans de Schregel, François de
8 Legouche, Nicolo Schregel, Galenus de
9 Moll, Jacob de Slaghmulder, Daniël de
10 Popta, Yunes Sneeuwaert, Hubert
11 Sande, Philips van der  
12 Tol, Marinus van  
Based on The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913; and id., 1.03.01 124. 
 
TABLE 21: THE RIFT IN THE DUTCH NATION OF IZMIR (1675) 
 Disobedient Obedient
1 Broen, Marco Pietersz Calckoen, Johan
2 Charelles, Johan Capoen, Christoffel
3 Cosson, Abraham (assessor) Craijesteijn, Jacob
4 Delespaul, Gaspar Craijesteijn, Hendrik
5 Eijghels, Johan Dam, Jacob van Dam (consul)
6 Groeninks, Adriaan Glück, Benedict
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7 Lepla, Johan Heuvel, Frederik van den
8 Moll, Johan de Houset, Dionis
9 Popta, Yunus Laer, Cornelis van
10 Sande, Philips van der Merct, Jacobus van der (treasurer)
11  Mesteecker, Hendrik
12  Mozses, Abraham de
13  Persijn, Cornelis van
14  Poel, Pieter van de
15  Rigo, Laurens (chancellor)
16  Schregel, François de (assessor)
17  Schregel, Galenus de
18  Slaers, Willem
19  Slaghmulder, Daniël de (assessor)
20  Sneeuwaert, Hubert
Based on The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912; id., 1.03.01 124; and id., 1.02.22 684, 31a-34b. 
 
TABLE 22: THE RIFT IN THE DUTCH NATION OF IZMIR (1677 AND ONWARDS) 
 Disobedient Obedient
1 Bourgois, Jacob Broen, Johan van
2 Charelles, Johan (assessor) Calckoen, Johan
3 Cosson, Abraham Capoen, Cristoffel
4 Cosson, Daniël Dam, Jacob van (consul)
5 Delespaul, Gaspar Groeninks, Adriaan
6 Eijghels, Johan (assessor) Houset, Dionis
7 Gluck, Benedict Laer, Cornelis van
8 Kerckbrinck, Hendrik Mesteecker, Hendrik
9 Marcquis, Willem Mons, Abraham de
10 Merct, Jacobus van der (treasurer) Poel, Pieter van de
11 Pradelis, Willem van Rigo, Laurens (chancellor)
12 Sande, Philips van de Schregel, François de
13 Slaars, Willem Schregel, Galenus de
14  Slaghmulder, Daniël de (assessor)
15  Sneeuwaert, Hubrecht
 Factional Alliances and Loyalties
 Voyvoda of Izmir Kadi of Izmir
 French consul English consul
 DLH States-General
Based on The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912; id., 6913; id., 1.02.22 676; id., 684, 23b-25a. 
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Summary in Dutch  
 
 
 
Het onderliggende betoog behandelt de vroegmoderne geschiedenis, demo-
grafie en geografie van de West-Anatolische internationale havenstad Izmir. 
Het doet dat, ogenschijnlijk in navolging van vrijwel alle contemporaine en 
moderne bronnen en studies, door de stad te beschouwen als een dubbelstad 
bestaand uit twee delen; één Osmaans, en één Europees. Echter, hier is het 
nu eens niet de bedoeling deze verdeling te bevestigen, maar te laten zien 
hoe slecht deze in staat is de loop van de geschiedenis van de stad, de regio 
en het rijk waar het deel van uitmaakte, en van het fundamentele belang 
daarvan voor de wereldgeschiedenis, te verklaren. 
Er zijn hoegenaamd geen succesvolle uitzonderingen op de regel dat 
men deze geschiedenis begint vanuit het aloude, door ideologie en bronpro-
blemen ingegeven, discours van Osmaans-Europese tegenstelling en Euro-
pese economische penetratie van een Osmaans Rijk in structureel verval, om 
van daaruit de speurtocht naar de vroegst mogelijke stadia van Osmaanse 
periferalisatie aan te vangen. Aan de hand van nieuwe bronnen, van de herin-
terpretatie van bekende bronnen, en van een substantiële herevaluatie van de 
Osmaanse worsteling met de vroegmoderne tijd en de cruciale rol die de 
Köprülü-dynastie daarin speelde, verleggen wij de aandacht naar de geschie-
denis van interculturele uitwisseling in Izmir; de stad die vanaf eind 16de 
eeuw als hoofdgeleider van het proces van periferalisatie zou hebben gefun-
geerd – en dan met name naar de formele en informele sociale en fysieke 
‘tussenruimte’ die deze interactie in 17de-eeuws Izmir opleverde. 
Er blijkt dan geen sprake te zijn van een haast absolute scheiding en 
een sociaal en ruimtelijk niemandsland daartussen, maar vooral van strategi-
sche verhulling van de interculturele tussenruimte in de correspondenties uit 
Izmir (vanwege herhaald verlies van lokale archieven de belangrijkste bron-
nen). Deze politiek van dissimulatie was verre van eenvormig, maar slaagde 
er doorgaans in de handelingsruimte van alle lokale partijen te beschermen 
tegen de pogingen van Osmaanse en Europese centrale overheden om Iz-
mir’s interculturele ruimte te beheersen. Er was, met andere woorden, sprake 
van een lokale dynamiek die externe krachten zodanig insloot en vervormde 
dat zij vooral lokale partijen dienden. Izmir was daarmee dus niet het verder 
lege veld waarop Europeanen en Osmanen elkaar via lokale vertegenwoordi-
gers om hegemonie bevochten, maar een historisch ‘actor’ op zichzelf. 
Deze studie wil daarmee een uitdaging zijn aan het adres van de teleologische 
(veelal Eurocentrische en soms triomfalistische) geschiedschrijving van stad, 
rijk en wereldsystemen, en een aanzet geven tot een historiografie waarin de 
Osmaanse beschaving niet toeschouwer of dwarsligger is, maar een actief en 
eigenmachtig deelnemer. 
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